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Do Patent Systems Improve Economic Well-Being? 
An Exploration of the Inventiveness of Business Method Patents 
Abstract 
 
The reach of the patent system has substantially broadened in recent decades. Subject 
matter extensions (to life forms, software and business methods) were not introduced by 
parliaments, but by individual judges considering specific cases, often between private 
parties. The focus in this thesis is whether these changes create a net economic benefit 
to society. Because of the lack of data on patents, it is not possible to address this 
question directly. The thesis therefore focuses on a critical aspect of patents: their 
inventiveness. 
Patents were designed to increase the quantum of inventions used industrially in a 
society, thereby increasing employment, income and wealth. To provide an incentive to 
the inventor, a limited term monopoly was granted. Society therefore benefits if the 
induced inventions generate benefits greater than the monopoly costs. This depends 
critically on the inventiveness threshold for patentability.  
The main contribution of this thesis is a detailed empirical assessment of the 
inventiveness of patents. This assessment breaks new ground by using the actual claims 
in the patent specification as the basis for a qualitative assessment against the yardstick 
of whether there is any new contribution to knowledge. This yardstick is used because a 
key social benefit from private invention is the spillovers from new knowledge. In 
addition a low inventive threshold encourages monopoly grants for inventions that 
would have occurred absent patents, and thus increases social costs without any 
offsetting benefits. 
A small universe of 72 recently granted Australian business method patents is assessed 
on this basis. Of these, one possibly contributes new knowledge, and three others 
possibly contribute new ideas, but without any associated new knowledge. It is hard to 
find any contribution in the rest of the dataset. The data suggest that the large majority 
of currently granted patents produce no benefit to society, and do not meet the normal 
definition of the concept of “invention”. 
The detailed analysis shows the underlying problems to include identifying previous 
knowledge, an issue already suggested by the literature, but more extensively 
documented here. The legal judgement rules developed through case law are shown to 
be very poor yardsticks for implementation of an important economic policy. The 
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narrow legal doctrines result in, for example, the computerisation of well-known 
methods being judged both novel and inventive. They also allow obvious combinations 
of old ideas, and trivial variations on old ideas to be granted patent monopolies. Despite 
the analogous use doctrine, patents are granted for the application of known methods to 
new areas for which they are well suited.  
A number of proposals are put forward for reform of patent policy. The underlying 
theme is that there should be a good chance, and clear evidence, that the patent system 
enhances national economic well-being. Specific proposals include writing the objective 
of patent policy into the statute so that judges have clear guidance in their decision-
making, limiting the grant of patents to science and technology based inventions, 
requiring the patent applicant to demonstrate novelty and inventiveness beyond 
reasonable doubt, setting the inventiveness standard in the context of a balance between 
benefits and costs, and introducing a defence of independent invention.  
As the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
mandates no discrimination under patent law between fields of technology, the results 
of this investigation may be generalisable to other technology fields. They may also be 
generalisable to the inventiveness standards in other jurisdictions: of the 72 Australian 
patents, 32 have already received at least one overseas grant (18 if New Zealand is 
excluded).  
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1 
Introduction 
“In summary, [the intellectual property rights] system in general, and the patent system in 
particular, has been neither necessary nor sufficient for technical and/or economic progress at 
country and company level historically.”  
(Granstrand 1999: 44) 
1.1 Public scrutiny of patent laws 
The essence of patent policy is a very simple bargain. Society accepts the harmful effects of 
patent monopolies in exchange for a higher level of invention, and thus a higher level of 
economic growth. Because of a lack of suitable data, it has not yet been possible to test 
whether patent systems are in fact welfare enhancing.  
This study was initially motivated by the inequity of disallowing today's lower income 
countries access to the imitation and copying strategies used to such great effect by richer 
countries in their own path to economic growth. However two other issues quickly became 
apparent. Firstly, it became evident that patent policy was based on a great deal of opinion 
and very little evidence.1 Secondly, it became evident that there had been major changes in 
the social bargain balancing the benefits and costs of patents, even in more industrialised 
countries with highly developed technology. A large volume of informed commentary 
suggests that the balance in the patent system has shifted quite substantially.2 The recent 
US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) report on innovation noted that ‘[a] plethora of 
presumptions and procedures tip the scales in favor of the ultimate issuance of a patent, 
once an application has been filed’ (US FTC 2003: 8).  
The issue thus arose as to whether even in higher income countries the current patent 
system provides a net economic benefit. 
 
1  This concern was also a major motivation for a recent investigation into net private returns to publicly 
listed US firms (Bessen and Meurer 2008). Macdonald suggests that the major presumption of patent policy—
that patents are essential for innovation—is a myth (Macdonald 2004).  
2  One concern is the substantial extension in patentable subject matter, including the removal of any 
science or technology requirement for a patentable invention. The extension to software and business methods 
is discussion in Section 3.2 below. Another major concern is that the threshold standard of inventiveness has 
sunk to an extremely low level. This issue is investigated in Section 3.4 below. Concerns that the very 
definition of ‘invention’ has been changed to include biotechnology products and processes that have no 
element of inventiveness are beyond the scope of this thesis, but are discussed in Palombi 2004.  
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It is generally taken for granted that patents are needed if a country is to have a high level 
of invention.3 This conventional view has not been widely interrogated, despite the series 
of empirical studies whose results call it into question.4 Mazzoleni and Nelson consider the 
very strong endorsement of this conventional wisdom, not just among economists, but 
among public officials and in the community, puzzling in view of the range of empirical 
research on the effectiveness of the patent system (Mazzoleni and Nelson 1998a: 273-274). 
Scherer asked, about a decade later, why patent policy had been strengthened despite the 
evidence that patents play only a minor role in business decisions on R&D expenditure. He 
concluded that it was ‘far from clear that the positive effects outweigh the negatives’ 
(Scherer 2006: 41). 
This lack of scrutiny contrasts with other areas of regulatory intervention in the operations 
of markets. Since the 1980s the 'anglo' world in particular has been swept by a paradigm 
that regulatory intervention reduces the benefits provided by the disciplines of free market 
operations. In countries such as the USA, Canada, the UK, New Zealand and Australia 
there have been major reviews of whole areas of regulatory intervention in markets. In such 
reviews the onus has been on the proponents of regulation to demonstrate that the 
intervention was welfare enhancing—that is, that markets were in some way failing and 
delivering outcomes that were not allocatively efficient.  
But not in regard to the patent system. 
For some reason patent systems have managed to escape the serious attention of de-
regulators (Arup 1998). Even where they were subject to review, the reviews tended to be 
cursory. Certainly none took a view that any evidence was needed to justify the patent 
intervention.5 A conventional static theoretical neo-classical economics perspective has 
been repeatedly used to support the need for a patent system. Based on this it has been 
generally accepted that this market intervention improves economic well-being. No 
 
3  This underlying assumption is clear in several recent reviews: IPCRC 2000, US FTC 2003; US 
National Academy of Sciences 2004, as well as in academic articles (e.g. Gans et al. 2004).  
4  These studies are discussed in Section 2.4 below.  
5  The most recent Australian review mentioned three studies which demonstrate that patents are not 
generally needed to encourage innovation. But it took the view that an ‘effective system to define and enforce 
intellectual property rights is critical for … dynamic competition to occur on a material scale’ (IPCRC 2000: 
5). No supporting evidence was presented. It did not address the issue of the extent to which the patent system 
induced innovations which would not otherwise have occurred. Many issues critical to the monopoly/ 
competition trade-off, such as the height of the inventive step, were not discussed (Lawson 2008).  
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evidence has been demanded. Landes and Posner ask why the patent system was 
strengthened precisely at the time other markets were being extensively deregulated. They 
find an answer in public choice theory—small number of entities reap significant benefits 
from stronger patents, and have been successful in their lobbying efforts (Landes and 
Posner 2004).  
1.2 What this study aims to contribute 
The initial intention was to undertake a cost-benefit analysis of patent systems. However 
the lack of systematic data on the proportion of patented inventions induced by the patent 
system, and the proportion of patented inventions actually used, meant this simply was not 
possible. Little more could have been achieved than the conclusion from the supporting 
research for the 1984 review of the Australian patent system that ‘the benefit/cost ratio of 
the patent system in Australia is negative, or at the very best, in balance’ (Mandeville et al. 
1982: 213).  
Attention was then turned to the continuing expansion in the coverage of patent systems, 
with a particular focus on the patentability of software and business methods. It became 
apparent that these extensions were being made by judges, not as a result of considered 
policy deliberation. The change in the interpretation of patent law so that patents could be 
granted for software actually occurred after governments in both the USA and Australia 
had accepted review recommendations that patents not be provided for software. This 
norm—that the extension of patents to new fields without any evaluation or economic 
justification—seems to be seen by ‘the patent community’ as a strength. 
"Previous decisions on the patentability of other controversial areas, such as software, 
genes, bioinformatics and the treatment of humans, have not been based on 
assessments of whether patent protection is necessary in order to encourage 
innovation in those particular fields. To require such assessments for all inventions 
which are not in a field of technology … This appears to be undesirable …" 
(ACIP 2003: 33 emphasis added) 
Australia uses the term ‘manner of new manufacture’ from the 1623 Statute of Monopolies 
as the definition of a patentable invention. The patent community has successfully argued 
(to both the 1984 patent review and the 2000 intellectual property and competition review) 
that the ‘flexibility’ this gives to judges is a major strength and should be retained (IPAC 
1984; IPCRC 2000). 
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The literature on the extension of the patent system to business methods—outside any field 
of science or technology—provides an opportunity for the non-scientist to look in detail at 
how the patent system actually works. The subject matter of the thesis was narrowed down 
to an investigation of the extension of patentability to business methods. 
Surprisingly, this soon led to a broadening in focus. The business method patents literature 
strongly suggests there are real problems with the test for inventiveness as it currently 
operates in patent law. Surveying US literature on business method patents, Hall concluded: 
"... there is a remarkable amount of agreement, if not a consensus, that the average 
quality of patents being issued during the past decade or so is too low, especially in 
the software and business method areas." 
(Hall 2003: 15) 
Inventiveness lies at the heart of a patent system. It is central to patent policy, both in terms 
of the goal of inducing more innovation and the consequences of such innovation for 
economic growth. Only if a patented invention is truly inventive can it generate a social 
benefit. So allegations of problems with the inventiveness test are very serious. There is 
substantial evidence that the degree of inventiveness required for a patent is extremely low. 
These suggestions derive from the legal and economic literature, not just from newspaper 
and web reports about patents such as a method for swinging a swing sideways (Gruen 
2004) or IBM’s method for reserving use of a toilet on an airplane (Kahin 2003c: 215).  
There is a large literature discussing the very low quality of patents, particularly in the 
USA. Some submissions to the Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee 
(IPCRC) argued that the inventiveness standard for Australian patents is also very low. 
This study places empirical evidence about the inventiveness of patents on the table.  
While data on the inventiveness of patents do not answer the question of the net social 
outcome of a patent system, they advance the evidence basis for the debate. If most granted 
patents are inventive, then at least some social benefits can be anticipated from the system. 
But if many granted patents are only marginally inventive, then any presumed benefits from 
the patent system will be much less, and may not offset the costs that patent systems 
impose. In such circumstances the patent system may be welfare-reducing rather than 
welfare-enhancing. If patented inventions are modestly inventive, further evidence may be 
needed before drawing conclusions about the welfare impact of a patent system. 
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Investigation of the inventiveness of patents thus provides critical information for the 
design of a balanced and welfare-enhancing patent policy. In its report on innovation the 
FTC emphasised the role of competition in fostering innovation, and the consequent need 
for careful balance in the patent system. “Poor patent quality … that inadvertently may 
have anticompetitive effects can cause unwarranted market power… Such effects can 
hamper competition that otherwise would stimulate innovation. (US FTC 2003: 5). 
1.3 How this study is structured 
The thesis is structured conventionally. Chapter 2 looks at relevant theories, compares them 
against the evidence, and draws conclusions about the most suitable theoretical framework 
for patent policy. Attention is then turned in Chapter 3 to the expansion in the coverage of 
the patent system to new fields, focusing on the extension to business methods. This 
involves a review of case law, but focusing on what the series of decisions imply from an 
economic perspective. It also involves a review of the literature on business method 
patents, though this is narrowed to the empirical literature. This suggests strongly that the 
grant of business method patents might be occurring because of a reduced inventiveness 
standard. So Chapter 3 concludes with a review of the case law on novelty and 
inventiveness, again from an economic policy perspective. The conclusion is that the 
inventiveness requirement within the current patent system is so minimal that it is 
imperceptible to those outside the patent community.  
Chapter 4 presents aggregate data about business method patenting in Australia, Canada 
and New Zealand. Section 4.3 describes the dataset of recently granted Australian business 
method patents which form the empirical contribution of this thesis. In Section 4.4 an 
alternative approach to measuring inventiveness is developed. This is based on the 
fundamental need for balance if a patent system is to be welfare-enhancing. Effectively it 
asks that a patent not be granted unless there is a contribution of new knowledge. The 
assessment of the inventiveness of the selected 72 patents is based on the claims, which are 
‘construed’ to determine where the inventiveness of the ‘invention’ lies.6 Chapters 5 and 6 
present the assessment of the inventiveness of these 72 patents. There is one possible 
 
6  To determine the subject of a patent ‘the claims of the patented invention must be carefully construed, 
giving emphasis to the purpose of the specification, not just a literal interpretation’ (Stoianoff 1999: 501). 
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contribution to new knowledge, and three possibly new ideas among the 72 patents. The 
vast majority of business method patents currently being issued are granted for ‘inventions’ 
that make no new contributions to knowledge. There seems to be no benefit 
(‘consideration’) in exchange for the government-sanctioned monopoly. 
1.4 Policy implications 
The results are assessed and policy conclusions drawn in Chapter 7.  
The lack of inventiveness in recently granted business method patents raises the question as 
to the degree of inventiveness in other ‘fields of technology’. Unless the problem of 
uninventive patents is entirely due to difficulties in identifying prior art—and is thus a 
problem restricted to software and business methods—then the requirement that there be no 
discrimination by field of technology suggests the inventiveness standard may be miniscule 
throughout the Australian patent system. The evidence presented in Chapters 5 and 6 
suggests that a number of doctrines and decision making rules combine to lead to the grant 
of uninventive patents, and are thus likely to apply in other fields. This, together with clever 
legal drafting (for example, ‘Swiss’ medical claims),7 suggests that the problems may be 
pervasive throughout the patent system.  
An uninventive ‘invention’ cannot contribute spillover benefits. While it might be argued 
that such patents will have limited power in the market place, this cannot be assumed. 
Allowing a company to patent an old process gives that company the power to approach 
other companies and ask for royalties or ask them to cease certain activities. Given the high 
cost and considerable uncertainty of patent litigation, there is substantial evidence that 
many companies take the path of least resistance and comply.8 There has been a dramatic 
increase in patent litigation in the USA over the past two decades (Gallini 2002). The case 
that led to the view that business methods were patentable in Australia imposed costs on 
Catuity, which was found to have infringed on the known use of dynamic storage in smart 
 
7  ‘Swiss’ medical claims are a means of making unpatentable methods of medical treatment patentable 
(Thambisetty 2008: 20-21). 
8  We are all worse off for this entirely understandable response. Indeed in the USA, the fact that one 
company has paid a licensing fee is now used as indirect evidence that a patent is valid, though it has nothing 
to do with inventiveness (Jaffe and Lerner 2004). So when one company pays a license fee to make life easier, 
other companies are likely to be less successful in challenging patents, however uninventive they may appear.  
 7  
                                                
cards.9 Signature Financial Group’s US 5,193,056 patent computerised US Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) guidelines for minimising tax on certain investment products, 
foreclosing all other options (Stern 1999: 132), and so had significant market power despite 
being completely uninventive. 
Section 7.4 draws on the empirical findings to present some ideas for how a patent system 
could be reshaped to reduce its costs and increase any benefits. National welfare would be 
enhanced if the inventiveness threshold for patenting were substantially increased. This 
would mean abandoning a series of detailed proscriptive rules (doctrines) that have been 
built up by the courts over time. In particular the legal doctrines reducing the quantum of 
existing knowledge that can be used as a basis against which to test novelty and 
inventiveness need to be swept away. A broad approach to defining fields of technology 
would also do much to restore balance to the patent system.  
Given the very high value that can be extracted from the few patents that hold most of the 
value of the patent system, and the large community of lawyers who make a living from the 
patent system, there is a strong incentive for private parties to attempt to ‘game’ the system. 
‘Legal entrepreneurship when economic stakes are high does not work simply by exploiting 
change and complexity that is inherent in post-industrial societies. It also works by 
contriving change and complexity’ (Braithwaite 2005: 148). Similar issues are found in 
respect of tax law, where wealthy parties have a strong incentive to ‘game’ the system. 
Drawing on the experiences of tax law, it seems essential to include in patent law some 
clear objectives so that over-arching principles, including an ‘anti-avoidance’ principle, 
provide clear guidance to judges on how to interpret specific rules. Braithwaite suggests for 
tax policy that principles should trump rules where there is a conflict. These suggestions 
would also clearly do much to return patent law to a system of balance. 
Operating principles from the field of de-regulation also suggest that decision-making rules 
should be changed, and that the responsibilities of each party should be re-considered. This 
would lead to the onus of proof being placed on the applicant, on a beyond reasonable 
doubt basis. Together with higher inventiveness standards, less restrictive definitions of 
current knowledge, and the insertion of over-arching principles into patent law, these 
 
9  Welcome Real Time v Catuity [2001] FCA 445 (17 May 2001).  
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changes would substantially reduce the volume of granted patents, and the patents that were 
granted would be far more likely to confer a net benefit on society. Thus any incentive to 
genuine innovation would be retained, while the costs of the patent system would be 
substantially reduced.  
These suggested reforms would be entirely compliant with obligations under the 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Under 
TRIPS, governments could also specifically exclude software as well as any inventions 
lying outside any ‘field of technology’ from patentability. While clever legal drafting might 
be used to undermine such exclusions, it might do much to reduce the volume of noise in 
the current patent system if clear principles and an overall objective were also included in 
the legislation. This should include a provision that parallels the anti-avoidance principles 
in tax legislation.10 This would reduce costs and risks for innovators (Bessen and Meurer 
2008) thus shifting the balance in the patent system to improve the likelihood of a net 
benefit.   
 
10  That is, that drafting designed to make uninventive “inventions” patentable is the patent equivalent of 
financial products designed to avoid or reduce paying tax, and as such has the intent of “avoiding” the 
objectives of the legislation.  
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2 
Patents and Innovation 
“Patents vary greatly in their social value and it is a small set of them which is responsible for 
most of the social and private returns” 
(Sena 2004: 316) 
2.1 The value of new technology 
New technologies deliver a range of direct benefits. Some new products and services 
directly improve health and physical and mental well-being. Others provide greater choices 
and directly lead to higher standards of material and cultural well-being. Many new 
technologies are directed to reducing the cost of production, thus making some goods 
generally more affordable. But as well as the direct benefits of new technologies, they also 
play a key role in economic growth. Through their impact in raising the body of 
knowledge, and thus productivity, they are important in raising per capita income, the 
traditional measure of economic welfare in a society. 
The objective of patent policy is to provide an incentive to the development of new 
technology, thus ensuring that the rate at which technology grows is higher than it would be 
without this market intervention. But there are inherent contradictions in patent policy: 
while designed to encourage new technology it acts by suppressing its diffusion and 
widespread use. The essence is exclusion and prevention: ‘… the very protection which 
encourages [knowledge] production at the same time thwarts the object of the exercise, 
namely, the diffusion of knowledge’ (Drahos 1996: 122).  
The mechanism through which new technologies drive economic growth is the diffusion of 
new knowledge, particularly through 'spillovers'.11 The exclusion (monopoly) mechanism 
of patent policy is designed to reduce unauthorised use of the new technology, and thus can 
directly impede economic growth. How the balance works out in practice is an empirical 
question, and is the critical issue in the design of a welfare-enhancing patent policy.  
Unfortunately little empirical evidence is available to assist in setting this balance.  
 
11  Spillovers are a form of externality. They refer to situations where there is no payment (market 
transaction) for the knowledge received. Empirical evidence on spillovers is discussed in Appendix 1. 
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This chapter proceeds by first looking briefly at some of the key terminology in innovation 
and technology development (Section 2.2). Then attention is turned to competing economic 
theories of innovation (Section 2.3). These are compared to draw out their critical 
assumptions, insights and policy prescriptions. The concept of local knowledge is brought 
into this comparison, to highlight the important issue of the role of imitation and 
incremental improvement in technology development.  
A rational policy choice between alternative economic models depends on the reality of 
their assumptions and the extent to which their contrasting assumptions and predictions are 
supported by empirical evidence. Data from surveys in different countries and at different 
times are now available to shed light on the two critical issues of appropriability and 
imitation. These are discussed in Section 2.4. These data allow a choice between theories to 
be based on evidence: a great step forward from the earlier era of debate on patent policy 
where ‘[c]onviction was pitted against conviction, argument against argument, assumption 
against assumption’ (Machlup and Penrose 1950: 28).12 The conclusions reached in this 
chapter are summarized in Section 2.5, where some rough estimates of the proportion of 
inventions induced by patent policy are presented. Section 2.5 also looks at the light thrown 
by economic theory, and supporting empirical evidence, on the critical issue of balance in 
the patent system.  
2.2 Technology, knowledge, invention and innovation 
Patent Acts do not always define the purpose of the patent system. For example the 
Australian Patents Act 1990 states no objective,13 though it does limit the grant of a patent 
to an ‘invention’ which is also ‘a manner of new manufacture’.14 Similarly, the European 
Patent Convention (EPC) states no purpose except to ‘to strengthen co-operation between 
the States of Europe in respect of the protection of inventions.’15 In the USA, Article 1, 
 
 
12  Though a large part of the patent literature continues in this earlier vein, ignoring the empirical data.  
13  The IPCRC had to go back to a 1981 Second Reading speech to find a stated purpose for the 
Australian patent system. They quote this as ‘The main purpose of a patent system is to stimulate industrial 
invention and innovation by granting limited monopoly rights to inventors and by increasing public 
availability of information on new technology. Patent procedures must achieve a balance among competing 
interests while remaining administratively workable’ (IPCRC 2000: 136, citing The Hon David Thompson 
Minister for Science and Technology, April 1981 Second Reading Speech, Patents Amendment Bill 1981).  
14  To receive a patent the invention must also meet novelty and inventiveness standards, and be useful. 
15  Preamble, European Patent Convention (http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/e/ma1.html, 
last accessed 7 December 2007). Articles 52 and 53 specify that it is inventions which can be patented and 
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Section 8 of the Constitution gives Congress the power to ‘promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.’16  
Nonetheless there is general agreement that the purpose of patent laws is to provide an 
incentive to inventors, thus achieving a higher level of technological development, 
invention or innovativeness. But the grant of a patent monopoly is conditional: information 
about the patented invention must be disclosed. Because the principal object of patent 
policy is rarely specified in the legislation, but the disclosure conditionality is, disclosure is 
often given weight as an objective of the system, especially within legal circles.17 But 
within the economics literature there is a clear understanding that the reason for the 
intervention is to increase the level of inventive activity or innovation, directly or 
indirectly, because of the importance of technological development to economic growth.18  
2.2.1 Knowledge and technology 
Turning now to a range of definitional issues, most economic discussions of the 
development of new technology treat it as an issue in the production of knowledge, which 
is then immediately discussed in terms of information (see, for example, such disparate 
works as Arrow 1962; Mandeville 1996). So within the economics discipline the terms 
knowledge and information are often used with the same meaning, though most detailed 
discussion is framed in terms of the economic characteristics of information. Because of 
important asymmetries in information about new knowledge,19 in this study I avoid using 
define subject matter limits to what can and cannot be patented; and Articles 54, 55 and 57 set criteria relating 
to novelty, inventiveness, and usefulness. 
16  http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/lawcopy.pdf (accessed 7 December 2007). 
17  For a criticism of the consequences of this legal focus on the condition rather than the purpose of the 
grant see Ghosh and Kesan 2004. Related to this is the theory that patents lead to a higher rate of economic 
growth, not by inducing more invention, but because of the disclosure of technological information in patent 
specifications. While this theory is strongly held in legal circles, it has not generally been well regarded by 
economists and has not been empirically tested (Mazzoleni and Nelson 1998b). Macdonald suggests that, at 
least from the perspective of small firms, the patent system demands more information than it supplies 
(Macdonald 2004: 151).  
18  The various economic and non-economic rationales for patent systems are well-reviewed in Machlup 
and Penrose 1950. More recent reviews of economic rationales include Mazzoleni and Nelson 1998a, 1998b, 
and Gallini 2002. It is interesting to note that as evidence is produced to reject a current rationale, new 
rationales are developed. A recent contribution to new rationales is Heald 2005.  
19  Information about the new knowledge is asymmetric between the producer and the potential consumer. 
Until the person who has invented the new knowledge discloses enough information about it, a potential 
purchaser cannot determine if that knowledge will be worth the price. Of course, once the knowledge has 
been disclosed, the potential purchaser will be able to retain it whether or not s/he pays for it. 
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the word information to mean knowledge or technology.20 Moreover, as Saviotti has 
pointed out, knowledge has an important function in the generalisation and interpretation of 
factual information (Saviotti 1998).  
Technology is a sub-set of knowledge. Technology is ‘the branch of knowledge that deals 
with science and engineering, or its practice, as applied to industry; applied science.’21 
Economic analyses of knowledge focus mainly on the production, dissemination and 
impact of technological knowledge.22 Until recently the patent system was also principally 
concerned with technology: for example the TRIPS Treaty prohibits discrimination 
between fields of technology (Article 27). This limitation to technology has been such a 
profound assumption of patent systems that it has not been written into many statutes.23 
Patent statutes with a Common Law heritage tend to use terminology such as ‘art’ and 
‘manner of manufacture’ and so provide no constraints to technologically based fields of 
activity. This study uses the normal (dictionary) definition of technology, and excludes 
from its ambit such fields of knowledge as accounting, business studies, law and economics 
itself.  
2.2.2 Invention or innovation? 
Turning now to the concepts of invention and innovation, Ruttan notes a general agreement 
within the social sciences that invention somehow precedes innovation which in turn 
precedes technological change. He goes on to note the much lower degree of certainty in 
defining the two concepts (Ruttan 1959: 596). A search of four social science/economics 
encyclopaedias finds no entry for invention but one or more entries for innovation (Kuper 
and Kuper 1985; Eatwell et al. 1987; Michie 2001; Smelser and Baltes 2001).24 Rogers 
 
 
20  Dosi et al. (2006: 1112) suggest this identification of knowledge with information can be quite misleading. 
21  Macquarie dictionary, revised 3rd edition, 2001: 1930, emphasis added. 
22  Though recently interest in organisational innovation has increased, and National Innovation Surveys 
now include questions on organisational innovation as well as the development of new products and processes 
(see, for example Australian Bureau of Statistics 2005).  
23  For example it is not mentioned in the European Patent Convention (EPC), from which European 
patent statutes derive (Bakels and Hugenholtz 2002: 35). It is effectively one of those '… propositions and 
opinions shared by a group and so obvious to it that they are never fully or systematically articulated' 
(Hirschman 1977: 69).  
24  The focus in economics and management studies on innovation rather than invention is confirmed by a 
search of JSTOR. A search for titles with invention but not innovation yielded 30 articles and innovation 
without invention yielded 241 articles, while there were only 13 citations with both invention and innovation 
in the title, of which ten were published before 1968. A search of management journals, excluding economic 
journals, provided no additional citations for invention together with innovation, an additional three articles 
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suggests that a ‘distinction should be made between innovation and invention, defined as 
the process in which a new idea is discovered, or created. In contrast, innovation occurs 
when a new idea is adopted or rejected’ (Smelser and Baltes 2001: 7541). But Ruttan sees 
no conceptual basis to such a distinction, and suggests that the term invention be reserved 
for the sub-set of innovations which are patentable (Ruttan 1959: 603).  
Given the subject of this study—the patent system—it seems sensible to avoid the 
confusion of using the term invention in two different, and conflicting, ways. To the extent 
that inventions are conceptually distinct from innovations, they are perhaps closer to the 
idea part of the spectrum and further from the final implemented form of the new idea.25 
But most patent systems claim that ideas are not patentable, only practical applications of 
ideas. This parallels the distinction between an underlying technology (the body of 
knowledge) and its practical implementation in a specific technological artefact (Monk 
1992). So in a sense use of the term ‘invention’ for what can be patented is contradictory—
what can be patented is practical implementations of new knowledge, and so is closer to the 
meaning of the word ‘innovation’. 
Another issue in choosing an appropriate terminology is the differing implications these 
two words have for non-technological ideas and practices. Invention tends to imply 
something new which is based on science and technology. In part this meaning derives 
from the use of the term invention in patent statutes, and the long-standing tacit assumption 
that patents are awarded only to inventions based on new science or technology.  
Throughout this thesis the term ‘invention’ is reserved for that which is patented, or for 
which there is a patent application.  
for invention but not innovation, and an additional 195 articles for innovation but not invention. The greater 
contrast in focus in the management literature also confirms the actual use of the term innovation in practical 
business contexts. There has been little work on the economics of invention (Magee 2002).  
25  However this implies a linear model of innovation where invention precedes innovation, which in turn 
precedes commercialisation and diffusion. Such models have been criticised as being unrealistic in most 
circumstances (Godin 2006). More complex models, with multiple feedback loops between a range of players, 
including customers and upstream suppliers, seem to provide a more realistic picture of how innovation 
actually takes place (Kline 1985; Rothwell 1992). While any discussion of patent policy needs to occur within 
the context of innovation, a discussion of innovation theories and knowledge about innovation lies well 
beyond the boundaries of this thesis. Macdonald (2002; 2003) reviews the relationship between the 
assumptions in patent policy and the assumptions in different models of innovation.  
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A final definitional issue is the relationship of innovation to expenditure on research and 
development (R&D). R&D expenditure is widely used as a measure of input into the 
innovation process, though it is recognised to be only a very partial measure (Carter 1996; 
US CBO 2005; Pavitt 1984: 370). R&D expenditure ignores the range of innovative inputs 
that can occur throughout an enterprise. Business expenditure on R&D (BERD) also 
excludes most inputs into public sector research, though there are clear links from public 
sector research to business innovation. Nonetheless, for want of a better measure, BERD is 
regularly used to measure the level of resources allocated to technological innovation. And, 
although it is clearly an input measure, it is also presented as a measure of innovation 
performance, especially in discussions of the need for additional government support.26  
2.3 Competing theories 
From a policy perspective there is little useful data about the impact of the patent system. 
Consequently much academic and policy discussion has been either theoretical, or focused 
on R&D expenditure. Academically, the topic of patents is usually considered to fall into 
the legal domain, despite its clear economic goals. Much of the legal discussion is 
doctrinal—individual cases are analysed for the light they throw on legal doctrines. Some 
lawyers have contributed theories of patenting, the best-known being Kitch’s ‘prospect 
theory’ (Kitch 1977).27 There are only a few studies that present systematic evidence about 
the real world impact of patents. These mostly focus on the gross private value of patents, 
litigation, or the relationship between technology or market structure and patenting.  
While there is no economic theory of patents per se (BIE 1994b: 5), a conventional neo-
classical analysis is usually used to justify intervention in the market for innovation, 
particularly in policy discussions. Australia’s Advisory Council on Intellectual Property 
(ACIP), in its recent paper on patentable subject matter frames this rationale for the patent 
intervention quite fully: 
“The purpose of the monopoly is to allow the patentee to generate monopoly profits, 
and thereby to reward the inventor and provide an incentive for research and 
development, with subsequent economic and social benefits. An incentive is required 
 
26  See for example the views of the Business Council of Australia as presented in Maddock 2002. 
27  Others include a ‘rent-dissipation’ theory (Grady and Alexander 1992) and a ‘transactions cost’ theory 
(Heald 2005).  
 15  
for research and development because the knowledge embodied in an invention has 
“public good” characteristics. This means that an invention may be the subject of 
“free riding” (i.e. unauthorised competitive use) by others, which results in the 
inventor not obtaining the full benefit of the invention. This, in turn, will lead to 
under-creation of inventions, to the detriment of society as a whole.” 
(ACIP 2008: 7) 
The discussion below draws out this rather conventional static exposition of neo-classical 
economics and contrasts it with an alternative economic perspective based on information 
economics. The purpose of this comparison is to identify the underlying assumptions and 
predictions of the theoretical approach used as the standard justification for patents. These 
assumptions can then be tested against available empirical research findings to develop an 
evidence-base for choosing an appropriate economic theory on whether or not there is any 
failure in the market for innovation. There are, of course, a number of neo-classically based 
economic criticisms of the conventional static analysis and these are also discussed briefly.  
2.3.1 Conventional economics: the production of innovations 
The conventional economic discussion of patents falls within the neoclassical tradition, and 
is frequently sourced to Arrow's seminal article on the nature of information and the impact 
of these characteristics on socially optimal levels of invention generation and diffusion 
(Arrow 1962). There are a number of useful expositions of this approach (Dixon and 
Greenhalgh 2002; Gallini and Scotchmer 2002; Scotchmer 2004; Blind et al. 2006; Withers 
2006). Drahos also provides a clear exposition of the conventional theory but is more 
critical of its assumptions (Drahos 1996).  
The neo-classical approach focuses on the production of innovations, and predicts 
insufficient incentives to invest in new products and processes. The analysis is organised 
around a range of 'public good' characteristics of knowledge. A critical assumption is a low 
or zero cost of acquiring new knowledge, once produced. This creates competitive imitators 
who are able to enter the market with low (or zero) fixed innovation costs. If this 
assumption holds, the inventor is unable to appropriate a sufficient return to her investment, 
and there will be an under-allocation of resources to innovative activities. The inventor will 
only be able to recoup marginal costs of production and there will be no return to the fixed 
innovation outlay. In other words there is failure in the market for innovations.  
The neo-classical theory of patents argues that the cost of this alleged failure in the market 
for innovations is very high, because there are significant positive externalities from the 
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development and application of new knowledge. Such positive externalities mean that the 
social return to innovation is greater than the private return.28 The marginal approach that 
underlies welfare economics requires that resources be allocated such that the marginal 
social costs equals the marginal social benefit.29 Because of the positive externalities 
associated with innovation, the neo-classical approach concludes that there will be under-
investment in innovation unless there is some form of market correction.  
A number of alternatives to the patent system have been used in practice (particularly 
public funding of research). Indeed one of Arrow's main conclusions was the need to 
explore alternatives to the firm as the appropriate institutional arrangement for 
innovation.30 There is a small literature on such alternatives (for example, Wright 1983; 
Scotchmer 2004), but they are often dismissed as inferior, usually on the grounds that 
patents provide a ‘market-based solution’. Any above-normal return to a patented invention 
is achieved through higher prices in the market than would otherwise prevail. But there is 
no reason to expect that the reward obtained will bear any relation to the social return 
(Machlup 1958). Patent systems create artificial rights to exclude others from using 
specified applications of knowledge: a significant regulatory intervention in the market. 
Where patents are effective in achieving a high return to the innovator, it is through this 
exercise of monopoly power.  
In summary the neo-classical theory as applied to patents predicts under-investment in 
innovation activity. This prediction is based on three critical presumptions: 
• the cost of acquiring/consuming new knowledge is very low;  
• market mechanisms fail to ensure an adequate reward for inventors; and  
• there are large positive externalities from innovation. 
 
28  Social costs are a measure of total costs: they are private costs plus costs imposed on other parties 
(negative externalities). Social benefits (returns) are private benefits plus any benefits to other parties 
(positive externalities). The yardstick for measuring efficiency in resource allocation (welfare maximisation) 
is that marginal cost equals marginal price equals marginal benefit. That is, resources cannot be distributed to 
make anyone better off, without making anyone worse off. See Weimer and Vining (2005), for a discussion of 
the use of this approach as a yardstick for public policy analysis.   
29  The validity of the typical marginal analysis of economics in a ‘winner take all’ environment such as 
the patent system has been challenged (Andersen 2003 and Lemley 2005). This is an interesting and 
fundamentally important point, but the issue lies well beyond the scope of the current study.  
30  ‘There is really no need for the firm to be the fundamental unit of organization in invention; there is 
plenty of reason to suppose that individual talent counts for a good deal more than the firms as an 
organization’ (Arrow 1962: 158). 
 17  
                                                
The evidence for or against these critical assumptions is reviewed in Section 2.4. But before 
that a contrasting theory of innovation—the information economic approach—is explored. 
2.3.2 Alternative approaches: information economics 
There are many alternative theories and models of innovation.31 Here an information 
economics approach is chosen to illustrate the very different outcomes that derive from a 
different perspective, and a different set of behavioural presumptions. It has been selected 
as a device for investigating the realism of the assumptions used in the conventional neo-
classical approach and the impact of these on predicted outcomes. Information economics 
focuses on knowledge as a key input to production, and sees innovation as a complex chain 
of feedbacks and interdependencies: ‘a collective, social, learning, evolutionary process’ 
(Mandeville 1998: 49). Knowledge is cumulative, and is itself a prime input into inventive 
activity. This leads to a focus on the costs of acquiring knowledge, which are seen to be 
significant.  
Information economics makes an important distinction between tacit (‘know-how’, that 
which is hard to reduce to written form) and codified (written down and more readily 
transferable) knowledge (Mandeville 1996). Only human beings can hold tacit knowledge. 
It is costly to turn tacit into codified knowledge, but only the latter can be exchanged easily 
in the market. Both language and learning are needed for the absorption, interpretation and 
use of codified knowledge: the user cannot readily absorb the codified knowledge unless 
s/he has the requisite language and sufficient learning (Saviotti 1998). This approach 
suggests that diffusion of knowledge is difficult and costly, as only users with the right 
human capital can absorb the knowledge. But precisely because of this, the number of 
people who can appropriate new knowledge can be quite small. The cost of acquiring 
knowledge is thus the very mechanism which ensures a return to its generation. 
Nor is it always easy to extract the relevant codified knowledge from innovations. Codified 
knowledge can be read only by those with access to the code (Saviotti 1998). A new 
product embodying new knowledge does not necessarily disclose the underlying 
technology (Monk 1992). It will take time and resources to move from the artefact to 
understanding the technology, to being able to use it to replicate the artefact, let alone to 
 
31  See Granstrand 1999 for a useful discussion of such models.  
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improving it. Of course, the relative ease or difficulty of accessing the underlying 
technology from a technological artefact will vary along a number of dimensions. This has 
given rise to classifications of industries and technologies designed to identify different 
innovation patterns, particularly in relation to appropriability and the spread of knowledge. 
Using data for about 2,000 significant British innovations in the period 1945 to 1979 Pavitt 
identified four different types of firms based on their technological trajectories (Pavitt 
1984). This typology was subsequently extended to five sectors by Greenhalgh and Rogers 
(2004). Merges and Nelson identify four types of industries, where issues surrounding 
imitation vary significantly. Only their category of discrete product innovation conforms to 
the normal presumptions in patent law: that existing knowledge can be clearly identified, 
and that inventions can be clearly separated and identified as infringing or not (Merges and 
Nelson 1990).32 Saviotti (1998) looks at how appropriability conditions vary with the 
degree of codification and the proportion of agents knowing the code.  
All knowledge builds on earlier knowledge, though where there are radical breakthroughs 
in thinking or understanding, earlier knowledge can become obsolete. Those who generate 
new knowledge use earlier knowledge as an input to the process. Because the cost of 
developing new knowledge is independent of the scale on which the knowledge is later 
used, there can be advantages in sharing knowledge widely. Mandeville (1996) discusses 
the conditions which will encourage such sharing, and Sena provides a review of recent 
literature on R&D cooperation (Sena 2004). Pavitt points to the extent to which industrial 
innovation is a cumulative process specific to firms (Pavitt 1984: 353). Using time series 
data (though for a very short period) Greenhalgh and Rogers (2002) find that competitive 
advances achieved through R&D, patenting or the use of trade marks are quickly eroded.  
There is a substantial theoretical literature on initial and subsequent innovation, and the 
appropriate incentives to ensure the right returns at each stage.33 Particular concern is 
expressed that subsequent innovators should make the right payments to initial innovators 
 
32  In this context discrete products are those where there is a one-on-one match between a product and a 
patent. In contrast, dozens if not hundreds of patent rights might be involved in the production of a complex 
product. The other two categories are chemicals (which has some characteristics of discrete product 
industries, some of complex product industries, and some unique characteristics) and science-based industries.  
33  Despite this literature the neo-classical framework holds deeply embedded assumptions that 
innovations can be clearly identified, and are independent and un-related, as well as having no impact on 
subsequent innovation (Mazzoleni and Nelson 1998b). Even in the literature on sequential innovation, a 
starting point owing nothing to previous knowledge is regularly assumed. 
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(see, for example, Scotchmer 1991, 1996; Gallini and Scotchmer 2002). In contrast 
information economics does not identify an initial inventor, though it recognises radical 
inventions. Instead it sees the whole process of innovation as cumulative: knowledge grows 
through use, and there is a multiplicative effect when new knowledge is added to old 
knowledge (Mandeville 1996). Most innovation takes place in the realm of uncodified 
knowledge, and mechanisms for the diffusion of uncodified knowledge—such as well-
functioning labour markets—are critical to an effective innovation system. New knowledge 
is a process of learning; imitation is an important element of learning but is not possible 
without investment in learning (Cohen and Levinthal 1989). Indeed imitation and 
adaptation (further incremental innovation) are essential parts of the process of building the 
stock of knowledge. Radical breakthroughs can occur on the back of a process of 
incremental innovation (Magee 2002).  
Once attention is turned to the inventor as a recipient as well as a creator of new 
knowledge, issues around the diversity of local knowledge emerge. Local knowledge is a 
concept used in anthropology to refer to the bodies of knowledge held by communities 
(Geertz 1983; Pottier 2003). With increasing cultural diversity, shared disciplinary 
knowledge may be complemented by different intuitions and perspectives, including 
possible approaches to applying knowledge. Different inventors may build on the same new 
piece of knowledge it in quite different ways, developing a range of practical applications. 
Such differences in local knowledge or mind-sets underlie the high value placed on team-
work in many areas.34 Beyond differences between individual inventors, are differences in 
local knowledge and capabilities at the firm level, with much technology knowledge being 
firm-specific (Lamberton 1999; Pavitt 1984).35  
From the perspective of this study Saviotti’s treatment of the local character of knowledge 
is particularly useful (Saviotti 1998). The generalisation and interpretation embedded in any 
given piece of knowledge can span varying breadths of factual information. Different 
combinations of codified and tacit knowledge, including legal and managerial as well as 
 
34  Features of open-source software that have received attention are the speed of the process and quality 
of the product. Both features are attributed to the wide variety of expert input (Bessen 2001; Lerner and Tirole 
2002; Bakels and Hugenholtz 2002).  
35  Lamberton also identifies considerable differences in the personal and groups uses of information as 
the first of twelve key propositions about the characteristics of information (Lamberton 1986). 
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technological knowledge, are used in the creation of specific products. The frontiers of 
scientific or technical knowledge are often explored simultaneously by different 
researchers, but each brings their own intuition and differing mental models. The 
correlations which are established between different pieces of information are thus likely to 
vary between researchers, especially in the development of artefacts. Codification is a time-
intensive process of establishing increasingly broad, more widely accepted, generalisations.  
This is not the place for an exploration of this large topic.36 In the realm of innovation these 
individual and firm differences in local knowledge mean that imitation is often likely to 
lead to a range of re-interpretations and improvements (Ricketson 1992). Indeed 
Mandeville (1996) suggests that there is no clear distinction between innovation and 
imitation. Dempsey points out that the qualities which any knowledge has depend critically 
on individual and organisational capabilities (Dempsey 1998: 44). In contrast to the image 
underlying the theoretical economics literature on sequential innovation, where it is 
generally assumed that a radical innovation is followed by a series of incremental 
inventions, a series of incremental additions to knowledge can form the basis for 
subsequent radical breakthroughs (Magee 2002). Indeed this latter conception underlies 
Usher's views on the emergence of strategic inventions (Usher 1954).  
This focus on diffusion of knowledge as a key input in the production of new knowledge, 
together with recognition of the time and resources needed in imitation and improvement, 
leads to a recognition of the role of market mechanisms in providing a return to R&D 
investment. Now that it is widely accepted that most markets are imperfect, the existence of 
temporary rents and excess profits (first mover advantages) is the accepted paradigm.37 
Other 'natural' protections of new technology, such as knowledge imperfections, transaction 
costs and the need for complementary assets (Teece 1986), create at least temporary 
barriers to entry, and therefore opportunities for returns to innovation. Where the tacit 
component of knowledge is high, the cost of learning to use new products is also high. 
Where consumers incur high learning costs, for example for computer software, the costs to 
 
36  For an interesting review of the literature on organisational ecology, evolutionary theory and learning 
theory as applied to the innovative capabilities of firms see Sorensen and Stuart 2000. 
37  Though this argument (advanced by Schäffle, who called it head-start profits) was rejected during the 
19th century Great Patent Debate, because it was then considered that perfect markets were pervasive 
(Machlup and Penrose 1950). 
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the consumer of switching between products are high, so there are great advantages to early 
market entrants. It is now also recognised that in markets where there are such network 
effects, early movers and dominant players have considerable market advantages. The first 
party to bring an innovation to market may thus reap a considerable on-going reward 
through this mechanism.  
Overall, then, a perspective on knowledge as a costly input into the production process, and 
of knowledge development as evolutionary and cumulative, leads to quite different 
predictions than the cost-free imitation assumptions of conventional neo-classical theory. 
Market failure in the generation of new knowledge is unlikely except under highly 
constrained circumstances: where information is highly codified or where imitation and 
improvement can genuinely occur at a much lower cost in terms of both time and money. 
2.3.3 More nuanced neo-classical approaches 
Further qualifications are added by the more nuanced expositions of neo-classical theory, 
including dynamic expositions. As input to the 1984 Australian review of the patents 
system Tisdell drew attention to the importance of distinguishing between different types of 
innovation, as they could have considerably different welfare and competition impacts. He 
noted that the strength of the effective monopoly was likely to vary between more radical 
product innovations and innovations which introduced a cost-reducing new process into 
relatively competitive markets. For the former the more inelastic the demand curve, the 
greater the welfare loss. But for the latter the more elastic the demand curve the greater the 
welfare loss (Tisdell 1981). Deardorff (1992) uses a simple classical model, but introduces 
a high innovation and a low innovation country to show that the overall welfare impact is 
highly contingent. Depending on the relative size of the two markets, the quantum of 
additional invention induced may be insufficient to offset welfare losses on a global basis.  
Bessen and Maskin compare the performance of a static and a dynamic model of 
innovation, incorporating both patents and imitation and find that ‘results that seem secure 
in the context of a static model are overturned in a dynamic model’ (Bessen and Maskin 
2000: 20). They find that in a dynamic world there are many incentives to innovate, and the 
‘incentive’ effect of patents in a static model can be reversed. 
Perhaps the most trenchant of the conventional criticisms is Boldrin and Levine’s analysis 
which focuses on market size, the economic scale of production, and the dynamics of 
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market entry. They use quite simple conventional tools to illustrate a fundamental flaw in 
the conventional analysis. Where the potential size of the market is large compared to 
efficient plant size, the absence of competing products will allow the innovator to price 
above marginal cost, thus recouping the innovation investment (Boldrin and Levine 2004). 
This exposition demonstrates the mechanisms through which first-mover advantages 
operate to provide a return to innovation in competitive markets. It clearly indicates that it 
is only where innovation costs are very high that initial market advantages may be 
insufficient to ensure a sufficient return to cover these fixed outlays.   
The conclusion of this brief review of alternative economic treatments of the likelihood of 
failure in the market for innovation is that in most circumstances first mover advantages, 
differentiated product markets and high learning costs will provide a sufficient return to the 
inventor. If there is any general market failure it is likely to be in the diffusion of 
technology, particularly where the uncodified knowledge component is high and labour 
markets do not work well. In regard to the generation of innovations, market failure is 
probable only in very narrow circumstances, the most important of which is where the 
initial innovation cost is very large. This in fact brings the discussion full circle to Arrow’s 
seminal article (Arrow 1962). Arrow concluded that markets were most likely to fail where 
the innovation cost was large and lumpy and suggested that the appropriate response was 
public financing.   
2.3.4 Comparing the approaches 
The two perspectives make radically different assumptions about the cost of acquiring new 
knowledge. The neo-classical framework assumes this cost is very low. This assumption 
leads directly to a predicted outcome of widespread market failure. In contrast, an 
information economics perspective sees the cost of acquiring new knowledge as potentially 
very high, and sees little likelihood of market failure unless knowledge is highly codified. 
Where much of knowledge is uncodified, as in newly emerging technologies, there is a 
substantial difference in the outcomes predicted.  
There is less difference between the two frameworks regarding positive externalities from 
the development of new technology. Indeed, because of its focus on the importance of 
knowledge flows as inputs to new knowledge generation, information economics 
specifically recognises the high social value of such spillovers. This issue is not central to 
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choosing between alternative theories, but it is important in the design of patent policy. The 
immediate beneficiaries of spillovers play an important role in driving economic growth. 
But they are increasingly referred to as ‘free-riders’ in the policy-oriented patent 
literature.38 Indeed there is a recent tendency among supporters of strong patent 
intervention to equate the goals of patent policy with the elimination of ‘free-riding’ 
(Lemley 2005). This is to turn the goal of patent policy on its head, and would have very 
dangerous consequences for the ultimate goal of higher economic growth. From the 
viewpoint of maximising economic growth, an ideal innovation policy combines a 
sufficient incentive to invent with high knowledge spillovers.39  
The radical difference in predictions about whether there is any market failure in the 
generation of new innovation thus derives largely from the difference in assumptions about 
the cost of acquiring knowledge once it has been generated. Both the assumptions and the 
predictions are amenable to empirical testing. If the cost of acquiring newly created 
knowledge is low, then the cost of imitation will be low, both in terms of time and speed. 
But if imitation is costly, and if it takes time, then natural market imperfections will provide 
sufficient incentive to innovate for most industries and technologies. There is now a 
substantial body of empirical evidence on the relative importance of market mechanisms in 
ensuring adequate returns to R&D investment, and on the time and cost needed to imitate 
new products and processes. This is reviewed in Section 2.4. 
2.4 What do the data say? 
The empirical evidence reviewed in this section focuses on two questions: are patents 
needed to induce sufficient R&D investment? are the costs of imitating  close to zero? 
2.4.1 The early evidence 
The earliest empirical data is the oft-quoted Harvard Business School student project 
(Scherer et al. 1959) in which only seven out of 91 respondents ranked patent protection 
first or second among five factors affecting R&D investments. Most ranked it last; and 
 
38  For example the IPCRC Committee states that ‘the principle problem which patents attempt to address 
is the threat of free riding on investment of intellectual effort. Unless kept secret, inventions and ideas can 
often be cheaply copied or imitated by competitors’ (IPCRC 2000: 136). 
39  The issue of innovation spillovers is a complex subject, and there is a large literature including many 
empirical studies. Again this is a topic lying well beyond the boundaries of this thesis. A brief discussion of 
the empirical findings is presented in Appendix 1. 
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most emphasised the necessity of remaining competitive, desire for efficient production, 
and desire to expand and diversify sales as reasons for undertaking R&D.40 This was the 
earliest systematic evidence suggesting that most R&D might occur absent patents. 
While not directly addressing the question of appropriability, Firestone's study of the 
economic utility and disutility of patents in Canada is of interest as the earliest large-scale 
survey of patent use.41 The focus of this study was on whether patents were worked (used 
in production). Only 15 per cent were worked in Canada, though 50 per cent were worked 
in at least one country (Firestone 1971: 347). For Canadian patent owners, 26 per cent said 
that the patent system had a fair or major significance for the decision to work an invention 
in Canada (compared to 9 per cent of US owners and 3 per cent of other foreign owners) 
(Firestone 1971: 372). 
The next piece of empirical evidence focussed more on appropriability, and on patents as 
an incentive to invent (Taylor and Silberston 1973). This empirical study of British firms in 
five industries42 found that the R&D effort of most companies would be little different in a 
world without patents, except in specific industries: primarily pharmaceuticals and some 
other areas of finished chemicals (Taylor and Silberston 1973: 325-6).43 This was followed 
by Mansfield's study of 100 US firms in 12 industries (Mansfield 1986). This broader and 
more systematic sample again found that the patent system was most important in 
pharmaceuticals, where over 60 per cent of innovations would not have occurred absent 
patents. Patents were moderately important in chemicals, petroleum and machinery and 
fabricated metal products, but had little or no effect in the other seven industries.44 Despite 
 
40  This oft-quoted study was privately published and is hard to obtain. More accessible is Scherer's 
testimony to the US Federal Trade Commission where he told the story and reviewed some of the results 
(Scherer 1995). He provides further information in Scherer 2006.  
41  The study is based on 1,930 valid returns about Canadian patents granted in 1957, 1960 and 1963.  
42  While Taylor and Silberston obtained data from only 44 firms, these performed 25 per cent of UK 
business R&D at the time.  
43  Specifically seven firms said patents made no difference to any research projects; 18 said it would 
make a difference to a few, five said it would make a difference to about 10 per cent of projects and nine (six 
of which were chemical firms) said it would have made a difference to more than 10 per cent of projects. 
44  This study drew a random sample of larger R&D performing firms. The reported percentage of 
innovations that would not have been developed absent patents was 38 per cent for chemicals, 25 per cent for 
petroleum, 17 per cent for machinery, 12 per cent for fabricated metal products and 11 per cent for electrical 
equipment. For primary metals and instruments it was 1 per cent. It was zero for office equipment, motor 
vehicles, rubber, and textiles (Mansfield 1986: Table 1, p. 175).  
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the strongly expressed views that patents were not an effective mechanism for obtaining a 
return to R&D expenditure, a high proportion of innovations were patented. 
Following these early studies was the large-scale 1983 Yale survey, with a sample of 630 
US firms from 100 industries.45 This confirmed that most innovation would occur without 
patents (Levin et al. 1987). The study usefully distinguished between product and process 
innovations. Respondents assessed alternative means of protecting the competitive 
advantage of innovations using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = not at all effective; 7 = very 
effective). Patents were reported as more important for product than process innovations 
(4.33 compared to 3.52). But other (market) mechanisms, such as first mover advantages 
and complementary sales and service capabilities, were considered to be much more 
effective than patents. For product innovations, sales/service efforts (5.59), lead time (5.41) 
and learning (5.09) were all reported as more important than patents (4.33). For processes, 
lead time (5.11), learning (5.02), sales/service efforts (4.55) and secrecy (4.31) were all 
reported as more important than patents (3.52). The only industry in which patents were 
rated as more effective than any market mechanism was drugs. In addition, patents were 
rated as equally effective as market mechanisms in organic chemicals, plastic materials and 
steel mill products.  
2.4.2 What are the costs of imitating? 
At the same time as this information on appropriability was emerging, so were studies on 
the relative costs of imitation and the time required for an imitating product to reach the 
market. In a study of manufacturing firms in the north-eastern part of the USA,46 Mansfield 
and colleagues found that the average ratio of imitation to innovation costs was 0.65, and 
the average ratio of imitation to innovation time was 0.70 (Mansfield et al. 1981). For one 
in seven innovations, imitation costs were no lower than the original innovation costs, 
largely due to the innovator's greater technological capacity. These results are significantly 
 
45  High-level R&D managers were asked to report typical experiences or central tendencies, that is were 
treated as informed observers of a business rather than as representatives of a firm. The sampling frame was 
the FTC 4-digit industry classes, excluding those reporting no formal R&D, and all miscellaneous (not 
elsewhere classified) classes. The survey covers only publicly traded firms with R&D greater than 1 per cent 
of sales or greater than $US35 million (1981). All publicly listed R&D performing firms in the sampled lines 
of business were contacted. The response rate was 42 per cent (Levin et al. 1987: 790-791, 819-820).  
46  In the chemical, drugs, electronics and machinery industries. The firms were selected ‘more or less’ at 
random, and innovations selected ‘more or less’ at random from those introduced recently. Of the 48 product 
innovations covered in the study, 34 had already been imitated. 
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different from the zero cost assumptions of the conventional neoclassical framework. 
Mansfield and colleagues found considerable variation around these averages. They also 
found that products with relatively high imitation cost ratios tended also to have relatively 
high imitation time ratios (and vice versa). The study also investigated whether patenting 
made a difference to imitation, and found that about 60 per cent of patented products were 
imitated within four years. However it was clear that patenting increased both the time and 
the cost of successful imitation: the median increase in cost was 11 per cent, but for 
pharmaceuticals it was 30 per cent.  
Further data on imitation were provided in the much larger 1983 Yale Survey, which again 
found substantial variability in time and cost of imitation. Variations in the imitation cost 
ratio were greater within than between industries, but there were significant differences 
between industries in the imitation time ratio. In general, imitation saved around 50 per cent 
of the cost of the original R&D. However more major innovations were more expensive to 
replicate, and replication took longer—sometimes over 3 years; most often at least 6-12 
months. It thus seems that market mechanisms are able to ensure a greater degree of 
protection to more significant inventions. The data from the Yale survey also showed that 
imitation was generally more expensive and time-consuming for process than product 
innovations. Imitation costs and time were also positively related to patent effectiveness 
(Levin et al. 1987: 824).  
Looking at this matter from a theoretical perspective, Maurer and Scotchmer note that as 
long as the costs of independent invention are reasonably large compared to the cost of an 
‘initial’ invention, then an independent invention defence to patent infringement would 
reduce the deadweight costs of the patent system (Maurer and Scotchmer 2002). Given the 
threat of entry of ‘duplicate’ products, the ‘original’ inventor would be less likely to charge 
very high prices. The empirical data on the substantial costs of imitation are therefore 
important not just in regard to the assumptions of the model used to justify patent 
intervention, but also to the design of patent policy.  
One limitation of the Yale survey was its focus on larger firms. This was overcome in the 
1994 Carnegie-Mellon survey (CMS), which again confirmed the finding that patents were 
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generally considered to be one of the least effective mechanisms for obtaining a return to 
investment in R&D (Cohen et al. 2000).47  
The combined analytical power of the Yale and Carnegie-Mellon surveys is enhanced by 
their relative timing. The Yale survey occurred before the strengthening of the US patent 
system, which is generally dated from the creation of the US Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit (CAFC) in 1982, and the latter some time after this strengthening had 
begun. Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000) conclude that the major change during the decade 
is a considerable increase in the importance of secrecy. They also suggest that patents may 
be more central for larger firms in more industries, and that there may be a larger minority 
of industries where patents are counted as a major mechanism of appropriation (Cohen et 
al. 2000: 13). Given the significant increase in the value of patents as a result of decisions 
by the CAFC, such an increase is not surprising. It does, however, need to be interpreted in 
the light of the reasons given for patenting, which are discussed below. Overall, however, 
the data from the CMS confirm the findings of the earlier studies: except in a narrow range 
of industries patents are seen as far less important than a range of market mechanisms in 
ensuring a profitable return to R&D expenditure. That is, with a few exceptions, patents are 
not needed to induce investment in R&D.  
The policy implications of these findings are significant. If a policy intervention does not 
affect behaviour in the intended manner, but simply provides a windfall gain for what 
would have happened anyway, it is not just ineffective, it is also inefficient, leading to a 
reduction in welfare. 
2.4.3 Other countries 
The studies cited above are mostly of US manufacturing firms. Looking outside the USA, 
several studies confirm the US results. A number of these are in papers which are 
surprisingly difficult to obtain, and these are not considered here.48 The studies that are 
available identify similar patterns among European firms to those found among US firms.  
 
 
47  The CMS was a random sample of R&D units located in the USA and conducting manufacturing R&D 
as part of a manufacturing firm. It was stratified by 3-digit SIC codes. The results reported in Cohen et al. 
(2000) are from a sub-sample of firms with sales over $US 5m, or with 20 or more employees in the business 
unit. Firm size ranges from 25 to 100,000+ employees (median 3,309).The response rate, adjusted for 
erroneously selected firms, was 54 per cent.  
48  The unobtainable studies are Arundel and van de Paal 1995; Goto and Nagata 1996; Cockburn and 
Henderson 2003, and two studies quoted in IPCRC (2000) for which insufficient bibliographic information is 
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Harabi undertook a modified and augmented version of the Yale survey in Switzerland in 
1988.49 The results confirm the US evidence: patents are the least effective means of 
obtaining a return from R&D investment. Again, there are some narrow exceptions: 
chemicals and some branches of machinery and electrotechnics (Harabi 1995). The most 
effective appropriation mechanisms are lead time and complementary sales and service.  
A recent study of larger Spanish manufacturing firms also found that patents were the least 
important mechanism for protecting innovation (González-Álvarez and Nieto-Antolín 
2007). The Spanish data show that patenting is considered more important in the chemical 
industry, confirming the CMS data. Patents are also reported as important in the electronics 
sector. Graham and Mowery (2003) and Hall (2005), among others, have shown that the 
electronic industries have high patent propensities, and the US data show that patents are an 
important tool for market access (cross-licensing) in the electronics industries.  
Since then a systematic series of innovation surveys have been implemented, both across 
the European Community and in other countries. While these surveys do not investigate 
innovation appropriation mechanisms in the same depth as the Yale survey and the CMS, 
they do ask a small number of relevant questions,50 and provide very broadly-based 
confirmation of the US findings. Except for a small number of industries, patents are the 
least important mechanism for ensuring a return to R&D. Because these surveys provide 
much better coverage of smaller firms, they are discussed below in the context of evidence 
about the importance of patents to smaller firms. 
2.4.4 What about small firms? 
It is often suggested that small firms and independent inventors are particular beneficiaries 
of the patent system. Mansfield notes that the evidence on this is weak and contradictory 
(Mansfield 1986: 175). Cohen et al. (2000) find that the use of patents is significantly 
greater among larger firms. Not only do larger firms have greater patenting propensities, 
provided (one is cited as Fest, 1996 and reports on a 1994 German survey; the other is a survey carried out by 
the French Industry Ministry: see IPCRC 2000: 141).  
49  Covering R&D performing firms, with the capacity to respond to a German-language questionnaire. 
50  The Second European Community Innovation Survey (CIS2) asked no questions about mechanisms 
used to protect innovations; and CIS3 asked whether patents and other formal (legal) or strategic (market) 
methods were used, but not the importance or effectiveness attached to them (Mairesse and Mohnen 2003). 
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they are more likely to use patents to negotiate or to prevent infringement suits. Smaller 
firms are far more likely to report patenting to enhance reputation.  
There is substantial survey evidence that small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) make 
less use of the patent system than do large firms. In a large survey of R&D performing 
manufacturing firms in Europe, designed to identify potential users of the patent system, 
the European Patent Office (EPO) confirmed earlier findings of this relationship (EPO 
1995b).51 About 30 per cent of small and medium sized firms had used the patent system, 
compared to nearly 60 per cent of large firms.52 This study also confirmed that larger firms 
patented a higher proportion of their inventions, and concluded that in this sense SMEs 
were ‘under-utilising’ the patent system. The study also confirmed the findings of the 
earlier US work on appropriability. Even users of the patent system reported factors such as 
product quality, delivery capacity, customer oriented products, technical/individual 
customer service, technologically advanced products and price as more important that 
patents as a competitive tool (EPO 1995b: 103). Like the studies quoted earlier, both users 
and non users of the patent system ranked patents as the least effective of a range of factors 
affecting their competitive position.53 
There are now a large number of studies reporting results from national innovation studies. 
While these surveys provide surprisingly little information about patents,54 they do indicate 
that patenting rates are low, even among firms undertaking formal R&D activities. These 
surveys also provide a small amount of information on the relative importance of patents 
compared to other methods of appropriation, and consistently find that market mechanisms 
are far more important than patents. For example, 1990-1992 data from the first European 
 
51  The initial universe of 1.8 million ‘production’ firms was reduced by excluding small (<20 employees) 
firms in low-technology industries. Within the remaining pool of about 360,000 firms, about 53 per cent do 
no formal R&D, and were also excluded. The study thus estimated that the pool of potential patent applicant 
firms was about 170,000 out of the initial 1.8 million, or a little under 10 per cent. It was estimated that one-
third of these firms had already used the patent system (EPO 1995b: 102). Screening interviews were held 
with 8,837 companies, then in-depth interviews were held with 1,006 patent applicants (companies with at 
least one patent application in the previous five years), and 1,345 non-applicants.  
52  Small firms are defined as those with <20 employees, medium sized firms as those with 20-99 
employees and large firms those with 100 or more employees. 
53  The one surprising finding in this study is the very low patent usage rate among chemical and 
pharmaceutical firms: only 26 per cent. A lower usage (23 per cent) was found only for precision mechanics 
and optics (EPO 1995b: 102-3). 
54  The dearth of questions about patents in National Innovation Surveys is itself interesting, and suggests 
that the designers of these surveys—innovation specialists—do not consider such questions important. If this 
implication is correct, it confirms the view that patents are largely irrelevant in inducing innovation.  
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Community Innovation Survey (CIS1) indicate that the most important methods of 
appropriating a return to innovation are lead-time advantages and complexity.55 These 
methods were consistently ranked as most important across all size classes of firms 
(Arundel 2001: 615-5). Secrecy is also ranked ahead of patents, and is relatively more 
important in small than in large firms.  
The Third European Community Innovation Survey (CIS3) collected data on approximately 
60,000 firms across the European Union for the period 1998-2001 (Eurostat 2004).56 This 
survey found that 44 per cent of firms were innovating, and that 17 per cent of these 
innovating firms had applied for at least one patent (with 11 per cent having at least one 
valid patent at the end of 2000). Again a higher proportion of innovating firms use market 
methods to obtain a return to innovation (36 per cent use lead-time, for example). This 
survey reports that the proportion of firms innovating increases with firm size, both for 
manufacturing and service firms (Eurostat 2004: 42). No community wide data are reported 
on differences in patenting by firm size.  
The 2003 Australian Innovation Survey received responses from nearly 7,000 companies, 
and found 35 per cent to be innovators (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2005).57 Only 4.4 
per cent of innovating firms used patents to protect their innovations. Indeed over half the 
firms reported no formal or informal methods for protecting their innovations. Nine per 
cent of innovating firms claimed to be undertaking innovations that were new to the world: 
the type of innovation which neo-classical theory would predict was most in need of patent 
protection, but which information economics would suggest needed least regulatory 
protection. As found elsewhere, patent use increases systematically with firm size.  
Macdonald, investigating small firm use of patents from the perspective of information 
flows, also confirms that small firms' use of the patent system is low (Macdonald 2003).58 
 
55  A multiple choice among five listed methods was allowed. Two were the formal methods of patents 
and registered designs. The fifth was secrecy (Arundel 2001: 616).  
56  Iceland took a census. Other countries used a postal survey with a random stratified sample to ensure 
representation of large, medium and small firms. Response rates varied from 21 per cent in Germany to 94 per 
cent in Norway (Eurostat 2004: 287).  
57  This survey excluded five industries (agriculture, forestry and fishing; government and defence; 
education; health; and personal/other services). It also excluded all firms with fewer than five employees. The 
response rate was 82 per cent (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2005: 75, 80)  
58  Using data from two samples of UK firms—one of 615 small firms with at least one UK or European 
patent in 1990 and a control group of 2,000 small manufacturing firms. 
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Bakels and Hugenholtz, reviewing the evidence on use of the patents by software SMEs, 
conclude that their low rates of use should be assumed to be rational (Bakels and 
Hugenholtz 2002: 25). Despite the anecdotes of small firm success based on patenting, 
clearly the system is much less used by small than by large firms.  
The data from the National Innovation Surveys provide strong support for the findings of 
the Yale survey and the CMS, and extend these to R&D performing small firms. Patents are 
the least effective form of protection in most industries. Large firms make greater use of the 
patent system and patent a higher proportion of their innovations. Studies like that by the 
EPO express concern about this ‘under-utilisation’ of the patent system by small enterprises 
and suggest various policy responses such as information campaigns and lower fees (EPO 
1995b). Macdonald (2003), on the other hand, demonstrates that there is a lack of fit 
between the design of the patent system and the approach to innovation in most companies. 
This clearly suggests that non-use of the patent system is entirely rational. Bakels and 
Hugenholtz, after reviewing the evidence on the use of patents by software SMEs, also 
conclude that their low utilisation rates need to be seen as entirely rational (Bakels and 
Hugenholtz 2002).  
2.4.5 So why do firms acquire patents? 
Given the systematic way in which R&D-performing firms in most industries report that 
patents are among the least effective means of obtaining a return on their investment, the 
paradox has been why they take out patents. But given the nature of the patent system 
(especially prevention of independent invention), in a world where patents exist the patent 
system itself causes patenting for defensive reasons. The CMS found that the R&D 
performing firms surveyed patented 49 per cent of their product innovations and 31 per cent 
of their process innovations. These firms were asked why they patented their most recent 
patented innovations. Naturally most firms reported prevention of copying as the principal 
reason.59 The next most important reason given was to block rivals (see Table 2.1). 
Blocking involves the use of patents to prevent other firms patenting related inventions 
(Cohen et al. 2000: 17), and is clearly an anti-competitive use of the patent system. Other 
 
59  Firms were asked to choose from a list of seven reasons which might have affected their most recent 
decision to patent. Multiple choices were allowed (Cohen et al. 2000: 17). Oppenheim 2000, also reports 97 
per cent of a sample of UK SMEs saying the purpose of patenting was to stop copying, and that 40 per cent of 
these respondents reported this as the sole reason for patenting. 
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important reasons were to prevent infringement suits and to use for negotiating access to 
other firms' patented technologies, both reasons caused by the patent system. The final 
major reason for patenting was to enhance reputation, a reason smaller firms were far more 
likely to report (Cohen et al. 2000: 24). Patenting to obtain license revenue was reported by 
only a minority of firms.  
When the data are weighted by the number of patent applications, the results change 
appreciably only for two reasons: prevention of infringement suits and use in negotiations 
(Cohen et al. 2000: 18). This indicates that firms which patent frequently are particularly 
concerned to protect themselves against litigation, and to participate in cross-licensing 
negotiations. Thus in terms of patent applications, very many are filed for reasons that are 
dysfunctional in terms of overall economic welfare (blocking rivals) or because of the very 
existence of the patent system (preventing infringement suits or participating in 
negotiations for access to complementary or overlapping technologies). 
The CMS Survey confirms the earlier research that patents are an important mechanism for 
obtaining a return to investment (the inducement mechanism) in only a small number of 
industries. It extends this analysis by investigating the motives for patenting, and finds that 
much patenting activity takes place only because the patent system exists. Such strategic 
reasons for patenting are confirmed by Blind and colleagues, who review a small number of 
studies on this topic, and add new data from German firms which actively use the patent 
system (Blind et al. 2006). They suggest that the motives for patenting are becoming 
increasingly uncoupled from the need for protection from imitation. The surveys Blind and 
colleagues review mainly use European data, which systematically confirm that important 
reasons for patenting are defensive and offensive blocking and negotiations for exchange of 
technologies. One of the most interesting findings reported is a survey of very large firms 
investigating changes in motives to patent over a ten-year period. The most important 
change influencing increased patenting is patenting by other market participants.60
 
60  Blind et al. report this as a result from a 2003 OECD survey by the Committee for Scientific and 
Technological Policy (Blind et al. 2006: 658). In relation to the possibility that it is the patent system itself 
which creates the need for patenting, Walterscheid raises this possibility as occurring as early as the late 
eighteenth century: ‘a point was reached wherein the patent system created its own logic and patents begat 
patents’ (Walterscheid 1996: 81). 
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Table 2.1 Reasons for patenting recent innovations: USA, 1994  
 
 products processes 
 unweighted
weighted by 
patent 
applications 
unweighted 
weighted by 
patent 
applications 
Prevent copying 96%  78%  
Prevent other firms' attempts to 
patent related inventions  
(blocking rivals) 
82%  64%  
Prevent infringement suits  
(defensive patenting)  59% 74% 47% 63% 
Enhance reputation 48%  34%  
Strengthen firm's position in 
negotiations with other firms   
(cross-licensing) 
47% 58% 37% 49% 
Earn licensing revenue 28%  23%  
Measure performance of firm's 
technologists  6%  5%  
Source:  These data are from the 1994 Carnegie Mellon survey of US R&D units of manufacturing firms as 
reported in Cohen et al. 2000: Tables 8 and 9, and text p. 18. 
 
Cohen, Goto and colleagues have undertaken an interesting comparison of US and Japanese 
manufacturing firms, identifying a number of different behavioural patterns, particularly 
with respect to strategic patenting. They find that patents play a larger, but different, role in 
Japan.61 Because patent scope is much narrower than in the USA, products more frequently 
require access to multiple patents. Compared to US firms, Japanese firms more frequently 
use patents to gain market access to complementary technology than to block rivals, and 
this strategy is prevalent across a wider range of industries.62 They also find that there are 
far greater intra-industry information flows in Japan, with rival firms being an important 
source of technology information.63  
                                                 
 
61  Which may be attributable to the different design of the Japanese patent system, with its emphasis on 
the diffusion of technology information (Cohen et al. 2002). As of the mid-1990s the Japanese patent system, 
in comparison to that of the USA, encouraged earlier filing, ensured earlier and universal disclosure, allowed 
pre-grant opposition, and provided lower returns to patent litigation. Claim construction was also much 
narrower, reducing the scope of any individual patent. For a useful discussion of changes in the Japanese 
patent system see Branstetter 2004.  
62  In the USA, where patents tend to have wider scope, there is less likelihood that discrete products will 
require access to multiple patents. As a consequence, US firms tend to use blocking strategies to shut out 
competition in discrete product industries. In Japan, in contrast, cross-licensing may well be necessary in 
discrete as well as complex product industries, as patent scope is narrower, and so patents are more frequently 
used as a bargaining chip to gain market access. 
63  Perhaps related to this, the time required for imitation is consistently lower in Japan than in the USA. 
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These surveys indicate that not only are patents not needed in most industries, but that a 
major factor underlying patenting activity is simply the existence of the patent system. This 
is not surprising when one considers that the patent system can inhibit independent 
invention. As the level of patenting rises, the risk that a firm will be found to infringe 
another firm's patent increases. The rational response is to insure against this by taking out 
one's own patents. Bessen and Meurer point out that the only firms at risk of facing a patent 
infringement suit are innovating firms (Bessen and Meurer 2008).  
But this is a long way from the objective of inducing more innovative activity. It is not—or 
should not be—the objective of patent policy to induce more patent applications.64 By 
combining the data on the relative effectiveness of patents with the data on the reasons for 
patenting one can achieve some interesting insights into the genuine inducement effect of 
the patent system. CMS data for industries where patents are ranked as highly effective (in 
ensuring a return to innovation) are shown in Table 2.2. This identifies five discrete product 
industries and five complex product industries. Discrete products are those with a relatively 
simple mapping between patents and products. Complex products are those where access to 
a large number of patents is required to produce a single product. 
In all the discrete product industries where patents are relatively important, the primary 
purpose for use is to block rivals—to stop them patenting competing products (Table 2.2). 
Firms in drugs and chemical industries show very high patent system use, with an almost 
exclusive focus on blocking as the underlying strategy. The situation is more varied for the 
five complex product industries where patents are ranked as a relatively important 
mechanism in returns to innovation. For three of these industries the principal reason for 
patenting is to block rivals (medical equipment, electrical equipment and special purpose 
machinery). In the computer industry the principal reported reason is defensive—to prevent 
infringement suits. In the car/truck industry the principal reason is reported as being to  
While lead time and complementary production and service capabilities are important in both countries, 
above-market returns (rent) to innovations are lower in Japan than in the USA. 
64  The massive increase in patent volume is discussed below (Sub-Section 3.3.2). Briefly the research 
consensus is that there has been a substantial increase in the number of patents per billion dollars of R&D 
expenditure, though there is no agreement on the drivers of this increase in patent ‘yield’. There has also been 
a very substantial growth in the ratio of intellectual property lawyers to $US billions spent on research and 
development—from under 45 in 1970 to about 75 in the late 1990s (Barton 2000). 
 Table 2.2 Industries reporting high patent effectiveness:  main reasons for patenting 
 
 Effectiveness of patents as an 
appropriation mechanism 
Mean % 
patented 
Main reason for Main reason for 
 Products Processes product patents process patents 
 Score Rank Score Rank 
new 
products
new 
processes  %  % 
Discrete product industries           
drugs (SIC 2432): 50 1= 36 3= 96 42 block 97 block 82 
chemicals, n.e.c. (SIC 2400) 37 1= 20 4= 69 62 block 86 block 55 
metal products (SIC 2800) 33 2= 20 4= 40 20 block 83  block 50 
rubber/plastic (SIC 2500) 39 2= 22 5= 49 20 block 78  block 75 
petroleum (SIC 2320) 33 3= 37 2= 38 62 block 90 block 80 
           
Complex product industries           
medical equipment (SIC 3311) 55 1= 34 4= 67 31  block 93 block 69 
electrical equipment (SIC 3100) 34 2= 19 2= 59 19 block 79 block 36 
computers (SIC 3010) 41 2= 30 4 39 26 suits* 90 suits* 88 
special purpose machinery n.e.c. 
(SIC 2920) 
49 2= 29 5 39 10 block 73 block 54 
car/truck (SIC 3410) 39 2= 22 5= 49 20 negotiate# 75  negotiate# 63 
Source:  Cohen et al. 2000: Tables 1, 2, A1, 8 and 9 
Notes: Industries are included in this table if either the effectiveness of patents in protecting product or process innovations is first (1), first equa1 (1=), second (2) or 
second equal (2=) as shown in Table 1 or Table 2 in Cohen et al., 2000. This does not necessarily mean that patents are highly effective. For industries shown 
above the percentage of innovations for which patents are considered effective for product or process innovations is: drugs (50%, 36%); chemicals n.e.c. (38%, 
20%); metal products (39%, 22%); rubber/plastic (33%, 20%); petroleum (33%, 37%); medical equipment (55%, 34%); electrical equipment (35%, 19%); 
computers (41%, 30%); special purpose machinery n.e.c. (49%, 29%); and cars/trucks (39%, 22%).  
* to prevent infringement suits # to strengthen the firm's position in negotiations with other firms 
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strengthen the firm's position in negotiations with other firms. Much current innovation in 
the car/truck industry involves electronics, and (as discussed in Section 3.3), the electronics 
industries have been shown to involve extensive use of patents for cross-licensing.  
2.5 Policy implications 
These empirical data provide strong evidence that imitation is neither instantaneous not 
costless. Even in Japan, where imitation lags are shorter than in the USA, lead-time is 
reported as a significant means for obtaining a return for innovation. Patents can increase 
the cost of imitation, especially in the chemical industries, but there are widespread natural 
lags in imitation for patented and unpatented products and processes. First mover 
advantages, other market imperfections, and firm capabilities ensure the market provides a 
return for most innovations. Imitation takes money as well as time: in a small proportion of 
cases imitation is as expensive as creation. While imitation costs are very variable, both 
within and between industries, typically they are at least 50 per cent of the original creation 
cost. Products or processes which are more expensive to produce are also generally more 
expensive to imitate, both in time and money. The market thus appears to provide generally 
broad protection to innovations and greater protection for more expensive innovations.  
With few exceptions, these empirical studies show that firms consider market mechanisms 
to be far more important than patents in ensuring a return to innovation. The studies cover a 
wide range of high-technology industries, including computers, semi-conductors and 
aircraft industries. They include lower technology industries and firms of all sizes. They 
have been replicated in many higher income countries. In most industries, they confirm the 
greater importance of market strategies than patents in ensuring profitable R&D. Product 
differentiation, first mover advantages, reputation and effective complementary production 
and service systems are, in most industries, more important than patents in ensuring an 
adequate return to innovative activities. The empirical research thus shows that, generally, 
the assumptions and predictions of the conventional neo-classical model do not work well 
with respect to industrial innovation. Normal competitive mechanisms should generally 
ensure a good level of industrial innovation.65 
 
65  For broader discussions of the importance of competitive mechanisms as a key driver in industrial 
innovation, and many examples, see Baumol 2000 and Boldrin and Levine 2008.  
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However in a narrow range of industries patents are reported as being critical to the 
decision to invest in R&D. The pre-eminent cases are pharmaceuticals and fine chemicals. 
Repeatedly it is found that it is pharmaceutical and fine chemical industries which report 
that, absent patents, their innovation behaviour would change. These industries have certain 
features in common. Especially for products, the codified element of innovation is high 
compared to the tacit element. The cost of innovation is also high, especially where 
regulatory requirements create the need for expensive Phase III trials. In addition, the 
development of generic pharmaceutical industries shows that the costs of imitation are 
relatively low. Fourthly, the boundaries defined are clearer, reducing the cost of disputes. 
To a lesser extent, patents are reported as important in the mechanical equipment industry.  
A common feature of the industries where patents are reported as an important mechanism 
for appropriation is that innovations fall at the codified end of the knowledge spectrum. It is 
here that information economics agrees with the conventional neo-classical approach that 
imitation may be faster and cheaper. But for most industries, the neo-classical assumption 
that imitation costs are close to zero is shown by the evidence to be simply wrong. Indeed, 
it can require almost as large a resource input to imitate as it can to invent. Two critical 
assumptions in conventional economic analyses of patents are thus demonstrated by the 
evidence to be profoundly wrong—it is expensive to acquire new knowledge so imitation 
costs are rarely low, and markets for innovation do not regularly fail. 
While the data systematically indicate that patents are an ineffective appropriation 
mechanism in most industries, there are small proportions of firms reporting patents as an 
important appropriation mechanism. Teece has drawn attention to the central importance of 
access to complementary assets in achieving a market return to innovation (Teece 1986). 
Boldrin and Levine suggest that it is only in circumstances where the R&D investment is 
large and indivisible that normal market mechanisms will fail to provide an adequate return 
to innovation (Boldrin and Levine 2004). This is precisely the type of situation which 
Arrow identified as creating a case for government subsidy of R&D in his seminal article 
(Arrow 1962).  
There are thus some very particular circumstances where the market for innovation may 
fail: where the new knowledge is highly codified; where the inventor does not have good 
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access to complementary assets; or where the investment is large and indivisible. These 
situations aside, there is no evidence of any general failure in the market for innovations.66  
Effective policy needs to be based on a good understanding of the relevant issues. And as 
the essence of policy intervention is to achieve change, it is particularly important to 
understand the factors that affect the variable of interest (here, innovation). The evidence 
presented above shows that, in most circumstances, patents are likely to induce very little 
additional innovation. Rather, they may provide windfall gains for behaviour that would 
have occurred in the absence of patents.  
2.5.1 Do patents induce innovation? 
As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, the most important issue in good patent policy 
design is balance—balance between any benefits induced and any costs incurred. If total 
costs exceed total benefits, then the policy is clearly welfare-reducing. Most discussion of 
patent policy is based on theory (or opinion) not evidence. Indeed it is often suggested that 
there is no evidence. However substantial empirical research on appropriability can be used 
to develop at least rough estimates of the proportion of patented inventions that might be 
induced by patent policy. These can be used as a yardstick against which costs can be 
compared. The estimates presented here make assumptions that tend to over-estimate rather 
than under-estimate induced patents. The assumptions and the calculations are discussed in 
detail in Appendix 2. 
Australia typifies the type of country long known not to benefit from a patent system 
(Penrose 1951). Despite Australia’s high level of education and generally innovative 
culture, there has never been a large manufacturing sector. While there are high-technology 
niches and some firms have developed leading-edge technologies, Australia is overall a 
technology-importing nation. One could expect this also from Australia’s small size 
                                                 
66  Some indeed take the view that, when considering innovation, the market failure framework is deeply 
misleading (Dosi et al. 2006). Others comment on the dissonance between the expanding patent system and 
the empirical evidence. Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, for example, comment ‘Curiously enough, these policy 
changes have been made despite a forty year legacy of empirical findings in economics that call into question 
whether patent protection—no less stronger patent protection—advances innovation in a substantial way in 
most industries’ (Cohen et al. 2000: 2).  
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compared to global markets and populations.67 It is hard to envisage circumstances in 
which Australia might become a technology-exporting nation. There are therefore few 
domestic firms or independent inventors who might benefit from a patent system. The vast 
bulk of Australian patents are granted to foreign entities—some 92 per cent of all standard 
patents granted since 1990.  
Against this background it is not surprising that the patent system is estimated to have 
induced at most only 6 per cent of granted patents. This estimate is based on assuming that 
all chemical and pharmaceutical innovations patented in Australia by Australian-domiciled 
entities (including subsidiaries of global pharmaceutical companies) are induced by the 
Australian patent system. It also assumes that 40 per cent of patented innovations in other 
fields are induced—a figure well above the estimates established overseas. In contrast, it 
assumes no inducement effect for firms and individuals resident in Canada, the USA, Japan 
or Europe.  
While as many as 6 per cent of patented inventions may be induced, not all of these will 
generate positive externalities. Where innovation and/or production takes place overseas, 
any knowledge spillovers are most likely to accrue overseas. Benefits in the form of 
increased consumer surplus—which flows along supply chains—will also often accrue 
overseas, as Australia has little depth to its manufacturing base. It is estimated that only 
some 3 per cent of innovations patented in Australia generate the type of dynamic benefits 
that are alleged to offset the static monopoly losses created by a patent system.  
The USA forms quite a different picture. It was only with respect to the USA that Machlup 
famously drew no conclusions as to the overall costs and benefits of a patent system.68 
Despite decades with a declining manufacturing sector, the USA retains a relatively large 
manufacturing base, and US firms are key decision makers for much offshore 
manufacturing. The USA has a long been a net exporter of technology. Indeed there is 
 
67  OECD statistics for Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2004 show that Australia’s GDP was only 2.1 
per cent of the total OECD (calculated from http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/Index.aspx?datasetcode=SNA_TABLE1, 
accessed 31 August 2008).  
68  ‘If we did not have a patent system, it would be impossible, on the basis of our present knowledge of 
its economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. But since we have had a patent system for a long 
time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it. This last 
statement refers to a country such as the United States of America—not to a small country and not to a 
predominantly nonindustrial country, where a different weight of argument might well suggest another 
conclusion’ (Machlup 1958: 80). 
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evidence to suggest that the adoption of a national policy to promote patent protection 
overseas was designed to significantly increase the net royalty inflow, thus reducing the 
continuing balance of payments deficit (Sell 2003; Scherer 2006).  
With its much larger market, a higher percentage of US patents are owned by US entities. 
So it is not surprising that some 29 to 40 per cent of US patents may be induced. This much 
larger figure is partly due to the higher proportion of US patents owned by US residents, 
and partly to the assumption that the very large size of the US market induces innovation in 
at least some overseas firms selling into that market. Of the estimated induced patents, an 
estimated 25 to 33 per cent have the potential to contribute dynamic efficiency gains to the 
economy to offset any costs created by the patent system (see Appendix 2). 
2.5.2 What about the costs of patent systems? 
While the percentage of granted patents which might give rise to dynamic benefits in the 
USA is ten times the magnitude in Australia, it cannot be assumed that the net impact of the 
patent system in the USA is positive. In order to draw any such conclusions, the possible 
benefits flowing from the induced innovations need to be considered in relation to the costs. 
The idea that patent policy is the most efficient available mechanism for inducing a higher 
level of innovation is at least partly based on the idea that the costs of a patent system are 
trivial (Andersen 2003). But again little attention has been paid to these costs and there is 
an absence of quantification.69 In terms of private costs and benefits, recent work suggests 
that among US publicly listed firms, only pharmaceutical firms gain a net private benefit 
from patents. Other publicly listed firms show a net private loss, due to the much increased 
risk of litigation, and the impact his has on firm value (Bessen and Meurer 2008).  
                                                 
69  There is almost no literature on the costs of the patent system. Searches of academic databases provide 
almost no entries on the costs of patents as a system, though there are more entries on unrefereed internet 
sites. Those few authors who provide any detailed discussion of patent system costs tend to the view that 
detailed empirical estimates are impossible (for example, Machlup 1958; Cole 2001). Alternatively they 
discuss the nature of some of the costs incurred, but without making any quantitative estimates. Both 
Macdonald and Ricketson challenge the prevailing view that the impact on innovation is positive, and note the 
lack of any empirical evidence to support such claimed benefits (Ricketson 1992; Macdonald 2002). Lemley 
(2001) undertakes an interesting assessment of the cost and benefit of more rigorous patent examination. 
Other authors note positive or negative impacts, generally with no empirical support other than anecdotes. 
Bessen and Meurer have recently tabled some interesting work on the private costs of patents for publicly 
listed US firms (Bessen and Meurer 2007). For an initial attempt to gather together the available information 
on patent system costs (and benefits) see Moir 2008a.  
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The two most important costs are any negative impact on subsequent invention, including 
discouraging new market entrants, and direct welfare losses due to reduced (monopoly) 
output. It has been argued that very few patents are used—perhaps as few as 5 per cent (see 
for example, Lemley 2001, and Blonder 2005). But no evidence is cited for such estimates. 
A European Union study on small firms and patent enforcement provides no supporting 
evidence or citations for the statement that:  
‘[i]t is well known that the majority of patented inventions are never used in practice, 
either because they are overtaken by further advances, or they are seen by their 
owners to be uneconomic, or for some other reason’ 
(EU 2000: 30),  
These views run counter to the evidence-based data tabled by Firestone in 1971. He found 
that 50 per cent of Canadian patents were used to support production. He reported figures 
from the UK and the USA: in the UK 30 per cent of patents were worked (Firestone 1971: 
14), while in the USA large firms worked 49 per cent of their patents and small firms 71 
per cent (Firestone 1971: 149). These figures are consistent with a 1957 US study reported 
by Griliches (1990: 1679) that 41 to 55 per cent of patents were used commercially, with up 
to 71 per cent used among small firms. While this evidence is dated, it does suggest that at 
least a substantial minority of patents are used in commercial production. This is confirmed 
by patent renewal data. Griliches (1990: 1679-80) summarises the evidence as indicating 
that about half of granted patents are renewed beyond year ten and about 10 per cent to the 
maximum limit.70 Renewal rates are lumpier in the USA as renewal fees are due at only 
three points over the 20 year potential life. The percentage of US patents renewed to their 
full term is estimated at nearly 40 per cent (Thomas 1999b). These data show that while 
many patents lose any value quickly, a substantial minority retain value for some time—
their private value at least exceeds the costs of renewal.  
Certainly if a patent is not used it cannot generate a cost to others. Some of the literature 
presumes that because of the existence of close substitutes, very few patents have any real 
 
70  Patent renewal data are mostly used to calculate the private value of patents. There are marked inter-
country differences in renewals, but these largely disappear once industry is controlled. There are also 
differences in renewal rates by patent cohort and by residence, with renewal rates being much lower for 
domestic than for foreign patent owners. There are no single effective summary measures of renewal rates, 
and they are usually shown graphically. Neither Schankerman and Pakes (1986) nor Pakes and colleagues 
(Pakes et al. 1989) give summary measures of renewal rates. However Griliches provides a summary of the 
early studies (Griliches 1990).  
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degree of monopoly power (for example, Gans et al. 2004). But, presuming rationality 
among most patent owners, the renewal data show that a large minority of patents clearly 
retain value for many years.  
A patent might, of course have value for many reasons. There is substantial evidence that 
many patents are taken out for defensive purposes—a form of insurance. But does value 
mean use? Firestone's data cover the traditional view of patent use: use in production. It is 
such uses that create the static (deadweight) losses attributable to the use of monopoly 
power. But the data on the reasons for patenting show many other uses, and that these are 
increasing in importance (Blind et al. 2006). These new uses revolve around defensive and 
offensive blocking, and trading use-rights to bundles of patents. Central to these new uses 
is the impact of patents on the opportunities other firms have to develop and improve 
existing technology, and to enter specific markets.  
The possible negative impacts of patents on subsequent innovation is a concern that has 
been raised by many (for example, David 1993; Macdonald 2004). Penrose suggested this 
was the most significant of the social costs of patent systems: ‘[b]oth within and between 
countries the greatest social cost of patents arises from the restrictions they put on the right 
to imitate new ideas’ (Penrose 1951: 99). Not only can negative impacts on subsequent 
innovation create direct losses, but also—because innovation is cumulative, evolutionary 
and path-dependent—it can change the direction of future technological development.71  
Patents also create social costs where they reduce market competition by excluding new 
entrants. Cockburn and MacGarvie comment that ‘[d]irect evidence on the “stifling” versus 
“stimulating” impacts of patents on innovation and competition is not easy to find’ 
(Cockburn and MacGarvie 2006: 1). In their study of 27 narrowly-defined classes of 
software products they find that entry is lower in industries where there are more software 
patents, suggesting that patents do operate as a barrier to entry. But they also find that firms 
 
71  Because of the general lack of variability between national patent systems, real world experiments and 
counter-factuals are rarely available to test the actual impact of patent systems. In one of the very small 
number of studies of differences in innovation behaviour between those resident in countries with patent 
systems and those resident in countries without them, Moser looked used a new dataset of close to fifteen 
thousand innovations at the Crystal Palace World Fair (1851) and at the Centennial Exhibition (1876) to 
examine the effects of patent laws on innovation. She found that the existence of patent laws changed the 
fields in which innovative activity occurred, but did not raise the overall level of innovation (Moser 2005).  
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holding software patents are more likely to enter these markets, suggesting that patent 
ownership assists entry, at least in markets where patents are prevalent. 
2.5.3 Balance in the patent system 
This discussion confirms that patent policy is a very blunt instrument: it induces only a 
minority of patented inventions. The owners of the majority of patents may therefore 
receive windfall profits. Because little serious attention has been paid to the costs imposed 
by a patent system, the dangers of patents as a policy instrument have been inadequately 
explored.72 The empirical data suggest that patents are effective in achieving a higher level 
of innovative activity only in a narrow range of circumstances. The strong conclusion is 
that patent policy needs serious review.  
This conclusion is similar to that reached, by different routes, by many others. Encaoua and 
colleagues suggest that if the policy interest is the incentive to invest, then patents should 
not be the default policy choice (Encaoua et al. 2006). Boldrin and Levine suggest patents 
should be used only when the innovation investment is large and indivisible (Boldrin and 
Levine 2004). Winter, using a model of evolutionary innovation, demonstrated that both 
R&D investment and total surplus would be higher without patents (Winter 1993). Dutton 
(1984) and Mandeville (1996) both concluded that the most balanced (welfare-enhancing) 
patent policy was a weak patent system. 
These results are not new. In a treatise on the key policy needs to support competitive 
markets, Edwards concluded (more than half a century ago) that patent policy was 
‘improvident’ as it met only the needs of a few, yet applied broadly. He noted that patents 
 
72  In regard to the recent judicial expansion in subject matter to business method patents, efforts to collect 
evidence on their policy impact have been prevented by interested parties. ‘The White House Office of 
Science and Technology Policy commissioned a study on software patent quality and business effect by the 
Science and Technology Policy Institute at RAND in early 1998. However, it was suspended at the request of 
a U.S. multinational company concerned that the study would undercut efforts to secure greater international 
acceptance of software patents. The penultimate Senate draft of the American Inventors Protection Act of 
1999 mandated a General Accounting Office study of business method patents, but this was removed at the 
behest of the patent bar. Despite calls by the 1999 National Research Council report, Digital Dilemma, for 
research on the effects of software patents, no studies have been commissioned, nor has the National Science 
Foundation supported any empirical research on the subject’ (Kahin 2003a). Bessen and Meurer comment that 
the Federal Trade Commission (US FTC 2003) recommendation which was most prominently rejected by the 
Intellectual Property Owners Association (dominated by patent lawyers from large firms) was 
Recommendation 10 ‘expand consideration of economic learning and competition policy concerns in patent 
law decisionmaking’ (Bessen and Meurer 2008: 293-4).  
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were appropriate only in narrow circumstances, particularly where the development costs 
were large and indivisible: 
"If special protection is needed at all, the need is proportional to the probable cost of 
development rather than to the profit-yielding possibilities of the patent or the size of 
the concern that holds it. It would be improvident to relax the protection of important 
public interests in the case of all patents in order to meet a problem presented by a 
few patents. The proper remedy is the use of special measures to encourage 
development at any particular points where such measures are needed."  
(Edwards 1949: 247) 
Despite the lack of any sound theoretical base or any supporting evidence that patent policy 
is necessary, let alone welfare-enhancing, it has actually grown stronger (Gallini 2002; 
Branstetter 2004). Jaffe reports ‘widespread unease that the costs of stronger patent 
protection may exceed the benefits’ (Jaffe 2000; 555). In part, the strengthening has been 
due to decisions by individual judges, a story investigated in more detail in Chapter 3. In 
part it is due to successful lobbying by the small number of firms which are major 
beneficiaries of the patent system.73 In part it is due to a general shift in the pendulum 
towards viewing patents in a more positive light (Granstrand 1999). A particularly 
concerning aspect of this move towards stronger patent policy has been the extension in the 
boundaries of what is patentable, in particular the extension beyond the boundaries of 
science and technology.  
The remainder of this study focuses on this extension in the reach of the patent system, 
asking how it has occurred and what is its effect. As noted in Chapter 1, this leads 
inexorably into an investigation of inventiveness. The path by which the patent system has 
narrowed definitions of novelty and inventiveness so that seemingly obvious patents are 
regularly granted is also discussed in the next chapter.  
 
73  Landes and Posner point to the persistent asymmetry in the benefits and costs of strong 'intellectual 
property rights' (Landes and Posner 2004). The USPTO website provides a data set on major users of their 
patent system for the period since 1963. Considering grants from patents filed in the years 1990 to 2001, there 
were a total of 1,713,605 patents granted, of which 1,468,408 (86 per cent) were granted to organisations. Of 
these 656,974 (45 per cent) were granted to 300 companies who each owned 1,000 or more patents granted in 
the period 1963 to 2006. The 100 companies holding most patents in the 1990 to 2001 period held 513,228 
patents in aggregate, or 35 per cent of patents granted to organisations. In Australia 161,404 patents were 
granted from applications in the 1990 to 2001 period, of which 141,584 (88 per cent) were to organisations. 
The 100 companies holding most patents held 34 per cent of patents granted to organisations (Moir 2008b: 
Table 2).  
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3 
Judicial Decision Making?  
The Extension of Patentability to Business Methods 
“… the greatest changes in the legal system made by judges, without legislative review or 
approval, have occurred in the area of patent law.” 
(Boldrin and Levine 2008: 63) 
3.1 Introduction 
Until 1998 there was a consensus that business methods were not patentable. In Europe this 
is due to a specific statutory exclusion,74 while in other countries it developed through case 
law consideration of specific applications. This changed with a single legal judgement in 
the USA. Some common law countries (such as Australia) have moved to adopt this 
judgement and now grant patents for business methods. This chapter looks first at how this 
change in the subject matter reach of the patent system occurred (Section 3.2). Attention is 
then turned to what is known about the impact of this change, and the findings of the small 
empirical literature on business method patents are reviewed (Section 3.3). One common 
theme in this literature is that ‘the problem’ is not so much a change in patentable subject 
matter as a difficulty either in the identification of existing knowledge, or in the application 
of appropriate standards of novelty and inventiveness. So the question of how standards of 
novelty and inventiveness have changed over time is investigated in Section 3.4. The focus 
is on understanding the practical meaning, and economic impact, of the current novelty and 
inventiveness tests.  
Australia is used as the main case to illustrate how the legal treatment of what is patentable 
has changed. This provides background for the analysis, in Chapters 5 and 6, of recently 
granted business method patents. But one cannot deal in isolation with any common law 
country, as they tend to look to each other for legal precedent.75 Common law countries are 
 
74  Art 52(2)(c) European Patent Convention (EPC) ‘ … shall not be regarded as inventions … methods 
for performing mental acts, playing games or doing business …’. 
75  A distinguishing feature of modern common law is that it is created or refined by judges, and decisions 
in each case draw on previous case law and impact on future case law. In England the stare decisis concept 
developed in the late eighteenth century. The stare decisis concept ‘may be viewed as a peculiarly legal 
adaptation of the common practice of relying on past experience’ (Walterscheid 1995c: 794) . 
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the UK (except Scotland), the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, 
Malaysia and many other former British colonies.  
As with many other common law countries Australia initially derived its patent legislation 
from the English Statute of Monopolies 1623 which came into force in 1624. While the 
Australian Patents Act 1990 had as one of its goals a shift from archaic to plain English,76 it 
specifically retains reference to the seventeenth century language of the Statute of 
Monopolies in the critical definition of an invention as a ‘manner of new manufacture’.77 
So the terminology and concepts of 1623 remain embedded in the patent system, both in 
statute law and in the body of case law. This can be quite complex, for example Canada’s 
statute law is modelled on US law, but case law tends to follow the UK (Bochnovic 1982).  
There is a strong tendency for countries to cross-refer to changes in other countries, both in 
terms of changes to patent legislation, and in terms of case law developments. Thus when 
Australia finally repealed the Patents Act 1903, replacing it with the Patents Act 1952, the 
Attorney-General gave as one reason the extensive overhaul of the British Patent Act in 
1949.78 Similarly, in reviewing the boundaries of patentability, the New Zealand 
government is paying careful attention to approaches in Europe, the USA and Australia 
(New Zealand Ministry of Economic Development 2002).  
In the same way that executive governments consider overseas developments when 
reviewing patent legislation, judges look at decisions made in other jurisdictions, as well as 
precedents in their own country. The 1959 NRDC decision by the Australian High Court, 
which considerably enlarged patentable subject matter in Australia (Christie 2000), has 
been influential in overseas decisions (Lahore 1978; Goldsmith 1994: 19). In allowing 
patentability for a loyalty system ‘invention’, Justice Heerey of the Australian Federal 
Court stated, without any supporting argument, that he found the US Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit (CAFC) State Street Bank decision persuasive.79   
 
76  Barry Jones, MP, Minister for Science, Customs and Small Business, Second Reading speech, 1 June 
1989. One of the major thrusts of the bill was ‘it brings the language and structure of the Act down to earth.’ 
77  Interestingly the Act specifies no purpose or objective, and what constitutes a patentable invention is 
not discussed until S.18. An invention is defined in Schedule 1 (the dictionary) as ‘"invention" means any 
manner of new manufacture the subject of letters patent and grant of privilege within section 6 of the Statute 
of Monopolies, and includes an alleged invention.’  
78  Second Reading Speech, 22 May 1952, Senate Hansard: 687 (at 690).  
79  Welcome Real-Time SA v. Catuity Inc, [2001] FCA 445 (17 May 2001): 129.  
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The story of changes in patentable subject matter (Section 3.2) and changes to novelty and 
inventiveness standards (Section 3.4) as applied to Australia is thus linked to, and has 
parallels with, other nations. In telling these stories, some discussion of developments in 
other common law jurisdictions is therefore both inevitable and enlightening. Indeed it is 
not possible to tell how the current patent system developed in Australia without telling of 
developments in both the UK and the USA.80 It should be noted, however, that the 
principal focus in this study is the economic impact of patent systems, and the social costs 
and benefits of changes to what is patentable. This overview of legal developments can in 
no way be considered a history from a legal perspective.81 The objective is to provide, for a 
non-legal audience of policy analysts, an overview of the principal decisions which affect 
the changing balance of the patent system and thus its changing economic impact. The 
interpretation of case law decisions, and of statutory changes, is from an economic 
viewpoint, and therefore presents quite a different perspective than would a legal analysis 
of the same material.82 
The story is told here because it does not appear to be available elsewhere. There are some 
more specific contributions, such as Bochnovic’s excellent study of the development of the 
inventive step doctrine (Bochnovic 1982), and Dutfield’s work on the life sciences 
industries (Dutfield 2003). The IPCRC report includes an interesting table on the evolution 
of the meaning of ‘manner of manufacture’ concept (IPCRC 2000: 147).83 Thambisetty 
reports, from a legal perspective, on the net outcome of selected case law interpretations. 
She documents a range of silly outcomes (doctrinal incoherence) in patent law 
 
80  And, by implication, Europe as UK patent law was amended in 1977 to align with the EPC. 
81  For example, the focus is principally on patentable subject matter and on issues relating to novelty and 
inventiveness. But there were other interesting changes, also introduced by judicial decision, for example the 
shift from domestic ‘working’ of the patent and dissemination of the new skills through the training of 
apprentices, to the requirement for a written specification, codified in the 1852 UK Patents Act ((Australian) 
Patent Office 1969).  
82  For example lawyers treat the concept of 'patentable subject matter' in a complex, multi-faceted way, 
including elements of technology field, type of invention, the tangible to intangible continuum and degree of 
inventiveness. From a policy perspective 'patentable subject matter' seems more an issue of what technology 
fields are (or should be) patentable. An innovation policy analyst would also look at inventiveness as a 
continuum from incremental to radical. In contrast, lawyers divide the concept into three components: 
newness, inventiveness, and a threshold requirement of 'invention', and assess each in a highly circumscribed 
manner in relation to a highly circumscribed set of documents or evidence of previous knowledge.  
83  Unfortunately this table is unsourced and undiscussed. It includes a 1951 case as indicating the 
extension of patentability to cover agricultural processes, which other commentators say did not occur until 
the 1959 NRDC case ((Australian) Patent Office 1969: 29). 
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(Thambisetty 2008). Understanding how the law has changed over time is important to 
understanding the current state of balance in the patent system.  
The development of patent law is also fascinating from a policy perspective: despite the 
alleged importance of patent systems to economic wellbeing, executive governments have 
given only vestigial consideration to patent policy. Where specific reviews have been 
established, these have been dominated by those with a strong interest in the preservation 
and extension of the patent system.84 There has been a significant lack of any evidence on 
the economic impact of any change in law, partly because this is not required in legal cases, 
and partly because when the new legal doctrines are codified, they seem not to have been 
subject to any policy analysis. As will be seen below, until the recent introduction of 
patents as an issue in trade negotiations, most patent policy appears to have been made by 
judges. For example, the three Australian Patents Acts (1903, 1952 and 1990) were all 
presented to parliament as codifications of the current law, as was the 1952 US Patent Act, 
even though it introduced into statutory law itself the test for non-obviousness. There is no 
evidence of any policy assessment of the impact of case law doctrines before they are 
codified into statute law.  
 
84  Christie and Caine (2005) provide a useful listing of reviews of the Australian patent system since 
Federation in 1901. Excluding those looking only at specific aspects of patent legislation, there have been 
four general reviews of the patent system. The 1935 Knowles Committee and the 1950 Deane Committee 
made recommendations that were incorporated into the Patents Act 1952. As noted in the Second Reading 
Speech, the membership of the Deane Committee was the Commissioner of Patents, the Parliamentary 
Draftsman, two past Presidents of the Institute of Patent Attorneys of Australia, and a judge. The committee 
recommended no changes in principle, but a number of practical changes, the most important being a new 
capacity for substantial amendment of patent specifications after filing. The 1984 IPAC review, which 
eventually led to the Patents Act 1990, claimed to be the first review from a predominantly economic 
perspective, but the sole economist on the committee disagreed, claiming that there was nothing economic 
about the review and that it was constrained by ‘special pleading by those directly involved’ (IPAC 1984: 79-
80). The other members were a patenting expert from BHP (chair), the commissioner of patents, an ex 
commissioner of patents, a patent attorney, a solicitor, an officer from the CSIRO, and the head of the then 
Department of Productivity. While the 2000 IPCRC review was both wider (addressing all intellectual 
property legislation) and narrower (focusing on competition principles) it is also counted here, as it took a 
sufficiently broad approach to competition issues to raise some major issues about the quality of the patent 
system. The Patents Act 1990 has been amended to incorporate recommended amendments which affect the 
application of the principles of novelty and inventiveness. The committee was headed by an economist, and 
its other two members were a law professor (co-author of a major Australian text on intellectual property) and 
a consultant on intellectual property licensing. The previous Director General of the then Australian Industrial 
Property Office was Special Adviser to this committee. This committee could perhaps be considered to be the 
least biased of all the major committees: there were no practicing patent attorneys on the committee, and it 
included one academic and one previous academic. Nonetheless it did not address critical competitive issues, 
such as the height of the inventive step, in other than a cursory fashion (Lawson 2008: 54).  
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3.2 Patentable subject matter 
The Statute of Monopolies severely curtailed the royal privilege of granting monopolies. It 
made only three exceptions—inventions, monopolies approved by an Act of Parliament, 
and the monopolies or privileges of groups such as incorporated cities or various merchant 
and craft organisations. The exception for inventions was put in a very qualified form:  
“the sole working or making of any manner of new manufactures within this Realm, 
to the true and first inventor and inventors of such manufactures, which others at the 
time of making such letters patent and grants shall not use, so as also they be not 
contrary to the law or mischievous to the State, by raising prices of commodities at 
home or hurt of trade, or generally inconvenient”  
(Statute of Monopolies 1623, S. 6 emphasis added).85  
Effectively this codified earlier common law on the granting of monopolies (Bochnovic 
1982; Pila 2001a). 
As can be seen the inventions exception to the ban on monopolies did not include the word 
invention, though such grants could only be made to inventors. It did however state clearly 
that the patented item should be new, and that it should not hurt trade. Given the historical 
context of the Statute, drafted to make monopolies which interfered with the common law 
right to carry on a trade unlawful, this reinforces the requirement of difference from 
existing manufactures.86 Walterscheid reviews Lord Coke’s 1628 discussion of the 
qualities required for a patent to be valid at law,87 and identifies a strict prohibition against 
the patenting of improvements (‘so as also they be not contrary to the law’) (Walterscheid 
1995a: 878). This prohibition was removed in 1776 (Walterscheid 1995c: 779).  
 
85  The official version is ‘…the sole working or makinge of any manner of new Manufactures within this 
Realme, to the true and first Inventor and Inventors of such Manufactures, which others at the tyme of 
makinge such tres Patents and Graunts shall not use, soe as alsoe they be not contrary to the Lawe nor 
mischievous to the State, by raisinge prices of Commodities at home, or hurt of Trade, or generalllie 
inconvenient…’ (text available at http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/l, accessed 11 August 2008)). 
86  From a policy perspective, the phrase ‘which others at the time of making such letters patent and 
grants shall not use’, seems to emphasise the quality of newness in the phrase ‘manner of new manufacture’. 
But the legal interpretation can be quite different: the phrase  is interpreted by some lawyers as conferring the 
monopoly exclusion right. Walterscheid (1995a: 877) explains this as a shift in language usage and cites 
Coke’s 1628 exposition on the validity of patents to provide an authoritative view from the time that this was 
in fact a re-emphasis of the novelty requirement. 
87  As well as a very ‘modern’ requirement—that the substitution of domestic for imported goods not lead 
to price increases (Walterscheid 1995a: 878-9).  
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While the US statutes did not refer to the Statute of Monopolies, they did borrow its 
terminology and concepts.88 For example, US patent law has always granted patents of 
invention only to the ‘first and true inventor’, though this has been interpreted as 
specifically excluding patents for imported inventions (Khan 2006). US patent legislation is 
authorised by the Constitution ‘to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts’. This 
clear statement of an objective contrasts strongly with many other jurisdictions, for 
example Australia, where the statute includes no stated objective or purpose. 
3.2.1 Extension to processes and chemicals 
The first extension to patentable subject matter (in the sense of what kind of technology) in 
the UK took place some two hundred years after the enactment of the Statute of 
Monopolies. Until the mid 19th century Section 6 was read as allowing monopoly privileges 
only for products, and applications for patents for processes (if these did not involve a 
machine for production) were treated with doubt. But in 1842 the English courts granted a 
patent for hot-air blasting for iron smelting, a case which ‘… has settled for all time that a 
process as such may be valid subject-matter for a patent.’ (Curtis and Lahey 1954: 2).89 
This issue, of the extension of patents from products ('manufactures') to processes that were 
not themselves machines, is central to the current issue of the extension of patents to 
software and business methods. Both Merges and Stern see the extension of patents to 
business methods as being founded on this early extension to processes (Merges 1999; 
Stern 1999). Both note the difficulty courts have often had in dealing with the patentability 
of processes.  
The next significant subject matter extension was of chemical entities. The role of the 
chemical industry in the development of patent law has been well told by Dutfield (2003). 
He notes that patent law began at a time when developments in the mechanical sciences 
dominated the industrial field. However as modern chemical (and later pharmaceutical) 
industries developed, the courts were faced with new challenges. There was significant 
 
88  And, of course, the patent laws of the constituent states (ex-colonies) had a common heritage. For 
example, the 1641 code of laws adopted by the State of Massachusetts, stated ‘There shall be no monopolies 
granted or allowed among us, but of such new inventions as are profitable to the country, and that for a short 
time’ (Warshofsky 1994: 32).  
89  Crane v Price 1 W.P.C. 393.  
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controversy over whether chemical products should be patented. The first German patent 
law (1877) excluded from patentability food, drink, medicines and chemical substances.90  
Indeed most European countries excluded chemical substances from patentability until 
quite recently (Boldrin and Levine 2008: 244). In 1919 the UK changed its statute to 
exclude chemical products, a move designed both to assist in the development of the British 
chemical industry, which lagged that in Germany (Pitkethly 1999) and to deal with the 
shortages of medicine that Britain had experienced (Boldrin and Levine 2008: 249). This 
exclusion continued until the 1949 Act. Italy too excluded chemical products from 
patentability from 1939 until 1978, when a legal challenge by a consortium of 
pharmaceutical companies led to a ruling that this exception was unconstitutional (Scherer 
2006).91 Italy had been a major centre for generic pharmaceuticals, including those 
supplied to the U.S. military (Scherer 2006), but the legal change meant Italy lost 
competitiveness and India took over as the global leader in generic pharmaceutical supply. 
This was possible because India's patent statute also excluded chemical products, but not 
chemical processes, from patentability. The patent term was seven years (Cullet 2001). 
With the advent of TRIPS, it is no longer possible for a nation to both belong to the global 
free trade community and choose to exclude certain essential products from patent 
monopolies.92 
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries US patent law addressed similar issues. 
While US patent statutes have never referred to the Statute of Monopolies to define a 
patentable invention, they have imported a number of concepts from that statute. US patent 
law has never listed any specific subject matter inclusions or exclusions, but as in the UK, 
similar exclusions have been created through case law. The most fundamental of these is 
that discoveries, laws of nature and abstract ideas are not patentable.93  
 
 
90  Dutfield suggests that at the time of the first Federal German patent law the chemical industry was 
divided in opinion between those who favoured patents for processes only, and those who favoured no patents 
because of the harm patents had done to the British and French chemical industries (Dutfield 2003: 78).  
91  This decision preceded the EPC coming into effect in Italy by a few months. It has been beyond the 
scope of this thesis to investigate the role of the EPC in the general shift away from a prohibition on patenting 
chemical compositions. Art 52(1) of the EPC states that ‘European patents shall be granted for any invention, 
in all fields of technology, provided they are new, involve an inventive step and are susceptible of industrial 
application.’ This was quite a radical change in patent policy.  
92  TRIPS, Article 27 states, inter alia, ‘… patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without 
discrimination as to … the field of technology…’. 
93  1840, Wyeth v Stone; the US Supreme Court confirmed this exclusion in 1853 (IPCRC 2000: 149). 
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3.2.2 Early Australian patent law 
As part of Federation in 1901, the sovereign states of Australia handed to the new 
Commonwealth the power to grant patents, trade marks and design rights, and these are 
specifically mentioned in the Australian constitution. Similar practical considerations also 
led to the US constitution containing a power to make such laws,94 but in the US case the 
goal of advancing science and the useful arts was specifically written into the constitution 
(Walterscheid 1998). The Australian constitution simply lists a series of matters transferred 
from state to federal jurisdiction. The first Australian Patents Act took effect in 1904 and 
was closely modelled on then prevailing UK law (Walker 1949).95 Australian patent law 
thus inherited a large body of case law decisions from Britain’s highest courts. In terms of 
patentable subject matter, the Australian law followed British case law. Patents were 
allowed for processes as well as products, and chemical products could be patented.96 The 
British definition of novelty was also imported into Australian law, as was the view that it 
was now consistent with common law to provide patents for improvements.  
At the time of the first modern overhaul of Australian patent law, in 1952, these remained 
the limits to what was considered patentable. While processes were patentable these related 
to processes which produced relatively tangible outputs, but including, for example, 
electrical oscillations and extinguishing fires underground (Curtis and Lahey 1954). The 
1952 Act repealed and replaced the 1903 Act, but there were few changes of substance.97 It 
More recently US Supreme Court Justices Breyer, Stevens and Souter, in dissenting from a decision not to 
hear a dispute between Labcorp and Metabolite, commented that “[t]he relevant principle of law ‘[e]xclude[s] 
from ... patent protection ... laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.’ Diamond v. Diehr, 450 
U.S. 175, 185 (1981). This principle finds its roots in both English and American law” (548 U. S.  (2006); 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/05pdf/04-607.pdf ).  
94  From a practical viewpoint, multiple parallel monopoly systems create substantial difficulties, 
especially if a monopoly is granted to one party in one state and to a different party in another. See 
Warshofsky (1994: 40-46) for a discussion of the steamboat patent wars that began before the 1787 sittings of 
the US Constitutional Convention and continued through the second US Patent Act of 1793. Subject matters 
were specifically passed from the sovereign states to the new federal government in both the USA and 
Australia. If a power was not specifically transferred it remained with the sovereign states. In the US 
Constitution the science and useful arts clause was the only clause where a means and any limitations were 
specified (Walterscheid 1998: 23).  
95  There were some differences: acceptance was required within 12 months, unless an extension fee was 
paid; examiners were allowed to report on novelty; and prior public use was a ground for opposition 
((Australian) Patent Office 1969). 
96  Australia did not follow the UK in excluding chemical products from patentability during the period 
1919-1949. In fact Australia’s first specific exclusion from patentability did not occur until 1990, when it was 
introduced following negotiations with minor parties in the Senate.  
97  Substantial new rights to amend patent specifications during the examination process, new appeal 
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remained the case that the invention had to be a ‘manner of new manufacture’, be new and 
be useful. The larger part of the 1952 parliamentary debate was about new arrangements to 
give exclusive rights to patent attorneys. The bill had bi-partisan support. In his Second 
Reading speech, the Attorney-General recognised the goals of the system and the 
importance of the public benefiting from the legislation: 
“The chief beneficiary of our patent system should be the Australian public, and this 
should be true whether or not the invention is commercialized. Where the invention is 
commercialized the public benefits from the product or process. Where it is not 
commercialized the public benefits from the recorded knowledge of the inventor. In 
either case, some contribution is made to technical progress, and so to social and 
cultural progress.” 
(Hansard, Senate, 22 May 1952: 689-690, emphasis added)  
At that time there was a general view that patents were only for the application of science 
and engineering to useful ends. The Attorney-General's comment—that a patented 
invention makes a contribution to ‘technical progress’—is worth noting as evidence about 
the tacit understanding that existed about patent law. There were a number of exclusions as 
to what was patentable. Given the nature of the adversarial process of civil cases, the body 
of case law defined, on a case by case basis, what was not patentable rather than what was. 
The general view was that patents could not be granted for mere schemes or plans, new 
uses of old substances (unless some alteration was needed to put this into effect), principles 
or ideas (Curtis and Lahey 1954). The then Commissioner of Patents, speaking at the 
ANZAAS General Meeting in 1952, also noted that ‘the discovery of an unknown property 
in a known material is not patentable, primarily because no manufacture in the sense of a 
physical thing is disclosed’ (Wilmot 1954: 3). 
3.2.3 The ‘manner of new manufacture’ test 
This view was, however, overturned in the 1959 NRDC judgement by the High Court.98 
This case involved the application of a known chemical to selectively destroy weeds. 
Effectively it extended patentability to horticultural and agricultural processes, previously 
considered unpatentable.99 The decision has, however, been interpreted more broadly. 
arrangements, and some modifications which effectively extended patent life by up to a year. This Act also 
created a sub-set of lawyers who had the exclusive right to advise on patent prosecution matters. 
98  National Research Development Corp. v. Commissioner of Patents (‘NRDC’) (1959) 102 CLR. 252. 
99  In 1951 Standard Oil Development Company’s application for the use of chemicals to selectively 
eradicate weeds was refused (68 RPC 144 (Australian) Patent Office 1969: 29).  
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Christie, for example, argues that this decision was not merely a watershed, but a 
bombshell (Christie 2000: 20) and that it has effectively eliminated any technological 
boundaries to what is ‘inherently patentable’ in Australia.100 In the judgement the High 
Court also noted that ‘the distinction between discovery and invention is not precise enough 
to be other than misleading in this area of discussion.’101 The IPCRC review took the 
opposite position and emphasised that a distinction between discovery and invention was 
fundamental to the integrity of the patent system, particularly in ensuring patents do not 
unreasonably undermine competition (IPCRC 2000: 151). No recommendations were made 
as to how this important principle might be incorporated into statute law.  
In regard to what constituted a manner of manufacture, the High Court considered that the 
relevant issue was not the meaning of the words ‘manner of new manufacture’, but ‘the 
breadth of the concept which the law has developed by its consideration of the text and 
purpose of the Statute of Monopolies.’102 In other words the High Court gave priority to the 
body of case law, not to the statute they were interpreting. The NRDC decision has been 
interpreted as determining that an invention is a patentable if it involves ‘a mode or manner 
of achieving an end result which is an artificially created state of affairs of utility in the 
field of economic endeavour’.103 Christie (2000) argues that, given the ease of drafting 
suitable claims for implementation, the NRDC decision removes any subject matter 
exclusions to patentability in Australia, except for those specified in legislation. 
Legal texts regularly warn about the dangers of taking wording from one patent case and 
applying it to another. But NRDC does seem to have been very influential in removing 
what were earlier thought to be clear boundaries to patentable technology. This is due both 
to interpretation of the decision in case law, and its use in the Patent Examiner’s Manual. In 
particular, it seems to have either removed the requirement for a tangible output or re-
defined tangible outputs to include intangible outputs (such as curves on computer screens). 
Van Caenegem considers that the application of the NRDC principles has shown them to be 
‘vague and embryonic’ (van Caenegem 2002: 44).   
 
100  Provided it also satisfies the other requirements such as novelty, inventiveness and utility. 
101  NRDC [1959] HCA 67; (1959) 102 CLR 252 (16 December 1959): 8. 
102  NRDC [1959] HCA 67; (1959) 102 CLR 252 (16 December 1959): 14. 
103  CCOM v Jiejing (1994) 122 ALR 417; 51 FCR 260 (22 June 1994): 128. 
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3.2.4 Extension to software and business methods 
But, in general, it was still the view in the 1960s that certain things remained outside the 
bounds of the patent system, including computer programs (as they were simply 
mathematical algorithms) and business methods (mere schemes and plans). This view was 
clearly expressed in 1968 in a decision by an Australian Patent Office Hearing Officer on a 
(software) method for solving linear programming problems more quickly: 
“Computer programming is a relatively young art and, although many stratagems and 
simplifications have been devised so far, a much greater number may be expected to 
be devised in the future. It would certainly be mischievous to the State and generally 
inconvenient if, after investing a million dollars in a computer, the owner were to find 
himself prevented from operating it efficiently, or in any other manner he may wish, 
or with any degree of privacy or secrecy he may desire.” 
(British Petroleum Co. Ltd.'s Application (1968) 38 AOJP 1020: 1021) 
In 1972 the US Supreme Court, in the Benson decision, specifically held that computer 
software constituted unpatentable mathematical algorithms (Chin 1998). The next 
important decision was the 1981 US Supreme Court case Diamond v Diehr. This was in 
fact a split decision (5-4) and the dissenting judgement argues strongly that the majority 
substantially misinterpreted the invention. The majority held that the claimed process for 
curing rubber was patentable subject matter, even though it included a mathematical 
algorithm. They argued that ‘patentable subject matter’ was the only issue before it, and 
whether the process was novel or inventive was not a matter for it to determine.104 The four 
dissenting judges held that the claimed process was not patentable subject matter because 
there was nothing new in it, except for the use of a computer. Citing the earlier Supreme 
Court case, Parker v. Flook, the dissenting judges noted that ‘a computer program could 
not be transformed into a patentable process by the addition of post-solution activity that 
was not claimed to be novel.’105  
Legal decisions can seem strange from a policy viewpoint, and this carving up of the 
patentability requirements into discrete sub-issues, not all of which are considered in a 
 
104  Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981): 216. (‘… it may later be determined that the respondents' 
process is not deserving of patent protection because it fails to satisfy the statutory conditions of novelty 
under § 102 or nonobviousness under § 103.’). Section 101 lists patentable subject matter. That listing 
includes the qualifying adjective ‘new’ twice: ‘§101. Inventions patentable Whoever invents or discovers any 
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title’ [35 USC § §1 et 
seq. (emphasis added)]. 
105  Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981): 216. 
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single hearing, seems to result in the grant of uninventive patents. In this case all the judges 
agreed that computer programs themselves were not patentable. It was also clear that the 
only new element in the process was the computerisation—that is, the software. Yet the 
manner in which Section 101 was interpreted by the majority—specifically that the word 
‘new’ in the definition of patentable subject matter was not relevant—meant that a patent 
for a probably uninventive ‘invention’ was upheld by the Supreme Court.  
Following the Diehr decision, a series of decisions by the CAFC broadened the scope of 
software patentability.106 During this period lawyers kept pushing the software envelope 
(Merges 2003) and the ‘doctrine of magic words’ was used to ensure that software 
applications would meet the eligibility requirements (Cohen and Lemley 2001). The 
essence of most of these ‘inventions’ was software, often the simple use of computers to 
convert known processes and algorithms into computerised applications. But legal language 
converted these software inventions into ‘devices’, ‘methods’ or ‘apparatus’ or gave them 
‘tangible’ effect through the alterations in the computer caused by the operation of the 
specific software. As general purpose computers are specifically designed so that different 
software can be run on them, these ‘tangible effects’ seem a strange sort of legal fiction.  
This fiction derives from the fact that ‘software can easily be demonstrated to produce 
physical changes in a machine, since each step in the program causes a different hardware 
stage. … [but] this applies for any piece of software, even the storage of data collections’ 
(Brödner 2003: 159). Depending on the drafting, claims which are for computer software 
are regularly referred to as apparatus claims. This fiction is widely used by the European 
Patent Office (EPO) to permit software patents, despite the fact that the relevant statute 
specifically states software may not be patented. Brödner notes such claims are drafted as 
‘integral parts of a machine or process’ (Brödner 2003: 160). From an economic or policy 
viewpoint, if the essence of the invention lies in the software then it is a software invention. 
Re-labeling the invention as an ‘apparatus’ or a ‘device’ does not change the fact that the 
sole inventiveness lies in a piece of software, except in respect of patent law.  
 
106  Especially the CAFC judgement in the Re Appalat case (33 Fed 1526 (1994), which held that software 
leading to a tangible result, including converting a general purpose computer to a special purpose computer 
was potentially patentable under 35 USC § 101.  
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In the USA this process of legal semantics eventually led to the 1998 State Street Bank 
decision which took the view that nothing was excluded from patentability.107 More 
recently, there has been a move to a position where no technological basis is required for a 
patentable invention, though this matter has not yet been ruled on by a court of law. The 
USPTO Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) reviewed a case that an 
examiner had rejected as it lay outside the ‘technological arts’ (Ex parte Lundgren).108 The 
majority reversed the examiner’s decision, finding that his position introduced a new test 
for patentability for which there was no statutory basis. Smith J dissented, finding it 
reasonable to interpret the term ‘useful arts’ in the Constitution as ‘technological arts’, and 
noting that ‘the process as claimed is not tied to any known science or technology’. 
Thambisetty interprets this as a signal that the USPTO ‘intends to steer away from the 
limiting notion of ‘technology’’, and notes that this is ‘a doctrinal shift of radical 
proportions’ (Thambisetty 2008: 22).  
The changes over time in ‘protection’ for computer software in the USA are well told 
elsewhere.109 In both the USA and Australia government review bodies recommended that 
patents not be extended to software, both because there was no apparent need for such 
intervention in the market, and because of the considerable practical difficulties that would 
be experienced in administering patents for software.110 In both countries government 
accepted this advice and action was taken to amend copyright legislation (1980 in the USA 
and in 1984 in Australia) to make it clear that copyright protection was available for 
software. This preferred policy response was advocated by the USA, whose first success in 
persuading other governments to adopt this approach was in Japan (Samuelson et al., 1994: 
2348). These executive government decisions were subsequently overturned by the courts, 
both in the USA and in Australia.  
 
107  US patent statutes have never specified any subject matter exclusions. In contrast the EPC (Article 
52(2)) defines a number of things as not patentable inventions: discoveries, scientific theories and 
mathematical methods; aesthetic creations; schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing 
games or doing business, and programs for computers; and presentations of information. Article 52(3) states 
that the exclusions relate only to ‘such subject-matter or activities as such’. It is interesting that this ‘as such’ 
qualifier parallels the Supreme Court majority decision in Diamond v. Diehr.  
108  76 USPQ 2d 1385 (BPAI 2005).  
109  See Graham and Mowery (2003); Samuelson et al. (1994); and Smith and Mann (2004). 
110  1966 President’s Commission on the Patent System (‘“To Promote the Progress of … Useful Arts” in 
an Age of Exploding Technology’) (Samuelson et al. 1994: 2362), and the IPAC report (1984: 41).  
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3.2.5 The European approach 
This contrasts with the situation in Europe. A 2005 judgement by Mr Peter Prescott, QC, 
sitting as Deputy Judge in the British Patents Court (Chancery Division of the High Court 
of Justice) provides an excellent history of the development of the exclusions in the EPC, 
and an assessment of how the exclusions should be applied in law. He concluded that the 
rationales for the various exclusions differed, and that therefore reasoning in relation to one 
type of exclusion did not necessarily apply to another. He found that the exclusions for 
computers and business methods were hard exclusions, made as a matter of deliberate 
policy, and consequently deserving of very strictly application.111 He noted that  
“at the time the EPC was under consideration it was felt in the computer industry that 
such patents were not really needed, were too cumbersome (it was felt that searching 
the prior art would be a big problem), and would do more harm than good.” 
[2005] EWHC 1589 (Pat): 35 
Prescott J went on to conclude that legal drafting should not be used to circumvent to 
legislative prohibition.112 In regard to the business method exclusion he first asked what 
was the policy reason underlying this exclusion and found that: 
“…historically, patents for business methods were never granted yet business 
innovation went on very well without the benefit of that protection and without the 
red tape. Businessmen have been every bit as inventive as engineers. … Consider … 
the invention of money; of double-entry bookkeeping; of negotiable bills of 
exchange; of joint-stock companies; of insurance policies; of clearance banking; of 
business name franchising; of the supermarket; and so on. None of these needed 
patent protection to get started. A patent system is always a burden on trade, 
commerce and industry: if only because of the “red tape” effect. The only question is 
whether the benefits outweigh the burdens. That has to be demonstrated by those who 
assert it is so, and in any case the decision is for the legislature. In this country and in 
Europe the legislature has not yet been persuaded.” 
[2005] EWHC 1589 (Pat): 41 
This view—that extensions in patentable subject matter should be a matter for policy 
makers not judges—differs strongly from the judicial approach exhibited in NRDC and the 
majority judgement in Diamond v. Diehr.  
While this clarifies the situation under UK law, the story is quite different for patents filed 
through the European Patent Office (EPO), notwithstanding that both jurisdictions 
 
111  In contrast to the discovery exclusion which was a ‘soft’ exclusion, where an artefact based on the 
discovery can be patented, while the discovery itself cannot. 
112  [2005] EWHC 1589 (Pat): 36. 
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effectively operate under the EPC. The EPO's approach to examining business methods is 
to separate out ‘abstract’ applications (which will be rejected) from those based on 
computers or other apparatus (such as telephones). For the latter group, the subject matter is 
disregarded, and applications are simply treated as computer-implemented inventions. For 
computer-implemented inventions, the overall purpose is also disregarded (EPO, 2000). It 
is estimated that over 40,000 software patents have been issued by the EPO, despite the 
clear statutory prohibition on the grant of patents for software as such (Miceli 2005). 
In theory, computer-implemented inventions must have a ‘technical effect’, but after 
reviewing key cases considered by the EPO Technical Boards of Appeals (TBAs) Bakels 
and Hugenholtz conclude that ‘[t]he distinction between patentable and non-patentable 
inventions as shown by these decisions seems rather arbitrary’ (Bakels and Hugenholtz 
2002: 10). Thambisetty more forthrightly suggests that ‘[o]ne way of interpreting this mess 
is to clearly recognise that the EPO is interested in extending patentability to computer 
programs’ (Thambisetty 2008: 14, emphasis added). A major policy difficulty with the EPC 
is that, while member countries pay regard to EPO decisions, this is not reciprocated 
(Palombi 2004: 71-72).  In this regard it is important to note that the EPO TBAs are not 
courts of law, but rather a parallel mechanism to national patent office hearing/review 
mechanisms. It is therefore surprising that they give such scant regard to decisions by duly 
constituted courts in member countries.  
3.2.6 Australian consideration of software patenting 
The re-write of the Australian Patents Act in 1990 derived in part from the first review of 
Australian patent law allegedly from a predominantly economic perspective (IPAC 
1984).113 The stated intent was to modernise and simplify the system, but not change any of 
its essential features. A number of administrative changes were made, but there were only 
two changes to patent policy: the novelty and inventiveness standards were ‘raised’ by 
changing the definition of existing knowledge,114 and the ability to extend patent life was 
removed, except for pharmaceutical products.115  
 
113  The sole economist on the committee lodged a dissenting statement saying that ‘[t]his report does not 
live up to its claim to have adopted an economic perspective and to have applied economic criteria’ (IPAC 
1984: 79). See footnote 84 above (p. 48) for details of the roles held by members of this committee. 
114  Though the definition is still tightly circumscribed. Existing knowledge for patent law purposes is a far 
narrower construct than existing knowledge in normal parlance. This is not a matter that has received 
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The IPAC review considered whether patentability should be extended beyond the 
manufacturing sector, in particular to software based industries, but concluded this would 
be inefficient. The committee noted that:  
“the computer software industry in Australia has been developing rapidly without 
relying on patent protection. This, coupled with the great practical difficulty of setting 
boundaries for patentable software and of conducting systematic and thorough 
novelty searches, convinced the Committee that it should not recommend explicit 
extension of the field of patentability to cover software”  
(IPAC 1984: 41).  
The committee then considered the EPC approach, which codifies exclusions to patentable 
inventions. It did not favour adoption of this approach because of the extensive body of 
case law for the existing Australian system. IPAC recommended that patentability not be 
extended to software, but considered that it was not necessary to write a specific exception 
into statute law.116 There was bi-partisan support for these recommendations.  
But only the following year the Federal Court allowed a software patent for use of two 
algorithms which produced an improved representation of a curve.117 This was held to be a 
useful ‘art’ as the invention had a commercially useful effect (Christie 2000: 18). And in 
1994 this liberal interpretation of ‘manner of manufacture’ was again applied to allow a 
patent for Chinese text software.118 The policy advisability of extending patent ‘protection’ 
to software is queried even in intellectual property texts (see, for example, McKeough et al. 
2004: 333; van Caenegem 2007: 177).  
Again it can be seen that, at least in part, the extension of patentability to software survived 
court scrutiny because of the semantics of legal drafting. In both these cases the drafting 
does not claim the software in itself, though use of similar software in a similar application 
could well be found infringing. But clearly the only possible inventive element in each is 
attention either in economic analyses nor in legal proposals for patent reform, though the latter do consider 
means for ensuring that allowable ‘bricks and mortar’ knowledge is more readily found.  
115  Only one subject matter exclusion was written into the Patents Act 1990. This exclusion was proposed 
by neither major party. Initially the Democrats (a minor party) proposed excluding genetic materials of any 
type. This was narrowed to human beings and the biological processes for their generation in an amendment 
proposed by independent Tasmanian Senator Brian Harradine. 
116  It is quite possible that at that time there was little evidence of the degree to which the EPO would 
flout the Convention it administers.  
117  International Business Machines Corporation v Smith, Commissioner of Patents (1991) 33 FCR 218; 
(1991) 105 ALR 388; (1991) 22 IPR 417; (1992) AIPC 90-853. 
118  CCOM Pty Ltd v Jiejing Pty Ltd (1994) 28 IPR 481. 
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the software. The initial legal decision was that the CCOM ‘invention’ used a computer in a 
conventional manner to reproduce mental processes, a decision which appears very sound 
from a policy perspective. But this was overturned by the Full Federal Court. The Full 
Court based its decision on UK legal reasoning 
“that more than a mental process was involved in claiming the process of application 
of certain steps represented by a computer program on a standard computer, since the 
method as claimed was incorporated in the program and in apparatus in a physical 
form.”  
(van Caenegem 2002: 46) 
Balancing costs and benefits is central to a welfare-enhancing patent system. Ensuring that 
there is a consideration in exchange for the monopoly grant is of critical importance. This 
decision shifts the likely balance of benefit and cost, effectively providing a monopoly for 
mere computerisation.   
In 2000 the committee which reviewed the Patents Act in the light of the Australian 
government’s Competition Principles119 considered several aspects of patentable subject 
matter. In regard to discoveries120 it took the view that competition goals ‘are well served 
by a patent policy that rigorously distinguishes between discoveries … and inventions … 
[and] only the latter should qualify for patent protection’ (IPCRC 2000: 151). This is 
because ‘[p]roperty rights in discoveries … could give rise to unreasonable barriers to 
potential competitors or to those who wished to use the ‘discovery’ in other fields of 
endeavour’ (IPCRC 2000: 152). The committee considered that there was some uncertainty 
in how the requirement of ‘utility’ applied in differentiating discoveries from inventions 
based on discoveries. It made no recommendations on either matter.  
The committee also looked at the question of business method patents. It was not convinced 
that any incentives were needed for such innovations. It did not, however, recommend any 
action as it considered that most business methods ‘will not pass the general tests for patent 
grant’ (IPCRC 2000: 153). This sanguine view has not been borne out. By 10 August 2008 
Australia had granted 898 patents where the primary classification was in the business 
 
119  These principles have been agreed between the Commonwealth and State governments and are 
embodied in the Competition Principles Agreement and the National Competition Policy. The objective is the 
removal of anti-competitive elements of existing and proposed regulation. The agreements are oversighted by 
the National Competition Council (http://www.ncc.gov.au, accessed 14 August 2008).  
120  That is, things that are found (e.g. gene sequences) as opposed to things that are created (e.g. methods 
for determining gene sequences).  
 62 
                                                
method classes.121 The most recent filing year for which patent decisions are largely 
completed is 2000. By the end of February 2007 55 per cent of the 251 business method 
applications in that year had been granted.122 A set of recently granted Australian business 
method patents is evaluated for their inventive contribution in Chapters 5 and 6. The results 
of this analysis are at marked odds with the prediction of the IPCRC.  
In 2001 the Australian Federal Court clearly stated that it found persuasive the US State 
Street Bank decision that there was no business method exception to patentability.123 
However the invention in question, the essence of which was the use of dynamic storage on 
loyalty program smart chips, was determined not to be a business method, but rather to be a 
method and device used in business (McKeough et al. 2004: 334). In reaching his decision 
Heerey J reviewed relevant principles of patent law, starting with the NRDC as a leading 
authority.124 He took particular interest in UK cases after NRDC but before software and 
business methods were specifically excluded from patentability under the 1977 UK Act. 
Referring to an IBM application for automatic calculation of sale prices for shares by 
comparing buy and sell orders,125 he noted that the patent was held to be valid despite it 
being accepted that the scheme was not novel.126  
Justice Heerey’s decision in Welcome Real Time cast doubt on whether any physical aspect 
was necessary for patentability, and as a consequence the Australian Patent Office revised 
its examination guidelines to remove any such requirement (ACIP 2003: 12). In 2003 the 
government’s Advisory Committee on Intellectual Property (ACIP) reported on whether 
business method patents should be allowed in Australia. In its report ACIP noted the strong 
argument that there should not be any interference with free competition unless there was 
evidence ‘demonstrating a need to spur innovation in a particular field’. Such conclusive 
 
121  And a further 722 where a secondary classification was to a business method class.  Data are from a 
search of AusPat (see Appendix 3 for data sources and Appendix 4 for patent classification information).  
122  This was a noticeable reduction from the grant rates in earlier years (82 per cent in 1997, 67 per cent in 
1998 and 63 per cent in 1999, see Table 4.1). 
123  Welcome Real Time SA v Catuity Inc (2001) 51 IPR 327. 
124  Welcome Real Time SA v Catuity Inc (2001) 51 IPR 327: 110-126.  
125  IBM Corp’s Application [1980] FSR 564. 
126  Such legal reasoning is a profound puzzle from a policy perspective. Given the essential requirement 
of novelty in patent law, how can an 'invention' which does not meet this standard be considered valid? From 
a policy perspective many patent decisions appear to revolve around such legal semantics (for example the 
US Diamond v Diehr case, and the Australian IBM and CCOM cases). Yet the ‘inventive’ element in all these 
cases is software, i.e. mathematical algorithms. Similar legal semantics are used by the EPO to grant software 
patents despite the statutory prohibition of patent monopolies for software (Bakels and Hugenholtz 2002). 
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evidence was lacking in regard to business methods. ACIP considered the possibility of a 
technological field or technical effect limitation to prevent business method patents. It was, 
however, concerned that this might ‘foreclose the possibility of patenting new areas of 
invention until clear economic evidence is available and legislation suitably amended.’ It 
was also concerned that this might eliminating some areas where patentability was 
currently permitted (ACIP 2003: 3). The option of limiting patent monopolies to fields of 
technology is of course perfectly consistent with the over-riding principle of limiting 
interference in free markets. Nonetheless ACIP rejected this option, partly because it 
considered that legal semantics (‘clever claim drafting’) could be used to undermine the 
intent of the legislation, and partly on the grounds of uncertainty and cost. ACIP therefore 
recommended no action to prevent business method patenting. The government accepted 
this recommendation in May 2005. 
Since then at least one business method invention has been found to be unpatentable—four 
times, but each time on different grounds (Tyacke and Webb 2007). It involves an 
‘invention’ to shift assets into a trust structure so that they cannot be claimed by creditors. 
As such, it naturally attracts the particular interest of the legal profession. It can also be 
seen as ‘hurting trade’ with legitimate creditors left with unpaid debts. The ‘invention’ 
involved no technical features (there were no computerisation claims). The application was 
initially rejected as being a mere scheme or plan. On appeal, the Deputy Commissioner of 
Patents rejected the initial ground for rejection, but found that it was ‘a discovery in relation 
to the laws of Australia and … [so] could not give rise to an artificially created state of 
affairs’ (Tyacke and Webb 2007: 119), that is, it was not a ‘manner of manufacture’.127 The 
applicant appealed again and Branson J rejected the application commenting that NRDC 
should not be seen as a relevant definition of ‘manner of manufacture’ given the facts of 
this case. She determined that the critical principle in the case was that ‘an invention should 
only enjoy the protection of a patent if the social cost of the resulting restrictions upon the 
use of the invention is counterbalanced by resulting social benefits.’128 As an additional 
reason for rejection she noted that the invention might shield the owners from laws enacted 
 
127  (2004) APO 11. 
128  Grant v Commissioner of Patents (2005) FCA 1100: 20. This view can be seen to derive from the use 
of Section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies to define invention. Section 6 includes a number of provisos 
including not being contrary to law, not hurting trade, and not being generally inconvenient.  
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in the public interest. This is one of the few recent patent cases that seems sound from a 
policy and public interest perspective, yet it has been criticised by the legal profession, for 
example in the fourth (and final) decision on the case.  
A further appeal again confirmed the rejection of the application, but with different 
reasoning. Justice Branson’s economically sound argument was specifically rejected as not 
relevant to the determination of patentability.129 This time the application was rejected on 
three grounds: it had no physical effect; new legal findings are discoveries not inventions; 
and it was ‘a mere collocation of known parts’130 rather than a new combination. The 
decision clearly stated that being a business method was not in itself an obstacle to 
patentability.131 Further, the judgment questioned the Deputy Commissioner’s view that 
patentable inventions should lie within the area of science and technology.132  
So from July 2006 the situation in Australia parallels that in the USA: business methods are 
no longer excluded subject matter, even if they involve no use of science or technology. 
They simply need to meet the criteria of novelty, inventiveness and utility. Because of the 
specific exclusions in the EPC, most European countries do not, at least theoretically, grant 
patents for business methods. This exclusion, as with the software exclusion, seems to be 
interpreted more narrowly in some jurisdictions than others. Prior to its accession to the 
EPC, software was patentable in the UK, and case law from that period still influences 
decisions in other common law jurisdictions. This is despite the UK government’s 
deliberate decision to exclude software and business methods from the scope of patent law.  
 
129  Grant v Commissioner of Patents (2006) FCAFC 120: ‘we do not find it necessary to discuss the 
requisite economic benefits of the alleged invention’ (43); ‘Nor is the Court in a position to determine the 
balance between social cost and public benefit. Parliament has already made that judgment, as its predecessor 
did in 1623, by rewarding innovation with time-limited monopoly’ (45). This seems very poor logic. The 
1623 parliamentary determination was with respect to the patent system overall. Many specific inventions 
have been refused patent monopolies because of there is no net benefit to society. Indeed the patent system 
requires courts to make judgements with regard to specific inventions. The argument as put directly overrides 
all the provisos in Section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies, yet it is this section which defines a patentable 
invention in Australia.  
130  Grant v Commissioner of Patents (2006) FCAFC 120: 39. 
131  Grant v Commissioner of Patents (2006) FCFCA 120: 47. 
132  The Full Federal Court, in considering the Grant case, took the opportunity to pass an opinion on the 
Szabo case (Re Peter Szabo and Associates Pty Ltd (2005) 66 IPR 370) and stated that they were not sure that 
the argument that a science or technology base was required for patentability was correct ((2006) FCAFC 
120: 37-38). The outcome of this possible proscription remains to be seen.  
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In Europe governments decided to ensure that software and business methods remained 
outside the boundaries of the patent system.133 In the USA, Australia and New Zealand, 
executive governments have considered and rejected the extension of patentability to 
software. This has not influenced a series of judges who have effectively reversed these 
policy decisions and extended patent monopolies to new subject matter areas. In both 
Australia and the USA the limitation of patent privileges to scientific and technical 
applications has been totally removed.  
A central issue that arises is why legislatures do not intervene to reverse these judicial 
policy changes. The answer lies in the realm of public choice theory. There are a small 
number of companies which benefit considerably from increased patent rights, and these 
are very active lobbyists. So too are the growing numbers of patent attorneys who earn a 
very substantial income from patents and so have a direct financial interest in increasing 
volumes of applications. The costs of the patent system are, like the costs of tariffs, widely 
distributed and hidden, so there is no effective opposition group in civil society. Added to 
this, legislators would need to reverse a decision (albeit to return to the status quo ante), 
and this would occur against a background of many decades of propaganda about the 
'rights' of inventors and creators. Finally, legislators (and indeed innovation policy analysts) 
are warned about the extreme dangers of interfering in a complex area of law. These issues 
go far beyond the scope of this study.134   
The complex ‘manner of new manufacture’ test remains the basis of Australia’s definition 
of a patentable invention. It has been discussed by two review committees. In 1984 IPAC 
considered whether explicit restrictions should be introduced for chemicals and for 
software, but recommended retention of the ‘manner of new manufacture’ test because of 
the extensive body of case law, and the flexible manner in which the definition had been 
used. In 2000 the IPCRC took a similar approach, accepting that this ‘open-textured 
 
133  Though this legislative determination appears to be being actively undermined by the EPO, which has 
now issued in excess of 40,000 software patents (Miceli 2005) and many business method patents (Wagner 
2008). Some reasons for this are addressed by Thambisetty 2008, but a general consideration of the EPO’s 
Technical Board of Appeals decisions lies beyond the scope of this thesis. 
134  But are dealt with by a range of other analysts (see, for example, Ryan 1998; Drahos 2002; Sell 2003 
on the role of major winners in the development of TRIPS, and Landes and Posner 2004, in regard to the role 
of the winners in the development of US copyright and patent laws). Bakels and Hugenholtz 2002, suggest 
that the technicality rules operate to obscure the purpose of patent law which is, as noted in Chapter 2, a 
simple bargain in which the overall net social benefit should be positive.  
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standard’ imposed costs, but considering that there were also costs to a more codified 
approach. Most submissions to the IPCRC argued for the retention of the ‘manner of new 
manufacture’ test because it had shown it could respond flexibly to changing technologies. 
That is to say courts were expanding what could be patented, without any economic 
assessment whether such a market intervention created positive or negative net benefits for 
Australia. Retention of the ‘manner of new manufacture’ test effectively devolves decision-
making about a major element of innovation policy from parliament to the courts. They do 
not seem well-placed to make such economic judgements. In contrast to these reviews of 
the patent system, the Australian Law Reform Commission,135 considered this archaic term 
unhelpful, and recommended its review (ALRC 2004). In 2008 the government responded 
to this recommendation, referring the matter to ACIP.136 
3.3 The impact of State Street 
There has been a voluminous literature on the 1998 State Street Bank decision.137 Most of 
this discusses either the legal basis of the decision, or the pros and/or cons of allowing 
patenting for business methods. There is, however, a smaller literature that attempts to 
measure the economic impacts of the decision.138 This empirical literature is reviewed in 
this section to establish what we actually know about what business method patents are, 
who benefits from them, and what impacts they have on business and the economy, in 
particular in relation to innovation.  
It is neither possible nor sensible to look at this question without also paying some attention 
to software patenting. Firstly, similar issues are raised. Secondly, it is unlikely business 
 
135  ‘The ALRC is a law reform body whose statutory functions are to bring the law into line with current 
conditions, remove defects in the law, simplify the law, adopt more effective methods for administering the 
law, and provide improved access to justice. From this perspective, it is indeed odd that the key concept of 
‘manner of manufacture’ depends on a provision in a 380 year old English statute that has long since been 
repealed in the jurisdiction in which it was enacted; and that the relevant section of the statute is not 
reproduced in Australian patent legislation’ (ALRC 2004: 6.55). 
136  An issues paper was circulated in July 2008 (ACIP 2008).  
137  The bulk of this literature is on the US system. Hunter (2004: 4) provides a useful categorisation of 33 
publications in terms of the issues addressed. Hall (2003: 26) summarises the recent literature making policy 
recommendations with respect to business method or software patents. Merges (2003) provides good back-
ground on the antecedent legal changes, and discusses historic parallels. For detailed reviews of the patent at 
issue in the State Street Bank case, see Stern 1999; Krause 2000; Thomas 2001).  
138  This, of course, parallels the general paucity of evidence about the impact of the patent system. In 
regard to evidence on business method patents, the dearth of empirical evidence is noted by Lerner and Zhu 
2005, Allison and Tiller 2003 and Hunter 2004. The few available studies concentrate on the US experience, 
which covers a longer period and has a larger number of cases.  
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method patenting would have occurred if patent eligibility had not already been extended to 
software. While there are some business method patents that are not implemented through 
software, these are rare, and the vast majority use software to convert the unpatentable idea 
into a patentable application. In looking at business method patents Hall notes that: 
"... many scholars make little distinction between business method patents, internet 
patents, and software patents more broadly ... many business method patents are in 
fact patents on the transfer of a known business method to a software and/or web-
based implementation, so the distinction is hard to maintain. " 
(Hall 2003: 2) 
The EPO notes that business methods have the ‘quality of being concerned more with 
interpersonal, societal and financial relationships, than with the stuff of engineering’ (EPO 
2000: 3). Hunter provides an excellent description of the essence of business method 
patents, as well as focusing on a key difference from traditional patent subject matter: 
"business method patents are far more concerned with human, economic, and 
managerial interaction than with physical action or transformation. That is to say, 
they concern the application of information technology to managerial work and to the 
interaction, communication, and decision-making between and among task groupings 
and economic actors."  
(Hunter 2004: 16-17) 
There are, in fact, considerable practical difficulties in identifying software or a business 
method patents. Layne-Farrar (2005) investigates the impact of alternative definitions by 
comparing three empirical studies of software patents and one of internet business method 
patents. She concludes that the definition used does impact on the patents selected, but that 
many of the key variables are robust to differences in definition.139  
3.3.1 What are business method patents and who benefits? 
In one of the earliest discussions with any empirical data, Hall identifies 19 US patent 
classes where software or business method patents may frequently be found, and a further 
five classes where they are occasionally found (Hall 2003: 25). She suggests that some 
10,000 to 12,000 software patents are being granted in the USA each year, with about 1,000 
‘pure business method’ patents being granted each year. A smaller category of interest is 
financial services patents, where Hall reports the level of grants as ‘miniscule’ (Hall 2003: 
4). Lerner (2002) identifies 445 US patents for financial formulae and methods issued in 
 
139  This issue is discussed further in Section 4.3 in relation to the selection of a set of Australian business 
method patents for in-depth study.  
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the 29 years between January 1971 and February 2000, and finds a dramatic upsurge in 
grants. Allison and Tiller identify some 1,400 US internet business method patents, mostly 
granted in 1998 and 1999, and concentrated in three classes (Allison and Tiller 2003).  
Despite Hall’s evidence on the broad range of classes in which business method patents 
may be found, US class 705140 is commonly considered the business method class in the 
USA. Up to and including 2000, 4,674 patents had been granted in this class, with 36 per 
cent held by just 44 companies.141 Pitney Bowes led the field with 327 patents, followed by 
IBM with 209. Both already had more than 10 patents in the class by 1980. There is then a 
big gap until Fujitsu with 93 and NCR with 91 class 705 patents (Hall 2003).  
Among these dominant patenters, two-thirds were patenting in this class before 1990, and 
one-third before 1980 (Hall 2003: 28). It thus appears that business method patents were 
being issued well before the watershed State Street Bank case. It is also clear that patent 
ownership in these new classes is dominated by a small number of companies. A similar 
result, but with a lower degree of dominance, is found for finance patents: 112 of 445 
finance patents (25 per cent) are held by 19 companies (Lerner 2002: 908). Merrill Lynch, 
Citigroup, Hitachi and Reuters owned most finance patents (Lerner 2002: 909). 
Studies of business method patents in Europe are harder to find. Wagner attributes this to 
difficulties with the classification used by the EPO. He solves this problem by matching US 
class 705 patents granted by 1 March 2004 with EPO applications, and identifies a set of 
1901 cases (Wagner 2008). Over 40 per cent of these cases are applications from just 14 
companies. The three dominant companies are Pitney Bowes, IBM, and NCR. Among the 
top 14 firms three, including Pitney Bowes, are from the franking machine industry. 
Wagner shows that there is considerable use of the EPO opposition procedures within this 
industry, with over 40 per cent of granted patents being opposed. The highest opposition 
rate is for patents granted to Pitney Bowes: of 99 grants, 67 have been opposed and 26 
revoked. This study raises interesting questions about the quality of granted business 
method patents, an issue considered further below.142 It does confirm that there is a high 
degree of concentration in the firms using the new business method patent class. 
 
 
140  ‘Data Processing; Financial, Business Practice, Management, or Cost/Price Determination’. 
141  These companies and the US government each held ten or more class 705 patents by 2000 (Hall 2003).  
142  Wagner suggests a strong business imperative for competitors to oppose Pitney-Bowes’ patents as 
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Although only small numbers of business method patents were being granted prior to 1998, 
following the State Street Bank decision there was a large increase in the number of such 
applications and grants. Applications in US class 705 rose from about 1,000 in 1997 to 
peak at over 9,000 in 2001; they then dropped by 20-25 per cent before gradually climbing 
to again reach about 9,000 in 2006 (Hunt 2007: 25). But given the substantial time lag 
between application and grant, this provides only a few years of experience of the impact of 
such patents. Consequently there are few empirical studies directed to the economic impact 
of business method and/or internet patents. Software patents have been granted for longer, 
and there are some empirical studies of this broader group. Academic interest in the impact 
of the establishment of the CAFC in 1982, with its apparent pro-patent bias, also provides 
some useful empirical studies which throw light on the relationship between patenting and 
innovation, as well as on the vast upsurge in software patenting.  
3.3.2 The surge in patenting; growth in software patents 
The general upsurge in US patenting since 1984 has attracted substantial academic interest. 
The principal question is, of course, whether this simply reflects higher R&D spending. 
Neither Kortum and Lerner (1999), Bessen and Hunt (2004), nor Hall (2005) find a close 
relationship between R&D expenditure and the upsurge in patenting. In contrast, for US 
manufacturing industry inventors for the period 1984 to 1995, Kim and Marschke find that 
changes in industry structure and industry-specific R&D expenditure explain about 70 per 
cent of the increased patenting volume. Given the decoupling of patenting from a 
technology basis, it can no longer be assumed that analyses of manufacturing industry will 
provide the major explanation for economy-wide trends. Kim and Marschke do not discuss 
how their limited dataset relates to the overall economy and overall US patenting. They do, 
however, suggest that some 60 per cent of the increased volume of patenting is due to 
patenting from the electronics and computer industries (broadly defined), and contrast this 
with the findings by Hicks et al. (2001) that 57 per cent of the growth is due to the health 
and information technology industries (Kim and Marschke 2004: 544). The single general 
conclusion from all these studies is that there has been a shift in the average number of 
Pitney-Bowes is well known as a very aggressive user of its large patent portfolio. In other areas firms may 
invest less in reviewing recently accepted patents so many equally invalid patents may be being granted.  
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patents obtained per dollar of R&D expenditure, a view also confirmed with data from 
Germany (Blind et al. 2003). The drivers of this change in patent ‘yield’ are disputed.  
Kortum and Lerner—noting that the upsurge is largely among US entities patenting in the 
USA and overseas—examine and reject the conventional wisdom that the shift in decisions 
by the new court was the main driver of this change (Kortum and Lerner 1999). This view 
is largely based on simultaneous increases in overseas patenting by US companies and no 
close relationship between the timing of increased US patenting by foreign firms and the 
establishment of the CAFC. They attribute the upsurge to improved research management.  
Hall finds a marked break in the growth rate of total patent applications in 1984, from an 
average 0.3 per cent a year to an average of 6.9 per cent a year (Hall 2005: 38). A growth 
accounting approach is used to show that this increase occurred across all technology 
classes, but only in a narrow set of industries: electrical, computing and instruments. Key 
events around the time of the upsurge in patenting in these industries were the establish-
ment of the CAFC, and two significant judicial decisions (Texas Instruments and Polaroid) 
which markedly increased the value of patents (Hall 2005 and Hall and Ziedonis 2001).  
Bessen and Hunt (2004) investigate the rapid increase in software patenting using a 
keyword search approach.143 This definition may include substantial numbers of non-
software patents—perhaps as many as half (Layne-Farrar 2005: 16). Reducing Bessen and 
Hunt’s estimates by half still implies a software share of patents of at least 7 per cent by 
2002 (Bessen and Hunt 2004: 5). The above-average growth in software patenting is not 
explained by differential research inputs, productivity growth, or other observable factors. 
Holding a range of relevant variables constant, Bessen and Hunt find a 50 per cent increase 
in software patenting between 1987 and 1992, and a 164 per cent increase by 1996 (Bessen 
and Hunt 2004: 22). They conclude that patents and R&D are substitutes not complements, 
and that a parsimonious explanation of the data is an increase in strategic patenting.144  
 
143  All US patents granted since 1975 were searched using the keywords ‘software’ or ‘computer’ and 
‘program’ AND NOT ‘chip’ or ‘semiconductor’ or ‘bus’ or ‘circuit’ or ‘circuitry’ or ‘antigen’ or ‘antigenic’ or 
‘chromatography’. This identified 130,650 software patents granted in the years 1976 to 1999, which were 
matched to firms in the 1999 Compustat database. This provided a set of over 2,000 parent firms.  
144  There are a number of surveys confirming extensive strategic patenting behaviour. They are reviewed 
in Blind et al. 2006.  
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Compared to general patents, software patents are more likely to be assigned to companies, 
owned by US assignees and have US inventors (Bessen and Hunt 2004). This finding: that 
US owners are over-represented among software or business method patents compared to 
patents in general is reported in a number of studies (Gandal 2002; Lerner 2002; Allison 
and Tiller 2003). Compared to software patents, US internet patents are more likely to be 
held by small companies (Gandal 2002; Allison and Tiller 2003).  
But software can be used in an embedded fashion (as in the Diehr and Lutton rubber-curing 
patent), or can itself be the effective product (as in Amazon’s one-click method for ordering 
books on-line). By limiting the analysis to major US packaged software companies (in the 
period 1987-97) Graham and Mowery are able to exclude embedded software patents from 
their analysis.145 They find that ‘pure software’ patents generally more than doubled over 
the decade as a proportion of total US patents (1.7 to 3.8 per cent). The share of software 
patents held by packaged software firms increased from <0.1 to 3.2 per cent (but only to 0.7 
per cent if Microsoft is dropped from the set). The largest share of software patents is held 
by large electronic firms,146 whose share rises from 35 to 45 per cent over the decade. 
There is no clear pattern in patenting trends for individual companies, but if companies are 
grouped into incumbents and new entrants, then it appears that patent propensity has 
increased for incumbents, but not for new entrants (Graham and Mowery 2003). 
3.3.3 The economic effects of patent boundary changes 
Two studies directly address the impact of legal changes to subject matter boundaries on 
firms. Lerner and Zhu look indirectly at the impact on software patenting of the Borland147 
copyright decision which limited the use of copyright in protecting more than expression 
(Lerner and Zhu 2005). Their results are consistent with the hypothesis that the reduction in 
copyright protection led to an increase in patenting. They find no evidence of any negative 
association between this change in patenting behaviour and a range of measures of firm 
 
145  The data are from 11 IPC sub-classes, selected because they are the ones mainly used by the largest six 
US software producers. They also exist throughout the period 1984-97. These classes exclude categories 
where software is embedded in other products. 
146  IBM, Intel, Hewlett-Packard, Motorola, National Semiconductor, NEC, DEC, Compaq, Hitachi, 
Fujitsu, Texas Instruments and Toshiba. Bessen and Hunt (2004) also find that manufacturers, especially in 
electronics and machinery industries, obtain the bulk of software patents (65 per cent).  
147  Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc., 516 U.S. 233 (1996). 
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performance.148 Hall and MacGarvie use a similar event study approach to investigating the 
impact of the series of patent decisions—from Diamond v Diehr to In re Beauregard—on 
stock market valuations of firms (Hall and MacGarvie 2006). They separate publicly listed 
software firms into those upstream (more likely to benefit from holding patents), and those 
downstream (more likely to have to pay larger licensing fees if patents become stronger and 
more widespread). They find that the Diamond v Diehr decision had little impact on 
software firms—as one might expect given that the decision was about embedded software 
not software per se. But the 1994 In re Alappat decision—widely regarded as a key 
decision in the extension of patentability to software—was associated with a statistically 
significant fall in cumulative abnormal returns, the effect being more marked for 
downstream applications and service firms. In other words profits for downstream and 
service firms were negatively affected by this decision. Similar results were found for the 
1994 In re Lowry decision which was another strong extension in patentability for 
software.149 The negative impact of legal decisions about patents and copyright on firm 
profits has at yet received little attention in the literature on patent or copyright reform. 
A major competition issue for the patent system is its impact on the entry of firms. 
Schumpeter considered that new entry—dynamic competition—was far more important 
than traditional notions of competition within a static framework, and this view of the 
positive benefits of the ‘gale of creative destruction’ underlay his acceptance of monopoly 
and oligopoly (Schumpeter 1954). So too did the presumption that significant innovations 
are frequent and ensure that monopolies are only temporary. Boldrin and Levine, in 
contrast, argue that with intellectual property rights monopolies tend to become very long-
lasting and ‘generally engage in rent-seeking behaviour’ (Boldrin and Levine 2008: 191). 
Merges, a legal scholar, draws a parallel between the role patents played for industry 
outsiders in the early US railway industry, and the possible impact of the extension of 
patents to the software industry (Merges 2003). But neither Graham and Mowery nor 
Bessen and Hunt (2004) find any pattern of high patenting among entrants. Indeed Graham 
and Mowery (2003) find an increased patenting propensity only for incumbents in the 
 
148  As always, however, empirical studies of patenting are challenged by the fact that there is a strong 
positive relationship between having once patented and patenting again. 
149  It effectively removed the printed matter exception to patentability where information is processed 
automatically rather than manually. 
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software industry. In the semi-conductor industry (which, like software, has a profile of fast 
incremental innovation), Hall and Ziedonis find a large increase in patenting since 1989 
among capital intensive manufacturing firms (Hall and Ziedonis 2001). But they also find 
that smaller design firms entering the market since 1982 have a very high propensity to 
patent. They suggest the two different groups of firms are patenting for different reasons, 
and that financing may be particularly important for patenting in new firms.  
More light is thrown on these mixed results by Cockburn and MacGarvie, who investigate 
the impact of patents on patterns of entry and exit in 27 narrowly defined software patent 
classes in the period 1994 to 2004 (Cockburn and MacGarvie 2006). They find both that 
entry is lower into classes where there are more software patents, and that firms with more 
patents are more likely to enter software markets. Thus while the existence of large 
numbers of patents reduces firm entry, firms that do enter need to hold patents. Further, 
holding patents seems to increase the survival chances of software firms.  
Mann specifically investigates the role of patents in attracting capital, drawing on in-depth 
interviews with around 60 small start-up software companies (Mann 2005). He reports that 
early stage companies pay little attention to the patent system, but that interest increases for 
later start-up companies. While he finds a wide variety of opinion in regard to critical 
factors for financing, the role of patents is clearly not pre-eminent; it also varies by the 
stage of development of the firm. Mann also points to the considerable diversity within the 
software industry, with some sectors showing very high patenting rates (for example, 
graphics, expert systems and security) while others have very low patenting rates (email 
and internet software and financial software).  
Lerner has investigated the impact of the State Street Bank decision on innovation in the 
financial services industry (Lerner 2004). Despite a widespread view that the finance 
industry is highly innovative, very little research has been undertaken on innovation in 
financial services, compared to innovation in manufacturing. Most of what exists is 
concerned with the diffusion of innovation rather than its generation. Lerner matches 
innovation stories from the Wall Street Journal to patent data and to firm data from 
Compustat, and assesses the importance of the innovations by their impact on the trading 
price of listed firms. He finds that financial innovation occurs in firms of all sizes and that 
less profitable firms are disproportionately innovative. Since State Street Bank large firms 
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have increased their domination of innovation, and the elasticity of patenting with respect 
to size has increased sharply. In other words, large firms have responded more strongly to 
the State Street Bank decision and increased their patenting activity more markedly.  
Overall then it appears that firms are now more likely to obtain a larger number of patents 
from a given R&D expenditure. There is no evidence that this change has had a negative 
impact on firm performance, but neither is there evidence that these higher patenting rates 
have enhanced firm performance. High patenting rates in an industry appear to deter entry, 
but entrant firms actively use patents to achieve entry. Very early stage firms appear to 
ignore the patent system altogether, but are not at risk of being sued because of their lack of 
financial resources. While it is often claimed that patents are important for obtaining 
venture financing, there is little empirical evidence to support this claim, at least for the 
software industry, broadly defined. 
3.3.3.1 Case studies and doctrinal analyses 
In contrast to these empirical studies, another strand in the literature analyses individual 
cases (Hall 2003; Lesavich 2001; McFarlane 2001; Stallman 2001; Stern 2001). Hunt 
provides some useful information from specific cases on license fees and litigation 
outcomes (Hunt 2007). Murphy searched for key terms from the field of operations 
research to identify what is currently being patented (Murphy 2002). Over the period 1996 
to 2001, he found that about 10,000 patents with operations research terms were issued 
each year, many being in the telecommunications and medicine fields. Lerner found a 
striking number of finance patents where highly relevant prior art was not cited, and 
describes two in detail to demonstrate their complete lack of inventiveness compared to 
existing knowledge (Lerner 2002: 922-924).150 While these articles provide a wealth of 
detail on the nature of business method patents, and considerable insights into the practical 
operation of patent law, they provide no systematic evidence on the economic 
consequences of such patents.  
 
150  Daughtery III’s patent (5,884,286) for an expirationless option transaction (also filed in Australia in 
September 1997 and sealed as patent number 715495 in May 2000); and Traub, Paskov and Vanderhoof’s 
patent (5,940,810) for using advanced simulation techniques to value securities (not found in Australia). In 
each case Lerner points to a range of directly relevant prior art not cited. The prior art Lerner identifies 
suggests substantial problems with the novelty of both these patents. 
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A number of legal articles suggest that the problem with business method patents is one of 
low patent standards (Whitmeyer 1991; Merges 1999; Barton 2000; Freedman 2000; 
Ullman 2000; Gladstone 2002; Evensen 2004). The most frequently cited patent standard 
problem is in regard to inventiveness, a problem often closely linked to difficulties in the 
identification of relevant prior art (Dreyfuss 2000; Krause 2000; Bakels and Hugenholtz 
2002; Noveck 2006). The very narrow way in which an 'art' (technology field) is defined is 
also identified as eliminating much of the available pre-existing knowledge from 
consideration (Bagley 2001). Others suggest that the problem is the very broad scope 
provided to software and business method patentees, because of the high level of generality 
in which the claim language is framed (Cohen and Lemley 2001; Williams and Bukowitz 
2001; Bessen and Meurer 2008). Still others deem the problem to lie with the definition of 
inventiveness itself, including that obvious ideas are not written down (Ullman 2000; 
Bakels and Hugenholtz 2002).   
3.3.3.2 The quality of issued patents 
There are some empirical assessments of the claims that the quality of business method 
patents is low. They all, however, compare business method patents to other patents. While 
this provides useful information on the comparative quality of business method patents, it 
provides no direct evidence about the absolute quality of such patents. As has been pointed 
out there may be a very low standard of inventiveness for patents generally (Harris 1986; 
Lunney 2001; Jaffe and Lerner 2004; Lunney 2004). In a presentation on patent quality to 
an OECD Conference, Merrill advised that in the USA  
"… the foremost criticism, voiced by many proponents of the system, has been that 
too many issued patents do not meet the statutory tests of novelty or utility or at the 
time they were made would have been obvious to people skilled in the respective 
technologies”  
(Merrill 2003: 112).  
Campbell-Kelly and Valduriez select 50 of the best-quality software patents (those most 
cited by subsequent patent applications), and consider a range of aspects of quality. They 
point out that the overall inventiveness standard required for patents is very low, and their 
assessment of obviousness is against this low general standard as used by the USPTO. They 
observe that all 50 of the studied patents are incremental. But they find only two to be 
technically obvious. They considered that these two obvious patents were not particularly 
obvious ‘by the standard of patents in general’ (Campbell-Kelly and Valduriez 2005: 32). 
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Both the obvious patents were among the five with overly broad scope, and one is a 
business method patent.151 To investigate whether the patents are ‘real’ or merely strategic 
devices, they compare the subject matter of the patents to the top research agendas of 
computer science associations, and conclude there is a strong correlation. They also 
conclude that the set of 50 'best' software patents is more inventive than software patents 
generally, based on a comparison of average prior citations and average claims to a broader 
set of software patents.152 This conclusion rests heavily on the validity of these proxies as 
measures of inventiveness. There are some reasons to suggest that a set of patents with high 
forward citations might be more important. But the authors themselves note that all 50 
inventions can at best be described as incremental. They also found that the two most 
obvious were less obvious than many granted software patents.  
In regard to patent scope, Campbell-Kelly and Valduriez find no correlation between the 
breadth of the claim and the number of claims, unless patents are first grouped into 
categories of high, medium and low breadth, in which case there is a positive correlation. 
This finding suggests problems with the use of the number of patent claims as a proxy for 
the breadth (scope) of patent claims.  
The only other in-depth insights into the quality of business method patents are Lerner’s 
detailed assessment of two finance patents (Lerner 2002) and Wagner’s investigation of 
franking machine business method patents153 in Europe (Wagner 2008). Wagner found that 
Pitney-Bowes’ competitors regularly opposed their patents, as a strategy for dealing with 
Pitney Bowes’ aggressive use of its patent portfolio. He reports that 26 of 67 opposed 
patents were revoked, and suggests that this indicates substantial problems at the EPO in 
identifying prior art in the business method field.  
Other studies use quantitative proxies to investigating patent quality. Allison and Tiller 
point out the limitations of this, before comparing internet business method patents to a set 
of randomly selected general patents (Allison and Tiller 2003). They find that mean 
 
151  US Patent 4,992,940, "System and method for automated selection of equipment for purchase through 
input of user desired specifications." 
152  The 50 'best' software patents have more prior citations and more claims than either internet software 
patents or general software patents in Allison and Lemley's (2000) study of a number of technology classes. 
153  Modern franking machines provide significant value-added services, which would largely involve 
software implementation. Examples are account details and mail tracking, both of which would fall into US 
class 705 (Wagner 2008). 
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citations and mean non-patent citations are both higher for internet patents than for general 
patents.154 Compared to general patents, internet patents cite much more prior art, including 
more non-patent prior art. While some prior art is identified by applicants, examiners also 
add prior art citations. It is not known which prior art citations are added by the applicant 
and which by the examiner, but Allison and Tiller suggest that the difference between the 
two sets is so high that it is unreasonable to suppose that it is due to the examiners.   
Hunter also considers whether too little prior art is cited, comparing business method (class 
705) patents to general data processing (software) patents (Hunter 2004). He confirms that 
business methods patents do not cite less prior art than software patents. Gandal compares 
internet business methods patents in three classes155 with non-internet patents in the same 
classes and finds the former have fewer citations (Gandal 2002). Lerner found that financial 
method patent applications were far less likely to cite academic ‘prior art’ references, 
compared to a small matched sample from other fields (Lerner 2002). Lerner also found 
that examiners were less experienced in looking at such applications, were far less likely to 
have advanced qualifications in the field, and were far less likely to add academic 
references in the prior art search. Lerner reports that finance patents are litigated 27 times 
more often than general patents, and that this litigation focuses on patents held by 
individuals and smaller entities (Lerner 2008). The results of these quantitative assessments 
of prior art are therefore very mixed. But Wagner’s direct report on opposition outcomes 
for one industry confirm the view that there are substantial difficulties in the ability of 
patent offices to identify existing knowledge for business method ‘inventions’.  
Hunter investigates whether business method claim scope is too wide, using the number of 
claims as a proxy, and finds that they do not have more claims that software patents 
generally. Gandal (2002) uses the number of IPC classes to which internet patents are 
assigned as a measure of patent scope, and finds that they are assigned to fewer classes (i.e. 
narrower in scope) than non-internet patents in the same classes. Both these measures of 
scope are problematic. Clearly much further work is needed in this area.  
 
154  As the distributions of these variables are highly dispersed, they re-test their findings after eliminating 
outliers, and find their findings robust. 
155  Assigned to class 705, 707 or 709 as the primary classification and having the words ‘internet' ‘world 
wide web’, ‘world-wide web’ or ‘www’ in the title or abstract.  
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Several authors refer to the problem of the degree of abstraction in software and business 
method patents. Bessen and Meurer (2008) argue that the high level of abstraction allowed 
in many patents, but particularly software and business methods, undermines the essential 
requirement that an inventor possess the property for which a monopoly is sought, and that 
patents are being granted for considerably more than was ever possessed by the patent 
owner. They give several telling examples, and note that claims are often drafted so that 
they can be narrowly interpreted for validity purposes and broadly interpreted for 
infringement purposes (Bessen and Meurer 2008: 57). Writing as far back as 1977, Kitch 
pointed to the frequency with which patent scope exceeded the actual invention and used 
this observation as argument in support of his ‘prospect’ theory (Kitch 1977).  
While there are some discussions of business method patenting in Australia, none are 
empirical. Brennan and McFarlane both look in some detail at the Welcome Real Time case 
(McFarlane 2001; Brennan 2002), and at the US Priceline.com case. McFarlane also 
considers in detail a specific Australian business method patent, and concludes that any 
innovation must lie in the business process as there is no technical innovation. ACIP noted 
that the Australian Patent Office removed the requirement for a ‘technical means of 
implementation’ following the Welcome Real Time case (ACIP 2003: 12).  
Overall, these various efforts to pin down the extent of any quality problem with business 
method patents are hampered by the poor relationship between the available proxy 
measures and the underlying variables of concern. The in-depth study by Campbell-Kelly 
and Valduriez (2005) provides the most valuable insight: among a set of patents likely to be 
the most inventive, all are only for incremental inventions, and 4 per cent are technically 
obvious, though less obvious than many other software patents. The in-depth analysis of 
business method patents in the franking machine industry shows that patent offices 
continue to have difficulty identifying existing knowledge. The next section of this chapter 
explores the legal history on the novelty and inventiveness requirements of patent law. 
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3.4 Novelty and inventiveness 
The literature reviewed in the previous section raises the serious question as to whether 
patents have been extended to the new field of business methods solely, or largely, because 
of deficiencies in the novelty and inventiveness standards. There are two aspects to this 
proposition. One strand in the literature suggests the difficulties are practical, particularly in 
identifying the pre-existing body of knowledge, and so are limited to software and business 
method applications. The other strand suggests that the actual novelty and inventiveness 
standards applied to all applications have fallen to too low a level, either through the 
procedures implemented by patent offices, or through case law. 
The history of the novelty and inventiveness criteria for patentability is reviewed in this 
section. As was the case with patentable subject matter it will be seen that the major policy 
changes have been made through case law, rather than through legislation. The exception is 
some minor legislative amendments to the definition of the existing knowledge base made 
(in 1990 and 2001) following recommendations by review bodies. As will be seen there is a 
strong contrast between the (albeit limited) parliamentary debate on the importance of high 
standards, and the actual standards that are applied by the patent office and the courts. 
There is also a strong contrast between views expressed in patent reviews—such as the 
IPCRC view that business method patents would not meet the general tests for 
patentability—and the patent system as it actually operates. 
The first question for an innovation policy analyst is, why are there two distinct criteria? 
The Macquarie dictionary defines novel as ‘of a new kind, or different from anything seen 
or known before’ (revised 3rd edition: 1312). Inventive is an adjective deriving from the 
verb to invent ‘1. to originate as a product of one's own contrivance: to invent a machine. 
… 4. to devise something new, as by ingenuity. [late ME, from L inventus, pp., discovered, 
found out].’ (994). Thus to invent is to create something new: in their essence novel and 
inventive mean the same thing. It is also clear that this quality of novelty, or inventiveness, 
is a continuous variable. ‘How novel?’ is a reasonable question to ask about an invention. 
Why then are there separate requirements of novelty and inventiveness under patent law?  
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Indeed modern Australian patent law seems to have three related requirements: the two 
separate criteria of novelty and inventiveness,156 and an additional criterion related to the 
meaning of the word invention (Bennett, 1993: 21-22).157 Whether this third criterion 
provides an additional threshold or not is as yet unclear. Certainly an ‘invention’ can be 
novel and not pass the ‘is it an invention’ test.158 Whether an ‘invention’ can pass the 
inventiveness test but fail the ‘is it an invention’ test has not yet been considered.  
Brennan and Christie (1997) discuss this question of a ‘threshold requirement for 
inventiveness’ with particular reference to Philips v Mirabella, a case which had two 
Federal Court decisions and then went to the High Court on the issue of whether section 18 
of the Patents Act 1990 continued to allow such a basis for rejection.159 The High Court 
held that the opening words of section 18 implied that some quality of inventiveness is 
indeed needed for an invention to be patentable. This invention had been held to be novel 
by a lower court, but had not been assessed against the inventiveness test by that court. The 
case demonstrates that the very narrow meaning that novelty has today. This derives from 
the fact that patent law has developed very precise rules about what is accepted as existing 
knowledge against which the threshold tests for patentability are applied. A great deal of 
knowledge is excluded when novelty and inventiveness are determined.160  
The rationale for having three such closely intertwined tests becomes clear as one unravels 
how each criterion has become increasingly narrow through a series of judicial decisions.  
 
156  The inventiveness criterion in practice is often determined in terms of whether the reverse holds—was 
it obvious? It parallels the US requirement in section 103 of ‘non-obviousness’.  
157  The novelty requirement in set out in section 7(1) of the Patents Act 1990, while the inventiveness 
criterion is set out in section 7(2). Section 18 defines a patentable invention and is the basis for the third 
criterion of a threshold of inventiveness.  
158  NV Philips Gloeilampenfabricken and Another v Mirabella International Pty Ltd, (1992) 24 IPR 1; 
(1993) 44 FCR 239; and (1995) 132 ALR 117. 
159   Interestingly, the IPCRC considers that this decision involved importing earlier case law into the 1990 
Act, rather than simply interpreting the word ‘invention’ in section 18 as requiring at least some element of 
invention (IPCRC, 2000: 146). The IPCRC was well aware of the economic importance of inventiveness, 
noting that the scope of a patent was ‘largely determined by its inventiveness relative to existing public 
knowledge (prior art)’ (IPCRC, 2000: 9). 
160  Patent law scholars can expound in fine detail and at great length on the different meanings of ‘new’ 
for these two tests. But from a viewpoint of patent policy balance such nuances are irrelevant—if the major 
threshold tests are as low as many suggest, clearly monopolies are being granted where no counter-balancing 
consideration passes to the public. The policy question is how to re-introduce effective threshold criteria.  
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3.4.1 Novelty in practice 
In early UK patent law the only criterion along the novelty/inventiveness dimension was 
‘new’. Bochnovic (1982) comments that early British case law made no clear distinction 
between the quality or degree of newness, invention and manner of manufacture. He 
suggests that inventiveness issues were generally dealt with as issues of ‘manner of 
manufacture’ (subject matter). He further suggests that both subject matter and 
inventiveness were entwined with the public interest considerations which were basic to 
common law and the Statute of Monopolies.  
Newness relates directly to what others are doing at the time or have previously done: 
“Obviously, a monopoly will not be granted, or the grant will not be valid, if it 
prevents any person from doing what he had been previously accustomed to do. Such 
a grant would be contrary both to Common Law, and to the provisions of the Statute 
of Monopolies” 
(Curtis and Lahey 1954: 7).  
Bannon considers that if a proposed invention is substantially identical to what has been 
known before, then it is not novel (Bannon 1984: 49). McKeough et al. suggest that ‘the 
consideration moving to the public in return for the monopoly is the revelation of 
something hitherto unknown’ (McKeough et al. 2004: 346).  
The legal concept of newness, or novelty, is tested in terms of whether an invention has 
been ‘anticipated’, in the ‘prior art base’ as it existed immediately before the application 
was made. The Patent Examiner’s Manual (IPAustralia 2008: section 2.4.2) advises that a 
good way to test whether an invention has been anticipated is to apply the ‘reverse 
infringement test’: would the previous invention (the 'anticipation') be deemed to infringe a 
patent on the application? The Manual notes that every essential element of the claim must 
be anticipated for there to be a lack of novelty.  
Thus where an invention has a number of elements, as is frequently the case with software 
and business method 'inventions', the likelihood of it being deemed exactly the same as a 
previous invention is substantially reduced, even if every separate element can be found in 
previous inventions. This is because novelty must be tested against previous publications, 
considered one at a time.161 
 
 
161  Two publications can be considered together, if and only if a person skilled in the art would treat them 
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3.4.2 Limiting pre-existing knowledge: 'prior art' 
The ‘prior art base’ is thus central to the test for novelty. But the ‘prior art base’ as it 
operates in patent law is a very different thing from existing knowledge, or the application 
of existing knowledge. What constitutes the base against which patent applications should 
be tested has been limited through case law, and then been adopted into statute law. The 
test for newness was originally against whether an invention had been publicly worked 
within living memory.162 In 1778 this test was expanded to include disclosure through 
publication (Walterscheid 1995b: 849).163  
The 1984 IPAC review recommended a number of changes to broaden the definition of 
‘prior art’, in order to raise novelty and obviousness standards. Its recommendations 
stopped short of an absolute universal knowledge base, as used for example in the EPC. 
This was because of concerns regarding the cost, especially increased uncertainty, of 
establishing prior use outside Australia. But it did recommend, and the government 
accepted, that a global (rather than a domestic) publication base should be adopted. This 
was implemented in the Patents Act 1990. Sixteen years later the IPCRC recommended that 
a global standard also be used for previous use, and this change was made in the Patents 
Amendment Bill 2001.164  
But in regard to defining ‘prior art’ patent law does more than define what documents and 
uses are acceptable as part of existing knowledge. There are also strict rules limiting the 
combination of individual documents or artefacts.  
In 1880 British case law established the precedent that in determining novelty only one 
piece of previous knowledge could be considered at a time.165 This changed the relevant 
test for novelty: this was no longer against the body of existing knowledge, but against 
as a single source. The fact that one document might refer to another is, under patent law, an insufficient 
reason for two documents to be considered together (IPAustralia 2008: sections 2.4.4.2 and 2.4.4.4). 
162  The within living memory condition was adopted into statute law in the form that patents over 50 years 
old did not count as ‘prior art’. It was only removed from the Australian patent statute in 1990, following a 
recommendation by IPAC. It remains in the New Zealand Patents Act 1953, Section 13(1). 
163  Liardet v. Johnson (Hulme, 18 L.Q.R at 287). 
164  The IPCRC also recommended an absolute global standard for common general knowledge used in the 
inventiveness test. While accepted by government this proposed change was amended in the Senate (because 
of the intervention of the minor Democrats party) and the common general knowledge of the person skilled in 
the art remains common general knowledge in Australia (McKeough et al. 2004: 358). 
165  Von Heyden v. Neustadt (1880) 50 L.J.Ch. 126 at 128; 14 Ch.D. 230 (see Bochnovic 1982: 20).  
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specific individual items of knowledge.166 This decision was re-emphasised by Viscount 
Dunedin in 1929 (Pope Appliance v. Spanish River). It was challenged in subsequent cases, 
but the legal doctrine was re-affirmed by the UK Court of Appeal (1952) and the House of 
Lords (1956) (Bochnovic 1982: 21).  
This legal doctrine has been adopted into British and Australian statute law. IPAC 
recommended that, except for explicit cross-referencing, the prohibition on combining 
evidence should remain. No reasons were given. The IPCRC did not consider the question 
of the limited base against which novelty was assessed. The doctrinal (now statutory) limit 
on allowable existing knowledge substantially increases the likelihood that any patent 
application will pass the novelty test, and so has a significant influence on balance in the 
patent system. If much existing knowledge is ruled out of consideration, then it is easier to 
claim a new contribution. There does not appear to have been any economic evaluation of 
this rule, either at the time it was adopted into statute law, or in subsequent reviews.  
Against these legal curtailments of how existing knowledge is defined, it is interesting to 
ask whether the threshold tests posited in patent texts such as those by Bannon and 
McKeough et al. are consistent with such a narrow definition of existing knowledge and its 
application. If existing knowledge is limited to what is written in a single document, or 
demonstrated in one product or process, then is it reasonable to state that the novelty test is 
‘substantial identity with what has been previously known’ (Bannon 1984: 49), or ‘the 
revelation of something hitherto unknown’ (McKeough et al. 2004: 346)? These rules 
effectively mean that the normal concept of the ‘existing body of knowledge’ does not exist 
in patent law. Certainly the material on recently granted Australian business method 
patents, presented in Chapters 5 and 6, challenges the notion that an invention is required to 
make a contribution to the public knowledge base to be deemed patentable.  
3.4.3 Emergence of the inventive step 
The inventive step test emerged from case law at around the same time as the novelty test 
was emasculated through the restrictions placed on evidence about existing knowledge. It 
was only adopted into statute law many years later (Bochnovic 1982: 9). Bochnovic 
 
166  The publication is to be read from the perspective of a person skilled in the art, that is, in the light of 
that person’s common general knowledge. But there should be no addition from this common general 
knowledge base to the document in determining the ‘prior art’ (see IPAustralia 2008: section 2.4.5.2.3). 
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indicates that the first British case where a patent was held invalid for want of an inventive 
step was in 1868.167 He indicates that this new requirement occasionally ‘appeared as a 
modified novelty requirement or as a requirement of some intangible inventive ingenuity’ 
(Bochnovic 1982: 15). Kitch argues that the ‘substantial novelty’ test disappeared in the 
USA between 1885 and the 1920s, and was replaced by the less clear-cut non-obviousness 
test (Kitch 1966, 1977). Beier compares the development of the inventive step test in the 
USA, the UK, France and Germany in the period 1850-1960 (Beier 1986). He suggests a 
major difference between the USA—with its focus on the kind of creative process and the 
skills of the inventor—and Europe, where the focus was principally on the technical and 
economic effects of the invention. 
The new inventive step test increasingly revolved around the word obvious, which of 
course raises the question of ‘obvious to whom?’168 The appropriate judge of the inventive 
step has been determined to be a ‘person with ordinary skills in the relevant art’.  
After finding that existing knowledge in terms of the novelty test is constrained to single 
documents considered one at a time, it should come as no surprise that in regard to the test 
for obviousness existing knowledge is also highly circumscribed in law. The person skilled 
in the art (PSA) is assumed to have all the knowledge that is common and general within 
that field—but no more. Until 1990 s/he might be allowed to combine that general 
knowledge with one other item of knowledge. In 2001 this was amended to allow two or 
more documents to be combined with common general knowledge, but only under quite 
specific conditions. Section 7(2)(b) of the Patents Act 1990 allows the person skilled in the 
relevant art to consider sources of information beyond common general knowledge if and 
only if ‘the skilled person … could … be reasonably expected to have ascertained, 
understood and regarded as relevant to work in the relevant art ...’. 
An interesting recent Australian case illustrates how narrow is the interpretation of 
permissible existing knowledge for the inventiveness test. Australian patent 662,655 is 
essentially for removable tags for use in touch football. It was appealed after grant and 
during this process was revoked by the Commissioner of Patents, on the grounds that it was 
 
167  White v Toms, (1969) 37 LJ Ch 204. 
168  This approach, the so-called ‘Cripps question’, was introduced as a test in Sharp & Dohme v. Boots 
Pure Drug Company in 1928, and embodied in statute law in the UK in 1932. 
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obvious, given eight previous US patents. The applicant appealed, and Justice Lindgren of 
the Federal Court held that the relevant person skilled in the arts would not have considered 
consulting the US patent database, and that such information could not therefore be used to 
show that the invention was obvious. The Commissioner appealed to the Full Federal 
Court, but they agreed with initial judgment: it was unreasonable to expect a Rugby League 
or Australian Rules coach, referee, umpire or administrator to search US patents (APLF 
2006).169 This decision effectively means that in many fields, particularly fields with 
moderate to low levels of technology and patenting, all previous knowledge demonstrated 
through the grant of patents becomes irrelevant for determining if a patent application is 
inventive or not. This makes a mockery of the whole question of an objective test of 
inventiveness and of the balance between the grant to the ‘inventor’ and the public interest. 
It is, however, clearly founded on the wording of Section 7(2)(b) of the Patents Act 1990. 
3.4.4 Comparing novelty and inventiveness 
The inventiveness and novelty tests thus differ both in regard to what sub-set of existing 
knowledge forms the base point, and the judgement rule that is used. The common feature 
is that both use only a sub-set of existing knowledge.  
For the novelty test any global knowledge can be used, but not more than two pieces at a 
time—two documents or artefacts.170 If the new 'invention' is so similar to the documentary 
or practical evidence that the two 'inventions' would infringe each other, then the new 
'invention' is not novel. Any difference between the new 'invention' and the allowed 
piece(s) of pre-existing knowledge should not involve ingenuity (Bennett 1993).  
When it comes to judging inventiveness, a broader sub-set of pre-existing knowledge can 
be considered—common general knowledge in the field, and two or more documents. But 
this additional documented knowledge can be used only if the skilled person would regard 
such documents as relevant to their work. Bennett (1993) suggests that there would be too 
much scope for finding a patent uninventive (invalid) if documents were pre-selected and 
the person skilled in the art was then asked to judge if the invention was obvious. In 
 
169  Commissioner of Patents v Emperor Sports (2006) 225 ALR 407; (2006) 67 IPR 488; [2006] FCAFC 26. 
170  In fact there are very strict limits on using two pieces of knowledge for this test. For example a cross-
reference in one document to another is not sufficient for it to be certain that both documents can be used in 
the novelty test. In most cases only a single document or artefact is considered. Details of the novelty test are 
in Section 7(1) of the Patents Act 1990.  
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Australia the statutory wording has effectively been used to eliminate patented knowledge 
from existing knowledge in low technology fields.  
In considering how balance in the patent system can best be used to maximise economic 
welfare, Jensen and Webster (2004) assess the impact of type I errors (rejecting good 
inventions) and type II errors (granting patents for uninventive applications). Granting 
monopolies for uninventive ‘inventions’ adds to the volume of noise and the costs of 
establishing the boundaries to patented technology (Bessen and Meurer 2008). It also 
imposes direct costs on innovators through demands for royalties and infringement suits. It 
may also impose static monopoly losses on all consumers. Because of the skewed 
incentives to challenge uninventive patents (Thambisetty 2008: 30-32), most go 
unchallenged. On the other hand refusing a monopoly to a genuine invention imposes costs 
only on the party seeking the monopoly—and as seen in the Grant case discussed above 
there are many avenues for a review of such a decision. Decisions such as that in the 
Emperor Sports case shift the balance of the patent system towards the grant of monopolies 
for uninventive ‘inventions’, thus reducing the likelihood that the system overall will be 
welfare enhancing.  
3.4.5 Judging inventiveness 
Once the relevant body of permissible knowledge has been determined, the issue becomes 
whether the person skilled in the art would deem the invention ‘obvious’. Legal doctrine 
has determined that a person skilled in the art must be ‘an ordinary worker in the field not 
endowed with any special inventive skills.’ (van Caenegem 2007: 84, emphasis added). Van 
Caenegem comments that this whole procedure is rather surreal, particularly when 
discussing inventions at the leading edge of science and technology ‘where inventiveness is 
a common attribute of every typical worker’ (van Caenegem 2007: 85).  
Closely related to this is the issue of the boundaries to the 'art' within which this person 
works. Recognising 'art' as meaning the field of technology, this can be defined relatively 
broadly or relatively narrowly. Bagley has demonstrated how, over time, US legal doctrines 
determining that the relevant field be broadly conceived have been narrowed in the period 
since the early 1990s (Bagley 2001). An automatic consequence of such narrowing is that a 
considerable amount of existing knowledge is ruled inadmissible in relation to the 
 87  
                                                
inventiveness test. This has a critical effect on the determination of inventiveness, 
especially in regard to the doctrine of analogous use, discussed below. 
A further issue is what presumptions and decision-making rules have to be used at various 
stages in the decision-making process. In practice the current Australian patent system 
contains a strong presumption in favour of the applicant. Under the current legal and 
administrative procedures it seems it is not the applicant who must prove that their 
invention is worthy of a patent. Rather it seems the Patent Office must prove it is not. The 
72 case files reviewed for the inventiveness assessment in Chapters 5 and 6 had many 
examples of patent attorneys demanding that unless the patent examiner cited chapter and 
verse detailing lack of novelty or inventiveness, the application should be accepted 
forthwith. This presumption, like much else in Australian patent law, was simply imported 
from the UK, where it developed through case law. US patent law also contains a strong 
presumption that an invention in a filed application meets the statutory requirements for 
patentability, but goes further. In the USA anyone challenging a patent on the grounds of 
lack of novelty or inventiveness must prove their case beyond reasonable doubt (Jaffe and 
Lerner 2004).  
The decision-making rule in Australia was that the applicant should be given the benefit of 
the doubt, derived from the High Court’s judgment in the 1959 Microcell case (IPCRC 
2000: 135). In regard to the novelty and inventiveness tests, this decision-making standard 
was amended to a ‘balance of probabilities’ test following a recommendation by the 
IPCRC. The committee recognised ‘[t]he inventiveness test is therefore now the main test 
for deciding whether the dynamic benefits society might gain outweigh efficiency losses 
from the exclusive right’ (IPCRC 2000: 154). Given this, it is surprising that the committee 
did not recommend a ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ test. Given the over-arching principle of 
competitive markets, the economic norm regarding regulatory intervention is that the onus 
is on the intervener to prove the case, which implies that the appropriate decision rule 
would be ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.171  
 
171  It is illuminating that the committee referred to ‘beyond all reasonable doubt’ as appropriate in 
criminal cases (IPCRC 2000: 166). This demonstrates how the framing of patent policy in a legal context 
allows the ready adoption of rules that are sub-optimal with regard to its economic objectives.  
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So in modern Australian patent law an invention is deemed to be inventive if an ordinary 
worker in the field, being of an uninventive turn of mind, and having only the common 
general knowledge of such workers, and using other material only where it would be 
clearly relevant to do so, would consider it obvious. Further, the field within which this 
worker operates is narrowly constrained. In the Welcome Real Time case the relevant field 
was determined to be loyalty programs not smart card technology. Yet the 'inventive' 
element in that case was in the dynamic storage used on the smart card: agreed in the legal 
hearing to be a well-known approach in software fields.  
The meaning of the word ‘obvious’ has also been constrained by case law, particularly 
where several attributes (called integers in patent law) are combined. As the Patent 
Examiner’s Manual makes clear, if there might be several ways in which existing 
knowledge could be combined to solve a problem, then a single solution is not obvious, and 
the proposed invention is not obvious (section 2.5.3.3.3).172 Further, in Section 2.5.3.5 the 
Manual makes it clear that case law also limits use of ‘obvious’ combinations of common 
general knowledge in judging whether an ‘invention’ passes the inventiveness test.173 This 
‘combinations doctrine’ limits obvious to means the sole obvious option. This issue is 
discussed further in Section 4.4.2. 
The Australian High Court has made a number of decisions on the inventive step test. 
Lawson considers that the combined effect of these decisions is to effectively eliminate this 
threshold (Lawson 2008). This conclusion is based on a view that the Court’s decision in 
Aktiebolaget Hässle174 makes it impossible to prove lack of inventiveness. Drawing on 
several cases he argues that the Court’s requirement to demonstrate a lack of inventiveness 
is to show that ‘an inventor would be directly led as a matter of course to the invention in 
the expectation of success’ (Lawson 2008: 56 emphasis added). As Lawson notes this 
creates a very low threshold, and rules as inventive any situation where experimentation 
among a range of likely options would be regarded as likely to lead to success. Like the 
‘combinations’ doctrine this limits consideration to only one option at a time and thus 
 
172  This view is referenced to two cases: Beecham Groups Limited's (New Zealand/Amoxycillin) Appln 
(1982) FSR 187: 192, and Lucas and Another v Gaedor Ltd and Others (1978) RPC 297:376 – 377.  
173  Citing Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing v Beiersdorf (Australia) (1980) 144 CLR 253.  
174  Aktiebolaget Hässle v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2002) 212 CLR 411. 
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substantially reduces the height of the inventiveness step. Again this ruling has a substantial 
impact on the balance of the patent system. 
As noted in the discussion of business methods in Section 3.3, there are also many 
criticisms of the standard of inventiveness (obviousness) in the USA. In a detailed analysis 
of US patent appeal cases over the period 1944 to 1995, Lunney finds that a series of 
changes in the legal rules underlies a sharp reduction in the likelihood that a patent will be 
found obvious since the creation of the CAFC.175 He notes a number of areas where the 
decisions of the CAFC run counter to those of the Supreme Court, and concludes that at 
times the CAFC has shown a ‘reckless indifference’ to upholding the law (Lunney, 2001: 
380). Quite recently the Supreme Court has agreed to consider a number of patent cases and 
there is some indication that aspects of CAFC decisions are being reversed. For example, in 
KSR v. Teleflex, the Court indicated that the relevant person skilled in the art should be 
considered to have normal creativity (Dreyfuss 2008: 433).176  
Overall then, it seems clear that the quantum of inventiveness required for a patent has 
become lower and lower through a series of legal decisions which have limited each 
element that comes into consideration in making this subjective decision. These case law 
decisions have been adopted into statute law, sometimes after many years, sometimes quite 
speedily. Judges have frequently expressed concern that hindsight not be used to unfairly 
deprive an applicant of a patent. Less concern has been expressed, at least in recent years, 
about the costs imposed on society if patents are granted where invention is lacking. With 
the large increase in the delay between application and grant, and further substantial delays 
where a patent is litigated, the problem of placing oneself in the situation of the state of 
knowledge at the priority date becomes more acute. Nonetheless where almost every legal 
decision seems to have the effect of expanding what can be patented, there has clearly been 
a major shift in the balance between costs and benefits.  
 
175  The elevation of ‘secondary’ (mainly commercial) criteria for determining obviousness; the relaxation 
of the need to demonstrate that any commercial success is due to the inventiveness of the patented item; and 
the elimination of the requirement to show that a combination of known elements produces an outcome 
greater than the sum of the parts.  
176  KSR v Teleflex, 127 S. Ct. 1717 (2007): at 1741-2. Dreyfus (2008) also points out that Section 103 of 
the US patent stature is largely about procedure, not about the appropriate standard of nonobviousness. To the 
extent that a nonobviousness standard is defined at all it is in relation to the person skilled in the art. 
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The net effect of these doctrines is that the system tries so hard to avoid rejecting a possibly 
inventive application that monopoly rights are being granted for a very large volume of 
‘inventions’ that do not even seem to merit the term ‘improvement’ let alone ‘invention’. 
The recently granted Australian business method patents evaluated in Chapters 5 and 6 
show that most of these patented inventions contribute no new knowledge. Nor do they 
appear to involve anything beyond the capacity of an ordinarily skilled worker in their 
implementation.  
This problem is compounded by legal semantics. ‘Clever drafting’ is used to turn software 
inventions into machines, apparatus or devices. Such ‘clever drafting’ also occurs in other 
technology areas, a notable example being ‘Swiss’ medical claims. The EPC specifically 
excludes methods of medical treatment from patentability, though it allows patenting of the 
first medical use of substances. The second medical use of a substance is defined as a 
method of medical treatment, so is unpatentable. Thambisetty (2008: 20-21) shows how the 
‘Swiss’ medical claim style of drafting uses semantics to make an unpatentable ‘invention’ 
patentable.  
3.4.6 Legislative and review body knowledge about inventiveness 
But before turning to this material it is interesting to consider the broader understanding 
about the quantum of inventiveness required for a standard patent. The perceptions and 
understanding of two groups are particularly important—advisers and parliamentarians.  
The IPCRC review body considered that most business method patents would fail the 
patentability tests—a view considerably at odds with the evidence. It is useful to consider 
whether there is more evidence on what such expert advisors know about the actual 
requirements for inventiveness.  
The IPCRC Committee was perhaps the least biased committee to have reviewed 
Australian patent law, at least in terms of the roles of its members.177 The IPCRC (2000) 
looked at a number of technical issues in patent law, in the context that complex trade-offs 
were required to ensure that the social benefit of the system exceeded its social cost. Like 
Jensen and Webster (2004) the IPCRC noted the need to balance the probability of granting 
 
177  Generally committees reviewing aspects of patent law in Australia have been heavily weighted 
towards those from ‘the patent community’, that is patent attorneys, intellectual property academics and 
frequent users of the patent system (see footnote 84, p. 48). 
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uninventive patents against that of rejecting inventive applications,178 and proposed 
changes to the definition of prior art for inventiveness, and to the decision-making rule for 
novelty and inventiveness. But it offered no comment on the implications for this balance 
of the limitations on combining individual pieces of prior art. Nor did it comment on any of 
the range of other matters (discussed above) which impact significantly on the height of the 
inventive step. They did note the view, in some submissions, that the inventive step in 
Australia was low. But given their judgement that business method applications would not 
meet the threshold tests for patentability, they clearly did not agree. As noted above the 
Mirabella case passed the novelty test but failed the ‘minimum threshold test for invention’ 
test. In commenting on the ‘minimum threshold test for invention’ test, the IPCRC 
concluded that ‘the costs and benefits of granted patents should ultimately depend on the 
higher specific hurdles of novelty and inventiveness, not on a bare minimum threshold test 
for invention’ (IPCRC 2000: 146 emphasis added). While the inventiveness hurdle may be 
higher, the Mirabella case clearly showed that the novelty test is (or can be) lower.  
Most economic assessments of the patent system assume that the inventive step threshold is 
set at a reasonable height. That was clearly the view held in the 1994 Bureau of Industry 
Economics (BIE) review of the patent system. That review noted the possibility of 
unnecessary costs if patents were granted to non-innovative products or processes, but 
considered that the novelty and non-obviousness tests prevented this occurring (BIE 1994b: 
45). The IPCRC noted that the novelty test had been largely supplanted by the 
inventiveness test, which ‘is therefore now the main test for deciding whether the dynamic 
benefits society might gain outweigh efficiency losses from the exclusive right’ (IPCRC 
2000: 154). The committee went on to discuss the restricted combination of documents and 
artefacts that could be used to determine ‘prior art’ without commenting on the economic or 
competition implications of restricting the existing body of knowledge in this way. The 
IPCRC recommended an inventive step in line with that of major trading partners, 
 
178  Though the IPCRC and Jensen and Webster define type I and type II errors oppositely. Jensen and 
Webster (2004: 62004) and Dreyfuss (2008: 433) set up the null hypothesis as “an application is an 
invention”, so that type I errors (rejecting the correct null hypothesis, also known as a false positive) is 
defined as rejecting a ‘good’ invention, and a type II error (falsely accepting the null hypothesis, or a false 
negative) is defined as granting a ‘bad’ patent. The IPCRC in contrast must have set up the null hypothesis as 
“an application is not an invention” as they define type I errors as granting ‘bad’ patents and type II errors as 
rejecting ‘good inventions (IPCRC 2000: 153). Both agree that a key factor in determining the trade-off 
between these two types of errors is the height of the inventive step threshold.  
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commenting ‘[h]aving a lower threshold is likely to lead to patents being granted too 
readily, imposing unnecessary costs on the Australian economy’ (IPCRC 2000: 9). This 
again suggests that the committee considered the inventive step to be reasonably high. 
It is also important to establish whether executive government and the legislature 
understand the actual inventiveness threshold required. Two recent legislative changes 
provide an opportunity to consider the understanding that government and parliamentarians 
have about patent inventiveness.  
Throughout this study the focus is exclusively on standard patents. But Australia has a two-
tier patent system. The petty patent system was replaced in 2000 with the innovation patent 
system. The clear intention in the design of the innovation patent was that the quantum of 
inventiveness be lower than for a standard patent. In his Second Reading speech, Mr 
Warren Entsch, MP, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Industry, Science and 
Resources contrasted the type of ‘improvements, adaptations and refinements’ to which the 
innovation patent was directed with ‘major inventive advances’ (Hansard, 29 June 2000). 
During the limited parliamentary debate only Mr Ross Cameron, MP, spoke about 
inventors, inventions and innovation. He referred to a number of significant inventions such 
as the aeroplane and space craft. Members of the legislature may well believe that standard 
patents are only granted for ‘major inventive advances’.  
The legislation supporting the innovation patent system says that there is an innovative step 
unless there is no substantial contribution to the working of the invention (section 7(5), 
emphasis added). This is a very different approach from asking whether an unimaginative 
skilled person would find something obvious or not. The concept was recommended by 
ACIP and derives from an ‘expanded novelty test’ used in the 1938 Griffin v Isaacs 
judgment (Blows and Clark 2006). The use of the adjective substantial to qualify the 
requirement of a contribution to working suggests that in practice the threshold for an 
innovation patent may in fact be higher than for a standard patent. As yet there is no case 
law on how this new test will be interpreted by the courts. 
The Patents Amendment Bill 2001 made several minor changes to the novelty and 
inventiveness tests following recommendations by the IPCRC. The definition of ‘prior art’ 
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was broadened by allowing two or more prior art documents to be combined with common 
general knowledge for the inventiveness test,179 but only under very restrictive conditions. 
For the first time in Australian patent history, it placed an obligation on patentees to 
provide information about searches for ‘prior art’, that is to take some responsibility for 
supplying evidence as to whether their invention is new or inventive.180 In addition, in 
respect of the novelty and inventiveness tests it changed the test used by examiners from 
‘benefit of the doubt’ to ‘balance of probabilities’. This package was claimed to increase 
the certainty of Australian patents by reducing the likelihood that a granted patent would be 
found invalid. Nothing was said about ensuring that only inventive inventions would be 
granted patents.181 
Again the parliamentary discussion was limited. The Second Reading speech was brief and 
factual. It made no comment about the consequence of the changes, except that it would 
bring Australia into line with other countries and ‘result in stronger patent rights’ (Hansard, 
House of Representatives, 24 May 2001: 26974-75). During the debate it was again only 
Mr Ross Cameron, MP, who commented on inventiveness. After noting the strengthening 
of the tests for novelty and inventiveness, and the importance of a balance between the 
creation and dissemination of knowledge, he concluded by commenting on novelty: 
“The question of prior art is really the basis upon which novelty is established. An 
inventor has to be able to demonstrate that the idea which he or she is promoting as 
new has not been thought of by someone else, either in Australia or somewhere in the 
world.” 
(Hansard, House of Representatives, 28 June 2001: 28948, emphasis added) 
 
179  Thus adopting the same standard as the EPC and US systems, as recommended by IPAC in 1984. 
180  Australian patent law is quite different from US patent law in terms of the obligations on the applicant 
to provide information about the pre-existing knowledge base, and its application. There has never been any 
obligation on a applicant for an Australian patent to provide full information on previous knowledge related to 
their application. The 2001 amendments, though reduced in the Senate, still required applicants to provide the 
results of searches by overseas patent offices for previous knowledge (a recommendation originally put 
forward by IPAC in 1984). Subsequently this requirement was watered down before being substantially 
removed on 22 October 2007 (http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/pdfs/news/ON20071018%20Patents%20 
Amendments%20Regulations.pdf, accessed 22 November 2007).  
181  As this discussion shows, the rules on novelty and inventiveness mean that perfectly valid patents can 
be quite uninventive when the ordinary meaning of ‘inventive’ is used. However the Committee’s comments 
relative to inventiveness are very carefully couched in the legal terms of the patent statute, and rarely directly 
address the issue of inventiveness. For example ‘[p]rovided patents are granted for real innovations (as 
stipulated in the legislation)…’ (138); ‘that patents are not granted where it is likely that reasonable threshold 
tests for securing a valid patent will not be met’ (143); ‘change the standard of proof for acceptance so that 
granted patents would be more likely to be valid’ (167); and ‘patents are only given where a genuine 
contribution has been made relative to prior art’ (10) (IPCRC 2000, emphases added).  
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From the (little) evidence available it seems likely that executive government, the 
Australian legislature, and key advisory committees consider that standard patents are 
granted only for quite substantial inventions. But in practice, as demonstrated by the High 
Court in the Mirabella case, it is perfectly possible for an alleged invention to pass the 
novelty test yet fail to merit the term ‘invention’.  
3.4.7 Preventing the grant of invalid patents 
There are a number of legal concepts which have been developed to try to ensure that 
patents are not granted for uninventive applications. Three such doctrines are the tests 
regarding analogous use, new use of old substances and mechanical equivalence (IPCRC 
2000: 154).182 In policy and practical terms these three doctrines are very similar.  
The earliest rejection of an invention on the grounds that it was simply an application of a 
well-known thing to a different purpose (analogous use) was in 1838.183 The principle was 
considered by the House of Lords in 1865, and in his judgment the Lord Chancellor said: 
“Upon that I think that the law is well and rightly settled, for there would be no end to 
the interference with trade, and with the liberty of any mechanical contrivance being 
adapted, if every slight difference in the application of a well-known thing were held 
to constitute a patent …” 184 
In contrast, in 1930, a refusal to grant a patent was overturned in respect of a known 
product (hardened glass) used for a suitable purpose: vehicle windshields. It was 
acknowledged that this was contrary to prior authority (Brennan and Christie 1997: 242). In 
Australia the High Court upheld the analogous use principle in 1959.185 This decision was 
based on an assumed power to examine an application for a threshold level of invention 
(Brennan and Christie 1997: 243). In other words, the statutory novelty test itself did not 
authorise rejection on the grounds of analogous use, but an invention that was simply 
analogous use did not qualify as an invention.  
 
182  Though the new use of old substances principle seems substantially overturned by the 1959 NRDC 
decision. Whether it continues to exist at all seems to depend heavily on the adjective 'mere', that is on the 
lack of any ingenuity in the underlying idea or its development for the new use. Limiting the grant of patents 
for new uses of known substances is further constrained by the 2004 Australia US Free Trade Agreement 
which requires patentability for new uses of known substances (ATS1 Art 17.9(1)) (see Lawson 2007: 145). 
183  Losh v Hague, 3 Hayward’s Patent Cases 125. The claim was for a wheel for use in railway carriages 
(Brennan and Christie 1997: 239).  
184  Hamilton E. Harwood and Another v The Directors, etc of the Great Northern Railway Company, 
(1865) 11 HLC 654 at 682-3, 11 ER 1488 at 1499 (emphasis added).  
185  Commissioner of Patents v Microcell, (1959) 102 CLR 232. 
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The doctrine of analogous use seems highly relevant to business method inventions. Many 
seem merely to take existing methods and use them in a new environment. On the face of it, 
they would seem to fail the patentability criteria on the ground of analogous use. Brennan 
considers the famous case of Priceline.com’s patent for a reverse Dutch auction system on 
the internet, investigating the state of internet knowledge at the priority date. Having done 
this, he asks whether the claim is not ‘a claim to a use for which the Internet’s then known 
properties indicated exact suitability’ (Brennan 2002: 27). The essence of the invention in 
Welcome Real Time v Catuity was the use of a well-known software technique (dynamic 
storage) applied in the software environment of smart chips. The relevant ‘art’ was 
determined as loyalty programs, so the well-known technique at the heart of the ‘invention’ 
was not allowed as existing knowledge against which inventiveness was tested. A prime 
example of the problem Bagley identified —very narrow definitions of the relevant 'art'.186  
The principle that one cannot obtain a patent for new uses of old substances has become 
quite complex. The NRDC case involved the new use of an old substance, but the issue 
before the High Court was whether an agricultural process could be patented. Nonetheless 
it is clear from the judgement that the High Court considered this new use extremely 
inventive, albeit that the inventiveness was in the discovery not the implementation 
process.187 The 2004 Australia US Free Trade Agreement requires that Australia provide 
patents for new use of old substances, though presumably normal novelty and inventiveness 
tests must be passed. As has been shown these standards are low.  
To the non-lawyer it is unclear why the analogous use principle did not apply in both the 
Priceline.com and the Welcome Real Time cases.188 The mechanical equivalent principle 
seems close to the analogous use principle, and should also be operating to ensure that non-
inventive patents are not issuing. From an economic policy perspective it is unclear why a 
 
186  ‘How broadly or narrowly the field of the inventor’s endeavour or the problem facing the inventor is 
defined largely determines what art is analogous, which in turn plays a significant role in the determination of 
whether an invention will be deemed obvious’ (Bagley 2001: 270).  
187  The IPCRC was clearly troubled by the lack of any effective distinction between discovery and 
invention, particularly in terms of its implications for biotechnology, but made no clear recommendations. 
188  Though a clue may be found in the recent ACIP issues paper on patentable subject matter where it is 
argued that different principles apply depending on whether an invention is classified as a ‘use’ or a 
‘combination’ (ACIP 2008: 18). If an ‘invention’ is classified as a combination, the issue will be whether the 
physical form is new and useful. But if it is classified as a ‘use’ then the issue becomes whether the principles 
underlying the elements are new.  
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monopoly needs to be granted to someone who develops a new use for a known substance. 
Such experimentation is part of normal life. These principles have been important in 
maintaining a balance in the patent system, and their apparent abandonment raises serious 
questions about whether the patent system is currently welfare-enhancing.  
3.5 Conclusions 
Developments in the meaning of patent law through individual cases is often based on 
argument between two private individuals (or companies), with no party specifically 
representing the public interest. There have, however, been some significant decisions in 
cases involving private parties on the one side, and society on the other (represented by 
commissioners of patents). In cases which involve a commissioner, the government is 
effectively represented, and the view taken by the lawyer arguing for the commissioner can 
be taken as the view of executive government. Both the US and Australian governments 
made active decisions not to extend patentability to software. But because specific 
exclusions were not written into the statutes, courts have seen fit to reverse these decisions. 
Monopoly grants are thus being broadened when the evidence is that they are not needed. 
The welfare impact can only be negative.  
In its review of business method patentability, ACIP commented that ‘Australia has on the 
whole benefited from the adaptiveness and flexibility of the ‘manner of manufacture’ test 
of patentability’ (ACIP 2003: 2). But this ‘adaptiveness and flexibility’ can be considered 
from another perspective—whether intervention in the market is necessary. The grant of 
monopolies for software was not considered welfare-enhancing, yet the courts used the 
flexible ‘manner of manufacture’ to confer such monopolies. In an area where there ought 
to be careful thought and analysis before intervening in a well-functioning market, an 
inflexible definition would better serve Australia’s interests. In its business method review 
ACIP commented that: 
“Previous decisions on the patentability of other controversial areas, such as software, 
genes, bioinformatics and the treatment of humans, have not been based on 
assessments of whether patent protection is necessary in order to encourage 
innovation in those particular fields. To require such assessments for all inventions 
which are not in a field of technology would result in Australian law having different 
criteria of patentability for different areas of innovation. This appears to be 
undesirable…” 
(ACIP 2003: 33, emphases added) 
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Despite the lip service paid in its report to the importance of competition principles, ACIP 
is clearly reluctant to consider that further regulatory intervention in the market should 
depend on any justification. As Professor Lamberton remarked in dissenting from the 1984 
IPAC report, this smacks of ‘special pleading by those directly involved’ (IPAC 1984: 80). 
From an economic policy perspective, it is essential for good public policy to undertake 
such an assessment before extending the reach of patent monopolies.  
Care would need to be taken in crafting a restrictive definition of patentability that would 
be resistant to continual expansion without any economic justification. The experience of 
the EPC serves as a useful lesson here. Exceptions need to be absolutely worded (Bakels 
and Hugenholtz 2002), or they can be undermined by interested parties, especially where 
those interested parties perform quasi-judicial functions. The current (ACIP) review of 
patentable subject matter provides the opportunity to return the patent system to the narrow 
realm in which it belongs—where there is likely to be a benefit to the public. Traditionally 
this was achieved by limiting patentability to inventions that were ‘manufactures’ or which 
drew on the ‘useful arts’ (technology).189 In considering the role of science in modern 
invention, the role of mathematics as an underlying enabling science, drawn on in many 
other fields, needs particular consideration. Because mathematics is so different from the 
other sciences, a restriction on patentability where the inventiveness lies centrally in a 
mathematical algorithm or its use should be carefully considered.   
Novelty and inventiveness standards have also been subject to substantial modification 
through case law. These more technical decisions, on the myriad of rules governing 
judgements about novelty, inventiveness and the precise definition of existing knowledge, 
have also changed patent law very significantly. This has substantially affected the balance 
between social costs and benefits. Over time many of these legal doctrines have become 
codified in statute law, without any apparent economic or policy analysis of their impact.  
 
189  The US Constitutional authority to ‘promote the progress of science and the useful arts’ combined 
proposals for authors and inventors. Science at that time has a similar meaning to knowledge and the ‘science’ 
part was directed to copyright. Indeed the titles of first two US patent acts were ‘An Act to Promote the 
Progress of the Useful Arts’ (see discussion in Walterscheid 1997, 1998). The 1966 report of the US 
President’s Commission on the Patent System was also called ‘“To Promote the Progress of … Useful Arts” 
in an Age of Exploding Technology’. 
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Such subsequent ratification by legislatures could be seen as a clear endorsement of the 
court decisions. However to the extent that parliamentarians, and indeed expert advisors, 
understand the inventive step to be much higher than it actually is, such ‘endorsement’ is at 
a minimum based on a lack of knowledge. None of these doctrinal rules appear to have 
been subjected to any evidence-based analysis, nor indeed to any assessment of whether 
they are effective in implementing parliamentary intent. In regard to a different aspect of 
patent law—fair-basing—McBratney has shown that a series of judgements have led to an 
outcome very different from that intended by parliament (McBratney 2003). This may well 
be the case with regard to the doctrinal rules affecting the height of the inventive step.  
However, patent law is a pre-eminent example of the operation of public choice theory 
(Olson 1971). Because a small number of people and firms capture a very large part of the 
benefit from ‘stronger’ patent law, there is a major incentive for them to lobby for such 
changes to be institutionalised. Those who pay are widely dispersed through society, and 
thus not in a position to organise to defend their interests. There are three other reasons 
why, against this background, legislatures have not intervened to overturn these 
judgements. Firstly, because the law has been changed, legislatures would be seen as the 
ones making the change: ‘attacking’ the newly established standards for the grant of 
‘property’.190 This is compounded by the long period of propaganda that all creative and 
inventive efforts deserve rewarding through patent (or copyright) monopolies, and that 
anyone who benefits from anyone else's ideas is a ‘pirate’. A third difficulty in expecting 
legislatures to intervene to overturn court decisions is that patent law is frequently 
presented as complex, and those not deeply immersed in it are warned, often by patent 
attorneys, against interfering. Indeed the complexity of patent law is often used to hide the 
simplicity of the underlying bargain. But as the story told above indicates, this complexity 
hides a series of decisions which may be innocuous in themselves, but which add to such a 
severe narrowing of the terms ‘novelty’ and ‘inventiveness’ that many commentators 
consider they have lost all meaning.  
It is fascinating that none of the patent reviews have explored the impact of these very 
narrow rules on patent balance, and thus on economic welfare and competitiveness. One 
 
190  Though there is no common law right to property in one’s invention (Walterscheid 1996: 92). 
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recent study does explore the impact of the current very high volume of only very 
marginally inventive patents on the ability of innovators to clearly determine the boundaries 
of patented technology. Bessen and Meurer show that for US publicly listed companies, 
who perform about 90 per cent of US business R&D, the net private return from the patent 
system is positive only for pharmaceutical companies (Bessen and Meurer 2008).  
This chapter has demonstrated that, over time, the nature, strength and reach of patent 
systems have changed substantially. The most significant recent changes are the extension 
of patentable subject matter to life forms, computer software and business methods. The 
patentability of life forms is a vast subject in itself and is beyond the scope of this study. 
But it is worth noting that Pila, in investigating how Australian and UK law treated 
methods of medical treatment, concluded that:  
“the rudderless nature of [judicial] decision makers’ responses to medical method 
patents has been to the detriment of 20th century patents law in its precipitation of at 
best unclear, and at worst unconvincing, legal principles.” 
(Pila 2001b: 461).  
The policy perspective that has been taken here does not allow any parallel judgement 
about the quality of law-making on software and business methods. But in terms of its 
impact on the underlying innovation policy goals, the cumulation of a series of judgements 
appears to have reduced the inventiveness requirement for a standard patent to a low if not 
zero level (Lawson 2008). If this view is correct it has major implications for whether the 
Australian patent system is welfare-enhancing.  
This view about the inventiveness standard can be tested. The remainder of this study is 
based on an in-depth investigation of a set of recently granted Australian business method 
patents. These are analysed for their inventiveness, but not in terms of the patent law 
definition. Within the context that a good patent system is a balanced patent system, where 
the social benefit exceeds the social cost, a set of criteria for determining inventiveness, 
based on the ordinary meaning of the word, are developed (Section 4.5). In particular this 
set of criteria requires that to be eligible for a patent an 'invention' make a contribution to 
knowledge. These criteria are used in the assessment of the 72 patents analysed in Chapters 
5 and 6. But before that, Chapter 4 presents an overview of business method patenting in 
Australia, New Zealand and Canada, discusses the selection of the cases investigated in 
Chapters 5 and 6, and develops the inventiveness yardstick used in this study.  
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4 
Investigating Australian Business Method Patents 
"A significant part of the perceived problem with business-method patents is a sense that the 
subject matter is typically obvious, but the patent system is now set up in a way that business-
method patents will not be adjudicated as obvious."  
(Stern 1999: 142) 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides practical background to the in-depth analysis of the inventiveness of 
recently granted Australian business method patents which is presented in Chapters 5 and 6. 
It describes the data used, and develops an approach to measuring inventiveness which 
draws from an economic policy perspective that there should be a benefit to society in 
exchange for the monopoly grant. 
Most of the business method patent literature is about the grant of such patents in the USA. 
Here data on the volume and trends in business method patenting in Australia, Canada and 
New Zealand are presented (Section 4.2). Grant rates vary considerably between countries, 
suggesting that alternative approaches to subject matter and/or inventiveness can operate 
effectively to determine the types of 'inventions' covered by patent monopolies.  
From the discussion in Chapter 3, it is clear that one issue in the extension of patentability 
to business methods is whether these are genuinely inventive. The remainder of this study 
is an in-depth investigation of the inventiveness of recently granted business method 
patents (Chapters 5 and 6). Three major criteria must be considered in selecting a set of 
patents from which to draw any robust conclusions, and these are discussed in Section 4.3, 
together with a variety of practical matters impacting on the selection of the dataset.  
The overall characteristics of the selected dataset are discussed in Section 4.3.1. The dataset 
contains 72 patents covering a range of business methods, including 14 finance patents and 
six betting patents.  
Section 4.4 sets the scene for the in-depth analysis of Chapters 5 and 6 by discussing how 
inventiveness can be assessed from a policy perspective, given the economic objectives of 
the patent system. Such an approach is radically different from the legalistic rule-bound 
approach of current patent law. A set of questions is developed to operationalise a system 
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that balances innovators' interests and the public interest, thus enhancing national welfare. 
Specific issues of the inventiveness of computerisation, use of networks, and combinations 
of old ideas are then discussed. Section 4.5 summarises the approach that will be used in 
Chapters 5 and 6. The set of 72 patents is divided into those where patents have been 
granted only in Australia (discussed in Chapter 5), and those with an overseas grant or 
refusal (discussed in Chapter 6).  
4.2 Comparative business method patenting 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand are quite different in terms of both population size and 
the size of their economies. Canada is a much larger economy than Australia, which is 
again much larger than New Zealand.191 One would generally expect a larger volume of 
patenting in a larger economy, and such a pattern is likely to be reflected in most categories 
of patents. The data in Figure 4.1 show this expected pattern. In the 14 year period 1993 to 
2006, there were 4,902 patent applications in the IPC business method classes in Canada, 
compared to 2,827 in Australia and 1,000 in New Zealand. Data are also available for 
Canada using a narrower definition of business methods – requiring that the main IPC class 
be a business method class.192 With this narrower definition the volume of business method 
filings in Canada drops by 43 per cent. 
The USA has seen a marked surge, followed by a drop and levelling off, in business 
method applications. This pattern is also evident in Canada, Australia and New Zealand, 
where there is a strong surge in the two years after the State Street Bank decision, before a 
levelling off. The apparent downtrend after 2004 is probably not as marked as suggested by 
Figure 4.2, because of delays in Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) applications entering 
national phase. As many PCT applications never proceed beyond an initial designation, it is 
misleading to include them until national phase entry has occurred.193 It can take up to 30 
months for national entry to occur, so further 2005 file year applications can be expected. 
The trends in the three countries are very similar. 
 
191  Gross Domestic product (GDP) is a useful and readily available measure of market size. The OECD 
publishes a regular series of national accounts estimates (http://www.oecd.org/, accessed 12 July 2008). 
Comparative GDP estimates in 2006 (expenditure approach, current US $ millions) are Canada 1,200,968, 
Australia 740,791, and New Zealand 108,607. Canadian GDP is about 60 per cent larger than Australian, and 
11 times larger than New Zealand GDP. Australian GDP is about seven times larger than in New Zealand.  
192  Some patents are very hard to define and are often assigned, by examiners, to multiple classes.  
193  PCT procedures are discussed in Section 4.4. 
 Figure 4.1 Business method applications and grants: 1993 to 2006 
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Note:  Canada* data are limited to cases where the main IPC class is business methods.  
Sources:  Data for Canada*, Australia and New Zealand are based on data supplied by the respective patent 
offices for business method applications filed between 1 January 1993 and 31 December 2006 (and, 
if they are PCT, if they have entered national phase), and grants from these filings to mid 2007. 
Canadian data for all business class applications are estimated from searches on the CIPO website.  
 
Where the three countries do differ markedly is in their grant rates (Figure 4.1). In 
particular Canada has a much lower grant rate than the other two countries. The Canadian 
grant rate is only 2 per cent for applications where business methods is the main 
classification, rising to 6 per cent if patents with any business method class are included. In 
contrast, during this same period, 23 per cent of applications were granted in Australia and 
57 per cent in New Zealand. New Zealand also deals very speedily with applications: only 
21 per cent were pending compared to 62 per cent in Australia and 74 per cent in Canada. 
New Zealand and Canada have similar withdrawal rates (20 to 22 per cent), while fewer 
applications are withdrawn in Australia, just 14 per cent. 
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The issue of business method patenting has been discussed in New Zealand, in the context 
of a broad review of the Patents Act 1953, but no policy decision has yet been made. New 
Zealand went through a similar process to the USA and Australia in regard to a gradual 
widening in the patentability of software. An initial court decision in 1993 allowed a patent 
for a computerised process for a shoe last. Further judgements in 1995 led to the adoption 
of the guidelines then in use in Australia, which centred around the need to produce a 
 commercially useful effect (New Zealand Ministry of Economic Development 2002: 45-
46). Business method patents are effectively granted in New Zealand if there is some 
method of implementation such as a computer program.  
Figure 4.2 Business method applications, 1993 to 2005 
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Notes:  Canadian data are limited to applications where the main class is a business method class, while 
Australian and New Zealand data are where any classification is to a business method class. 2006 is not 
shown because most 2006 PCT applications had not yet entered national phase. 2005 is also affected by this 
problem, but not as badly. Data for Canada and New Zealand are as at mid 2007, while Australian data were 
provided in early March 2007.  
 
The very high grant rate in New Zealand can be attributed to several characteristics of their 
patent law. Currently New Zealand checks for novelty only against existing knowledge in 
New Zealand rather than in the world. In addition examiners are not allowed to check for 
an inventive step, although this is a requirement for patentability. The New Zealand 
government has proposed changing both these matters, though these changes have not yet 
been implemented.194 Another issue that has been raised for possible legislative amendment 
                                                 
194  An exposure draft of a new Patent Bill was released in December 2004. Among other things this would 
change the basis of the novelty test so that it would become ‘new to the world’. A report on submissions made 
in response to the draft bill was released in May 2005. ShelstonIP reported in November 2005 that many 
submissions were made following the release of the exposure draft, and that these re-visited the policy issues 
canvassed during the initial consultation (http://www.shelstonip.com/503.asp, accessed 27 May 2008). In 
response to a request for information, an advisor to the responsible minister advised that, following a period 
of negotiating multi-party support, the Bill was introduced into parliament on 9 July 2008. Following the first 
reading the Bill will most likely be referred to a Select Committee. As elections are due in November 2008, it 
is unlikely that there will be further progress until 2009.  
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is the rule whereby the Intellectual Property Office of New Zealand (IPONZ) is required to 
give applicants the benefit of the doubt. This rule was changed in Australia in 2002, and 
was replaced by a ‘balance of probabilities’ test,195 as is now also used in the UK. New 
Zealand has similar legislation to previous UK and Australian statutes, and has also tended 
to adopt case law from those countries. It is thus likely that the New Zealand definition of 
novelty is as narrow as that used in Australia. In combination these factors underlie the 
higher grant probability in New Zealand compared to Australia. The higher grant 
probability in New Zealand is reflected in the experience of the dataset of recently granted 
Australian patents. The dataset includes 23 cases where a parallel application was made in 
New Zealand: as at June 2008, 19 have been granted or accepted, two are pending, and just 
two have been withdrawn. 
The very low grant rate in Canada contrasts sharply with Australian and New Zealand 
experience. In Canada, the requirement that a patent must be an invention ‘that offers some 
advantage which is material, in the sense that the process belongs to a useful art as distinct 
from a fine art’ has been interpreted to allow patenting of computer programs if they 
provide a useful end result (Fisher and Zollinger 2001). This implies that computerised 
business methods can also be patented, though the Canadian Intellectual Property Office 
(CIPO) has traditionally approached applications for business method patents with a high 
degree of scepticism, and it is widely perceived to be difficult to patent business methods in 
Canada (Fan and Coster 2007). A guiding principle is that ‘[a]n operation which is not 
patentable when carried out by an individual cannot be made patentable merely by having it 
carried out by a computer’ (Sarginson and Langan 2001: 5). 
However, the Canadian Patent Appeal Board made two decisions in early 2007 criticising 
these approaches, and the Commissioner returned both cases to the examiners for further 
consideration consistent with the Board's recommendations.196 The Appeal Board decisions 
show that a narrow rule-based approach is as prevalent in Canada as in Australia. One of 
the applications is a system for on-line trading of diamonds. There was agreement that the 
 
195  Australian Patents Amendment Act 2001 which came into operation on 1 April 2002 (Pascarl 2002). 
196  The applications are 2,119,921 "Computerized Stock Exchange Trading System" and 2,298,467 "Data 
Processing System for Facilitating Transactions in Diamonds". The assessment by the Appeal Board and the 
subsequent Commissioner decisions are available at http://patents.ic.gc.ca/cipo/comdec/en/search.html 
(accessed 3 January 2008).  
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main difference from the prior art lay in the databases about diamonds. The examiner 
considered that this was an administrative detail, compared to the prior invention of e-Bay 
and another system for internet selling of gemstones. The Appeal Board disagreed. The 
examiner had also argued that the subject matter was not patentable, but the Appeal Board 
took a very narrow view of schemes for doing business: ‘Business methods generally relate 
to methods which involve the manipulation of money in its various forms, … The aim of 
methods of this type is to increase an amount of money.’197 As this method did not 
manipulate money it was deemed not to be a business method. Further, the Appeal Board 
held that this system was not a process but a machine because all the claims were drafted as 
‘apparatus’ claims.198  
As at 12 July 2008 these recommendations of the Canadian Patent Appeal Board have not 
resulted in the grant of a patent to either of the two applications in question. But if the 
views of the Appeal Board prevail, the proportion of business method applications granted 
in Canada seems likely to rise. The present divergence in procedures does however show 
the impact that specific rules about such issues as obviousness and patentable subject 
matter can have. This is a matter explored further in Chapter 6. 
The generally sceptical Canadian approach to business method applications evident from 
Figure 4.1 also shows through in the cases selected for detailed assessment in this thesis. 
While a high proportion of owners of the selected Australian business method patents have 
also applied for patents in Canada, all of these applications are still pending or have 'died'. 
Indeed out of all business method applications filed in Canada between 2003 and 2006,199 
only three had been granted by the end of 2007—only one if the definition is restricted by 
requiring that the main IPC class be a business method class.200  
It would have been most interesting to compare these data with applications and grants in 
respect of the UK, as UK patent legislation more clearly excludes both software and 
business methods. UK patent data, however, is even less useful for economic and policy 
 
197 http://patents.ic.gc.ca/cipo/comdec/en/search.html, and enter application number 2,298,467.  
198  This widespread legal fiction is found in many jurisdictions. See discussion in Sub-Section 3.2.4. 
199  And entered national phase by 31 December 2006 if it is a PCT application. 
200  However, when the date restrictions are removed, a search of the CIPO database for any issued patents 
in the IPC8 business method classes shows that between 579 and 640 business method patents have been 
granted in Canada up to 31 December 2007. The range is due to the fact that no adjustment has been made for 
patents classified to more than one business method class.  
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analysis than patent data from other countries. The UK situation is further complicated by 
the fact that a UK patent can be obtained either by applying through the EPO or through the 
UK Patent Office. There is no single database covering both routes, and the available 
databases do not readily allow the linking of data on applications with data on outcomes.201 
Despite the theoretical position that patents are not granted in the UK for business methods, 
among the recently granted Australian business method patents selected for in-depth study 
five have also been granted patents in the UK (this is discussed further in Section 6.4).  
4.3 Selecting business method patents for study 
This section describes the main criteria considered in selecting the cases for study. Detailed 
technical issues relating to the selection of the dataset are discussed in Appendix 5. 
There are several criteria which need to be considered in selecting a set of patents for 
investigation. The first criterion relevant to this study is the desire to focus on the recent 
expansion of patentable subject matter to business method patents. It is notoriously difficult 
to use official patent databases to select patents of a given subject matter, despite the 
International Patent Classification (IPC) system. Patent classes can be extremely 
heterogeneous (Desrochers 1998). The most often quoted example is that water pistols and 
devices for distributing holy water are found in the same class (Griliches 1990: 1666). Side 
by side with this heterogeneity within classes, any given type of invention might be 
assigned to a range of classes. Sorensen and Stuart, for example, searched 2,400 patent 
subclasses to ensure a complete identification for semiconductor product, device and design 
inventions (Sorensen and Stuart 2000: 91). Nor are patent classifications useful for 
mapping knowledge: co-classifications turn out to be quite un-related (Leydesdorff 2007). 
Layne-Farrar compares several studies of software patents to investigate the impact of 
identification methodology on the findings (Layne-Farrar 2005). The studies reviewed used 
keyword searching (Bessen and Hunt 2004), IPC classifications (Graham and Mowery 
2003), or IPC classifications followed by a keyword search (Allison and Tiller 2003). 
While reluctant to endorse any one approach, Layne-Farrar does conclude that the soundest 
                                                 
201  The UK Patent Office was extremely helpful in trying to assist with data provision, but it simply was 
not able to provide linked data on applications and outcomes. Nor can the esp@cenet database be searched for 
granted patents in a particular class. This option is simply not available. The system is designed for searching 
individual applications. It does not appear to be possible to determine, from the publicly available databases, 
the full set of patents that have been granted in a particular classification. 
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method seems to be to combine a classification-based approach with a detailed review of 
selected patents to weed out those not appropriate for inclusion.  
Because of the diversity of business methods, compiling a useful set of key words is 
difficult, and in fact key words are often absent from patent titles (Murphy 2002). The best 
approach for the purposes of this study is therefore that recommended by Layne-Farrar. In 
this study selection is initially based on International Patent Classification (IPC) classes, 
and then cases that have been inappropriately selected are weeded out, by reviewing the 
patent specifications.  
The IPC classification system changed during the course of this study, and this change 
affected the business method classes (see Appendix 4). All Australian standard patent 
applications in either the previous (IPC7) sub-class G06/17/60 or the current (IPC8) sub-
class G06Q, excluding sub-group G06Q/20/00, were reviewed. Data on all patents filed in 
these classes from 1993 to 2006 were provided by IPAustralia.202 This approach means that 
some business method patents will be missed: those not classified to the IPC classes 
investigated here.203 
The second criterion relevant to this study is the representativeness of the selected patents. 
Patents are very diverse in character. Unless the set examined is large, there is a reasonable 
chance that the examined set will be unrepresentative. However reading patent claims is 
both tedious and time-consuming: the average number of claims in the selected dataset is 
30, with a range from four to 115. A balance thus needs to be drawn between a sufficiently 
large set from which to be able to generalise, and a sufficiently small set to be manageable.  
A third important issue in determining how to select patents for this study is the desire to 
look at the substance of granted patents, particularly at how inventive they are. This means 
the priority date of the invention is of critical importance: this date determines the body of 
existing knowledge against which the inventiveness of the claimed invention should be 
                                                 
202  A further proviso was, for PCT applications, entry into national phase by 31 December 2006.  
203  An indication of the imprecision of these classes is provided by comparing the number of applications 
which were in the IPC7 but not in the IPC8 business method dataset. Of the original 404 applications filed 
from 1993 to 1999 and classified as business methods under IPC7, 189 (47 per cent) were not in the IPC8 
business method classes dataset. On the other hand 93 'new' applications emerged, leaving a net fall of 24 per 
cent in the number of business method cases identified. In this study both the IPC7 and IPC8 business method 
classes were used. However it is quite possible that some business method applications were not assigned to 
any business method class, and are therefore missed in this study. 
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assessed. Clearly the more recent the priority date, the less likely are errors of hindsight (ex 
post facto analysis). Generally more recent applications have more recent priority dates.  
On the other hand, there are long pendency periods in the administration of the patent 
system, because of the leeway granted to applicants between each stage of the process. For 
the set of Australian business method patents filed in 2001, 32 per cent were still in the 
system at the beginning of March 2007 (see Table 4.1). For those filed in 2000, only 2 per 
cent were still in the system. So it takes approximately six to seven years for a cohort of 
filings to pass through the system. The 138 granted business method patents filed in 2000 
are generally likely to have priority dates in 1999 or 2000, though a small proportion will 
have earlier priority dates. From the perspective of mid 2007, these older priority dates are 
likely to create more substantial difficulties in determining inventiveness.  
A decision was therefore made to select all cases filed between 1 January 2003 and 31 
December 2006, and accepted or sealed by 30 June 2007. Most such cases have priority 
dates of 2002 or later. This gives a set of 94 granted patents. 
These 94 patents include two that clearly have nothing to do with business methods or 
service sector products. There is also one patent specifically about software processes, 
rather than computer-implemented business methods. These three patents have been 
excluded from the analysis.204 This reduced the dataset to 91 cases. But one of these was 
converted to a 'patent of addition' during the process of negotiation, following the 
examiner's second rejection on inventiveness grounds.205 
It is a moot point whether to count a patent of addition as a separate patent. This particular 
patent uses networks to print documents closer to their destination, prior to delivery, so 
clearly involves the business processes of logistics and delivery. Its great-grandparent is 
also in the selected dataset, covering much the same invention. Because its great-
grandparent is in the dataset, because of the extremely narrow scope of a patent of addition, 
and because no separate fees are payable, this particular case has been dropped from the 
dataset. This reduces the number of patents in the selected dataset to 90 cases.  
 
204  See notes to Table A5.1 (Appendix 5) for details. 
205  A patent of addition is restricted to a single improvement or modification of an invention in a parent 
patent. Fees paid for the parent patent also cover the patent of addition (see IPAustralia fact sheet available at 
http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/pdfs/patents/specific/add.pdf , accessed 18 December 2007).  
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Table 4.1 Australian business method applications, 1993-2006: status as at end February 2007 
Year in which application originally filed (1) 
 1993-96 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Number of applications 59 49 90 110 251 529 408 458 413 321 139 
% dropped out 14% 18% 33% 37% 43% 37% 3% 2% 0% 1% 0% 
% still in system 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 32% 81% 89% 96% 96% 100% 
   
Granted before 2000 41  7 1            
Granted 2000 or 2001 10 24 12 7  1             
Granted 2002 or 2003   7 41 42 40 22 5  3       
Granted 2004 or 2005   2 6 20 92 69 30 24  9  1   
Granted 2006 or 2007         5 71 32 14 6 8 1 
Ever granted  
(as at end February 2007) 51 40 60 69 138 162 67 41 15 9 1 
Grants expired 18 7 9 15 22 4 2 1 0 0 0 
Grants still in force 33 33 51 54 116 158 65 40 15 9 1 
% of grants expired 35% 27% 23% 22% 20% 14% 13% 12% 12%   
 
Cumulative filings 59 108 198 308 559 1088 1496 1954 2367 2688 2827 
Cumulative grants 51 91 151 220 358 520 587 628 643 652 653 
Grant rate for cohort  
  (% of filings granted) 86% 82% 67% 63% 55% 31% 16% 9% 4% 3% 1% 
Total in force business method patents 
(cumulative) 33 66 117 171 287 445 510 550 565 574 575 
Future grants (2)        3 85 165 204 199 155 69 
Cumulative likely business method 
patents 33 66 117 171 290 533 763 1007 1221 1384 1454 
Notes: Standard patents classified to business methods using either IPC7 or IPC8 (see Appendix 4). Data were provided by IPAustralia on 2 March 2007. 
(1) Includes PCT applications only after national phase entry. Data for recent years therefore significantly under-estimate the number of applications.  
(2) Assuming 50% of pending applications are granted, i.e. assuming a slightly lower grant rate than in the last almost complete year, 2000.  
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Of these 90 cases, 18 belong to a single applicant, Silverbrook Research Pty. Ltd. The 
Silverbrook patents are very diverse in terms of their titles, and it is easy to see why they 
have been classed as business method patents (see Appendix 6). But the underlying 
technology involves a high-speed printer, a scanning device, invisible ink and printed paper 
forms, that is, it clearly falls outside the arena of business methods. These cases are 
excluded from the study,206 giving a final set of 72 cases.  
While the selected set is a universe of recently granted cases, it is not a representative 
universe.207 Applicants determine the speed at which an application moves through the 
process: they can ask for early (expedited) examination, or can wait until they are directed 
to request examination. They also have 21 months to respond to adverse examiner's reports, 
and can choose how quickly or slowly to respond. There can be a number of examiner's 
reports: usually there are only one or two, but for one case in the dataset there were four. 
Those patents which are granted quickly have been pushed through the system by their 
owners, probably because they are seen as more valuable.  
Within this set of 72 cases there are 30 where the owners asked for expedited examination. 
Seventeen gave reasons: 11 mentioned commercial development, and six the need to stop 
potential infringers—others developing the same idea. The selected patents are thus likely 
to have higher private values than a randomly selected set of patents.  
The set of 72 cases also includes two where the application was accepted for a patent grant, 
but where the grant was opposed. The opposition for one was withdrawn in 2008, and it has 
been sealed.208 In the other case, the $140 acceptance fee was due shortly after the 
                                                 
206  The Silverbrook cases also have quite old priority dates: 16 with 1999, and two with 2000. Excluding 
these cases means that in the final set of 72 patents, 80 per cent have priority dates of 2002 or later, and only 
10 per cent (seven cases) have priority dates of 1998 or 1999. The 18 Silverbrook patents provide an excellent 
example of the business strategy of a 'patent thicket' (generally used to confuse and 'fence out' competitors 
from a designated technology area). Because it does not fall within the business method field, yet illustrates 
the use of business method patenting to assist in the development of patent thickets, the patent thicket aspects 
of this set of patents are discussed in Appendix 6. 
207  Nor is it a static universe. Over time a larger number of patents will emerge from these application 
cohorts. 
208  Application 2003200436 "Automatic Flight Management in an Online Marketplace" was accepted on 
19 July 2005, but an opposition was filed. Both parties filed lengthy statements, including expert witness 
testimony, about the patentability of this application. The opposition was withdrawn some time between mid 
January and early May 2008, when the patent was sealed.  
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opposition was notified. This was not paid, and so the application lapsed prior to grant.209 
Both cases are retained in the set of patents studies in depth in Chapters 5 and 6.  
4.3.1 Characteristics of the selected dataset 
The 72 patents in the selected dataset cover a diverse range of business methods and/or 
service sector products. Some concern support mechanisms common to all businesses, such 
as marketing, accounting, audit, customer management, purchasing and transport as well as 
back-office administrative activities. Others are service products, though as the products are 
intangible, the claims are drafted as a method or system for producing (and/or maintaining) 
the product (for example various financial products). A large proportion of the selected 
patents use flowcharts to illustrate the process in the 'invention'. 
What does this set of business method patents look like in terms of its characteristics? Data 
on the range of subject matter, outcomes from overseas filings, approaches to filing 
overseas, type of applicant and progress through the Australian Patent Office are discussed 
here. Further details are provided in Table A5.1. 
Eight of the patents have been filed in Australia only.210 The applicants are all Australian: 
five companies, one government department and one individual (with two patents).  
In general, companies dominate the patent system: 92 per cent of Australian patent grants 
are to organisations, mostly companies (Moir 2008b). However within the selected dataset 
individuals are over-represented, at about 18 per cent. Australian applicants are even more 
over-represented—54 per cent of the selected patents have Australian-based owners, 
compared to 8 per cent among patents generally. As a corollary US residents are under-
represented, with only 26 per cent of the dataset compared to 43 per cent among patents 
generally. This over-representation of Australian ‘inventions’ in the dataset is a reflection 
                                                 
209  Application 2006202244 "Method and processing arrangement for providing various financing 
options". The applicants are three individuals resident in the USA.  
210  At least a search of the esp@cenet database, using INPADOC families has not identified other related 
patents. This is not always a complete source, as patentees clearly often prefer a degree of secrecy (note the 
direct overseas filing route used by some applicants). The Australian Patent Office file for each patent in this 
set was reviewed, and this identified other applications. Additionally where the applicant is not Australian but 
the application appears to have been filed only in Australia, patent offices in the countries of residence were 
searched for a parallel application. This identified further overseas applications. Where the IPAustralia 
Patsearch database indicated that the applications was a divisional child (i.e. was split off from a 'parent' 
application), the family of the parent was checked. Again this identified further closely related overseas 
applications. Sources of data used in these searches are listed in Appendix 3. 
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of the speed of grant. Many of these applications went on to become PCT applications, and 
their owners were keen that they progress quickly through the system. 
Three-quarters of the cases with overseas applications (49 out of 64) have filed through the 
PCT route, or subsequently became PCT applications (see Table 4.2). The PCT process 
allows an applicant to reserve the option of submitting the same application in a range of 
countries, using the priority date of the first application. Following the first application, the 
owner has up to 12 months to apply in other countries through the PCT route. The owner 
then has a further 16 months to obtain an International Search Report (ISR). 'National 
phase' entry can occur up to 30 months after the first application, depending on 
circumstances.211 The PCT route is thus a highly efficient means of taking out an option on 
patenting in a number of countries. But it is relatively easy to monitor PCT applications, so 
disclosure is greater than if applications are filed separately. Eight applicants have filed in 
more than two countries, but directly rather than through the PCT route. Another seven 
have filed in only two countries: Australia and either New Zealand or the USA.  
Table 4.2 Type and residence of applicant: 72 business method patents  
 Type of applicant  
Type of  
application 
AU US Other Company Govn't Indiv Total 
PCT 24 16 9 40  9 49 
Multiple direct 
applications 1 2 5 8   8 
Only 1 other 
country 6 1 - 5  2 7 
AU only 8 - - 5 1 2 8 
Total 39 19 14 58 1 13 72 
 
As noted above, clear outcomes regarding overseas applications are known for only 40 of 
the cases—26 have overseas grants only, eight have overseas refusals only, and six have 
been both granted and refused overseas (Table 4.3). Others have progressed to some degree 
in some countries (for example, entering national phase, or requesting examination), but 
                                                 
211  See http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/seminar/basic_1/timeline.pdf for a useful diagrammatic illustration of 
these timelines (accessed 14 August 2007). In Australia the application must be accepted within 21 months of 
the examiner’s first report or it lapses (Patents Act 1990 s142(2)(e) and Patent Regulations 1991 s13.4).  
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there is as yet no known information about final grant or rejection. In some cases the 
application has been withdrawn. Such cases include situations where the company decides 
not to pursue the application further (perhaps for business reasons, perhaps because an 
examiner's report is seen as too adverse), and where the relevant patent office has refused 
the application as not being eligible subject matter.212 The term ‘non-entry into national 
phase’ also appears to cover withdrawals; non-entry is often noted after a country or region 
has been designated. There are many cases where there is at least one non-entry or 
withdrawal situation, most frequently in Germany, Japan or the European Patent Office 
(EPO).213 It is difficult to determine where withdrawal really means refusal, and these cases 
are treated as not yet having known outcomes, so are considered in Chapter 5.  
Progress through overseas patent offices is mostly based on EPO and WIPO databases, 
though when there is any suggestion of a filing in Canada, New Zealand or the USA, the 
databases of those patent offices have also been searched. A final update of this information 
was done in June 2008. Overseas applications exist for 64 of the patents, but for 32 cases a 
patent has as yet only been granted in Australia. Another 32 have been granted overseas, 
mainly in New Zealand and/or the USA, including six that have both been granted overseas 
and refused overseas. Eight patents in the dataset have no overseas grants, but have been 
refused overseas. This gives a total set of 40 patents with a known overseas outcome.  
A large proportion of business method patents are based on the use of software, as prior to 
the 1998 State Street Bank case this was thought to be a requirement for patenting business 
methods. They often take the form of software programs to manipulate data used in running 
a business, though the patent is often expressed as a claim to the method or ‘apparatus’. 
Many involve the application of well-known business methods to the internet. Others 
involve financial products, though again the underlying mathematics is often not new: the 
State Street Bank case involved the multiplication of a vector by a matrix. The underlying 
mathematics was developed in the nineteenth century. Yet this was the case that opened the 
 
212  A number of patent offices seem to avoid use of the word 'refused'. In the UK, for example, the code 
‘WAP’ covers applications that have been withdrawn or taken to have been withdrawn, as well as applications 
which have been refused or taken to have been refused. 
213  These cases are discussed briefly in Section 6.2.2 from the perspective of whether they throw light on 
national differences in patenting standards.  
 115 
floodgates of business method patenting in the USA, and subsequently in countries such as 
Australia and New Zealand.  
The business method patents recently granted in Australia cover a diverse range of subject 
matters, though there is a clear concentration in the fields of finance, trade and logistics and 
e-commerce broadly defined (Table 4.3). It is not always easy to assign an 'invention' 
unambiguously to a specific field, and the boundaries between categories such as between 
e-commerce and either finance, trade or marketing are very thin. When the details of these 
patents are discussed, those that do not have overseas grant outcomes are grouped by 
subject matter for discussion (Chapter 5).  
This set of patents have been granted surprisingly quickly (Table 4.4). A quarter (19 out of 
72) were accepted within a year of filing—seven were accepted within 6 months of filing. 
This is remarkably speedy processing.214 Over half were accepted within 2 years.  
A small number of the patents have quite old priority dates. The norm is that a complete 
specification should be filed within a year of a provisional specification, in which case it 
benefits from the provisional's priority date. Nearly 80 per cent of the patents conform to 
this norm: they either have identical filing and priority dates, i.e. there were no provisional 
applications (13 cases), or they were filed within the 12 month period (44 cases). However, 
a small number of patents strongly contravene the norm, having a period of over 4 years 
between the priority and filing dates. Seven of the nine cases with very old priority dates 
are from the USA, where continuations, and continuations of continuations seem to 
abound.215 In Australia if an application has more than one inventive concept, then it is 
split, creating a 'divisional child', and the child claims the priority date of the parent. In 
some cases grandchildren and siblings occur (see, for example, the Silverbrook cases 
discussed in Appendix 6). In all such situations the priority date can substantially precede 
the filing date. This compounds hindsight and documentation difficulties when assessing 
novelty and inventiveness. 
                                                 
214  See, for example, Jensen et al. 2005, who show quite high proportions of general patent filings still 
pending after six years in both the European and Japanese Patent Offices.  
215  Twenty-three per cent of US patent applications are continuations, and  52 per cent of litigated patents 
are continuations (Lemley and Moore 2003). 
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Among the 72 patents there are six cases of multiple patent ownership: Contentguard has 
four patents on writing contracts for digital rights management, and Accenture has three 
patents for office support systems.216 There are three companies and one individual who 
each have two patents in the dataset. US-based etalk Corporation has two closely related 
patents on performance evaluation, and Australian-based Shaw IP Pty Ltd has one on 
logistics and one on a security process. Within the sub-set of six betting patents, two are 
owned by US company Cantor Index LLC and two by an Australian individual.  
Table 4.3 Recently granted Australian business method patents:  
subject matter and extent of patenting  
 Extent of patenting 
Subject matter 
Granted 
only in AU
Also 
granted 
overseasa
Also 
refused 
overseasb
Clear 
overseas 
outcome 
Total 
Real estate 2 3 0 3 5 
Wholesale / retail trade or 
logistics 4 9 2 10 14 
Financial services 6 7 2 8 14 
E-commerce 3 4 2 5 8 
Marketing, advertising or 
loyalty programs 2 3 2 4 6 
Business performance 7 1 1 2 9 
Miscellaneous  3 2 1 3 6 
Betting 3 2 3 3 6 
Digital rights management 
(Contentguard)  2 1 1 2 4 
Total 32 32 14 40 72 
Notes:   a Overseas grants include acceptances that are not yet sealed.  
b Includes six cases that have both overseas grants and overseas refusals. 
 
While some of the general business method patents could apply across many industries, e.g. 
some accounting patents, others are narrower in their focus. In particular, the six betting 
patents are highly specific both in their content and in the underlying mathematics. In some 
ways they parallel financial services patents, and indeed two of the selected betting patents 
                                                 
216  Although Accenture's main business office is based in Chicago (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Accenture, accessed 3 January 2008), all three patents in the selected set were filed by its Swiss subsidiary.  
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are owned by a subsidiary of a global financial services firm.217 In terms of inventiveness 
they involve special issues as to whether implementation involves more than simple logic, 
and well-known mathematics. It has been decided to treat the betting patents as a subject 
matter group in Chapter 5, despite the grant of New Zealand patents to two of them. 
Table 4.4 Recent Australian business method patents:  
speed of issue and delays in filing 
 Applicant residence 
Speed of grant 
(time between filing and acceptance) Australia USA Other Total 
6 months or less 7 0 0 7 
≥6 months to ≤ 1 year 8 3 1 12 
≥ 1 year to ≤ 2 years 11 4 4 19 
≥ 2 years to ≤ 3 years 10 8 4 22 
more than 3 years 2 5 5 12 
Delay in filing 
(priority date to application date)     
dates identical 12 1 0 13 
1 year or less 20 11 13 44 
> 1 to 4  5 1 0 6 
> 4 1 7 1 9 
Total 38 20 14 72 
Note:  Because there can be different periods between acceptance and sealing, data on speed of grant are 
calculated as the time between date of application and date of acceptance.  
Another sub-set of patents that poses particular challenges for analysis are the four 
belonging to US-based Contentguard Holdings. Three of these patents belong to a single 
very large family, with over 180 members. The issues raised by large patent families and 
patent thickets are different from those raised by companies acquiring only a relatively 
small number of patents (see Appendix 6). The family size aspects of the Contentguard 
cases are discussed in that appendix.  
Where there are a number of closely related patents, determining inventiveness from a 
policy perspective is also more challenging. The Contentguard cases are written in 
                                                 
217  Cantor Index LLC is a subsidiary of Cantor Fitzgerald L.P., a global financial services firm.  
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particularly complex language. They are also very long claims: the average length of the 
four Contentguard patents is 60 claims, compared to 30 for the dataset overall. With four 
patents, three belonging to a family with over 180 members, tracing overseas applications 
is also complex and time-consuming. Three of the four patents do not yet have known 
overseas outcomes. One has been granted overseas. But because of the narrow differences 
between the subject matter of each Contentguard patent, it is considered preferable to treat 
them as a group. Because of the importance of overseas patenting to this company, and the 
large number of related patents granted overseas, these cases are considered in Section 6.5, 
despite the fact that two do not yet have known overseas outcomes. 
4.4 Assessing inventiveness 
Inventiveness, in theory, is a major criterion used to distinguish between a patentable and a 
non-patentable invention.218 Because the perspective taken here is that of the economic 
impact of the patent system on the national economy, i.e. a policy perspective, this 
assessment of the inventiveness of granted patents takes as its basis the ordinary meanings 
of the words novel and inventive.219 As noted in Section 3.4, dictionary definitions clarify 
that novel and inventive mean essentially the same thing. But there is a continuum of 
inventiveness ranging from 'mere workshop improvements' to radical breakthroughs. The 
challenge is to determine at what point along the continuum an incentive is needed, and a 
patent should be granted.  
In some ways it is easier to determine what inventions are truly radical than to determine 
which possess no inventiveness. A measure of the extent to which identified prior art 
differs from that cited in other similar inventions has been successfully used to identify 
radical tennis racquet inventions (Dahlin and Behrens 2005). The initial two 
operationalisations were rejected as identifying too many inventions to be genuinely radical 
 
218  As noted in Section 3.4, practice may be very different. Lawson disputes that inventiveness operates in 
any way in current Australian law to exclude uninventive applications (Lawson 2008). If neither novelty nor 
inventiveness are operating as limits to patentability, this leaves only utility and ‘manner of manufacture’. 
Van Caenegem (2002) argues that the ‘technicality’ requirement is now the major restraint on what may be 
patented in Australia.  
219  There are critics of this approach. For example Allison and Tiller consider that ‘… attempting to 
pursue the idea of “commonsense novelty” will place one on a slippery slope that is contrary to the 
fundamental norms of patent law. This is simply not the way to determine novelty or obviousness’ (Allison 
and Tiller 2003: 271). However, the cases analysed in Chapters 5 and 6 suggest that it is the norms of patent 
law that are in urgent need of revision to re-align them with the real world understandings. 
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(20 and 4 per cent). A third, satisfactory, definition identified six out of 581 patents as 
radical, and this definition appears robust on the basis of complementary evidence.  
While ‘about 1 per cent’ might feel right in terms of the proportion of patented inventions 
which are truly radical, the other 99 per cent includes at least a proportion of 'inventions' 
which are reasonably inventive, if not radically so. The challenge is to define clearly what 
is sufficiently inventive to merit a monopoly. As with all systems of market intervention, 
there are severe boundary problems: at this point an 'invention' is not patentable, but add a 
tiny bit more inventiveness and it does become patentable. Such difficulties, and the 
resources which are drawn to arguing about them, are one reason why economists consider 
market regulation inefficient. But, given market regulation, they have to be dealt with. The 
challenge is to identify some 'bright line' rules that will re-set a balance in the patent 
system, and will not be amenable to manipulation by those who make a living out of the 
regulatory intervention.  
Inventiveness is a continuum and deciding where to draw the patentability line is difficult. 
One finding in Section 3.4 was that a number of legal decisions are based on very narrow 
definitions of the relevant technology—so narrow that substantial relevant previous 
knowledge is ruled inadmissible. In the Welcome Real-Time case, widely cited as opening 
the doors to business method patenting in Australia, such a narrow view of the relevant 
technology field (loyalty programs) was taken that well-known technology used in smart 
cards was declared irrelevant, and the 'invention' was held to be inventive and therefore 
valid.  
Given that a patent system is a tool of economic policy, designed to increase national 
welfare, some useful guiding principles can be identified. First there should be a likelihood 
of some public benefit arising from the granted monopoly in order to offset the costs of that 
monopoly. Traditionally this has been seen as some contribution to new knowledge. This is 
not necessarily a requirement for a contribution to theoretical knowledge, as patents are 
traditionally granted only for artefacts embodying new knowledge not for the underlying 
knowledge itself. However discoverers of new knowledge can patent a specific 
embodiment of the knowledge. Equally, the contribution can be to practical knowledge, or 
know-how. But there must clearly be some contribution or no patent should be granted. 
Such a test is not part of the current patent system. There is no current requirement that an 
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'invention', to be patentable, should contribute new knowledge. Indeed much existing 
knowledge is eliminated from the novelty and inventiveness tests, making it likely that 
patented ‘inventions’ do not contribute any knowledge.  
Traditionally patents have been required to add to knowledge in the fields of science and 
technology. This assumption has been so basic to the patent system over its brief history 
that it appears never to have been explicitly written down. Recently, however, Australian 
courts seem to have followed the CAFC and the EPO into new realms. Despite the clear 
limitation implicit in the TRIPS Treaty220—that patents shall be available in all fields of 
technology—the Full Federal Court has recently criticised the Commissioner of Patents for 
expressing the opinion that the NRDC artificially created state of affairs test required ‘the 
application of science or technology in some material manner’. The Court was unsure that 
this was correct and considered ‘that to erect a requirement that an alleged invention be 
within the area of science and technology would be to risk the very kind of rigidity which 
the High Court warned against [in NRDC]’ ([2006] FCAFC 120, at 38).  
One difficulty that underlies the extensive argument on the patentability of software is that 
of separating the idea from its implementation. Before electronic computing, mathematics 
was a branch of science largely divorced from the world of patents, other than via its use in 
other branches of science or engineering. It was widely considered that mathematics, based 
largely on logic, was simply a set of ideas and as such unpatentable. A direct corollary was 
that computer programs were not patentable (Bauerle 2002). There was also a general view 
that software ‘inventions’ were so incremental that they would not pass the inventiveness 
threshold (Samuelson et al. 1994). But then a legal doctrine was developed in the USA that 
the application of an algorithm could be patented provided it did not claim all uses of the 
algorithm. It was imported into Australia in 1986 (Stoianoff 1999: 503-504). 
Computers run on electronic signals and are effectively ever-larger sets of on/off switches. 
All computing languages eventually have to convert to a set of binary (on/off) instructions 
or they cannot be implemented. This means that the mathematics involved in programming 
 
220  ‘The TRIPS agreement was negotiated at a time when most countries did not allow patents for 
business methods and computer software as they were thought to be inherently unpatentable’ (New Zealand 
Ministry of Economic Development 2002: 51). Indeed the TRIPS Agreement requires, in Article 10, the 
provision of copyright, not patent, protection for software—a very clear indication that at the time software 
was generally not seen as patentable. 
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is quite straightforward, and simply involves the application of logic to the problem in 
question. Nonetheless ingenuity is demonstrated in some of the underlying ideas—for 
example data compression techniques, important for the speedy transmission of data, are 
based on new approaches to describing digital data and images.221  
So the second issue—whether there should be a science/technology basis to the patent 
system—in fact raises a third issue. That is, should there be a requirement for more than the 
simple use of logic to solve a problem? Because mathematics is so inextricably tied in with 
philosophy and logic, it is also reasonable to consider whether mathematics-based 
inventions should be treated differently from other inventions. For example if the only 
inventiveness lies in the mathematics, perhaps a very substantial new contribution to 
knowledge might be required.222 Alternatively, the system could be returned to the status 
quo ante, where mathematical algorithms were considered unpatentable, whether or not 
they tied up all uses of an algorithm.  
At this point it is useful to return to the purpose of a patent system: to induce a higher level 
of inventive effort. Clearly the application of logic to solve a problem may well be possible 
with quite minimal resources (depending on the problem and the underlying technology). 
Where the investment costs are low, there is little likelihood of market failure (Boldrin and 
Levine 2008). In such situations there is no need for intervention and no need for grant of a 
patent monopoly. But where the initial investment is substantial, especially where it is 
indivisible, there may be grounds for identifying a failure in markets, and patents may be an 
appropriate solution (Arrow 1962; Boldrin and Levine 2004). So a useful pragmatic 
criterion for patentability could be the size of the inventive investment. Only where this is 
large and lumpy might a patent be considered. While this would be a quite new approach to 
defining patentability, it is one that would ensure that market intervention only occurred 
where this was welfare-enhancing.  
 
221  In photos, for example, shapes with identical colour attributes, such as sky, grass or solid-colour 
clothing, are broken into blocks and a closely matching pattern from a ‘catalogue’ is assigned to each block, 
rather than to each pixel. For data, variable record length techniques, first introduced in the early 1970s, 
aggregate sequences with similar values into the two dimensions of quantity and value (‘[f] or example, the 
string AAADDDDDEE can be reduced to 3A5D2E’ (http://www.ischool.utexas.edu/~l38613dw/ 
website_fall_02/readings/Compression.html, accessed 28 August 2008). This type of summary code has, of 
course, a long intellectual history tracing back to the craft of knitting.  
222  There are a number of technical suggestions for differentiating ‘obvious’ from inventive software—for 
example the concept of computational complexity (Chin 1998; Krause 2000).  
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The discussion so far has identified four possible tests for patentability that would return a 
public/private interest balance to the patent system. These are: 
• a contribution to new knowledge or know-how; 
• use of science or technology; 
• exclusion of the use of 'pure logic' (and possibly of mathematics); and 
• the size and lumpiness of the inventive investment 
 
The discussion has also touched on the importance of distinguishing between an idea and 
its implementation. In 1874 the US Supreme Court determined that where there was no 
distinguishable difference between an idea and its implementation, the idea was not 
patentable.223 This distinction—that knowledge should fall into the public domain even 
while specific uses of that knowledge are tied up in proprietary artefacts—is fundamental to 
the issue of balance in a patent system, and plays a significant part in determining whether 
a patent system is welfare-enhancing. The existing literature on software and business 
methods has pointed to the difficulties with the level of abstraction at which many software 
and business method patents are drafted (see Sub-Section 3.3.3.2).  
Some refer to this as patenting the ideas, or the problem not the solution (for example, 
Kahin 2003c). Fundamentally it is a problem of such a high level of abstraction in the 
claims that a strong exclusive monopoly is granted (Bessen and Meurer 2008). The 
Signature Financial Group patent at the heart of the State Street Bank case involved the 
simple computerisation of IRS guidelines for minimising tax on an investment product. As 
the lower court pointed out in invalidating the patent, this meant that no other party could 
use computers to follow these IRS guidelines. But due to the complexity and tight deadline 
for the process, it would not be possible to follow the IRS guidelines without using a 
computer. The CAFC overturned this decision, and held the patent to be valid.224  
This case again raises the issue of problems created when courts choose to look at only one 
issue, where a consequence can be upholding invalid patents. As in the majority decision in 
 
223  Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498. This case involved ‘implementation of an idea that 
was so simple that the idea and the embodiment merged’ (Gladstone 2001). The case is also discussed by 
Stern 1999; Thomas 1999a. 
224  Excellent detailed discussions of the State Street Bank v. Signature Financial Group decision, 
including the content of the patent, and its progress through the lower court can be found in Stern 1999; 
Thomas 1999a; Krause 2000. Stern (1999: Appendix A) provides a side-by-side comparison of Patent 
5,193,056 and the relevant tax law. He reports that ‘...claim 1 thoroughly foreclosed compliance with tax law 
requirements for avoiding multiple taxation of pooled-fund partnerships’ (Stern 1999:132). 
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Diamond v Diehr, the court chose to consider only subject matter eligibility (section 101). 
But it is clear that they would have been substantial issues in regard to novelty (section 
102) and inventiveness (section 103).  
The issue of requiring a technical aspect for a computerisation invention is discussed 
further below. But before turning to specific issues of computerisation, combinations and 
networks, there are two other basic principles that need consideration. The first is where the 
onus of proof should lie. The second, related, issue is about the manner in which real world 
('bricks and mortar') previous knowledge can be incorporated into the patent system. 
From an economic policy perspective a very odd aspect of the patent system is that in 
practice it is the government that has to prove that the ‘invention’ does not meet the 
eligibility requirements, rather than the applicant who has to prove eligibility. This runs 
completely counter to the general approach in regulatory interventions. The underlying 
presumption in favour of the applicant is manifested in a number of ways. First, the 
applicant does not have to produce evidence that the 'invention' is either novel or inventive. 
Second, multiple judgment rules each favour the applicant. In Australia the rule was 
recently changed from giving the applicant the benefit of the doubt (in respect of novelty 
and inventiveness), to making a judgement on a balance of probabilities.225 Third, the 
knowledge against which inventiveness is tested is narrowly proscribed. 
If normal procedures for regulatory intervention were used, it would be the applicant who 
would have to prove that their 'invention' was eligible for a patent.226 Such a change would 
radically alter the degree of balance in the patent system. At present the patent system 
seems entirely focused on avoiding type I errors (rejecting ‘good’ inventions). But it seems 
that such a high priority is given to this goal that there are now a very large number of type 
II errors (granting ‘bad’ patents). The lower the inventiveness requirement, the more likely 
the grant of ‘bad’ patents and the less likely the rejection of a ‘good’ invention (Jensen and 
 
225  From a regulatory perspective, and in order to avoid granting invalid patents, the rule should clearly be 
beyond reasonable doubt. In New Zealand the rule remains benefit of the doubt. In the USA the presumption 
of validity is so strong that anyone challenging a patent in court must prove ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ that 
the newly granted patent is obvious.  
226  This suggestion has also been put forward by Lemley 2001 and Barton 2004. The most disturbing 
example of the reversal of normal burdens of proof in the patent system is the requirement, in the TRIPS 
Treaty, that a party accused of infringing a chemical process patent should have to prove that they are 
innocent (Article 34).  
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Webster 2004). A change in the party bearing the onus of proof would almost automatically 
lead to a higher inventiveness standard, thus reducing the volume of ‘bad’ patents. But 
because the onus would lie with the inventor, the most interested party, the likelihood of 
more rejections of ‘good’ patents would not be high. The applicant has many opportunities 
to challenge a decision—the Grant case discussed above had four decisions. 
One of the difficulties that has plagued the application of the patent law inventiveness rules 
in the fields of software and business methods is that much of the pre-existing knowledge 
('prior art') is not available in documentary form (Noveck 2006). This means that an 
examiner cannot use it to reject an application. A fundamental assumption of patent law 
and administration as it operates today is that there is a good library covering the existing 
knowledge in each technological 'art’ (Cohen and Lemley 2001). Dreyfuss gives a number 
of examples of US patents granted for ‘shockingly mundane business inventions’ (Dreyfuss 
2000: 268) because existing real world processes are not used in assessing novelty or 
inventiveness. Wagner has shown that, where there is a sufficient incentive for active use of 
opposition procedures, a high proportion of business method patents are overturned (26 out 
of 67, or nearly 40 per cent) at the EPO, suggesting severe problems in identifying existing 
knowledge. If the onus were on the applicant to prove inventiveness, this problem might 
well not be so acute.  
Overall eight basic questions have now been identified to determine whether granting a 
patent for an 'invention' will properly balance private and public interests, by avoiding the 
grant of uninventive patents, yet allowing patent grant where the inducement effect is 
essential. They are: 
• is there a contribution to new knowledge or know-how? 
• is this a contribution in a science or technology field? 
• does the invention use more than 'pure logic' (or possibly mathematics)?  
• is the inventive investment large and indivisible? 
• is there a clear distinction between the inventive idea and its application? 
• does the application seek to patent a solution or a problem? 
• would the applicant be able to prove inventiveness? 
• is it inventive compared to real world practices? 
 
This set of questions avoids some of the traps that have developed in patent law—there is 
no need to define a person skilled in the art, as inventiveness is redefined on the basis of 
whether there is a contribution to knowledge, based on a science/technology, using more 
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than pure logic, and going beyond the patenting of ideas or problem specifications. Beyond 
that, reversing the onus of proof and specifically requiring that inventiveness be 
demonstrated in relation to real world practice would significantly reduce the quantity of 
‘bad’ patents currently issuing.  
But before moving to the application of these tests, it is useful to consider them in the 
context of three specific issues that have been raised about business method patents. These 
are computerisation, combinations and networks. 
4.4.1 Computerisation 
Many granted business methods are criticised for lack of inventiveness because they simply 
computerise old methods. It appears obvious to many that, given the arrival and extensive 
use of computers in today's economy and society, it makes sense to computerise existing 
methods. Indeed given the power of modern computers and software languages, the 
business equivalent of the 'null hypothesis' would be ‘why not computerise?’ rather than 
‘why computerise?’ Before the extension of patentability to business methods, 
computerisation of business methods was extensive and considered a normal part of doing 
business. The lack of patentability was not an impediment to innovation. Under the CAFC 
regime, combinations (including computerisation of old methods) are not deemed obvious 
in the USA unless the 'prior art' clearly pointed the way to combine the two ideas (Lunney 
2004). This approach also prevails in Australia. These narrow doctrines effectively presume 
inventiveness, unless a specific combination of ideas has been documented. A problem with 
this approach is that there is no market for documenting obvious ideas. Ullman (2000) 
suggests that it is the most obvious ideas which are hardest to demonstrate as pre-existing 
under patent law rules. Several researchers strongly criticise granting patents for 
'inventions' that simply involve computerisation (e.g. Stern 1999; Krause 2000). 
One suggested solution to this problem is the EPO approach requiring that a software 
patent must achieve a ‘technical effect’ (Martinez and Guellec 2003). There is a lively 
debate about the technical effect issue: Aharonian227 is highly sceptical of the practical 
 
227  Gregory Aharonian is the editor of a widely distributed electronic newsletter, PatNews. He is strongly 
critical of many business method and software patents, especially as regards standards of searching within 
existing knowledge. But he is equally critical of the European approach, which uses the concept of a 
‘technical effect’ to try to distinguish between software per se, and software embedded in other products. His 
website is http://www.bustpatents.com/, accessed 15 August 2007. 
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ability to use such a criterion in assessing a patent application. Others consider that many of 
the approximately 40,000 software patents granted by the European Patent Office (EPO), 
have no real technical effect (Miceli 2005). There also appears to be some variation within 
Europe (Freedman 2000): under German patent law a computer program must solve a 
concrete technical problem (Nieder 2002).228 Bakels and Hugenholtz suggest that this issue 
diverts attention from the real problem—that courts, particularly quasi-courts such as the 
EPO Technical Boards of Appeal, have virtually eliminated the inventive step (Bakels and 
Hugenholtz 2002).229  
In some ways the requirement for a technical effect is a search for a science/technology 
base to the invention. But because the requirement has been operationalised from a patent 
law perspective its narrow rule-based approach has had a minimal effect. This is evidenced 
by the number of software patents being granted by the EPO despite the legal prohibition 
on the patenting of software as such. Legal semantics are, however, used to pretend that 
software patents are actually claims for methods, processes, apparatus, or devices. However 
as Prescott J said in rejecting an Australian business method application in the UK: 
“You are not allowed to get round the objection—that you are attempting to patent a 
computer program—by claiming it as a physical artefact, a mere change of form."  
([2005] EWHC 1589 (Pat) at 36)  
Reviewing the key appeal decisions in the EPO system, Bakels and Hugenholtz are unable 
to identify any consistent approach in the technical effect requirement (Bakels and 
Hugenholtz 2002). Certainly the much-quoted Vicom decision is hard to comprehend from 
a policy perspective. It seems to imply that because a software program is implemented in a 
computer it is not a software program.230 As noted above (Sub-Section 3.2.4) such legal 
 
228  German courts have strongly defending this boundary. The German Federal Court of Justice has 
commented that ‘The patent system is also not conceived as a reception basin, in which all otherwise not 
legally privileged mental achievements should find protection. It was on the contrary conceived as a special 
law for the protection of a delimited sphere of mental achievements, namely the technical ones, and it has 
always been understood and applied in this way’ (cited in Pilch 2003: 293). This contrasts with the view of 
the Australian Full Federal Court in commenting on the Szabo case. 
229  A closely related issue is the definition of ‘invention’. Palombi (2004) argues that the EPO has ignored 
European case law and changed the definition of ‘invention’ to include biotechnological materials that are 
identical to materials existing in nature.  
230  T0208/84 available at http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/biblio/t840208ep1.htm, accessed 10 
July 2008. The Vicom case centred on a mathematical algorithm which the TBA agreed was in itself not 
patentable. But the TBA considered the contribution of the algorithm to the performance of a general purpose 
computer and concluded this was “a claim directed to a technical process” and so could not be regarded as 
relating to a computer program as such within the meaning of Article 52(3) EPC. Palombi concludes that “the 
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semantics have been used extensively to make what is unpatentable patentable. It does 
nothing to induce additional innovation, but by expanding the volume of patents supports a 
much larger patent community.  
With regard to business method patents, where the invention consists simply of 
computerising an existing business method, another suggestion has been to define ‘mere 
computerisation’ of existing processes as unpatentable. Applicants argue, of course, that 
their 'inventions' go beyond mere computerisation where they combine two or more known 
methods with computerisation. Combinations of previously known methods raise particular 
issues for the definition of inventiveness.  
4.4.2 Combinations 
In discussing how invention occurs, Magee (2002) notes the importance of combinations 
and using ideas from one context in another. A wonderfully inventive example of such 
thinking is velcro. While removing burrs stuck to his trousers, Swiss inventor George de 
Mestral thought about the marvellous qualities the burrs would make in a fastener.231 So 
certainly taking an idea from one context and applying it in another can lead to an invention 
that would almost unanimously be considered very inventive. In the velcro case, 
considerable trial and error was required to convert the idea into a manufacturable product. 
Patent protection may have been needed for this investment to be made.  
This example contrasts starkly with many patents issuing today in the field of business 
methods. In this area there are many examples of where ideas taken from one area and 
applied in another appear very obvious, yet have been granted patents. There are a number 
of documented examples in the USA of apparently obvious patents whose validity has been 
confirmed by courts—Signature Financial Group’s 5,193,056 patent simply computerised 
IRS guidelines. A recent review of the 50 'best' software patents granted in the USA found 
them all to involve only incremental improvements, and two to be obvious even against the 
low obviousness standards of the USPTO (Campbell-Kelly and Valduriez 2005).232 
mere application of the algorithm in a computer was enough to side step the prohibition [on software].” 
(Palombi 2004: 62). 
231  See story at http://inventors.about.com/library/weekly/aa091297.htm, accessed 12 August 2007. 
232  Best is defined in terms of the quantum of forward citations. See discussion in Sub-Section 3.3.3.2. 
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Australian patent examiners (like many of their counterparts overseas, including in the 
USA) are not allowed to deem the combination of two or more old ideas obvious, unless 
there is documentation suggesting such a combination, or unless that would be the sole 
combination that a practitioner would come up with, given common general knowledge, 
and the problem to be solved. This ‘combinations doctrine’ was discussed in Chapter 3. 
The Australian Patent Examiner's Manual (Section 2.5.3.5) quotes from case law: 
The proper question is … whether it would have been obvious to a non-inventive 
skilled worker in the field to select from a possibly very large range of publications 
the particular combination subsequently chosen by the opponent in the glare of 
hindsight … The prior existence of publications revealing those integers, as separate 
items, and other possible integers does not of itself make an alleged invention 
obvious. It is the selection of the integers out of, perhaps many possibilities, which 
must be shown to be obvious. ... The opening of a safe is easy when the combination 
has been already provided. 
(Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing v Beiersdorf (1980) 144 CLR 253 at 293, emphasis added) 
In this view the fact that many people would have come up with the same invention does 
not make it obvious, unless everyone would come up with only that combination. Because 
at least some others would have come up with a somewhat different combination, it is not 
obvious under patent law. Indeed this suggests that the more old ideas you combine, the 
less likely it will be that a patent office can reject your combination as obvious. From an 
economic policy perspective, this development in patent law appears dysfunctional. This 
‘combinations doctrine’ seems generally undiscussed in the legal literature, and there 
appears to be no assessment of its economic impact. Lawson (2008) however, does include 
an assessment of this case in his discussion of the very low standards to which the 
inventiveness test in Australia has fallen.  
But if one asks whether there is a contribution to new knowledge, the basis for defining a 
combination as inventive changes. With a 'beyond reasonable doubt' test and a change in 
the onus of proof, the norm with combinations would be deemed obvious, unless it could be 
demonstrated by the applicant that particular challenges were raised which were solved 
through a genuine contribution of new knowledge. Further if one asks that this new 
knowledge be in a technology field, then the technical requirement test is operationalised in 
a new way, effectively raising the standard for patentability.  
Granting ‘combination’ patents for software ‘inventions’ raises particular problems. 
Richard Stallman makes a very useful analogy between software programming and 
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orchestras.233 In both the challenge is producing a new work, on a large scale, using a 
multitude of features that are not new in themselves, but which are combined differently:  
“Imagine if the governments of Europe in the 1700's had wanted to promote progress 
in symphonic music by adopting a system of music patents. So that any idea that 
could be described in words could be patented if it seem to be new and original. So 
you'd be able to patent, say your three note melodic motive … they could have 
patented a certain chord progression and [maybe] patented using a certain 
combination of instruments playing at the same time or any other idea that somebody 
could describe.  
“Well, by 1800 there would have been thousands of these music idea patents. And 
then imagine that you are Beethoven and you want to write a symphony. To write a 
whole symphony, you are going to have to do lots of different things and at any point 
you could be using an idea that somebody else has patented. Of course, if you do that, 
he'll say "oh! you are just a thief, why can't you write something original". Well 
Beethoven had more than his share of new musical ideas. But he used a lot of existing 
musical ideas.’ 
(Stallman 2001) 
4.4.3 Networks 
Another issue in assessing the inventiveness of business method patents is the combination 
of old ideas not just with modern computers, but with modern electronic networks. The 
distributed systems that are now so ubiquitous provide a very powerful platform for 
delivering commercial goods and services, as well as for a range of non-market uses. They 
constitute the widely known field of e-commerce. While e-commerce applications have 
been around since at least the early 1990s, patenting of such methods has proliferated only 
since the State Street Bank case in 1998.  
This new patenting opportunity was given impetus by the widespread publicity surrounding 
Amazon's 1-click patent, granted in 1998 and subsequently used to force a competitor to 
change their business practices. There was widespread disbelief at the time that the Amazon 
patent had been granted, and a large and vociferous debate on the electronic airwaves and 
the press.234 Disbelief was compounded when much of the legal argument in the 1-click 
 
 
233  Other similar analogies have been made in respect of the plot lines in novels (Miceli 2005) and the 
moves in sports (Dreyfuss 2000: 13).  
234  There is a very extensive literature on this famous case, both academic and popular. US patent 
5,729,594 was issued on 28 September 1999. On 21 October 1999 Amazon sued a competitor for 
infringement, and an injunction was granted on 1 December 1999. While this was immediately appealed, it 
took 14 months for this appeal to be heard and a decision made—that there were sufficient doubts about the 
patent’s validity that an injunction was inappropriate, (Lesavich 2001). The case was then settled out of court, 
and the patent remained on the books. In early 2006 the USPTO accepted a request for re-examination from 
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case for an injunction against barnesandnoble.com revolved around when to start counting 
(Stern 2001). From a policy viewpoint the fundamental issue would seem to be whether this 
did not simply computerise well-known customer systems such as having a store account, 
or running a ‘tab’ at the local pub. This publicity directed attention to the new opportunities 
for achieving monopoly rights, and business method applications flooded into the USPTO. 
Certainly networks offer interesting new possibilities as to how to deliver a range of goods 
and services, with geography now playing a less constraining role. Nonetheless, where the 
'invention' consists solely in taking an old method and combining it with the internet (or 
other networks), one has to ask where the inventiveness lies. The set of recently granted 
Australian business method patents analysed in Chapters 5 and 6 contains a small number 
of patents taking advantage of the power of modern networks. This provides the 
opportunity to assess whether these 'inventions' address any technical problems in the field 
of software engineering in their implementation, or indeed develop any substantial new 
business methods. 
For reasons outlined above, patent examiners are constrained to deal with these cases as 
they would with any other 'combination'. Unless there is one, and only one, way to put the 
old ideas together with the new network, then it is deemed both novel and inventive under 
Australian patent law.235 And if just one old idea is networked, if it has not previously been 
done within that narrow field of commerce, then again it is defined as inventive. This 
explains why so many obvious patents issue—they are obvious except under patent law, 
where the meaning of the word obvious has been substantially narrowed. The new 
threshold questions identified above allow investigation of whether business method 
patents contribute any new knowledge and thus might provide any social benefits. 
4.5 Testing inventiveness in the selected dataset 
The 72 recently granted Australian business method patents are analysed in Chapters 5 and 
6. The sub-set of patents where there is no known grant or refusal overseas are analysed in 
New Zealander Peter Calveley. His request focused on the widest claim, and was based more on anticipation 
(novelty) than on inventiveness. Amazon amended the claim at issue in November 2007. Interesting material 
on the re-examination (including the volume of papers filed by Amazon in defence—167 documents, 
weighing 7 kgs) is available at http://igdmlgd.blogspot.com/, accessed 31 August 2008.  
235  A similar situation exists in the USA (see Jaffe and Lerner, 2004).  
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Chapter 5, and those with known overseas outcomes in Chapter 6.236 This allows for an 
assessment in Chapter 6 of whether differences in patent procedures in different countries 
are related to the level of inventiveness of granted patents.  
Data are not available to ask and answer all eight questions posed above in respect of all 72 
patents. The core questions asked for all the patents are: 
• is there a contribution to new knowledge? 
• is this a contribution in a science or technology field? and  
• is it inventive compared to real world practices? 
 
For many of the patents, the questions of whether the application is about a solution or a 
problem, whether more than 'pure logic' is needed in identifying the solution, and whether 
the inventive investment was large are also asked and answered. In a small number of cases 
the issue of whether there is a clear distinction between the inventive idea and its 
application also arises. The question of whether the applicant would be able to prove 
inventiveness is also sometimes asked. 
Despite the more specific nature of the questions asked, the subjective question of the 
requisite quantum of newness of inventiveness can arise. Because of the policy perspective 
taken—that a patent will not be welfare-enhancing unless it is likely to have some positive 
externalities (including spillover benefits)—the quantum question is answered here as ‘at 
least a modest amount’. While modest, this is at least a higher standard than the current 
highly constrained ‘not obvious to a skilled person’ test.  
The analysis is based on a reading of the patent specifications, with a particular focus on 
the claims, that is, on the knowledge claimed as invented, and for which a monopoly is 
sought. In legal parlance this is called ‘construing’—the content of the specification is 
assessed to identify the inventive contribution. There is little previous literature for this 
approach: in fact only one previous example of this approach has been found, and that used 
the low USPTO obviousness standard as the basis for assessing inventiveness (Campbell-
 
236  A complication to this division is the set of betting patents, where three have clear overseas outcomes. 
Because of the narrow product-oriented subject matter and single underlying science (probability theory) it 
seems preferable to treat the betting patents as a subject matter group in Chapter 5, rather than split some out 
for discussion in Chapter 6. It also seems sensible to treat the four Contentguard patents for digital rights 
management contracts as a set because of narrow differences in content. Two have known overseas outcomes 
and two do not. But the family to which three of these four patents belong has many granted overseas patents 
(see Appendix 6), so these four patents are considered as a set in Chapter 6 (Section 6.5). 
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Kelly and Valduriez 2005). Because of the time-consuming nature of reading claims, 
researchers have generally used number of claims and forward and backward citations as 
proxies for the novelty and inventiveness of the claimed invention, but they are very poor 
proxies. Here the qualitative material in the patent claims is used as the basis for assessing 
the inventiveness of the granted patents against the questions identified above.  
Patent claims are often written in obscure and complex language. As an aid to assessing the 
substance of the claims they were all 'translated' from legalese into English by the author. 
In discussing each individual patent, some examples are presented of the actual claims, 
usually in 'translation'. So that the reader may get a feel for the patents, for a small number 
of cases the original wording of the patent claims is provided in Appendix 7. 
Patent examiners are bound by the detail of patent law, as set out in the Examiner’s Manual 
(IPAustralia 2008). All the cases assessed here are applications accepted or sealed in 
Australia. In other words they have all been deemed to be sufficiently inventive to be 
patented under current Australian law. In this thesis, inventiveness is assessed using 
ordinary meanings of the concept, operationalised as whether the 'inventions' make any 
contribution to the body of knowledge. Using this yardstick some radically different 
conclusions about the inventiveness of the granted patents are reached. This should not be 
taken as a criticism of the work of patent examiners. They are bound by the law. I am 
taking a completely different approach, focusing on whether there is a possible benefit to 
society. Different outcomes are only to be expected. 
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5 
Business Method Patents:  
How Inventive are they? 
"Patents on software and business methods have extended the reach of the 
[patent] system into virtually every sector of the economy."  
(Kahin 2003c: 225) 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins the analysis of the inventiveness of Australian business method patents. 
The analysis is based on a reading of the patent claims, that is, on the product or process 
claimed as invented, and for which a monopoly is sought. The focus of the assessment is on 
how inventive these patents are. The basis on which cases were selected for review was 
discussed in Section 4.3. Questions that might be asked in assessing inventiveness from an 
economic policy perspective were identified in Section 4.4. 
All the cases discussed here and in Chapter 6 were accepted for grant of a patent in 
Australia by 30 June 2007. In general cases discussed in this chapter have no clear overseas 
outcome and cases discussed in Chapter 6 have at least one clear overseas outcome.237 
However it also seemed sensible to keep the six betting cases together and discuss them in 
this chapter, despite there being clear overseas outcomes for three of the six cases. It also 
seemed sensible to keep the four Contentguard cases together: they are discussed as a set in 
Chapter 6 although only two of the four have a known overseas outcome. Altogether 33 
cases are discussed in this chapter,238 and 39 in Chapter 6.  
The material is organised around the subject matter of the granted patents: real estate, trade 
and logistics, finance, e-commerce, marketing and business organisation and improvement. 
There is a small set of hard-to-classify patents, treated under a miscellaneous heading. 
Finally the six betting patents are discussed here, even though there are some known 
overseas outcomes. These betting cases raise some specific issues about the use of 
 
237  Cases are deemed to have clear overseas outcomes if there is a grant or a refusal. If there never were 
any overseas applications, or if all overseas applications have lapsed, there is no clear overseas outcome.  
238  Patents have been sealed for 32 of the cases. The remaining case was opposed, and the applicant 
allowed the application to lapse, rather than challenging the opposition. This case has been retained in the 
dataset, because of the late stage at which it lapsed, but it is clearly identified in the discussion (Section 5.4). 
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mathematics in an invention, and about the rules surrounding the requirement that there be 
a useful result from the invention. It was thus considered preferable to treat them as a 
subject matter group, rather than split them on the basis of overseas outcomes. 
There are challenges in providing enough information to lay a weight of evidence on the 
table, while not boring the reader with too much detail on a large number of ‘inventions’ 
that appear to make no contribution to knowledge. For each patent the substance of the 
invention is described and the question of what it contributes to new knowledge is asked, 
both in relation to any technology (usually software), and in relation to business methods. 
In making these judgements attention has been paid to the knowledge already embodied in 
real world business practices. The other five questions identified in Chapter 4 are asked for 
some but not all the cases.239 Some cases are illustrated with figures showing the detail 
included in their claims. For one of the patents the exact wording of the claims is shown in 
Appendix 7. Additional information on all the patents discussed in this chapter is provided 
in Appendix 8, Table A8.1 (current status of overseas applications, whether the Australian 
examiner raised any novelty or inventiveness objections, whether the applicant asked for 
expedited (fast track) examination, and how often the claims were amended).  
As noted in Chapter 4, many business method patents involve simple computerisation of 
known methods, or the use of known methods in electronic networks. Others combine two 
or more known methods, with or without the use of computers or networks. There are a 
small number of exceptions to this pattern and these are noted. Key findings related to 
patent policy and design are summarised at the end of each subject matter subsection, and 
the findings from the whole set of patents are discussed in Section 5.10.   
5.2 Innovation in the real estate industry 
Five of the recently granted business method patents relate to real estate, and two are 
discussed here. In both cases the applicants asked for expedited (fast track) examination, 
citing commercial negotiations. The other three real estate patents have also been granted 
overseas and are discussed in Chapter 6.  
                                                 
239  Does the invention use more than 'pure logic'? Is the inventive investment large and lumpy? Is the 
there a clear distinction between the inventive idea and its application? Does the application seek to patent a 
solution or a problem? Would the applicant be able to prove inventiveness? 
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One of the simplest examples of computerisation of a known business method is “A 
method for performing an asset valuation” (application 2005203023, priority date 12 July 
2005). The 19 claims of this patent are summarised in Figure 5.1. Although clearly 
designed for real estate, the claim is broadened to apply to any asset. As can be seen from 
Figure 5.1, the method has nothing about it that is different from the mental steps that any 
valuer would traditionally perform. The procedures are straight-forward, and so is the 
implementation software. The specification does not point to any technical contribution. 
This application was rejected twice for lack of novelty and inventiveness. In replying to the 
examiner’s objection that the method was common general knowledge, the attorney agreed 
that valuers used computers and calculators, but suggested they often cut corners and failed 
to keep computer records. The ‘structured approach’ in the ‘invention’ would overcome 
these problems. The claims were amended, but still do not appear to be anything other than 
simple computerisation of well-known steps.  
Figure 5.1 A method for performing an asset valuation 
 
Application 2005203023;    priority date: 12 July 2005 
 
Claims: 
 
1. method for asset valuation, comprising:  
(1a) posing 1+ queries to valuer;  
(1b) receiving responses;  
(1c) using a computational device, determining from responses if inspection needed. 
2. step 1a includes queries about adequacy of relevant information; 
3. step 1a relates to following groups: availability of mandatory data; information  
           about calling the client; data reliability; whether comparable sales data are  
           available 
4. step 1b includes receiving input into computational device from valuer 
5. between steps 1b and 1c an inspection flag is set, based on responses 
            6. inspection flag set if valuer finds available information inadequate 
 7. step 1c involves determining if inspection flag is set 
            8. inspection flag set if valuer finds available information inadequate 
9. receiving an asset valuation from the valuer using the computational device 
           10. creating the valuation report including received asset valuation 
11. if inspection needed, message sent advising valuer 
12. step 1c includes deciding if internal inspection needed 
           13. step 1c includes calculating loan to valuation ratio 
14 electronically storing record of information when valuation done 
           15. including valuer’s notes (using computational device) 
16. computer readable instructions for the above 
17. computational device loaded with these instructions 
18. valuation report generated by this method 
19. method as per accompanying drawings. 
 
The Director-General of the Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources 
(NSW) owns “Method and Tool for Assessing the Sustainability of a Development” 
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(application 2004200942, priority date 7 March 2003). This method/system/program 
gathers data on a range of sustainability indices and assesses their values against 
benchmarks and targets.240 Benchmarking was very popular during the Australian micro-
economic reform agenda period of the late 1980s and early 1990s,241 and measuring a range 
of performance indicators against target values is its essence. While the details of the 
material presented relate to residential property, application of the approach to commercial 
and industrial property is claimed, although relevant indicators would be different.  
It is unclear where any inventiveness lies. It cannot be in the programming, as computers 
were used to analyse benchmarking data well before the priority date. Is it in the specific 
indicators gathered? Perhaps newness lies in applying this well-known technique to 
property? Clearly this ‘invention’ contributes nothing new to knowledge. The examiner 
initially rejected the application on both novelty and inventiveness grounds. The applicant’s 
attorney simply responded that the cited prior patent art concerned the environmental 
impact of a firm’s supply chain, whereas this ‘invention’ was about ‘a development’, a 
matter not disclosed in the cited prior art. The patent was granted.  
This example indicates two difficulties in the narrow legal interpretation of the current 
body of knowledge (‘prior art’). The identified prior art was a single document—the range 
of academic, government and business material on benchmarking was not located by the 
examiner. Secondly, the fact that the cited prior art used benchmarking in a different 
environment seems to have been sufficient to sustain an argument of inventiveness. This 
ignores the fact that ‘[i]n business, as much as anywhere else, solving problems in one area 
by application of business principles or models from another area is clearly the norm’ 
(Bagley 2001: 274). But legal doctrines and decision-making rules prevent examiners from 
rejecting such applications of known techniques to marginally different environments. As a 
 
240  In this patent, the main claims are repeated three times (claims 1, 9, 16). Patent claims are often 
duplicated, by substituting the word method for the word system. This suggests that in patent law the words 
system and method have different meanings. But the definitions of method, system and process, in the context 
of a set of steps or procedures for producing something, are virtually identical. According to the Macquarie 
dictionary (revised 3rd edition), a method is ‘1. a mode of procedure, especially an orderly or systematic 
mode: a method of instruction. 2. a way of doing something, especially in accordance with a definite plan’ 
(1203); a process is ‘1. a systematic series of actions directed to some end’ (1514); and a system is ‘4. a 
coordinated body of methods, or a complex scheme or plan of procedure’ (1907).  
241  See, for example, the Bureau of Industry Economics series benchmarking reforms in the transport and 
communications industries. Benchmarking was also an essential component of the Continuous Improvement 
agendas of the early to mid 1990s in Australia. 
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result, monopolies are being granted for ‘inventions’ that contribute nothing to knowledge; 
indeed for what is normal business practice. 
These two real estate patents both involve the computerisation of old methods. The first is a 
‘mere computerisation’ claim. The second involves the application of a known technique, 
normally implemented by computer, to a specific field where it may not have previously 
been used, but for which it is well suited. In both cases the examiner initially rejected the 
application for want of novelty and inventiveness. In one case the attorney pointed out 
trivial differences—the possible failure to keep computer records—and the patent was then 
granted. In the other case the attorney’s argument that a well-known technique had not 
previously been used in the specific field was sufficient to obtain grant of a patent.  
Both claim a large area for their monopoly, though the methods ‘invented’ are much 
narrower. A court might disallow such broader claims. But a business wishing to operate in 
the broader claimed area must risk the possibility of high legal costs if the patentee wishes 
to enforce their claim. Often, of course, the patentee will send a solicitor’s letter asking for 
a royalty payment. Many businesses will choose to pay this, even where they consider the 
patent totally uninventive. The costs of a challenge can be high, and given previous legal 
decisions, confidence in a sensible court decision would be low.242 While it is generally 
agreed that most of the action in respect of enforcement occurs at this pre-litigation stage, 
there are no data indicating how extensive this problem is (Kahin 2003b). Some anecdotes 
are available (see, for example, Jaffe and Lerner 2004) but there are no systematic data. 
Such rational decisions by individual businesses introduce inefficiencies and costs for the 
economy as a whole, and these may be substantial. 
 
242  For example the inventiveness of the Welcome Real-Time patent was upheld despite dynamic storage 
techniques being well-known. From an economic policy viewpoint the most sensible recent legal decision was 
that an invention was not valid because there was no social benefit flowing from it. ‘The principle … that 
seems to me to be critical in this case is the principle that an invention should only enjoy the protection of a 
patent if the social cost of the resulting restrictions upon the use of the invention is counterbalanced by 
resulting social benefits.’ (Grant v Commissioner of Patents [2005] FCA 1100): paragraph 20, emphasis 
added). The legal profession considers this a strange decision (Davies Collison Cave 2006).  
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5.3 Wholesale and retail trade and logistics 
There are 14 patents granted for ‘inventions’ in wholesale and retail trade, procurement 
and/or delivery logistics. Ten of these have had clear decisions on overseas applications and 
are discussed in Chapter 6. The other four are considered here.  
Trade is one of the oldest occupations, with many systems and methods developed over 
millennia. Some patents in this area involve simple computerisation of these well-known 
methods. In addition, given that trade and distribution are closely connected, development 
of modern electronic and digital networks has provided a new platform for buyers, sellers 
and intermediaries to reach larger markets, less bounded by geography. A number of 
patents in this group involve a straightforward combination of known methods and new 
networks to create an 'invention' — at least as defined under patent law. 
A prime example of combining old methods with the advantages of electronic networks is 
"System and method for selecting a service provider" (application 2003200220, priority 23 
May 2002). Effectively this allows for comparison shopping between providers of services 
rather than goods. Traditionally larger companies use tender processes to select service 
providers, balancing quality and price to select a preferred supplier. This patent includes 
quality-weighting of prices in a computerised process, with the unusual feature of using 
historic rather than current prices.243 With networks, multiple buyers can share common 
databases, thus reducing costs in managing the purchase of services, and it is this well-
known feature of networks which creates the potential market for a system such as this. 
Once established, such a system would be likely to have significant network advantages 
over later entrants.  
The calculation of quality-weighted price estimates is mere computerisation of old manual 
(mental) methods—there are no contributions to business methods knowledge. The 
computer programming is straightforward, so there are no contributions to technological 
knowledge. As with other business method patents, there is a large ambit claim from a 
small base. This system was developed for the purchase of surveillance services, and 
 
243  While one can readily imagine this would reduce problems in managing the accuracy of the associated 
supplier database, the claimed advantage is that suppliers are thus motivated to keep prices down. 
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includes only the two quality dimensions of distance and cost per unit of time, yet the claim 
is for selection of a wide range of service providers. There were no examiner objections.  
The next patent also covers selection of suppliers, from a predetermined panel, but this time 
using an on-line reverse auction process. "System and method for conducting online 
auctions" (application 2003206509, priority 7 March 2002) combines the two known 
methods of selecting suppliers from pre-qualified panels (thus providing quality 
assessments for each supplier) and an auction process. The system depends on modern 
networks to operate effectively. As is normal with auctions, where a successful bid is not 
made, the 'controlling party' can consider revising the reserve price. The claims are written 
as a general auction process where either the buyer or the seller can be the 'controlling 
party'; they are also re-stated specifically for award of a supply contract to pre-qualified 
suppliers (claims 11-18). In the latter version, software is used to calculate a quality-
weighted price that each supplier would need to bid to be successful. This ‘current bid to 
win’ estimate is advised to each supplier (for their use in bidding). This last feature is 
possible due to the power of computers, but it effectively simply computerises a manual 
process that the person making the final choice among bidders (tenderers) would undertake 
anyway. The only added feature is that this information is shared with all other parties, 
presumably to encourage different price offers. Information sharing is a very old idea, and 
the ability to do so in this context is a quality of networks, not of this ‘invention’. No 
novelty or inventiveness objections were raised in Australia.  
Again there is no evidence of any contribution to knowledge, either in the business or 
software fields. The combination of two known methods within a network environment, 
together with computerisation of the mental steps behind the ‘current bid to win’ estimate, 
create a combination that no examiner would be able to demonstrate was obvious under 
current patent law. But if the applicant were asked to point to any contribution to 
knowledge offered by the ‘invention’, they would find it difficult to do so. Investment costs 
in developing such a system would be modest, so there is no apparent reason why it would 
not proceed successfully without a legislated monopoly.  
A patent for the remote ordering, checking and acceptance of ID cards simply uses the 
power of networks with traditional methods of supplying certain types of goods. "An 
Identification Card Production and Distribution Method" (application 2004201620, priority 
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20 April 2004) allows the supplier to obtain appropriate data to populate the fields of an ID 
card template. It then displays an image of the final product to the potential buyer, who can 
remotely edit the image before authorising production. The process starts by verifying the 
client's computer’s identity. There is no new knowledge contributed to either methods of 
doing business or to software programming. 
Despite being designed specifically for ID cards, the claims also cover gift vouchers, 
collection cards, compact disk cards, stamps, business cards, transit cards, licenses, 
photographs, ticketing labels, number plates, and SIM cards. Again this shows how 
patentees are successfully claiming large monopolies from small actual ‘inventions’. The 
examiner rejected this patent twice for lack of novelty and inventiveness. In the first reply 
the attorney amended the claims and argued that the amended feature of determining the 
identity of the client's computer made the claim both novel and inventive. The examiner 
replied that this was merely use of the known device of a cookie.244 The claims were 
further amended, and the patent granted.  
Another procurement patent based on network power is "System for Ordering, Tracking 
and Payment of Goods and Services" (application 2003200960, priority 18 September 
2002). This is a computerised system for multiple buyers using the same set of suppliers, 
who are specified as medical practitioners, suppliers of repair services to insurers, suppliers 
of reference services regarding potential employees, or suppliers of labour. The claims 
repeatedly specify that what is supplied is data, and payment depends on such factors as 
speed of supply and method of communication (presumably rewarding those communi-
cating in digital form as data then do not need conversion). Effectively it is a back-office 
process for handling invoices for specified services. While the claims are written in 
extremely complex language, and cover a wide range of (basic) design features, they are 
simply for computerisation of previously manual methods: what lawyers would refer to as 
mental steps. The claims, translated into English, are presented in Figure 5.2.  
The examiner twice rejected this application, the second time arguing that the 'invention' 
was no more than a workshop modification. The applicant again amended the claims, and 
argued that while specific elements might be well known, the particular combination of 
 
244  Cookies are pieces of text exchanged, unchanged, between a server and a web browser. They are used 
to authenticate information (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_cookie, accessed 15 January 2008).  
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Figure 5.2 System for Ordering, Tracking and Payment of Goods and Services 
(simplified claims based on granted claims) 
 
Application 2003200960;     priority date: 18 September 2002 
 
Claims 1-42: 
1 interface hub between buyer and multiple suppliers, where procurement is in response to 
benefit request by 3rd party consumer, and hub initiates payments to providers  
• 3rd party consumer is: applicant for insurance product (2); applicant for employment by 
buyer (3); wanting to be paid for services provided to buyer (4) 
5 communication is by range of methods 
• e-mail, fax, post, web, phone, data connection (9); web (10) 
• suppliers communicate via web site (22), fax (23), post (24) 
11 communication includes transfer of orders 
12 orders include criteria for selecting suppliers 
8 choice of suppliers based on criteria other than price 
13 communication includes data from suppliers, processed to conform to buyer 
requirements, and presented in digital form 
7 hub mediates between many buyers buying from same set of suppliers 
14 orders are initiated by buyer (14) or by agents of buyer (15) 
16 hub has document processing facility 
17 hub processes registration of suppliers 
18 registration permits access to specified areas of hub 
21 hub has input protocols specific to buyer and suppliers 
19 supplied goods or services are in data form 
20 hub pays variable amounts depending on provider responses (speed, length, 
communication method) 
25 suppliers are paid after presenting invoices 
6 procurement records are maintained on hub interface 
26 hub collates data on interactions and presents statistics for quality control, 
benchmarking and fraud prevention 
27 intermediate hub with data management capacities regarding suppliers to single buyer 
• common service supplied is: medical services and suppliers provide required records 
(28) repair services for insurance companies (29 and 31); paramedical or pathology 
services (30); references for applicants for employment (32); labour (33) 
• data provided by supplier includes time sheet and verification (34); requested 
documentary evidence (35) 
• transfer of data is by internet (36), e-mail (37), fax (38), post (39), phone (40) 
41 hub collates data on interactions and presents statistics for quality control, 
benchmarking and fraud prevention 
42 documentation carries advertising 
 
Claims 43 - 68 mainly repeat these claims in slightly different forms. Those which are 
additional are: 
 
45 hub processes data from suppliers into homogenised digital form as desired by buyer 
46 data received by fax/post is processed to digital format with OCR software 
67 hub captures data relevant to tax compliance 
 
 
Note:  Numbers refer to claim numbers. The full claims can be seen at  http://pericles.ipaustralia.gov.au/ 
aub/pdf/nps/2005/0106/ 2003200960B2/2003200960c.pdf, accessed 23 June 2008. OCR stands for 
optical character recognition.  
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elements ('integers' in patent language) had not been demonstrated by the examiner to be 
part of common general knowledge in Australia. The applicant also stressed the role of the 
third party consumer, who initiates the process (see Figure 5.2), as a key ‘differentiating 
integer’. This feature was added in response to the examiner's initial objections.  
It is difficult to identify any contributions to knowledge, either in business methods, or in 
software programming technology. Even from a patent law perspective there is clearly only 
a narrow differentiating factor from previous systems. Indeed the differentiating factor 
seems to be a matter of design rather than function. Because of the lack of any contribution 
to knowledge it is not possible to identify any possible benefits to offset the social costs of 
a monopoly grant.245 This patent illustrates the social costs inherent in a system where the 
onus of proof lies with the government not the inventor. If the inventors had been required 
to demonstrate that the system went beyond common general knowledge, they would have 
found this very difficult.  
None of the four cases considered in this sub-section passes the inventiveness test used 
here: a contribution of some new knowledge. None add anything to business method 
knowledge. None add to software engineering knowledge. All involve computerisation, and 
the power of electronic networks. Despite this, examiners objected to only two of the four 
applications. This is an area ('art') where a great deal of the existing knowledge is practical 
and not readily available in documentary form. This is an important reason for excluding 
software and business methods from patentability, at least under current legal tests for 
novelty and inventiveness. Where there is not a comprehensive, readily accessible library of 
the current state of knowledge, many uninventive patents are likely to be issued. These can 
impose a high cost on the economy, especially when they involve broad claims, as do two 
of these four patents. 
Implementation of these four patented 'inventions' would simply involve clear identification 
of the steps in the relevant process, then writing these up in software code. They do not 
involve high levels of investment. It is hard, therefore, to see that they are induced by the 
patent system, particularly as they all have automatic protection against copying.  
 
245  The owners, two Australian individuals, subsequently filed a PCT application. Europe was designated 
in May 2004, but INPADOC data indicate non-entry into Europe in November 2005. INPADOC also notes non-
entry into Japan in August 2006 (which the WIPO site lists as ‘withdrawn’). The US version has been ready 
for examination since December 2006, but has not yet proceeded further.  
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5.4 Financial services, methods and products 
Overseas research on business method patents has noted the speed with which sections of 
the financial sector have started patenting (Lerner 2002, 2004). The dataset includes 14 
finance patents, about one in five. Eight have had clear decisions about grant in overseas 
countries, and are discussed in Chapter 6. Drawing an absolute boundary between finance 
patents and e-commerce patents is not easy. Several could as easily have been classified as 
e-commerce patents as they involve systems for on-line trading of financial products.  
One of these cases is unusual in that it does not use any computerised methods at all. It is a 
system for teaching children about finance revolving around the age-old concept of the 
child working for her pocket money (“A Financial Education System”, application 
2003203582, priority 8 April 2003). Many elements that could be found in any textbook on 
financial education are included. There are options that simulate tax, sickness insurance, 
cheque or savings accounts, credit cards,246 and purchasing shares and/or real estate. 
Materials for implementing these options, e.g. pretend cheque books, are illustrated. The 
application was rejected as lacking any inventive step. The claims were re-written, and the 
patent granted.247 There is no evidence of any contribution to any kind of knowledge.  
Like other patents in the business method class, most of the finance patents are for 
methods, systems or processes, and often include parallel claims for software to implement 
the process, a computer-readable medium with the software code, and/or ‘apparatus’ 
configured to deliver the process.248 Despite being written as process claims, very often the 
claims really deliver a service product, though they are not framed as product claims. 
Indeed, given the nature of services, it is hard to imagine how a service patent would be 
written, except as a system/method/process claim. 
One example of this is “Financial products” (application 2005265435, priority 17 
November 2004). This is a process for delivering and maintaining a combined 
loan/investment product, where the loan is used partly to pay off the loan and partly to fund 
 
246  It must surely be the unusual child who has not independently come up with the idea of getting an 
advance on their pocket money, which is what this element of the claim teaches. 
247  But the response to the adverse first report is not on the file, and the original claims (the ‘A’ document) 
are not available on-line, so the extent of revision is unknown, as are the arguments put to the examiner.  
248  As discussed in Sub-Section 3.2.4. Such ‘apparatus’ claims are effectively claims for an ordinary 
computer programmed in a particular way. That is, the idea that the ‘invention’ involves any specific 
apparatus is a legal fiction. 
 the investment. There are 62 claims.249 Despite this detail the product covered by this 
patent parallels many geared investment products available on financial markets over the 
past decade. The process involved is in fact very simple, as is shown in the flowchart 
included in the abstract of the PCT version (see Figure 5.3). The only feature that might be 
deemed unusual—and only compared to recent investment loan products—is that 
ownership of the investment is acquired gradually as the loan is paid off. This feature is 
very reminiscent of mortgages and of lay-by (pay-by-instalment) retail schemes. 
Figure 5.3  PCT version of application 2005265435 “Financial products” 
Abstract of WO2006053387 
A method and apparatus for providing a 
financial product from a first party to a second 
party, wherein a processing system (10) is 
configured to receive loan parameters 
relating to a loan from the first party to the 
second party; and, determine, using the loan 
parameters and a repayment rule: payments 
to be paid by the second party to the first 
party, and an allocation defining: a first 
portion used for at least partially repaying the 
principal and/or interest on the loan; and, a 
second portion used for at least partially 
acquiring an investment for the second party. 
The method and apparatus also allows for 
the financial product to be maintained. 
 
Source:  http://www.wipo.int/pctdb/en/ (and enter WO2006053387), accessed 31 August 2008. 
 
The ‘invention’ simply involves the computerisation of known processes (‘mental steps’). 
Despite the product’s essential simplicity, and the availability on the market of a range of 
similar if not identical products, the examiner raised no novelty or inventiveness objections. 
The search of the existing knowledge identified five prior patent documents, and one web 
paper dated June 2000 on loans for investments. The latter paper came from the Cornell 
University archive arXiv.org (http://arxiv.org/ ), a website for ‘Open access to 432,402 e-
prints in Physics, Mathematics, Computer Science, Quantitative Biology and Statistics’. To 
an economist it seems strange to search for financial market products on a science site. This 
                                                 
249  Claims 1-11 cover an apparatus for providing the loan/investment product (and are repeated in claims 
28-38 for a method for providing the loan/investment product), claims 12-27 are for an apparatus for 
maintaining the product (repeated in claims 39-54 for a method for maintaining the product). Finally there are 
two process versions (without subsidiary claims) and four omnibus ‘as per drawing’ claims. 
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case confirms the frequent comments of other authors on the difficulty of providing 
adequate existing knowledge databases on software and business methods for examiners. 
Such concerns underlay earlier government decisions, both in Australia and the USA, not to 
extend the patent system to software.  
Another very simple financial product patent is Westpac’s “Integrated financial service 
product” (application 2005204292, priority date 26 August 2005). Westpac asked for 
expedited examination to progress the product’s commercial launch. However the 
application took nearly 20 months to acceptance as it was rejected twice. The ‘invention’ is 
a computerised system for an ‘integrated financial product’ consisting of a loan account, a 
credit card account and any other account selected from the bank’s product range. The loan 
and credit card accounts have a single credit limit, and are both unsecured loans. They have 
different interest rates. There is a ‘rewards’ program associated with how the customer 
manages transactions in and balances between the two accounts. There are transaction and 
rewards databases to manage the information, and produce customer statements.  
In rejecting the five (repetitive) main claims, the examiner pointed to lack of novelty and 
inventiveness, citing two patent documents and three non-patent documents, including the 
Commonwealth Bank’s Viridian package. Westpac’s attorney replied at length, arguing that 
‘none of the cited documents discloses each and every one of the essential features of the 
present application’ (emphasis added). The attorney argued that none of the cited 
documents would lead a skilled person to develop this particular invention. But it is well-
known that there is a high level of innovativeness in the financial sector. Since financial de-
regulation in the mid-1980s, retail banks have introduced many new products. Innovation is 
to be anticipated. The examiner was unimpressed by the attorney’s arguments and again 
rejected the application as lacking inventiveness.  
In their lengthy reply to this second rejection, Westpac’s attorney presented a detailed 
comparison with the Viridian product. The comparability argument depended heavily on 
extremely narrow readings of the meaning of specific features: for example the fact that 
customers can link credit cards to the Viridian product, but that they are not part of the 
Viridian product per se, is used as an argument for the inventiveness of the Westpac 
product. Viridian provides a benefit in terms of reduced loan debt but the attorney argued 
that this benefit is not a ‘reward currency’ and there are no ‘reward program rules’. Thus 
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‘benefit’ and ‘reward’ are argued to be sufficiently different that invention has taken place. 
An example describing actual use of the two products indicates a strong degree of 
similarity. Nonetheless the attorney argues that the Viridian product is a traditional line-of-
credit product, with a hundred year history, while the Westpac product’s ‘represents a 
significant shift in thinking. …The unique combination of loan account and credit card 
account (in contradistinction to ‘linkages’ of the prior art) …’. It was successfully argued 
that these minor differences, in combination, were sufficient for inventiveness.  
There is no addition to knowledge. The differences between the two products are at best 
marginal and at least insignificant. They look more like workshop variations than 
workshop improvements.250 There are no claims to solving any software challenges, and 
indeed the programming looks straightforward. But even with the ‘balance of probabilities’ 
test the examiner eventually accepted that the Westpac product was ‘inventive’ compared 
to the Commonwealth product. Perhaps a stronger decision rule—beyond reasonable 
doubt—would have made a difference. Alternatively if the applicant had to prove, rather 
than the examiner disprove, inventiveness in terms of at least a modest contribution to 
knowledge, then products such as this would not receive patents.  
The next case was accepted for a patent, but was opposed, and the application was allowed 
to lapse before grant.251 “Method and processing arrangement for providing various 
financing options” (application 2006202244, priority 26 May 2005) relates to home equity 
loans, or reverse mortgages. Initially it was a much lengthier claim, but the examiner saw 
no single inventive concept underlying the various aspects of repayment of the loan. Claims 
44-87 were deleted and re-filed as two separate divisional applications.252 This patent has 
55 claims253 covering a system whereby the early repayment of a (home equity) loan 
depends on the current value of the asset if the value has increased, but not if it has 
decreased.254 In contrast to regular secured mortgage loans where staged payments of 
 
 
250  The examiner advised in the first report that the subsidiary claims were merely matters of design. 
251  When faced with an opposition the applicants chose to allow the application to lapse by not paying the 
$140 acceptance fee, rather than defend against the opposition.  
252  The two children (applications 2007201104 and 2007201087 have both been accepted, and are both 
being opposed by Greenway Capital Limited (AusPat 23 June 2008).  
253  It has an unusually large number of as-per-drawings claims (11) and well as repetitive claims for 
processes, processing arrangements, apparatus, and storage mediums.  
254  The allegedly independent inventive concepts in the two divisional children are that repayment 
amounts are dependent on a proportion of the change in property value, and that repayments are based on the 
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interest and principal are made over an agreed period, home equity loans typically involve a 
single repayment (of capital and interest) at the end of the loan period. A variety of such 
reverse mortgage products have appeared on the market, in response to changing 
demographics. This ‘invention’ uses a dynamic ‘loan-to-value’ pricing model providing a 
basis for repayment values, especially if early repayment occurs. 
This patent illustrates the use of mathematical algorithms in finance patents. In most 
countries the mathematical model itself is not patentable subject matter. But when a specific 
use of the model is claimed, the application becomes patentable. Here the claimed process 
outputs a repayment amount for the loan. This ‘tangible, useful output’ is deemed sufficient 
to meet the ‘manner of manufacture’ test.  
The underlying model is quite straightforward in economics/mathematical/accounting 
terms. It is similar to other finance patent claims, such as claims to financial indices 
(Economist 2006). In many of these cases the underlying mathematics is well known and 
any competent student faced with the problem would be able to identify the appropriate 
mathematical approach and put forward options for solutions.255 There is no contribution to 
knowledge about financial products or processes. Nor is the programming complex, so 
there is no knowledge contribution to a technological art. The examiner raised no concerns 
about novelty or inventiveness. 
Given the overall competitiveness and innovativeness of financial markets,256 it is likely 
that such a product would be produced without the incentive of patenting. But with the 
advent of patenting additional commercial advantages can be perceived by some parties. 
The applicant asked for expedited examination as negotiations with a potential partner were 
underway. The applicant was also ‘concerned with the activities of a potential infringer.’ In 
elapsed time and later valuation. 
255  Though of course different students would come up with different variations on the theme. So as there 
would be no single obvious combination of features, the Patent Office would not, under current rules, be 
allowed to argue that any specific combination was obvious. See IPAustralia, Patent Examiner’s Manual, 
Section 2.5.3.5 Obvious Combinations of Features of Common General Knowledge, last updated 11 January 
2006 (http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/pdfs/patentsmanual/WebHelp/Patent_Examiners_Manual.htm accessed 
24 June 2008). The citation is Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co v Beiersdorf (Australia) Limited 
(1980) 144 CLR 253 at page 293. This issue was discussed in Sub-Section 4.4.2. 
256  Some have gone as far as arguing that the advent of the computer has turned the financial sector into a 
‘hothouse of innovation’ (Economist 2007).   
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other words the development was obvious enough that another business was also 
developing a very similar product, and these applicants wanted to get in first. 
In the event Greenway Capital Limited (an Australian residential real estate finance 
specialist)257 opposed the application, paying the $550 opposition fee in August 2007. The 
applicants chose not to pay the $140 acceptance fee by the due date and the application 
lapsed. Because it lapsed so soon after opposition was notified, the opposing party had not 
yet lodged papers specifying the grounds of opposition. Given the business of the opposing 
party, and the simplicity of the ‘invention’ it seems likely that Greenway would have 
argued that the ‘invention’ was neither novel nor inventive.  
“A financial management system” (application 2003271414, priority date 27 September 
2002) provides a computerised budgeting system with visual representations. Budget items 
are presented with icons, and re-allocations are shown with blocked out columns on each 
side and graphics with arrows and numbers in the centre, showing where funds are flowing. 
It is designed for use in either an office or a home environment. This is an Australian PCT 
application, and the International Preliminary Examination Report (IPER), issued by the 
Australian Patent Office, comments that ‘all claims are novel and involve an inventive step 
over the prior art. None of the cited documents, alone or in combination, disclose, or fairly 
suggest, all features of claims 1-24’ (emphasis added). Again this shows the impact of the 
prescriptive detail of patent law in narrowing the definitions of novelty and inventiveness 
and constraining their assessment against a small number of specific documents. It also 
shows the priority given to the combinations doctrine. 
Certainly helping the relatively innumerate to understand and use budgets is important. 
There are many financial education materials on the market, and have been for decades. It 
seems improbable that such materials do not include visual representations. While this 
‘invention’ involves computerisation, there are many computerised financial products on 
the market. This one provides visual illustrations for a very basic budgeting system, surely 
a matter of design, not function. There is nothing new in the function of the system, unless 
it is the computerisation or the very specific combination of features used or the graphics. 
This ‘invention’ contributes no new knowledge to either finance or information technology 
 
257  See http://www.greenway.com.au/, accessed 9 January 2008. 
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fields. Full details of the claims are shown in Appendix 7. The application was terminated 
before grant in the UK, suggesting an adverse examiner report, most probably on grounds 
of non-patentable subject matter. 
The search report identified four patents and no non-patent material. This lack of 
identification of any non-patent art is extraordinary, and again this illustrates the difficulty 
the patent system has in applying the concept of existing knowledge in non-technical fields. 
However, the patent documentation identified also appears inadequate. A final rejection by 
a USPTO examiner in March 2008 is based on lack of inventiveness in comparison to three 
US patent documents all dated 2001 or earlier. Only one of these documents is identified in 
the ISR done by the Australian Patent Office.  
Rivalling the finance sector in its eagerness to take advantage of the new breadth of 
patentable subject matter is e-commerce. The internet offers a substantial new reach in 
delivering both goods and services, and digitisation allows a range of old business methods 
to be adapted to internet use in a variety of ways. Sometimes this involves patching 
together several old ideas and developing an internet version. On other occasions, just one 
old idea is computerised and offered through electronic networks. Some of these are 
delivery and logistic systems. Others are financial. One patent which lies at the boundary 
between finance and e-commerce is “Transaction verification system” (application 
2004252925, priority 30 June 2003). 
This patent addresses the risk of financial fraud by requiring independent authentication of 
financial transactions. The main idea is to use a second, independent, communication 
channel to authenticate a transaction before approval.258 How inventive is this idea? 
Separate authentication is fundamental to any system requiring high accuracy levels, for 
example the invention of double-entry book-keeping in Tuscany in the late thirteenth 
century (Boldrin and Levine 2008: 185). The means of sending data and receiving a return 
authorisation parallels systems and methods in widespread use for electronic authorisation 
of credit card purchases for well over a decade. The combination of these two old ideas 
would surely be obvious to anyone confronted with a high probability of fraud in financial 
                                                 
258  Where fraud levels are low this is unlikely to be commercially appealing, given the impact of 
processing times. But that is not the issue. Indeed one notes this is a South African PCT application and fraud 
levels may be sufficiently high in some countries that higher processing times are an acceptable price for 
reducing fraud risk. 
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transactions. The messages are encrypted, which again seems an obvious step, and the 
encryption technology uses code-hopping techniques. So this is a straightforward 
combination of existing elements. There are no contributions to knowledge in any field. 
There were no examiner objections.  
Many financial systems and products have been computerised for decades. The most 
common feature of these six patents is either the combination of old ideas, or trivial 
variations on old ideas: at least four are clearly classifiable as such. One could be classified 
as a case of computerisation, or if that is not the basis of its alleged inventiveness, it is a 
trivial variation (2005265435, “Financial products”). The final case involved the use of 
simple mathematics to create an ‘invention’ that is similar to many other products on the 
market (2006202244, “Method and processing arrangement for providing various financing 
options”). It was opposed. As the applicants chose not to defend the acceptance, the patent 
was never sealed.  
The examiners allowed a monopoly for four of these six ‘inventions’ without raising any 
objections. Several of these cases again indicate the difficulty in applying patent law 
effectively where current knowledge is largely a matter of practice, so is undocumented; or 
where documentation lies outside the patent system. Other cases indicate the miniscule 
variations from previous systems that are all that is required for grant of a patent.  
While most of these patents do not depend on computerisation for the alleged inventive 
contribution, all but one use software and so have protection against copying. None involve 
any significant investment, nor—given the lack of any contribution to either finance or 
information technology knowledge—do they offer anything in the way of social benefits. 
The financial sector was already well known for its innovativeness before the patenting of 
finance products and methods commenced. There is still no evidence to support the 
existence of market failure or the need for intervention. Indeed this set of patents indicates 
that there will not be any spillover benefits to offset any costs incurred if these patents are 
successfully enforced against competitors. In addition, of course, time and resources have 
been diverted from productive activities, thus raising the cost base. Such resource 
diversions are not always voluntary. In the case that was opposed, Greenway Capital 
 151 
                                                
Limited had to pay $550 as well as patent attorney fees to oppose the grant of a very 
uninventive patent.259 
5.5 e-commerce, the web and e-mail 
e-commerce is now quite an old concept. The Australian government, at least, was involved 
in initiatives to create single business gateways in the early to mid 1990s. While the web 
has been around for at least as long,260 different uses have developed at different speeds. 
Some of the earliest commercial uses of the web have been airline travel,261 retail of books 
and other physical merchandise, and banks and other financial institutions. Since the cut-off 
date for patents in this dataset is that they were filed by 1 January 2003, it seems unlikely 
that merely putting old ideas on the web would be seen as novel or inventive even within 
the very narrow definitions used in patent law. There are eight patents in this category: 
three are discussed here, and five in Chapter 6. 
"A system and method for electronic commerce" (application 2005210510, priority 4 
February 2004) prevents fraud when e-commerce orders are placed over insecure networks. 
It is classified here rather than with the finance patents, as it deals largely with the order 
placement part of the system. The focus is on ensuring that critical data in the order have 
not been altered before the merchant accepts the data, mainly through use of a digital key 
automatically validated against a secure database. Presumably the advance is that the order 
data themselves do not need to be checked—if the secret key or digital signature is correct, 
then the order is assumed valid. A rather odd subsidiary claim is to a method of completing 
the order, when the critical order data are incomplete. Expedited examination was requested 
and approved, but there is no examination report available on the file. Nor does the 
IPAustralia Patsearch database give any date for a first examiner's report. There is no 
evidence of any contribution to knowledge in any field. At best this 'invention' seems to 
 
259  In fact because the application was split into three, and all were accepted, Greenway has had to pay 
three sets of opposition fees, as well as management time and patent attorney advice costs.  
260  http and html were introduced in the early 1990s and the first easy-to-use web browser, Mosaic, in 
1993 (Brödner 2003: 153). 
261  Airlines were well-placed to take advantage of the network power of the web. They had already 
discovered that effective electronic reservation systems provided significant competitive advantage. Sabre, for 
example, was introduced in the 1960s, and Amadeus was quality-certified in 2000 and had been around much 
longer. Other well-known long-standing airline reservation systems are Galileo and Apollo (now owned by 
Galileo). 
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take a number of elements from known systems and combine them in a logical manner to 
address a specified 'problem'.  
The EPO issued an adverse first report in October 2007. The essence of the rejection was  
“the claims are formulated in terms of such subject-matter (identifying and verifying 
e-commerce altered order critical data) or merely specifying notorious and 
commonplace features relating to its technological implementation (e-commerce 
system, computer, public data network), the examiner could not establish any 
technical problem which might have potentially required an inventive step to 
overcome.”262  
The examiner was unconvinced by the applicant’s lengthy rebuttal and indicated in a phone 
conversation in May 2008 that unless a technical contribution was identified, the next step 
would be oral proceedings.263 
Two patents in the set deal with e-mail. One has been granted in the UK, and so is 
discussed in Section 6.4. The other is "Method and system for blocking unwanted e-mail" 
(application 2003244552, priority date 4 September 2003). The applicant requested 
expedited examination because of concerns about infringement (independent invention), 
and the patent was accepted in 32 weeks and sealed within a year of filing. The patented 
method checks the addresses of incoming emails and allows them through if the address is 
known, and blocks them if they are from a known unwanted address. For remaining emails 
the method despatches a query to the sender, such that only a human being can reply. If a 
correct reply is received the mail is allowed through and further mail from that sender is 
also allowed through. A method for providing reports to the addressee is included. The 
whole method depends on interrogating headers, and the contents of blocked or unknown 
emails are not received onto the server.  
The applicant requested expedited examination because of potential infringement: a clear 
indication that the development was sufficiently obvious that other parties were moving 
down similar lines of development. The examiner considered the main claim to be neither 
novel nor inventive. The claims were amended ‘to clarify the invention over the cited prior 
art’. The applicant's attorney also argued that this invention was ‘not a challenge response’, 
 
262  EPO, Register Plus, application EP05700144, annex to examination report (26 October 2007) para 1.1.  
263  The EPO appears to have an effective system to terminate endless negotiations between examiner and 
applicant: oral proceedings. For cases in this dataset, all that have gone to the oral proceeding stage have 
either been withdrawn prior to the proceedings, or have been rejected. 
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and that it had the major advantage of not downloading unwanted emails onto the server. 
But this patent is for a challenge/response system, though the feature that rejected emails 
are not downloaded does differ from other products.264 Interestingly this last feature is 
optional in the marketed product. It is not part of the main claim (claim 1), but shows up in 
subsidiary claim 11.265 The programming to prevent downloading of unknown and 
unwanted emails is unlikely to contain any new software elements. It is merely a matter of 
specifying the instructions correctly. In terms of the business idea not to receive what you 
do not want, this would almost seem tautological, and thus the ultimate in the obvious. 
However, giving the 'invention' the benefit of the doubt, it may be that the idea of not 
receiving unwanted email on a server is new. There had been considerable public 
discussion about the problem of unwanted spam by September 2003—Australia’s Spam 
Act was passed in 2003 and preceded by substantial public debate—so the best point at 
which to block spam would quite probably have been discussed by many of those involved. 
It is not mere hindsight to identify a range of issues that would need to be addressed in 
spam prevention systems, and the point at which the unwanted email should be queried is 
clearly one such obvious issue. Thus although this idea may be 'novel' compared to any 
written documentation, it is likely to have occurred to many experts in the field. Overall 
then, it is a moot point as to whether this 'invention' has any element of inventiveness.  
The patent for "Browser Plug - ins" (application 2003200819, priority date 27 March 2002) 
claims software for more automated management of internet bookmarks/favourites, 
especially bookmarking of embedded links, without having to copy each, or load the 
relevant pages. The 11 claims are simply written, and cover software that can plug into 
existing internet browsers, a button for creating bookmarks and the capacity to retrieve and 
store web pages. They also provide a structured display for bookmarks and allow the user 
to determine a schedule for automatic up-dating of bookmarks. The software allows linked 
pages to be downloaded to cache while the user is doing other tasks, so that they will load 
 
264  The Challenge/Response approach to spam control automatically sends a message (the challenge) to 
the originator of unknown emails, with a certain type of response required for the email to be allowed through 
(Ferris Research Bulletin, Report #418 of February 2004 - http://www.ferris.com/2004/02/28/totalblock-new-
challenge-response-anti-spam-technology/ (accessed 9 August 2007) indicates that the particular product 
based on this patent (TotalBlock) is in fact a challenge/response approach, and that such technology has 
existed since at least 1996. The report goes on to note that the option of rejecting spam before receipt on the 
server is different from other challenge/response systems. It is an optional feature of the product TotalBlock.  
265  Whether this creates a legal problem for the monopoly claim is beyond the ambit of this study.   
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more quickly when access is wanted. The software checks book-marked web pages for 
updates, and alerts the user when pages are updated.  
This sounds a useful product, but it is hard to see that there would be any challenging 
software in it. In terms of the business idea itself, once the problem of the tedious nature of 
setting up bookmarks which are embedded in links was specified, the simple application of 
logic would provide this solution. Similarly it seems a fairly obvious step to allow 
automatic updating of bookmarked pages, and parallel processing (by downloading while 
other tasks are happening) to improve speed. The examiner rejected the patent twice on 
novelty and inventiveness grounds. In proposing final amendments, the attorney referred to 
an agreement, in a phone conversation with the examiner ‘that the presence of the 
limitation "update schedule" etc in claim 1 was sufficient to distinguish the invention from 
the prior art on the basis that these features are not found in the cited art.’  
There are four interesting things to note from this patent. All claims are drafted as being for 
software, and indeed the patent is essentially for a software product, and so protected from 
copying. Secondly, as with most other patents in this set, the investment is not large, so the 
impediment to producing this 'invention' seems non-existent. Thirdly the core of the 
'invention' seems to be in identifying the 'problem', as once this 'problem' is specified, the 
solution is a matter of simple logic (and therefore obvious). But current patent law has been 
so narrowed that the simple application of logic to the solution of a 'problem' is insufficient 
grounds for rejection. There is no contribution to knowledge in any field.  
Finally, the distinction between this 'invention' and the prior art is clearly small: an ‘update 
schedule’. This narrowing of the claim was instrumental in the grant. But whether such a 
narrow interpretation would be maintained in any validity dispute is unknown. The claims 
certainly do not read as being limited to an update schedule, and the claim language is very 
abstract. In general abstract claims can be read widely as well as narrowly, so if the patent 
is used to limit the activities of an independent inventor, there could be a social cost. 
In the e-commerce area, again, the business method patents granted in Australia appear to 
be only trivially different, if at all, from pre-existing products and services. In general the 
patented solutions appear to be nothing other than the simple application of logic to the 
stated problem(s). At best they combine well-known ideas in rather obvious solutions to 
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specific 'problems'. As there are no contributions to any technology, and as once the 
‘problem’ has been specified only logic and competent programming is required for 
implementation, these are either patents for ideas, or patents for trivial design variations. 
All are software programs, and thus already protected from copying. None involve large 
R&D expenditure, and there is no evidence that any are induced by the patent system. 
Because the differences from previous practice are so trivial, and there are no contributions 
to either software knowledge or knowledge of business practices, it is hard to see any 
possibilities for spillover benefits from these 'inventions'. Where then are the social benefits 
with which to offset any social costs?  
5.6 Marketing and advertising 
Within the selected dataset there are six patents dealing with various aspects of marketing, 
advertising or customer loyalty. For four of these there are known overseas outcomes, so 
only two cases are discussed here. It should be noted that some marketing and advertising 
patents are closely related to the e-commerce patents as they deal specifically with the 
internet. "Ad market system and method" (application 2003235214, priority 15 May 2002) 
uses extraordinarily (even for a patent) complex and obtuse language to describe a method 
to collect personal data from internet users, and to advertise to them. It is a combined 
market research and advertising system, with consumers receiving (unspecified) incentives 
to provide data and watch the ads. It allows advertisers to select targeted consumers, and 
estimates costs based on the number and frequency of viewing. Fundamentally it is 
software for collecting data, aggregating it, and making it available to advertisers. The 
system calculates who will watch what how often so that advertisers can look at anticipated 
costs and choose how to spend their budgets. It provides graphic and numeric displays.  
The examiner rejected the application for lack of any inventive step. The claims were 
amended and the attorney argued that the ‘incentive setup means’ and the ‘step of allowing 
the viewer to select’ were inventive. The attorney pointed out that there were two kinds of 
incentives, one set up by the viewer and the other by the advertiser. The patent was granted. 
But this 'invention' is simply about database management and analysis. There are no 
contributions to knowledge in either information technology generally, database 
management in particular, or indeed market research or advertising. The English translation 
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of the Japanese IPER was available in the EPO in January 2005, but no copy was found on 
the IPAustralia file. The IPER clearly states a view that there is no inventive step in this 
Japanese PCT application.266 Had this report been available to the Australian examiner, as 
was then required under patent law, the examiner might have resisted grant more strongly. 
The system components are described in terms of ‘interaction means’, ‘display means’ and 
so on, so that it is unclear if the program has even been written. Many patents in the dataset 
are written in this highly abstract manner. This problem of such a high level of abstraction 
(where it is difficult to distinguish between the underlying idea and the claimed 
implementation) has been noted by many others (Sub-Section 3.3.3.2). The breadth of the 
monopolies granted in such claims raises even greater challenges for patent system balance 
than is the case where claims are narrowly drafted.267  
"A Method of Commerce" (application 2004203807, priority 7 May 2004) effectively turns 
a magazine into a lottery ticket. The claims revolve round the identifier for the magazine 
and the purchaser, selection of the winner from the database, and publicity about the 
winner. In other words it parallels well-known systems for lotteries.268 It links the idea of 
prizes to the sale of magazines (presumably as a means of trying to increase sales). So at 
best it combines two well-known business methods. There are no software challenges to be 
overcome, and no contributions to knowledge.  
The examiner raised inventiveness objections, citing five patent documents and common 
general knowledge in the field. The attorney thanked the examiner for drawing this material 
to their attention,269 before quoting a 1972 case ‘… that individual patent specifications and 
their contents do not normally form part of the relevant common general knowledge…’ for 
the inventiveness test.270 The attorney then went on to argue that the five steps in the patent 
claim, viewed in their entirety, did not constitute common general knowledge, even if 
individual steps such as purchasing a magazine were well-known. Further argument again 
 
266  epoline Register Plus, publication number EP1505527, translation of the IPER 17 January 2005. 
267  For a particularly generous ex post interpretation, by the CAFC, of an abstract claim see Bessen and 
Meurer’s discussion of E-Data’s 4,528,643 patent (Bessen and Meurer 2008: 1-2, 4-5, 8-9, 194-195).  
268  Where individuals can register and the system links their ticket number to their registration number. 
269  Thus indicating clearly that neither applicant nor attorney had done an adequate 'prior art' search 
before filing the application.  
270  General Tire & Rubber Company v Firestone Tyre and Rubber Company Ltd (1972) RPC 457: 482. 
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revolved around the lack of any clear documentation about the specific combination of 
well-known features used in the 'invention'. The patent was granted.  
This again raises the substantive issue about the gap between the narrow patent definition 
of novelty and the specific test of inventiveness written into the Australian patent statute. 
Courts have determined that existing knowledge in patent documents might not be 
allowable knowledge for the inventiveness test. Under the novelty test not more than two 
documents can be combined, and then only in narrowly defined circumstances. Against this 
background obvious combinations of existing knowledge found in patent documents, in a 
low-technology field such as sports or business methods, would not be acceptable as a basis 
for determining lack of inventiveness.  
Both these patents combine existing methods and systems with modern electronic 
networks. They confirm that narrow definitions in patent law prevent combinations of well-
known methods being refused a patent. One also raises the problem of patents being drafted 
at such a high level of generality that there is little distinction between the idea and the 
implementation, thus greatly increasing the scope of the patent monopoly. Both involve 
software so are already copyright protected. Spillover benefits are hard to identify, given 
that both 'inventions' involve (at best) only trivial variations from existing systems. 
5.7 Overall organisational / business performance 
Nine patents deal generally with organisational performance, covering quite a diverse range 
of issues (see Table 5.1). Two have clear overseas outcomes and are discussed in Chapter 6.  
Within the dataset are two sibling patents,271 both titled "Performance evaluation tool and 
method" (applications 2003268606 and 2003268607, both filed on 11 December 2003). 
These are in fact the oldest cases in the selected dataset, as they claim a May 1998 priority 
date from their parent, also with the same title.272 In the 2003268607 case, the system 
establishes (and then stores) an organisational structure based on user input, imports 
productivity data, and maps this to the organisational structure using a configuration table, 
all quite old techniques. The Australian examiner rejected all eight claims as neither novel 
 
271  In that they are both divisional children of the same parent (application 765187, no year given). 
272  As a consequence both were directed to request examination immediately after lodgement. The 
applicant took the longest possible time to accede to this direction.  
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nor inventive compared to a US patent. The applicant's attorney responded that the US 
patent covered customer data collection and conversion, but not productivity data 
importation. The claims were re-drafted to emphasise the data importation features. Again 
this demonstrates the trivial difference from an earlier documented system. It is the addition 
of the productivity data importation feature that makes this 'invention' inventive. But this 
involves absolutely no contribution to knowledge of any kind, to any field. 
Table 5.1 Organisational improvement/business performance patents 
Application  
Number 
Title Owner Owner 
residence 
2003268606 Performance evaluation tool and method etalk Corporation US 
2003268607 Performance evaluation tool and method etalk Corporation US 
2003200483 Method and system for risk evaluation SAP Aktiengesellschaft DE 
2003204420 Systems and methods for work list 
prediction 
Staffware plc UK 
2004201587 A system and method for representation 
of business information 
Forge Research Pty 
Limited 
AU 
2003264604 Dynamic Collaboration Assistant Accenture Global 
Services GmbH 
CH 
2003255356 Change navigation toolkit Accenture Global 
Services GmbH 
CH 
2006200104 A method of determining a target event of 
a reoccurring event 
Cinc, Vic (individual) AU 
2004307528 Method and apparatus for managing 
information exchanges between 
apparatus on a worksite 
Leica Geosystems AG CH 
Notes:  Owner residence:   AU: Australia, CH: Switzerland, DE: Germany, US: USA.  
Cases in italics are discussed in Chapter 6.  
 
In regard to the sibling application (2003268606), the Australian examiner raised no 
objections to any of the 28 claims. The principal claim is for a performance evaluation 
method which stores questions, guidelines and the identities of organisational units, and 
associates appropriate questions and guidelines with each unit. At least one unit is selected 
for evaluation and questions (and guidelines) are ‘dynamically’ associated with the selected 
unit prior to generating the evaluation. Subsidiary claims specify that the questions are 
weighted, that there are target scores, that answer types are pre-defined, and that there is an 
algorithm for calculating the productivity score. The claim is expressed in several forms 
(method, system, steps for method, databases for system, generation of an evaluation, 
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method for generation of an evaluation etc.).273 Indeed it is surprising that such a simple 
system can be described in so many words. This is only possible because of the convention 
in patent applications of massive repetition and redundancy.  
At best the system involves computerisation of well-known methods—the mental steps 
normal in evaluating organisational performance. Like the benchmarking method of 
assessing the sustainability of residential developments patent (above Section 5.2), critical 
questions (indicators) are identified for different areas, and these are weighted before being 
cumulated and compared to a target score. Such methods have been around for a long time. 
Software and database management challenges are non-existent, even with an early 1998 
priority date. Again there is no contribution to knowledge of any kind.  
The EPO’s first report on etalk’s “Performance evaluation tool and method” essentially 
concluded that the technical implementation of the information model involved no 
inventive steps. The applicant rewrote all the claims, then argued that the invention as now 
defined ‘concerns a method and system of providing access privileges for a user’. The 
applicant argues that this ‘invention’ solved problems in updating access privileges when 
organisational units changed, and noted this feature was in none of the identified prior art. 
An oral proceeding has now been called: the EPO considers the subject matter—
information modelling—non-technical, that the access privilege features are administrative, 
and that any technical aspect is limited to the implementation of an abstract information 
model, requiring only common general knowledge.274 The EPO considers however that, 
while unpatentable, the access privilege update scheme is ‘arguably novel’.  
But if the contribution of this performance evaluation ‘invention’ is a new means of 
updating access privileges, then surely the documentation that exists—centring as it does 
on performance evaluation—would need to be substantially re-drafted? It would be 
misleading in the extreme for a patent on methods of changing computer access privileges 
to go out under the title “performance evaluation” and to be hidden in words about a 
performance evaluation software system. 
 
273  The EPO examiner’s first report (January 2005) on EP99921812 notes the 14 independent claims and 
asks that these be reduced to a single independent claim, consistent with EPC Article 84 and Rule 29(2).  
274  These documents are available at epoline’s Register Plus, publication number EP1076870. The 
applicant’s response is dated 29 July 2005. The call to an oral proceeding (scheduled for October 2008) is 
dated 18 March 2008, and the EPO’s detailed views are in the five page annex of the same date.  
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SAP's patent for a computerised risk evaluation system ("Method and system for risk 
evaluation", application 2003200483, priority 13 February 2002) also offers no advances in 
either approaches to risk evaluation or to software engineering. The claims are written in 
unhelpfully complex and legalistic language and repeat themselves as method, system and 
computer program product claims. But the approach is identical to risk management 
approaches in use since at least the mid 1990s, and probably well before that. The system 
takes a set of measures relevant to strategic business planning and forecasting, and assigns 
risks, threat levels and associated probabilities to each. An aggregate risk-weighted score 
for the business is then calculated. There is no development in methodologies for assessing 
risk. The patent does no more than computerise a known approach to assessing business 
threats and risks. The EPO’s examination division considers there is no technical issue 
meriting a prior art search due to ‘the paucity of technical definition going beyond the banal 
for the person skilled in the technical art.’275 No examiner objections were raised in 
Australia, and the application was granted without amendment.  
"Systems and methods for work list prediction" (application 2003204420, priority 29 May 
2002) is another patent for a system used in a particular context (insurance claims 
processing) where the claim is for a far larger scope. Again the patent is written in 
generalities, with ‘receiving modules’, ‘step determining modules’, ‘a step definition 
module’ and ‘execution modules’. These are simply different parts of the computer system 
and software. The claim was initially rejected as neither novel nor inventive. A single US 
patent was cited as relevant prior art. The attorney replied at length, arguing that the prior 
art focused on workflow rearrangement to meet predefined goals or deadlines. He went on 
to say that unless the examiner could provide a detailed explanation of exactly where in the 
prior art the 'invention' was anticipated, the patent should be granted. For example he 
argued the prior art did not suggest an ‘execution module’ to calculate an expected 
completion time. Compared to previous knowledge the sole difference in this 'invention' 
seems to be this estimation of the end time. This is a very small refinement to a well-known 
general approach.276 It does not add to knowledge of workflow management, nor are there 
 
275  Available at epoline’s Register Plus, publication number EP1336927, paragraph 2.2 of annex to the 
examination report of 28 February 2008. 
276  And very likely was already in use in practice. Project management and workflow analysis are 
fundamentally about completing work on time, and predicting completion dates is integral to this. 
 161 
                                                
any technical challenges in the programming. This patent is owned by a British company, 
and the patent has been withdrawn from the UK Patent Office, possibly because of an 
adverse examination report.277  
Another patent at the boundary between software, information management and business 
improvement is "Dynamic Collaboration Assistant” (application 2003264604, priority date 
19 March 2003). In setting the context for this application, Accenture Global Services 
GmbH notes the importance of teamwork and collaboration, and that computerised systems 
for this have developed in a piecemeal fashion. The examples they give are e-mail, 
groupware (where files are stored for shared use), mail and message lists, and ‘team 
workspace applications’ (chat rooms and shared file storage). They argue that this 
'invention' ‘integrates collaborative services into business processes to enable partners to 
share related information.’ 
Turning to the 44 claims (Figure 5.4), the 'invention' involves creating a ‘knowledge model’ 
listing all documents, files, individuals and organisations and assigning them to one or 
more contexts. Whenever a network user creates a new document, the knowledge module is 
checked and possible applications are displayed on the terminal screen. This is a very basic 
classificatory idea. Classification systems, or taxonomies, are one of the oldest building 
blocks of the scientific approach. This use of a very old scientific method in a new 
environment does not add to knowledge.  
The Australian examiner rejected this application twice. In response to the first rejection the 
applicant amended the claims to clarify the context in which the terminal was being used, 
and that this context drives the information displayed. The examiner responded that 
previous patents also determined context, by using keywords, and adjusted displays based 
on context. The applicant's attorney disagreed with this interpretation of the two previous 
patents. He argued that display of group information was not the same as display of a list of 
documents, and that keywords did not fully describe context. The patent was granted.  
 
277  Examination was requested in November 2004, and the application 'withdrawn' in November 2006. On 
the esp@cenet database (worldwide), the UK code ‘WAP’ is used to indicate withdrawal and refused or 
‘taken to be refused’. This code was also used for application 2003200436 (discussed in Section 6.2), where 
information available on the Australian file indicates that prior to the 'withdrawal', the UK Patent Office had 
advised that the 'invention' was not patentable as it did not address any technical problem. While it is likely 
the worklist application may have effectively been refused by the UK Patent Office, it is not absolutely 
certain that this is so, and hence the patent is dealt with here rather than in Chapter 6.  
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Figure 5.4 Dynamic Collaboration Assistant  (Summary of claims in plain English) 
 
Application 2003264604;   priority date: 19 March 2003 
 
Claims: 
 
1. method of collaborating across computer network by: generating a GUI* displaying 1+ 
collaborative applications; determining use context; adjusting display of applications based on 
use context and listing related documents / files  
*    provides links to listed documents (2);  
3 use context determined by scanning opened documents to see if they are new  
*    if new, does document contain contextual information? (5);  
*    by comparing user     profile with new document (6); 
*    drawing on contextual matching pattern (7);  
*    terminal sends message to server if contextual information (8);  
*    message is read (9);  
*    context information checked against knowledge model to give list of relations (10);  
*    including associated user and document lists (11);  
*    send message re new context to terminal (12);  
*    GUI# display on terminal consequently adjusted (13). 
4 use context determined by querying knowledge model where existing documents, files, people 
and organisations are associated with a use context 
14. Repeats claim 1 for a "dynamic collaboration assistant” application with a little more detail on the 
sub-elements (e.g. ‘text scanning component’, ‘context parser’, ‘context listener’), which are 
repeated in claims 15 - 25. 
26 Repeats claims 1 and 14 for ‘a computer program for use in …’ comprising: followed by similar 
details but phrased as computer usable medium, program code, configured in various ways and 
capable of analysis as per sub-claims above, repeated in claims 27 - 38. 
39. Repeats main broad claim in terms of a terminal connected to a server, means for generating the 
GUI*, determining the use context, and means for analysing and adjusting display.  
40 As per claims 14 - 25, where context listener can be placed in active or inactive state by the 
terminal user 
    and contains context selector component allowing manual setting of context (41) 
42 –  As per drawing claims. 
44  
 
Notes:  Numbers in parentheses are claim numbers;     #    GUI:   graphical user interface (i.e. an icon) 
 
Again it appears that it is the minutiae of legal semantics rather than genuine contributions 
to knowledge which determines whether a patent monopoly is granted.  
Accenture Global Services GmbH also owns "Change navigation toolkit" (application 
2003255356, priority 1 August 2002), a software product for organisations to use in 
implementing new computerised operational systems.278 Accenture identifies well-known 
problems with migrating to new systems: inadequate education of employees and 
managers; inadequate pre-testing; and budget over-runs. Their solution is a software event-
based methodology, where events are handled in accordance with ‘event rules’ stored in an 
‘event library’. Templates are used to record rules, and the library extracts the rules from 
                                                 
278  Such changes are complex, but if tightly and effectively managed, can go very smoothly. For example 
several Australian government agencies, including IPAustralia, implemented new personnel and/or financial 
management systems in the mid 1990s. 
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the template (i.e. the computer program reads and extracts the data and puts it in the right 
place). Claim 3 specifically refers to processing insurance claims, which suggests this is 
another broad claim for a system actually developed for a specific environment.  
Other subsidiary claims include details about: what is stored where in memory; that the data 
structures include sample forms, correspondence, tasks and file notes; that the ‘target 
environment’ (successful implementation of the new software system) includes a trial. The 
system also generates messages including about sponsorship support for the transition, and 
deals with information dissemination and training. Subsequent claims require that the new 
system include internet connection, that training includes training in undertaking remote 
audits and that a workplan and project timeline are developed. Overall this ‘invention’ 
simply computerises a known management solution to a specific problem.  
There is a public interest in having efficient and effective businesses and public 
organisations. Such organisations are very likely to replace major (computerised) operating 
systems from time to time, and this poses challenges. There are many ways to address 
these. This is an area where reputation is important, and where the services of companies 
with good track records are in high demand.279 Further if any company develops a 
computer program to support such a change, this program is copyright protected. Beyond 
this, the prime public interest would seem to be in the effective dissemination of good 
change management systems. There is no evidence of any impediment to the development 
of such organisational improvement methods: as demonstrated by the simple and logical 
nature of the steps claimed in this patent. But there are some questions about whether such 
techniques are sufficiently widely disseminated. So not only does this patent not add to 
existing knowledge in any field, it may act as an impediment to dissemination of known 
techniques. The claimed 'invention' merely computerises known methods and process steps. 
"A method of determining a target event of a reoccurring event" (application 2006200104, 
priority 12 May 2005) is about predicting re-occurring events such as regular meetings, 
public holidays, birthdays. This sounds very like the capability offered by Microsoft's 
Organizer since at least the mid 1990s. The method determines the cycle for the event, 
 
279  The applicant, Accenture, has had a leading position in the business consulting market since its initial 
formation as a division of Arthur Andersen. It was established as a separate company in 2000/2001 and 
changed its name to Accenture—a move apparently planned before the Enron scandal 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accenture, accessed 29 December 2008).  
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converts this to a numerical format, and determines a later occurrence. Subsidiary claims 
include: periodicity greater than a day, predetermined rules, conversion of the numerical 
format back into a date, calculations for more than one cycle, application to Julian, 
Georgian, or lunar calendars, and display of outcomes. Nothing about this system was 
novel in 2005, or indeed ten years before that.280 The examiner rejected the patent on 
novelty and inventiveness grounds, citing two US and two Japanese patents. The applicant 
amended the claims, particularly by limiting claim 1 by addition of the step of ‘applying a 
first format operator to the or each cycle and which converts a format of the or each cycle 
into a numerical format that relates to the origin.’ This conversion of a date to a number 
was not included in any of the four cited patents, and was argued to be a significant 
practical advantage over the four earlier patents. Given the alleged importance of this 
element of the invention, it is interesting that it was not included in the initial specification. 
The patent was granted.  
The element in this 'invention' that forms the basis of the claim to patentability is this 
conversion of a date to a number prior to manipulation and reconversion to a date. It is 
claimed that this method differs from the previous patented art. Whether it differs from the 
many calculators on the market before patenting was used for such subject matter is not 
known. Giving the patent the benefit of the doubt, this may indeed be a new way method 
for performing such calculations. If this is the case, it adds new practical knowledge. Is this 
contribution sufficiently 'inventive' to provide social benefits that will exceed any social 
costs? If the benchmark for granting a patent is at least a modest degree of inventiveness, 
this case is very borderline. There is a possible new method of date calculation (depending 
on how earlier calculators actually worked), producing identical outputs to previous 
techniques.  
Three of these seven patents involve very small variations on previously existing systems 
and methods, and three simply computerise previously existing methods. No examiner 
objections were raised about the three computerisation 'inventions', but novelty/ 
inventiveness objections were raised in the other four cases. As seen in other business 
 
280  The author owns an electronic organiser, purchased in 1994 and still working well, that will do 
Gregorian and lunar event forecasts and enter them as diary appointments. The addition of a Julian calendar 
seems trivial.  
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fields, attorney responses arguing inventiveness centre on exceedingly minor variations. 
One of these cases might involve new know-how in calculating future dates. With this 
possible exception, again there is little or no evidence that these patents will generate any 
social benefits to offset any social costs involved in their use, including the costs of 
preventing others from developing and using such obvious systems.  
5.8 Miscellaneous 
There are six patents which cannot readily be categorised by subject matter. Three have 
clear outcomes from overseas applications (a legal process, an expert medical system and a 
system for tracking the ownership of particular items), and are discussed in Chapter 6. The 
other three, discussed in this section, are an audit system, an on-line employment register, 
and a system for allocating emergency patients to treatment facilities.  
"A system for validation of chemical usage in the production of foodstuffs" (application 
2004233489, priority 26 November 2004) is a patent is to provide an independent check on 
the amount of chemicals in foodstuffs, and the claims describe a basic approach to audit. 
While the major claimed benefit of this ‘invention’ is independence, it includes a claim that 
the independent auditor (an agronomist) must be engaged by the chemicals seller, which of 
course totally undermines independence. However it has never been within the ambit of the 
Australian Patent Office that inventions must work: this is a matter for the courts.281 But 
does this patent add anything to existing knowledge? It involves basic audit steps. There is 
no contribution to audit methodology. The claims are for both manual and computerised 
versions. There are no software challenges in the computerised version.  
The patent was initially rejected for want of novelty and inventiveness, with three earlier 
patents and one conference paper being cited, all relating to validation of materials used in 
foodstuff production. The attorney responded that these previous publications commenced 
tracking materials only on the farm site, compared to this system which commenced 
tracking of input materials (specifically chemicals) prior to arrival at the farm. The claims 
were also amended to limit them to validating chemicals, rather than the broader materials 
 
281  As advised in correspondence regarding the grant of a patent on a perpetual motion machine. Bryce 
reports that the Australian Commissioner of Patents advised that ‘If the patent is later challenged in court, and 
the plaintiff shows that it violates the laws of nature, then the court will accept that the invention cannot work, 
and will not be useful. This is grounds for revocation of the patent’ (see Bryce 2001:11).  
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usage originally claimed. The patent was then granted. It appears that despite using 
standard audit methodology, and claiming both manual and computerised versions, the fact 
that previous publications did not specify a tracking system that extended further through 
the supply chain is enough difference for grant of a patent. This demonstrates again how 
minute differences in the specific application of existing knowledge are being used to 
justify grant of a patent monopoly. Clearly patent law has moved a very long way from the 
form it took in 1838 when such patents were rejected in no uncertain terms:  
"It would be a very extraordinary thing to say, that because all mankind have been 
accustomed to eat soup with a spoon, that a man could take out a patent because he 
says you might eat peas with a spoon. The law on this subject is this: that you cannot 
have a patent for applying to a well-known thing, which might be applied to 50,000 
different purposes, for applying it to an operation which is exactly analogous to what 
was done before." 
(1838) 3 Hayward’s Patent Cases 125, 141. 
(from Brennan and Christie 1997: 29) 
If the same logic were in regular use today, 'inventions' such as this would be rejected as 
roundly. Audit, like other branches of finance, is a broad enabling business methodology, 
designed for use in a wide variety of contexts. To grant a patent for a particular audit 
process, simply because that design may not previously have been written down, does not 
enhance economic welfare in general nor contribute to the objectives of the patent system 
in particular. Indeed it could better be seen as bringing the patent system into disrepute. 
"Skills Dissemination Tool" (application 2005234625, priority 15 November 2005), is an 
on-line employment register. It has a publicly searchable database of skills of subscribing 
members, including their geographic location. Searching is done using ‘statistical word 
association techniques’, the use of which was originally reported in 1961 (Stiles, 1961). 
The subsidiary claims relate to access and payment, and the items in the database. On-line 
job search systems have been available since at least the mid 1990s.  
The examiner rejected this application as lacking inventiveness compared to common 
general knowledge, and lacking inventiveness and novelty compared to nine previous US 
patents. The claims were revised to include a publicly searchable database. The attorney 
also argued that entry of vocational and non-vocational data by members differentiated the 
system from earlier systems. The attorney also analysed each of the cited US patents, 
arguing that each differed from the application. The arguments involved such design 
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minutiae as, for example, that earlier patented systems were limited to a specific geographic 
areas (as compared to the ability to select by geographic area), the selection of only one 
candidate (as compared to a list of candidates), the ability to search and apply for vacant 
positions (not available on this application), and limitations to specific groups such as 
members of a defined workforce. The examiner accepted these arguments for seven of the 
patents identified as part of the ‘prior art’, but maintained that the application was 
uninventive compared to two.  
The claims were amended by adding to claim 1 that the geographic indicator allowed a 
maximum availability distance to be defined by the subscriber. The attorney argued this 
new feature was a key differentiating factor. The attorney also argued that the use of 
statistical word association algorithms was not suggested by the earlier patents (despite the 
fact that the technique was over 40 years old), that potential candidates were listed rather 
than ranked, and that although other systems were limited to specific geographic areas they 
did not allow for selection by geographic area. The patent was granted.  
There were ten claims in the US version, compared to 14 in the Australian. The USPTO 
issued a first rejection report in April 2008 (US application number 11/371325). The 
examiner considered claims 5-10 to be descriptive. The remaining claims were considered 
obvious in the light of one previous US patent application and two web documents.  
Clearly this 'invention' involves no contributions to knowledge in any field. The differences 
compared to the 'prior art' are trivial, and could as well be seen as matters of system design 
as system function. Such minute differences in design are sufficient that the Patent Office 
must grant the patent. It appears that counting the scintilla of inventiveness required under 
current Australian patent law starts from a base of 'not exactly identical' rather than some 
modest degree of inventiveness. 
One of two medical patents in the dataset is "Emergency communication service providing 
method and device" (application 2003248001, priority 30 September 2002). This is a 
method (and system) for allocating emergency patients to emergency treatment facilities, 
and operates through a ‘communications network’, possibly a phone system (both terrestrial 
and satellite means are specified). The network links hospitals and other treatment centres 
to an emergency services centre (hereafter ‘the centre’), staffed by a doctor. The centre is 
 168 
also linked through the network to ambulance (and other emergency services vehicles). 
Data are sent from the ambulances to the centre; the centre checks treatment location 
availability, and advises the ambulances; the advice can also include treatment advice while 
transporting the patient.  
In any large city, having centralised advice on treatment facilities for emergency patients is 
sensible, but surely this idea was not new in September 2002? Where ambulance services 
are provided through a single authority, as is often the case, the ambulance call centre is 
automatically the repository of knowledge as to which hospitals are currently admitting 
patients, and which are not. The inclusion of medical advice on treatment during the trip 
may be helpful in those cases where the condition is beyond the skills and experience of the 
ambulance personnel, though more frequently the limiting factor is the facilities available 
in the ambulance. So this system seems simply to be a combination of well-known 
approaches and procedures. It was rejected for want of novelty compared to three previous 
Japanese patents. The claims were deleted and replaced. The new claims defined a satellite 
communication gateway. The attorney argued that none of the three cited patents disclosed 
a system where a single gateway was used by multiple service centres. The patent was 
granted. Again an 'invention' making no contribution to knowledge has been granted on the 
basis of one small feature making it trivially different from previous documented systems. 
Furthermore, this feature—not in itself new—was added during the negotiation process. 
None of these three patents make any contribution to new knowledge or its application—
indeed one merely applies a known general purpose methodology to a marginally 
lengthened supply chain. All involve only minute differences from well-known systems. 
One claims a monopoly for the manual as well as the computerised means of delivering the 
system. Again these patents show that current patent law, with its focus on detailed, 
prescriptive minutiae misses the purpose of patent law—encouraging innovation that would 
not otherwise occur.  
Of particular concern is the issue highlighted by the audit patent. Audit processes are well-
developed and are used across a very broad range of economic activities. To argue that an 
process applying such a well-known general technique to a new specific area is an 
invention is to make a mockery of the word. This case is paralleled by the grant of patents 
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for the application of other well-known methodologies in particular areas, for example 
accounting methods and benchmarking.  
5.9 Betting systems 
The six recently granted betting patents in the dataset are treated as a group, because they 
are all based on probability theory. For two of the patents in the group there were no 
overseas applications. For two others a patent has been granted in New Zealand. Three of 
the four with overseas applications have had rejections, and another has been withdrawn 
following an adverse examiner report (Appendix 8, Table A.8.1). But it was considered 
preferable to treat all the betting patents as a subject matter group, rather than separate out 
some for consideration in Chapter 6. Betting systems constitute a service product, and the 
underlying theory involves straightforward application of well-known principles from the 
probability branch of mathematics. Such 'inventions' are patentable nowadays because the 
‘manner of manufacture’ requirement of the Act has been re-specified as a ‘tangible 
output’, and the definition of tangible output includes intangible outputs such as ‘randomly 
determining a jackpot prize winner’, or ‘generating a payment to each punter’.  
Five of these patents concern parimutuel (totaliser) systems, well-known in Australia. In 
such systems a percentage is taken out of the pool, then the balance is divided between 
those holding winning tickets. Therefore odds (the exact winnings if the bet is successful) 
cannot be determined before completion of the relevant event. One patent deals with 
jackpots (Table 5.2). 
Table 5.2 Betting patents recently granted in Australia 
Application ID Priority date Title Applicant 
2004202762 5 April 2000 Interactive Wagering Systems and 
Methods with Parimutuel Pool Features 
ODS Properties, Inc. 
(USA) 
2003252947 3 April 2003 System and method for betting on a 
subset of participants in an event 
Cantor Index LLC 
(USA) 
2003257910 1July 2003 System and method for generating 
customized odds bets for an event 
Cantor Index LLC 
(USA) 
2005200780 2 July 2004 An improved betting method Fiorino, James (AU) 
2005201458 24 Aug 2004 An improved betting method Fiorino, James (AU) 
2005200984 3 Mar 2004 Communal Gaming Jackpot Method Stargames Corporation 
Pty Ltd (AU) 
 
The ODS Properties patent (2004202762) provides gamblers with information on how their 
planned bet will affect the pool and consequently any winnings. It has been withdrawn in 
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Germany and voided pre-grant in New Zealand. It received four final rejections and three 
non-final rejections from the USPTO. The US examiner is of the view that, given the 
problem posed, there is only one method of determining the odds, thus making it obvious. 
The applicant has been invited to present evidence on any other method. The applicant has 
not submitted any such evidence but is appealing the rejection decision.282 The examiner in 
Australia raised no novelty or inventiveness objections.  
The EPO has also rejected this application, as lacking an inventive step. The examiner 
commented that modifying a well-known interactive wagering system to simulate the 
placing of a bet would be achieved by a software engineer without the use of any inventive 
skills.283 At the appeal hearing the EPO Examination Division agreed the application had 
‘technical character’, as it was implemented on a computer, but remained of the view that 
there was no inventive step. The application was refused.  
Cantor Index's first patent (2003252947) is designed to allow a bet against a particular 
outcome, i.e. to allow one to bet that the favourite will not win. Their second patent 
(2003257910) is for calculating the odds for combined event outcomes, such as quinellas 
and trifectas. No examiner objections were raised in Australia against the first application, 
but the second application was rejected twice, before being granted. Both have been 
granted in New Zealand, and both have been rejected in the UK (Table A8.1). Both UK 
objections were based on a view that the applications related to excluded subject matter 
(computer programs and schemes or methods for doing business), but one was rejected 
under Section 1(2) and the other under Section 18(3) of the UK Patents Act.284  
The first of James Fiorino's two “improved betting method” patents proposes an alternative 
point at which to cut out the organiser's percentage. It is argued that this allows parimutuel 
operators greater ability to compete with fixed odds operators. The second is concerned 
 
282  The details of the US prosecution are fascinating, and can be viewed on the USPTO Public PAIR 
system (http://portal.uspto.gov/external/portal/pair ) and enter 09/827509 in the application field. To view the 
documents on this file select the ‘Image File Wrapper’ tab. An examiner interview summary record, 6 
December 2007 (accessed 12 July 2008), records details of an interview where the applicant argued ‘that it 
would not have occurred to one of ordinary skill in the art to implement a method that answers the question, 
"What would be the odds if I wagered X?"’. One has to wonder which 'art' the applicant had in mind. Clearly 
not betting systems.  
283  Epoline Register Plus, EP1269387, examiner correspondence of 5 July 2007, point 3, page 3.  
284  One of these rejections was appealed; the appeal was dismissed (by consent) on 20 February 2008 
(email advice from the Manager of the High Court Appeals Office, 24 June 2008). The UK application 
numbers are GB2400202 and GB2403564.  
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with the returns to win bets compared to place bets. Examiner objections were raised 
against both patents, and the claims of each were amended. The final patent in the set is for 
a jackpot betting system, where winners are randomly determined.  
Probability theory underlies all these patents, and is a very well understood area of 
mathematics. While clear thinking is required, given a type of betting system there is a 
single defined outcome, given any particular problem posed. There may be more than one 
method of calculating this outcome, but such alternative methods are well-known, and will 
produce identical outcomes. This logic underlies the USPTO rejection of the ODS 
application. Against this background it is hard to see where there could be any 
inventiveness in any betting patent, unless it is in the particular problem posed. Nor is it 
possible to see any contributions to knowledge in any field. From a policy viewpoint 
therefore it is hard to see any justification for legal doctrines which allow the grant of 
monopolies to such obvious applications of well-known mathematical knowledge.  
Two of these patents are owned by an individual, and there are no overseas applications. 
The other four are owned by companies, and all four seem to make considerable use of the 
patent system. Stargames Corporation Pty Ltd., the owner of the jackpot patent, has 11 
applications in Canada (but not this one), 13 in the USA (of which one has been granted), 
11 at the EPO, and three in New Zealand. A search for Stargames in the esp@cenet's 
worldwide database finds 52 listings. The patent recently granted in Australia has a 
European and a US counterpart application. It was withdrawn from the EPO, after two 
adverse examiner reports.  
ODS Properties, Inc. is an even more prolific patenter, with 22 entries in the Canadian 
patent database, though 15 are ‘dead’. As at January 2008, ODS had 13 US patents, with at 
least a further seven applications pending. In New Zealand it had 24 applications, ten of 
which were withdrawn and one of which lapsed after grant. The other 13 were accepted or 
sealed. There appear to be just five applications in Europe, in addition to the one recently 
granted in Australia.  
The final two betting patents are both owned by Cantor Index LLC, a subsidiary of the 
well-known US financial services firm, Cantor Fitzgerald LP. Cantor Index has ten 
applications pending in Canada in addition to the two in this dataset. They have both been 
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granted in New Zealand, where there are a further five applications, including two children 
of one of the patents in the dataset being studied here. There are a total of twenty published 
applications in the USA as well as two granted patents. Cantor Index's betting patents cover 
not just games but also financial markets.  
With very low inventiveness standards it is not surprising that a single company can come 
up with a large number of patentable ideas. Starting from this set of only six betting 
patents, some quite large patent webs have been discovered. Patent families and patent 
thickets, and their possible consequences are discussed briefly in Appendix 6. 
But given the nature of betting systems and long-standing knowledge of probability, it is 
surprising that so many patents are being granted in this area. Despite a specific output (e.g. 
‘simultaneously displaying the current odds and the projected odds’ or ‘determining an 
amount of a win bet payout’) being needed to convert the mathematical algorithm into a 
‘tangible useful output’, it seems such patents are being granted for the specification of the 
particular problem. Some of the specified problems seem well known (e.g. quinellas, 
trifectas, impact of an additional bet on a closed pool and so on). So grant of these patents 
is likely to be due to two problems: identification of pre-existing knowledge, and allowing 
claims for problem specification as opposed to inventions which contribute new knowledge 
and apply ingenuity rather than simple logic.  
5.10 Conclusions 
This detailed assessment of 33 recently granted Australian business method patents 
provides empirical evidence to confirm the view frequently found in the literature—that 
there is a serious problem with the inventiveness threshold in the patent system. As this 
detailed examination demonstrates, the definitions and rules used in the patent system have 
become radically divorced from an interpretation of inventiveness that requires a 
contribution to knowledge, or at least modest ingenuity in using existing knowledge. Given 
the literature, one would have expected some of the granted patents to be trivial. However, 
given the objectives of the patent system, and the statutory requirements for an invention 
and inventiveness, one would also have expected to find some genuinely new / inventive 
business ideas. What this chapter has shown is that, in case after case, it is minute 
differences in wording and content that allow a product, service or method to be granted a 
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legislatively-backed monopoly. With one possible exception, these trivial differences are 
not based on any additions to knowledge.  
Further evidence on this matter will be assessed in Chapter 6, where the other 39 recently 
granted Australian business method patents are reviewed. This provides an opportunity to 
confirm or reject the findings of this chapter. But before turning to this international 
evidence, what are the key lessons from the analysis here? 
Firstly, the legislative presumptions of novelty and inventiveness set the basis for an 
unbalanced system. In practice it is the government that has to show that the application 
does not meet the requisite standard, rather than the applicant proving that it does. 
Attorneys frequently argue that the examiner must demonstrate lack of novelty or 
inventiveness if s/he is going to refuse grant of a patent. But most of the patents reviewed 
here involve at best only trivial variations to existing systems, and it is hard to envisage 
what material most applicants could use to demonstrate any inventiveness. The norm in 
most cases of regulatory intervention in the market is that the party requesting the 
intervention should demonstrate, beyond reasonable doubt, that the intervention causes 
more good than harm. Indeed an economist would normally require that the good be 
significantly greater than the harm, because of the costs involved in any market regulation. 
There is no logical or evidence-based reason for this reversal of proof within the patent 
system. If the normal regulatory rule were adopted, it is likely that most of these 
'inventions' would not have been granted a patent.  
There are two possible exceptions. One may contribute new practical knowledge, and the 
other may contribute a new business idea. "A method of determining a target event of a 
reoccurring event" (application 2006200104) involves a possibly new method for 
calculating future dates by converting dates to numbers. "Method and system for blocking 
unwanted e-mail" (application 2003244552) stops unwanted mail at the server rather than 
after it is downloaded. This is possibly an inventive idea at the priority date of 4 September 
2003. Neither are significant inventions, but they may demonstrate at least a small amount 
of ingenuity.  
It would be interesting to know whether, if the applicants had to demonstrate inventiveness, 
it could be done for these two inventions. Stopping e-mail at the server is possibly an idea 
that would occur to many working on the problem of spam, so again it would be interesting 
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to see if the applicant could demonstrate inventiveness beyond reasonable doubt. Similarly 
it would be interesting to know whether the date conversion methodology of the 
reoccurring event patent had or had not previously been used in the many calculators on the 
market a decade or more before the priority date of May 2005. 
The other 31 cases assessed in this chapter show either trivial variations on existing 
systems, combinations of well-known methods or mere computerisation or use of networks. 
None of these 31 patents make any contribution to knowledge, nor do they require any 
ingenuity. In the worst cases, patents have been granted for the application of well-known 
techniques in narrow new fields. Examples of this are the "Method and Tool for Assessing 
the Sustainability of a Development" (application 2004200942) and "A system for 
validation of chemical usage in the production of foodstuffs" (application 2004233489). 
The former uses the well-known technique of benchmarking to assess the sustainability of 
residential development. The latter uses well-known audit processes across a longer supply 
chain than previously documented.  
The Australian High Court has previously determined that it is not inventive to take a 
known substance and claim a patent for using it to make a different article for which its 
properties make it suitable. In the 1959 Microcell judgement, the High Court ruled that: 
"If stainless steel and its properties were known, and many kinds of articles had been 
made of it, it would not be possible for a man to claim a monopoly for making 
kitchen sinks of stainless steel merely because he was the first man who ever thought 
of doing this. … It is not an inventive idea for which a monopoly can be claimed to 
take a substance which is known and used for the making of various articles, and to 
make out of it an article for which its known properties make it suitable, although it 
has not been used to make that article before. 
(1959) 102 CLR 232, 248 and 249 (from Brennan 2002: 29). 
It appears that this rule is rarely used today, certainly when it comes to taking well-known 
business method techniques and applying them to new fields for which they are obviously 
well suited. Brennan has considered this issue in respect of the infamous Priceline.com's 
internet reverse auction system (Brennan 2002: 26-27). The cases presented here suggest 
that this legal doctrine is rarely applied, with business method patents being granted which 
merely apply well-known methodologies to areas for which they are well-suited.  
That such patents are being granted seems to derive from the priority given to a legal 
doctrine on combinations. This doctrine derives from a 1980 decision and states that unless 
 175 
                                                
there is no other combination that would be obvious to a non-inventive skilled worker, then 
a combination cannot be deemed obvious.285 This ‘combinations doctrine’ leads directly to 
a system where such a strong priority is given to avoiding type I errors (rejecting inventive 
inventions), that very large numbers of type II errors (patents granted for uninventive 
inventions) are occurring. The grant of invalid patents incurs high costs for the economy, 
through their impact on business and invention. One of the cases discussed in this chapter 
was opposed, and the opposing company incurred costs to challenge the grant of a patent 
that clearly only used existing knowledge and logic to address the stated 'problem' 
("Method and processing arrangement for providing various financing options", application 
2006202244). While the opposing company had to pay $540 to lodge the opposition, the 
applicant did not pay the $140 acceptance fee and the application lapsed.286  
So the next lesson is that the narrow prescription of inventiveness leads to the grant of 
many patents which offer no possibility of any social benefit to offset any social costs. 
Statute law embodies doctrines reached through case law that limit, for example, the 
existing knowledge against which an alleged 'invention' is measured. The most farcical 
aspect of this is that previously patented inventions can be excluded from the body of 
knowledge for the inventiveness test, as the typical uninventive skilled worker in a 
narrowly defined field will be unaware of them. The test requires that ‘a person skilled in 
the art could have been reasonably expected to find, understand and regard as relevant’ 
any information used to test inventiveness (Patents Act 1990, Section 7(2)(b), emphasis 
added).  
This statutory provision forms the basis of the Emperor Sports decision, discussed in 
Chapter 3, that in many fields the person skilled in the art would not be expected to be 
aware of relevant patents. This ruling, that previous patents might not be reasonably found 
by skilled persons in low-technology fields such as business methods or sports, can 
effectively exclude all patented knowledge from the knowledge base use for the 
 
285  See Sub-Section 4.4.2 where the key segment of this decision is quoted in full. 
286  These amounts may seem trivial. But they do not include company time and technical legal advice. 
Nor do they recognise that this company has in fact felt it necessary to oppose not just this, but the other two 
applications that were split off from it as the examiner considered that there were three separate ‘inventions’. 
It might be noted that it is difficult to find information on oppositions on the IPAustralia website, and the list 
of fees (which is easily found) does not contain any information on opposition fees.  
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inventiveness test. At least based on the cases reviewed in this thesis, patent attorneys 
regularly make use of this judgement in their negotiations with the Patent Office.  
A closely related consideration is the difficulty in identifying existing knowledge in fields 
where much existing knowledge and practice is not available in documentary form. 
Because of the difficulty in documenting practical knowledge, examiners tend not to use 
such knowledge in investigating inventiveness. Practical knowledge is more often used by 
private parties in opposition proceedings or in court to challenge inventiveness, but this 
puts the onus on an innocent party to bear such costs. If this were reversed, and it was the 
applicant who had to provide evidence to challenge a refusal to grant a patent the costs 
would, more appropriately, be borne by the party gaining the monopoly benefit. 
These practical difficulties in examining for inventiveness in fields where most knowledge 
and practice is not written down (codified) were one of the major reasons behind early 
government decisions not to extend patents to software. Another was the view that, given 
the nature of the underlying technology—computer software—the main input was simple 
logic, and there was therefore little distinction between the idea and its implementation.  
Both these problems are evident in the patents examined here. Many are uninventive 
compared to existing practices—for example teaching children the value of money by 
working for their pocket money, or adjusting for quality when selecting a service provider. 
But because it is not normal practice to document the mundane (Ullman 2000), or all the 
trivial variations to a common practice that might be useful, there is no documentary 
evidence that the examiner can use in assessing inventiveness. This is another reason why 
the onus of proof should be changed to the party seeking the government's sanction for use 
of monopoly practices to achieve a market advantage. If there is no political will to make 
this welfare-enhancing change, then a strong exception to patenting in any field where the 
underlying techniques are based on mathematics or logic, and the product is a service 
product should be introduced.  
In several cases it is evident that there is little difference between the idea in the patent and 
its implementation. This is the case not only for all six betting patents, but for a number of 
other patents in the dataset, for example turning magazines into tickets for prizes, or 
automating the storing of linked bookmarks. Another aspect of this problem is the very 
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high level of generality used in many of the patent claims. Campbell-Kelly and Valduriez 
look at this issue in their review of 50 top software patents, and suggest that the appropriate 
level of detail varies with the type of issue addressed. They find that 21 of the 50 patents 
have a low level of disclosure (and only six have a high level of disclosure). They note that 
applications 'inventions' tend to be written at a very much higher level of abstraction 
(Campbell-Kelly and Valduriez 2005). The patents in the dataset considered here are 
applications, and are written in terms of such broad concepts as ‘calculating modules’, 
‘control means’, ‘display means’, ‘receiving device’, ‘capture apparatus’ and so on. In 
general, if a large number of people were posed the problem(s) identified in the application, 
many of them would be likely to come up with solutions close to those claimed in these 
patents, given the high level of generality at which they are written. In no cases are there 
any technical specifications, even where clearly specific devices are used. This means that 
the patent specifications disclose little other than the general idea of the 'invention'. 
Generally the higher level of abstraction, the broader the scope of the claims. In a number 
of the cases examined it is also clear that the 'invention' has been developed in a specific 
environment (e.g. buying security services, processing insurance claims) but the scope 
claimed in the patent is for a much wider field (buying services, workflow prediction). 
Bessen and Meurer (2008) point to the vagueness and obscurity in patent claims as creating 
major difficulties in determining their boundaries. They demonstrate that fuzzy boundaries 
create extremely high search costs for other innovators, and increase the risk of inadvertent 
infringement. They also note that the higher the level of abstraction, the greater the 
likelihood that the patentee may lay claim to knowledge s/he does not possess. If vague, 
opaque, non-disclosing broad claims are to be allowed, then balance in the patent system 
can be achieved only by also allowing independent invention as a defence against patent 
infringement.  
Another issue emerging from examination of these patents is the impact of the re-definition 
of the ‘manner of new manufacture’ test as a requirement for a ‘useful product’. The useful 
output can be as intangible as ‘the repayment amount determined for the loan’, or 
‘generating a payment to each punter’. This effectively removes the requirement for a 
science or technology basis from the patent system. In 2004 the Australian Law Reform 
Commission recommended review of the antiquated ‘manner of manufacture’ concept 
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(ALRC 2004). On 2 June 2008 the Advisory Council on Intellectual Property (ACIP) 
announced a review of patentable subject matter.287 This study indicates the importance of 
specific policy consideration of whether patents should be restricted to inventions with a 
science and technology base, and how intangibles, service products and software should be 
treated. 
With one exception, the claims in the cases considered here are all for computer programs. 
These programs implement processes and in some cases produce service products, such as 
banking options. There is no evidence in any of the 'inventions' of any challenges in the 
programming. If a technical effect is defined as making a contribution to the technology of 
software engineering none of these 33 ‘inventions’ achieve this threshold. Computer 
programs are, of course protected against copying by the Copyright Act 1968, which was 
amended in 1984 to include software programs (Bell 1987). Providing patent protection for 
software not only protects against copying, but it also prohibits independent creation. 
Where the 'invention' is only trivially different from existing systems, such independent 
invention is highly likely. This eliminates any possible social benefits while retaining the 
social cost of the monopoly grant.  
The other aspect of the software basis of these 'inventions' is that the investment cost of 
development is not high. Given such market factors as first-mover advantages, network 
effects and reputation, there is no evidence of any market failure—these 'inventions' would 
most likely be developed without any patent incentive. If this is the case, there is no social 
benefit from such patents as none of the ‘inventions’ needed to be induced.  
 
287  The terms of reference are ‘To inquire, report and make recommendations to the Australian 
government on patentable subject matter. The review will include the appropriateness and adequacy of the 
“manner of manufacture” test as the threshold requirement for patentable subject matter under Australian law, 
and the historical requirement that an invention must not be “generally inconvenient”.’ 
(http://www.acip.gov.au/reviews.html##subject, accessed 12 July 2008).  
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6 
Business Method Patents:  
How are they treated in different countries? 
“It was never the object of those [patent] laws to grant a monopoly for every trifling device, … 
Such an indiscriminate creation of exclusive privileges tends rather to obstruct than to 
stimulate invention. It creates a class of speculative schemers …”  
US Supreme Court (287 ref 107 US 192 (1882) Atlantic Works v Brady). 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter continues the analysis of Chapter 5, but for the set of recently granted 
Australian business method patents where a definite outcome is known for at least one 
overseas application. Of the 72 cases there were parallel overseas applications for 64. There 
is clear information on overseas outcomes for at least one parallel application for 40 of 
these. A clear outcome is defined as an acceptance/grant, or a refusal.288 Refusals which 
have been appealed are also defined here as a clear outcome. Excluding the six betting 
cases and the four Contentguard cases, there were 35 clear overseas outcomes. The betting 
cases were discussed in Section 5.9. The four Contentguard cases, which are from very 
large families, are discussed in Section 6.5, although two have no clear overseas outcomes. 
Altogether 39 cases are discussed in this chapter. They form a natural sub-set for 
comparative analysis of how business method patenting is dealt with in other countries.  
Despite the prescriptive nature of the TRIPS Treaty and the AUSFTA, there is still 
considerable room for countries to administer patent law to maximise national well-being. 
Countries can choose high or low novelty and inventiveness standards, how to define 
existing knowledge, and what presumptions and decision-making rules to use. TRIPS 
prohibits discrimination between ‘fields of technology’ (Article 27(1)). But this clear 
indication that patents should be technology-based does not require the extension of patents 
beyond the boundaries of technology. Countries can choose to exclude software and 
business methods from patentability.289  
 
 
288  Except for the USA. The USPTO refers to examiner’s reports as non-final or final rejections. But even 
final rejections are often followed by amendments and further examiner’s reports. One case in this study, still 
pending, has so far gathered six USPTO rejections. US rejection cases are only included as a definite outcome 
here when they are followed by abandonment or an appeal.  
289  When TRIPS was signed in 1994, it was widely understood that mathematical algorithms, and 
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The analysis in this chapter provides the opportunity to investigate whether countries are 
using the available discretionary scope in patent administration to ensure that uninventive 
business method patents are not issuing. Among the 39 cases discussed are ten where there 
has been a clear refusal to grant a patent. This raises the question of whether these other 
countries have higher obviousness standards, or whether they simply exclude either 
software or business methods as non-patentable subject matter. These cases are discussed in 
Section 6.2.1. 
Also relevant are cases where patent applications have 'died' or been withdrawn. Generally 
withdrawal information is less clear-cut as an indicator of patent quality. But there are 
reasons to believe that at least a proportion of lapsed cases may really be cases where 
examiners raised objections that the applicants could not overcome. In some patent offices, 
for example the EPO and the USPTO, examiner’s reports are generally publicly available, 
providing direct evidence on this. But in other jurisdictions, for example Canada, the UK 
and Australia, examiner’s reports are not easily available to the public. Data on withdrawals 
are discussed in Section 6.2.2. 
The business method patents discussed in this chapter are again analysed in terms of 
whether they make any contribution to knowledge, either in the field of business methods, 
or in the software engineering field. This assessment is based on ‘construing’ the claims. 
The original wording of six of the ‘inventions’ assessed in this chapter is provided in 
Appendix 7. Cases are organised by whether they have been refused and by whether and 
where they have been granted.290  
Where patents have been granted overseas, and there is no recorded refusal, a natural 
question is whether this indicates a higher inventiveness standard in the granted patent. 
Aside from the Contentguard cases, patents have been granted but not refused in 25 cases. 
Thirteen of these cases have been granted in New Zealand only,291 a further three in New 
                                                                                                                                                    
consequently computer software as such, were unpatentable. The subject of business method patents had not 
even been raised. TRIPS required that computer software be included in copyright laws (Article 10), 
indicating clearly that it was not on the agenda at that time for patent 'protection'. 
290  Further detail on the cases discussed in this chapter is provided in Appendix Table A.6.1.  
291  Including two cases where the patent has been accepted, but not yet sealed. Two betting cases 
(discussed in Chapter 5) also have grants in New Zealand bringing the New Zealand only total to 15. 
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Zealand and one or more other countries (Israel, UK and USA). There are 18 cases granted 
overseas only in New Zealand and/or the USA (and Israel). 
Among the 64 cases in the dataset with any parallel overseas application, there are 236 
known applications (Table 6.1). There are 52 applications at the USPTO, 12 of which have 
been granted and five refused. There are 39 applications at the EPO, with three grants and 
eight refusals. Applications for the UK are harder to track as there are two application 
routes—direct to the UK Patent Office or via the EPO. Cases with a UK (GB) designation 
are only found where there is a known outcome: grant, refusal or withdrawal.292  
Table 6.1 Outcomes from overseas applications: 72 recently granted Australian 
business method applications 
 Appli-
cations 
No 
decision 
Decisions 
   Grant Refusal W’drawn 
Australian application only 8 na na na na 
Cases with US applications  52 35 12 5 0 
Cases with NZ applications 23 2 19 0 2 
Cases with UK applications* 12 - 6 2 4 
Cases with EPO applications 39 24 3 8 4 
Cases with Canada applications 35 32 0 0 3 
Cases with Japan applications 29 18 0 0 11 
 
Total applications from 64 cases 
with at least one overseas 
application 
 
 
236 
 
 
141 
 
 
43 
 
 
10 
 
 
42 
Source: Calculated from Tables A.8.1 and A.9.1 (Appendices 8 and 9). 
Notes: Unit of measurement is each known application in any country. Cases where only non-entry is noted 
are not counted. Columns do not sum to totals as row entries are not shown for cases where there are 
only a few applications. 
* As UK patents can be obtained either by application through the EPO or application direct to the UK 
patent office, there could be more UK applications.  
 
Much of the literature criticising low inventiveness standards in the patent system is from 
the USA, where the inventive step is seen as particularly low (Section 3.4). As noted in 
Chapter 4, New Zealand has a high grant rate—examiners are not allowed to check for 
inventiveness: this matter is reserved for the courts. Those cases granted only in New 
                                                 
292  The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which has a unitary patent system for all 
parts of the realm, seems none the less to be called Great Britain (GB) in the global patent system. Great 
Britain correctly refers only to England, Scotland and Wales (see http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/Hl1/Help/ 
YourQuestions/ DG_10015114, accessed 2 January 2008).  
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Zealand and the USA may not therefore need to pass a higher threshold test of 
inventiveness. This set of patents is considered in Section 6.3. They have been grouped, not 
by subject matter, but whether they suggest any of the patterns identified in Chapter 5, such 
as mere computerisation, trivial variations to known methods, combinations or ideas.  
Eight of the granted Australian patents in the dataset have also been granted in either or 
both the UK and the EPO, where patenting of software and business methods as such is 
outside the scope of the patent statute. Nonetheless patents for software and business 
methods are granted where they provide a solution to a ‘technical’ problem. These cases 
provide the opportunity to see whether there is at least a contribution to software 
engineering knowledge in these patents. One has also been refused and is discussed in 
Section 6.2. The other seven are discussed in Section 6.4. 
This leaves the four cases where the patents are owned by Contentguard Holdings. As 
noted in Chapter 4, three of these patents belong to a very large family and hence it is 
difficult to track exact matches overseas in terms of grants and refusals. There are also 
special issues in regard to large families and patent thickets, and some information on these 
aspects of the Contentguard cases is provided in Appendix 6. From that information it is 
known that Contentguard holds a number of European patents as well as two Canadian 
patents, suggesting a possibly more inventive standard, or at least some technical effect. On 
the other hand, with such a large family distinctions between each application will be slight, 
indicating a very narrow scope and/or a lower inventive step. Because of these unusual 
features, the four Contentguard cases are discussed as a set in Section 6.5. 
Attention is turned in Section 6.6 to the lessons that can be drawn from this evidence. The 
findings of Chapter 5 are confirmed. But the data presented here also show that it is not 
necessary to have such low standards of novelty or inventiveness. Countries can choose not 
to expand the definition of patentable subject matter beyond the area of technological 
artefacts. Whether this then happens in practice depends on judicial interpretation. The UK 
and the EPO provide contrasting examples in regard to the application of the statutory 
software and business method exclusions. 
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6.2 Does refusal mean a higher standard of inventiveness?  
Ten granted Australian patent cases are considered here. Two are cases abandoned in the 
USA after multiple examiner rejections. The one UK rejection is imputed from material on 
the Australian case file, though the formal database simply says it was terminated before 
grant. Three of the rejections are being appealed (one in the USA and two at the EPO). 
Four cases involve both overseas refusal and overseas grant, while the remaining six are 
simple refusals. These ten cases are considered in Section 6.2.1. Attention is then turned to 
the evidence on patents which have been withdrawn from various jurisdictions. While this 
evidence is more speculative, there is reason to believe that at least some of these 
applications met serious objections from examiners (see Section 6.2.2). 
6.2.1 Cases refused overseas 
"Method for managing printed medium activated revenue sharing domain name system 
schemas" (application 2004201637, filed 20 April 2004, priority date 21 April 1999) was 
rejected in Norway in September 2005. It was 'withdrawn' in Germany (2002), Europe 
(2005) and Korea (2005). The withdrawal in Europe occurred six months after receipt of 
the first examiner's report, which rejected the application on the basis that it was not novel. 
The Canadian version 'died' in April 2006. It appears to be still pending in Japan.  
It is an e-commerce patent with a very large family: 88 members derived from 71 
applications. Although the 1999 priority date is claimed from an earlier Australian patent, it 
is in fact a continuation of granted US patent 6,314,457, which itself has three children, one 
of which has been granted a patent, two of which have been abandoned, and one of which 
is a pending PCT application (PCT/US00/09613). The US version has eight children, two 
of which have been granted and the other six abandoned. With such large and complex 
families, where titles, abstracts and subsidiary claims are frequently identical, tracing 
specific parallel applications is challenging. However as the applicant requested modified 
examination in Australia, allowable where a patent has been granted in a prescribed country 
and the description and claims are the same, one of the granted US patents must be virtually 
identical.293 The parent of the Australian application (same title) was sealed on 6 May 
2004, and the child on 10 March 2005, but both were allowed to lapse soon after grant.294  
 
 
293  The essence of modified examination, and the reason it is available only in respect of prescribed 
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One might imagine a very significant invention underlay such a large patenting effort. It is 
a method for managing a domain name service linking a wide range of users by scanning 
bar codes, including ISBN numbers. Users can then readily access electronic information 
about the items without knowing domain names. The invention uses a scanner (referred to 
as an ‘end-user device system’) capable of reading ‘machine-readable code’ (bar codes). 
These codes are associated through a link table with corresponding web addresses. The 
method for operating the system specifies steps for charging sign-up and usage fees, and 
subsidiary claims cover a credit-card module, a transaction tracking module and a module 
to underpin loyalty/reward programs.  
While there is nothing novel about scanning barcodes, the idea that this should link to 
product information rather than an inventory record or cash register may be new. There is 
no technological contribution in the implementation of this idea, and ideas themselves 
cannot be patented. There is no knowledge contribution to any field of technology. A 
critical question from a policy perspective is whether the manner in which the claims are 
drafted allows other businesses to use other variants of this business idea. The main claim 
is written at a high level of generality (see full claim wording in Appendix 7). There may 
thus be no difference between the idea and its implementation as drafted in this patent.295 
This would give the owner rights of exclusion over a wide range of means of linking bar 
codes to web pages. Whether business ideas in themselves are, or should be, patentable is 
an important competition/innovation policy question. Patent law has struggled for over a 
century with issues surrounding the application of intangible ideas.  
As noted in Chapter 5, a number of business method patents involve simple 
computerisation of known procedures. Seven of the ten refused patents fall into this 
category.296 Korea has refused three such patents. The first is a computerised expert 
medical system ("Medical data warning notifying system and method", application 
2003281184, priority 15 July 2002). Expert systems involve the conversion of human 
                                                                                                                                                    
countries, is that the overseas judgement as to patentability is accepted, with no questions asked.  
294  Both parent and child expired in 2005 (November and April respectively), as continuation fees were 
not paid. 
295  Given the idea, the implementation as described in the claims involves the simple application of logic 
to the idea of linking barcodes to web pages, and making money from this. 
296  The others are categorised as trivial variations, the simple application of logic to a given business 
problem, or just an idea.  
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knowledge into computerised systems. They require programming a highly specific set of 
rules, which simply translate into binary code the thought and decision processes of the 
expert(s). This type of system was originated in the artificial intelligence field during the 
1960s and 1970s and started to be applied commercially in the 1980s.  
Expert systems are a useful tool that releases expensive and highly trained labour, as may 
be the case with this system. Like audit systems, expert systems are a methodology that has 
already been applied across a wide range of fields. Development of the specific rules in a 
new field might be time-consuming, but it requires no ingenuity. So there is nothing new 
about expert systems and nothing inventive in applying them in a new area. The claims 
were originally written in general terms so that the patentee could claim use for any set of 
medical data transmitted from the home and needing monitoring by a medical professional. 
It was twice rejected by the Australian examiner for want of novelty and inventiveness. In 
response to the first rejection the applicant amended the claims, adding considerable detail 
about the specific medical data to be provided in the description, and narrowing the scope 
of the claims to peritoneal dialysis. If expert system methodology has not previously been 
applied to peritoneal dialysis, then this 'invention' involves the computerisation of 
knowledge about peritoneal dialysis. But it involves no addition to that knowledge.  
The Australian examiner again rejected the application for want of inventiveness, arguing 
that the differences in specific medical indicators listed would be obvious. The claims were 
further amended, limiting them to a system with a server giving a warning message, then 
reverting to stand-by mode (see Appendix 7 for exact wording of the claims). In arguing 
that the 'invention' now differed from previous patents, the attorney emphasised that the 
earlier patents did not include a server reverting to stand-by mode. It appears that this 
trivial feature made the difference: yet it has nothing to do with the essence of the 
‘invention’. This is a combination of known methods and thus adds nothing to knowledge 
in any field. The difference in outcome between Australia and Korea indicates the impact 
of differing definitions of inventiveness.297 
                                                 
297  The Korean Patent Act 1961 (as amended to and including January 2002) defines inventiveness as a 
‘highly advanced creation of technical idea utilizing the law of nature’ (Section 2:1) (Lanteigne, 2003: 44). 
Lanteigne notes that this is a much higher standard than required in either US or Australian patent law. 
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Another computerised method patent refused by Korea is "On-line interactive system and 
method for transacting business" (application 2003231594, filed 1 August 2003, priority 
date 6 July 1999). This patent has also been refused by the EPO, and an appeal has been 
lodged. This is an on-line method for buying, selling and transporting goods. The method 
involves reserving the goods when a purchase request is made, ensuring that the buyer has 
sufficient funds, then either selling and transporting the goods, or releasing them back into 
available inventory. Such systems are hundreds if not thousands of years old, though this 
version uses electronic network capabilities. The programming to achieve the claimed 
method seems quite straightforward, notwithstanding the ‘dynamic database’. The 
specification states that this method applies to on-line trade sales, especially for perishables, 
solving delays and uncertainties in trade sales, especially delays in payment.  
There is a complex family for this patent. It is a divisional child, split off from an earlier 
patent initially filed in the USA (note the 1999 priority date). Details of known applications 
and decisions are set out in Table 6.2. Two patents have been granted in the USA, and the 
claims of the 2005 US patent are very like the Australian child.298 The first US patent 
application was rejected four times before the patent was granted. In finally allowing the 
patent the US examiner noted that ‘… none of the art of record, alone or in combination, 
disclose that the freight carrier, in a trade transaction, that ships the goods to the buyer is 
also playing the role of a financial facilitator …’.299 The fact that no previous patent or 
documented source indicates exactly this role does not give the 'invention' inventiveness in 
the ordinary meaning of the word. The patented system remains a computerisation of the 
mental steps that have been common business practice for centuries. Again this case 
indicates the absurdities that can arise in a system where previous knowledge must be 
documented before an obvious (indeed commonplace) system can be denied a patent. The 
Australian examiner raised no objections to this patent.  
 
298  The information on the USPTO Public PAIR system indicates no relationship between US Patent 
6,934,692, issued 23 August 2005 and US Patent 7,249,078, issued 24 July 2007, though they share an 
identical child, filed on 14 May 2007. The two granted patents have claims so similar that a Terminal 
Disclaimer, agreeing that the second patent will expire on the same date as the first has been filed. This 
suggests that the second patent is very like an Australian patent of addition (see footnote 205, p. 109).  
299  USPTO Public PAIR system, application number 09/610772, notice of allowability, page 4 (emphasis 
as in original).  
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Table 6.2 "On-line interactive system and method for trans-acting business": 
Known applications and decisions  
Applications Decisions 
US provisional 6 July 1999  Withdrawn DE  8 May 2002 
US / AU / int’l filing (11 countries) 6 July 2000 AU grant (parent) 18 Sept 2003 
CA exam request 28 Dec 2001 RU grant 27 Jan 2004 
CN national phase entry 4 Jan 2002  AU grant (child) 9 Dec 2004 
AU filing (child) 1 August 2003 US grant 23 August 2005 
EPO 1st exam report 28 July 2004 EPO withdrawn 13 January 2006 
  KR refused 20 April 2006 
US, further divisional filed 14 May 2007 US grant  24 July 2007 
Notes:   Data are from esp@cenet, epoline (Register Plus), USPTO and WIPO databases and the Australian 
file. For country codes see patent country codes (p. xii).  
In the discussions with the USPTO about the second US patent, the applicant provided 
marketing material which included reference to the two patents granted in Australia and the 
one granted in Russia. While examination was requested in Canada in December 2001, 
there has been no further action, suggesting continued negotiations in regard to an adverse 
examiner's report. The applicant argued to the EPO that the system delivered a ‘technical’ 
advance in reducing ordering times (by reserving stock at the point of order), and that the 
inventive step lay in identifying this ‘technical’ problem. The EPO considered that any time 
saving was a business objective, which a skilled software engineer could implement 
without any inventiveness. As the technical automation of the business process was not 
inventive, the EPO rejected the application. The application was withdrawn in January 
2006, following a summons to oral proceedings (effectively two adverse reports). The 
patent was refused in Korea in April 2006. 
Again this case points to the importance of how different elements in patent law are 
defined. There are no contributions to new knowledge, whether technical or business 
knowledge. The central ‘inventive’ concept claimed—reserving stock at the point of 
order—cannot possibly be considered novel, given the history of wholesale trade. Yet the 
patent has been granted in three countries. Clearly it has faced considerable difficulties in 
Canada and Europe, and Korea has refused it. It appears that Canada, Europe and Korea 
may have some differences in approach which prevent the grant patents for some business 
method 'inventions'. 
The third patent refused by Korea is "Service points liquidation system" (application 
2003280529, priority 29 November 2002), another Japanese PCT application. Flow charts 
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show how used tickets are fed into a machine to accumulate ‘service points’, convertible to 
rewards. It is unclear from the description whether the purpose is to stop littering, by giving 
used tickets value, or to encourage higher purchasing because of the rewards. The abstract 
points to a motivation to stimulate further consumption, and certainly ‘stamps’ were used to 
this end in the UK through the 1960s and 1970s. This is a similar scheme, but takes 
advantage of modern electronic processing capabilities. Again one might question the basis 
for awarding a patent of invention to the simple computerisation of an old marketing idea. 
The Australian examiner raised no objections as to novelty or inventiveness, and the 
application was accepted in April 2005.  
This application was withdrawn from the EPO following an adverse examiner’s report. The 
examiner accepted that independent claim 1 possessed technical character as ‘the subject-
matter of the claim is directed to an information processing apparatus.’ But went on to ‘note 
that none of the features of any information processing apparatus are disclosed [sic] the 
application.’300 The examiner noted the claim combined technical and non-technical 
features, and that the closest prior ‘art’ was a general purpose computer. The examiner 
concluded that implementation of the business scheme would be obvious to a person skilled 
in the art of data processing—indeed that such implementation would be a ‘typical task’.  
The USPTO issued a final rejection notice for "System and Method for On-line Analysis 
and Reporting of Financial Operation Data from Community Pharmacies" (application 
2003204214, priority 25 June 2002) in May 2007. That final rejection notice included the 
advice that a response was required within three months. No response was received and the 
application was deemed abandoned in March 2008. This application was filed only in the 
USA and Australia.  
This patent is nothing more than computerisation of well-known accounting methods. It is a 
networked computer system for analysing operational/financial data from pharmacies, with 
a server to receive, store and analyse data, a monitor for viewing, an access box for transfer, 
a firewall, an internet service provider and wireless transmission. This is a widely used 
combination. The operational and financial data are specified as including: the current ratio; 
the acid test ratio; inventory turnover rate; periods for accounts payable collection, accounts 
 
300  epoline register Plus publication EP1525548, examiner’s report of 27 June 2006, paragraph 3.2 (a).  
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receivable collection and net working capital turnover; and percentage figures for gross 
margin, net income, and return on equity and assets. One could go back decades and find 
all these measures in any business accounting textbook. It does contain elements of 
benchmarking, but financial ratios were developed precisely for the purpose of comparing 
the performance of different entities (benchmarking).  
In the description of previous knowledge, the applicant notes that pharmacies have 
previously had to collect and analyse those data themselves or pay someone to do this for 
them. So the applicant notes a need for a computerised system. In other words, it is 
perfectly clear from the application itself that this is nothing other than a computerisation of 
pre-existing methods. Yet no novelty or inventiveness objections were raised before the 
patent was granted in Australia.  
The first US rejection report advised that the first four claims were not novel compared to a 
previous US patent application, and that the remainder were both not obvious (compared to 
patent documentation) and not statutory subject matter (computer program). The claims 
which were criticised as being for a computer program were re-drafted as computer-
readable storage medium claims, and the examiner agreed this change in semantics fixed 
the non-patentability problem. However the examiner went on to reject the amended claims 
as obvious in the light of a combination of patent and non-patent documents.  
A second patent rejected in the USA is "A system and method for representation of 
business information" (application 2004201587, priority date 16 April 2004). This 
'invention' links business data systems and geographic data systems so that the business 
data can be mapped and presented visually in geographic form. The attorney asked for 
expedited examination as ‘the applicant has a number of close competitors in the area and 
believes they are developing potentially infringing systems. They therefore wish to exercise 
their rights as soon as possible.’ This is a clear indication that the developments are obvious 
within the field, and no incentive is needed to encourage such innovation.  
The claims were subject to extensive correspondence between the Australian examiner and 
the applicant. Initially the principal claims were rejected as being neither novel nor 
inventive, and the subsidiary claims as being merely matters of design choice, or typical 
methods given general knowledge. The applicant requested reconsideration, on the basis 
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that the business information does not have a spatial component and therefore cannot be 
mapped, until converted in this 'invention'. The examiner was unconvinced by this 
argument and maintained a lack of novelty or inventiveness. The applicant then modified 
the claims, arguing that while existing systems provided a map application function for 
business data, in the claimed invention a predefined protocol allowed the user to change the 
view, update the data and work in the spatial dimension. While this is a different means of 
generating the mapped data, nothing in the application indicates any special software 
challenges requiring inventiveness or contributing to software engineering knowledge. 
Indeed the differences appear to be merely a matter of design.  
Following a third letter from the examiner, the applicant modified the claims again to 
clarify that the two applications (business data and map generation) interface with each 
other, so that the mapping function takes in the data and manipulates it to produce a map. 
The accompanying argument claimed that the prior art did not discuss an interface between 
business data and mapping techniques (though it did allow users to map business data). By 
the fourth exchange of views, the examiner indicated a willingness to reconsider the 
application if the broadest claims were narrowed in scope, and the interface element was 
written into claim 1. Like the expert medical system discussed above, this case shows how 
a specific, and well-known, software feature can be written into claims for a business 
process and make the difference between rejection and grant. 
The US examiner also had significant problems with this application, and the application 
was abandoned in the USA following a fourth rejection advice from the examiner. 
Again it is evident that only very trivial variations to the way in which existing knowledge 
is used are needed for the grant of a patent in Australia. But a marginally different way of 
producing the same result does not add to knowledge, except in unusual circumstances. As 
Machlup remarked fifty years ago:  
"The production of the knowledge of how to do in a somewhat different way what we 
have already learned to do in a satisfactory way would hardly be given highest 
priority in a rational allocation of resources"  
(Machlup 1958: 51).  
Another patent rejected in the USA is "System for Confirming the Presence at Home" 
(application 2003204139, priority 10 May 2002) which focuses on identifying whether a 
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person is at home. The refusal is being appealed. The ‘invention’ requires networked 
terminals. The subscriber sets a ‘presence at home’ indicator, and the deliverer's terminal is 
able to receive and correctly interpret this. Embellishments of the system include the 
capacity for the deliverer to send an enquiry to the subscriber, and for the subscriber to 
respond. Notices of outstanding deliveries can be sent, and the subscriber can respond. The 
correspondence can be confirmed, and delivery schedules sent.  
The full text of the claims in this patent is provided in Appendix 7. In some ways this 
patent is like a computerised conversation: ‘are you available at this time?’ ‘no, but what 
about…?’, etc. The claimed system has nine ‘functions’, the last of which describes an 
answering machine or forwarding function, depending on whether the transmitter is the 
subscriber or another party (see claim 7).  
While a phone conversation might be quicker, one advantage of this system is input at any 
time of day or night (as with email). But the sense of a patent is not at issue, only its 
inventiveness. It appears to be a simple system: the mere computerisation of the mental 
steps involved in a scheduling conversation. If it were the applicant who had to demonstrate 
novelty (in the ordinary sense of the meaning) and inventiveness (again against a standard 
of a reasonable quantum), it is hard to see how any case for a patent could be made. There 
is no contribution to either business process knowledge or to any of the technological arts. 
The Australian examiner raised neither novelty nor inventiveness objections. The 
application proceeded straight to grant. 
The application has received one non-final and one final rejection from the USPTO, and is 
currently the subject of an appeal. The first two claims were rejected as not novel compared 
to a US patent application; another five claims were rejected as not inventive compared to 
that and another US patent application.301 The appeal documents claim that the ‘Examiner 
has failed to show that each and every element as set forth in claims 1 and 2’ is anticipated 
(emphasis added). Similar argument—that the government must identify every element of 
an invention as pre-existing or obvious before denying a patent—has been found in several 
of the Australian files examined. From a policy perspective it is concerning that a situation 
                                                 
301  Details at USPTO, Public PAIR, application 10/434,276. The remaining two claims are ‘omnibus’ 
claims—see Appendix 7. 
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has been allowed to arise whereby it is the government that has to demonstrate cause for 
refusing a monopoly, rather than the applicant showing cause for its grant. 
The remaining three cases have been refused in the UK or by the EPO. The two EPO 
refusals have been appealed. The case refused in the UK was opposed in Australia,302 
though the opposition was finally withdrawn. This is Overture Service Inc.'s "Automatic 
Flight Management in an Online Marketplace" (application 2003200436, priority date 8 
February 2002). The UK database shows that the application was terminated before grant. 
But file material in respect of the Australian application throws useful light on how this 
should be interpreted. Consistent with the then legislative requirement that details of 
overseas search reports be provided to the Australian Patent Office, in January 2004 the 
applicant forwarded the UK examination report and the European search report. In June 
2003 the UK examiner wrote:  
"The application concerns a computerised system for managing an advertising 
"flight" online i.e. the business activity of promoting a particular set of products over 
some specific time interval. Although the invention is carried out on a computer, the 
invention does not make a technical contribution to the art."  
Effectively, then, the UK application was refused as not patentable subject matter. 
The Australian examiner initially rejected this application, principally on novelty grounds. 
The applicant amended the claims, replacing them with claims in the US equivalent, Patent 
7,231,358, granted in May 2007, arguing that the claims as amended were indeed novel 
compared to the prior art.303 In arguing this, the attorney first spent some time describing 
an advertising ‘flight’ (which has much the same meaning as the more generally recognised 
term advertising campaign) and its challenges. In particular he pointed out that the goal is 
to spend the total budget, evenly over time, with key issues being choosing where to 
advertise, how much to pay, and periodically assessing the impact of the campaign. One 
might note that this is no different from the key issues in an advertising campaign prior to 
                                                 
302  By Sensis Pty Ltd., on the basis of the priority date (claimed for a continuation, though the claims were 
been substantially re-written), inventiveness, novelty, and fair basis. 
303  US Patent 7,231,358 was granted only after claims were amended following an initial rejection on 
grounds of lack of inventiveness, and because the claims were written as computer program claims. There 
were further verbal negotiations following these amendments, and five claims were withdrawn. in many of the 
remaining claims the words ‘on line’ were replaced with ‘pay-for placement’. The scope thus seems to have 
been reduced from application in on line marketplaces to pay-for-placement marketplaces, and in this 
narrower context the claims apparently gained inventiveness.  
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the advent of the internet. The attorney claimed that these features posed a significant 
technical problem, particularly in determining how much to bid for different listings. He 
noted that because of the permutations in listings and payment bases the computations 
would not be possible on a manual basis.  
Following these introductory remarks the attorney argued that the cited prior art failed to 
suggest the unique features in this 'invention', such as ‘receiving advertising flight 
parameters from an advertiser’ (i.e. receiving input data) and ‘adjusting bid amounts of the 
specified advertiser search listings to achieve advertiser goals of the advertising flight 
parameters’ (deciding to pay more or less, after judging the effectiveness of advertising to 
date). These seem to be fairly straightforward matters. Certainly the computations may be 
such that no-one would dream of doing them manually, but they are not complex in either 
mathematical or software terms. And they are no different in basic form from the mental 
steps that would occur with a non-internet advertising campaign. Again there is clearly no 
contribution to software knowledge, and no apparent contribution to knowledge about any 
business method.  
The application is still pending at the EPO. An adverse examination report was issued in 
February 2008. The examiner noted that the subject matter was excluded by EPC Articles 
52(2) and (3), but that rejection on these grounds was not allowed because of (uncited) case 
law. The examiner argued however that there was no inventive step as no technical solution 
was proposed, nor any surprising technical effect claimed.304 The application was 
withdrawn from Japan in May 2006 and is pending in Canada (examination requested 
March 2002). It seems likely that an adverse examination report has been issued in Canada.  
It might be noted that Overture appears to be trying to build a patent thicket around the 
technology of managing on-line advertising. Patents thickets are discussed briefly in 
Appendix 6. The patented US version of this application has two parents, one of which has 
six children, and the other 17 children. In other words the granted US patent has 22 
siblings. Some of these siblings have children. Beyond this, a search for Overture on the 
USPTO site identifies 28 applications (of which 13 use words related to managing 
                                                 
304  epoline register Plus publication EP1335314, attachment to examiner’s report, paragraphs 2 and 2.1. 
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advertising listings in the title),305 and 45 granted patents. Esp@cenet's INPADOC system 
identifies 89 family members deriving from 69 applications.  
"Distributed Transaction Event Matching" (Application 2003204278, priority 21 May 
2002) is another software system, this time for tracking and recoding ‘network events’ (hits 
on either retail or portal web sites). It is for use by parties who have agreed a set of 
contractual obligations, including pricing and settlement rules, for such events. The system 
monitors the defined events (for example, advertisements, electronic products, or 
information), and determines payment amounts. There are no programming challenges to 
be overcome in implementing this system, and so there is no knowledge contribution to 
software engineering. The Australian examiner rejected the application on novelty and 
inventiveness grounds, citing previous patents, and common general knowledge about 
network gateways and bridges. The claim was amended and granted. In regard to the 
underlying business method, this simply implements the agreements in the signed contracts. 
Simple logic would allow the development of the relevant flow charts for subsequent use 
by the programmer. There is no contribution to knowledge in this. 
This application has been refused by the EPO, though the refusal is being appealed. It is 
still pending at the USPTO, though six rejection letters have now been issued. It is pending 
in Canada, but as examination was requested in May 2003, it seems likely that an adverse 
examiner’s report has been issued, or it would by now have been granted, 
The initial EPO rejection was based on subject matter excluded under EPC Articles 52(2) 
and (3) (October 2004), as being simply a business method with no technical character. The 
examiner did also note that there was no inventive step. The applicant amended the claims 
‘to bring out the technical nature’ of the invention. A second examiner rejection in June 
2005 was based on lack of an inventive step. The claims were further amended, but were 
again rejected, and an oral hearing was called. At the hearing the claim was rejected as not 
being inventive in the terms of EPC Article 56. The appeal has not yet been heard. 
This is another case which demonstrates at least one overseas jurisdiction has a tighter 
inventive step requirement than Australia. Whether this usefully distinguishes uninventive 
 
305  Of course USPTO information on applications is incomplete, as patent applications have only been 
published in the USA since 15 March 2001, and then only if there is a counterpart overseas filing. 
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business method patents will be assessed following consideration of patents granted by the 
EPO in Section 6.4.  
"A tax refund system" (application 2003219472, priority 18 March 2002) was refused by 
the EPO, but granted in the UK and New Zealand. The EPO refusal has been appealed. The 
patent deals with refunds of value-added tax (VAT), and simply computerises a manual 
process.306 Indeed the name is a bit of a misnomer, as the system does not actually deliver 
the refund, only a claim for a refund. The Australian examiner rejected it as neither novel 
nor inventive. The applicant amended the claims and wrote at length arguing that cited 
prior art did not teach all the features of this 'invention'. The system is clearly designed as 
an add-on to the point-of-sales (POS) terminals used by retailers, and extracts country 
details from credit cards to compare with amounts spent and determine whether a VAT 
refund is possible. A message prompts the terminal user to question the cardholder about 
eligibility for a tax refund. ‘VAT refunds’ is widely used as a point-of-sales advertising 
message on the windows and doors of many European retailers. Indeed the level of 
awareness of VAT refunds is so high that many retailers would, based on accent and 
general discussion during the sales process, have already identified likely eligibility and 
raised this issue, before they got to swiping the buyer's credit card. It is hard to see where a 
possible 'technical' contribution lies. There is no contribution to knowledge of either 
business methods or software.  
At the EPO oral hearing the applicant argued that it would not be obvious to use a POS 
system as a starting point for VAT refunds. Following a break in the proceedings a new 
claim was filed, but the EPO maintained that the closest prior ‘art’ was a POS system and 
that therefore there was no inventive step. The appeal has not yet been heard.  
These ten cases demonstrate that it is possible to design a patent system that can reject 
obvious 'inventions', particularly the computerisation of known business ideas. Seven 
clearly involve simple computerisation of known systems. Australian patent law definitions 
of novelty and inventiveness are so low that the simple computerisation of known methods 
is sufficient for grant of a patent monopoly. The US patent system also appears to suffer 
from this problem, and trivial design differences seem sufficient to introduce inventiveness. 
 
306  Or as the EPO's examiner said in the IPER of 16 April 2004, it is ‘straightforward automation’.  
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Nonetheless the USA has rejected two of these computerisation ‘inventions’: the 
computerisation of well-known accounting information, and the computerisation of a 
scheduling conversation. 
Where these systems have any new features, they are simply combinations of old business 
methods. It was the central role of the freight carrier in the trade system that finally 
permitted grant of this patent in the USA, but this has nothing to do with science or 
technology, and seems a trivial variation on a centuries old trade process. Indeed it may not 
even be a trivial variation, more trivial semantics. The service points system is a 
computerised version of loyalty stamps, an old marketing technique. None of these seven 
patents make any contribution to either business knowledge or software engineering.  
The other three patents involve trivial differences, the simple use of logic, or do not appear 
to go beyond the underlying idea. The patent on scanning barcodes to link to web pages, 
involves no challenges in its implementation, so is very like the oft-cited US rubber-tip 
pencil case,307 where the court found no difference between the idea and its implementation 
and so refused a patent (see discussion in Section 4.4). The business information patent 
involves only trivial variations from well-known methods. And the event-matching patent 
is the simple application of logic to a business problem.  
In terms of insights into the Australian thresholds for inventiveness, nine of these ten 
patents were examined in Australia, and novelty/inventiveness objections were raised for 
five. Attorneys were able to argue small details of law to overcome these objections. 
However no novelty or inventiveness objections were raised for the other four cases. 
Australian law as it currently operates seems unable to distinguish effectively between 
inventive and uninventive patent applications, at least when inventiveness is defined in 
terms of a contribution to knowledge or in terms of a balance between the costs and 
benefits of granting a patent.  
6.2.2 Cases where applications have been withdrawn 
Many patent authorities seem to be reluctant to advise that a patent application has been 
refused.308 There are exceptions: both Korea and Norway have clear refusal codes. But 
 
 
307  Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498. 
308  In Australia refusal is rare. Of the 84 refusals to 30 June 2008 shown by AusPat, only eight do not 
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others use euphemisms for rejection, or use a single code to cover both refusal and other 
outcomes, such as withdrawal. The advertising campaign (‘flight’) case discussed above is 
an example of a case where there was a clear refusal by the UK Patent Office, but the 
publicly available data indicate simple termination before grant. Another interesting case is 
a Contentguard patent, though not one in the selected dataset. The WIPO database shows 
both rejection and then, three months later, withdrawal.309  
This suggests that some of the withdrawal outcomes might indicate that the application is 
meeting resistance from the relevant patent office.310 The problem is to distinguish between 
legitimate cases of withdrawal—for example where subsequent research shows the 
'invention' not to be worth commercial development—and cases that are effectively 
refusals. One indicator of an effective refusal is withdrawal following an adverse 
examiner's report (especially if extra time has been requested to respond to the report). 
While legitimate commercial withdrawals might be included in this sub-set, there would 
certainly also be cases with genuine refusals, such as the advertising campaign (‘flight’) 
case. Only the EPO and USPTO provide easy public access to examiner's reports.  
This section looks at withdrawal data for the selected dataset of 72 patents. There were 30 
cases (42 per cent of the full dataset) with at least one instance of withdrawal. Seven of 
these 30 cases have also been formally rejected by at least one overseas patent office, 
though five of the seven have also been granted overseas. A further five of these 30 
withdrawal cases have been granted one overseas patent and as yet have had no refusals.  
Among the 30 withdrawal cases, there were a total of 42 withdrawal events (see Table 6.3). 
There were 11 withdrawal events in Japan, with eight withdrawn only from Japan. Japan's 
patent system is distinguished by the narrow scope of drafted claims (Ordover 1991). There 
provide details of either acceptance or opposition, and these could be data entry errors. It seems likely that in 
Australia refusal only ever occurs after opposition. For US applications there seems to be an endless process 
of amendment. One betting case (AU2004202762) had three USPTO non-final and four final rejections; the 
applicant then appealed rather than continue negotiations (see Section 5.9).  
309  The esp@cenet site shows a first examination report on 1 September 2004, then a refusal on 7 June 
2006 for application number EP20020739696 "Method for managing access and use of resources by verifying 
conditions and conditions for use therewith". But the WIPO site shows the parallel PCT application 
(PCT/US2002/017753) as being refused by the EPO (reference number 2002739696) on 29 January 2006 and 
then as being withdrawn on 28 April 2006 (http://www.wipo.int/pctdb/en/ and enter publication number 
WO/2002/101975, accessed 13 January 2008). 
310  Some non-entry cases (where a country or region is designated in a PCT application, but then does not 
enter national phase) may also be effective withdrawals. However, at best only an ISR or IPER might be 
available, so there is insufficient information to deem these cases refusals.  
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were nine withdrawal events in Germany, a country with a reputation for high 
inventiveness threshold (Harhoff et al. 1997). Altogether 13 cases were withdrawn only 
from Japan or Germany.311 The narrow scope of patent claims in Japan and the high 
inventiveness standard in Germany may create problems for highly abstract business 
method applications.312 Germany may also rigorously apply the EPC exception to software 
and business method ‘inventions’ (Pilch 2003).  
Table 6.3 Overseas withdrawals or 'deaths':  (all withdrawal events) 
 Withdrawn in 
only one 
country 
Withdrawn in 
multiple 
countries 
Total withdrawn 
Withdrawn from Japan 8 3 11 
Withdrawn from Germany 5 4 9 
Withdrawn from EPO or UK: 
   without adverse report 
   with adverse examiner report 
 
3 
2 
 
1 
3 
 
4 
5 
Died in Canada -- 3 3 
Withdrawn from Korea -- 2 2 
Total withdrawn 21 21* 42* 
Notes:  Cases are counted as withdrawn if they are reported as withdrawn (DE, EP, JP), terminated before 
grant (UK), voided pre-acceptance (NZ), or abandoned (EP, US). Two of the cases shown in this 
table are among the six with overseas rejections.   
* Columns do not add because of six cases with double withdrawals and three cases with triple 
withdrawals.  
 
There were nine withdrawals from the UK or the EPO, and of these five occurred following 
receipt of one or more adverse examiner’s report(s). This suggests that the applicant may 
not have been able to respond effectively to the examiner's concerns. If this surmise is 
correct, around half of such withdrawals may in fact be effective refusals. 
Although there are few data on withdrawals from Canada, the CIPO does provide 
information about whether examination has been requested.313 There are 35 cases about 
which some information is known for a parallel Canadian application. Of the ten cases with 
                                                 
311  Withdrawals from Germany tended to happen quite quickly after filing: sometimes less than a year 
after filing. Withdrawals in Japan tend to have occurred between three and four years after filing. 
312  Though with competent attorney advice, this should lead to a high level of non-entry rather than a high 
level of withdrawal. Among the 57 cases that had a PCT application or applications to multiple countries, 
only three are known to be non-entry cases with respect to Japan, compared to the 11 withdrawals. There are 
four non-entries to Germany, compared to nine withdrawals. Twenty of the cases have entered national phase 
in Japan and are still pending there.  
313  Though no information is available about the issue of first or subsequent examiner's reports. 
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a refusal overseas, seven entered national phase in Canada, and two have ‘died’. Two 
requested examination in 2001 or 2002, so presumably adverse reports have been issued, 
and negotiations are continuing. Among 15 cases where there has been an overseas grant 
and where there are data for Canada, five applicants have not yet requested examination. 
Seven of the other ten cases requested examination in 2005 or later. Seven of the ten cases 
with no known overseas outcomes but information on a Canadian application, have not yet 
requested examination and one has ‘died’. Overall, of the 21 cases where more than entry 
to Canada is known, three have ‘died’ and seven requested examination in 2004 or earlier. 
If these seven cases clearly met Canadian patentability standards it seems very likely that a 
patent would have been granted by now (July 2008).  
6.3 Are patents granted in other countries more inventive? 
In considering whether grant overseas indicates a greater degree of inventiveness, it is 
important to be aware that the novelty standard in New Zealand is a ‘new to the country’ 
not a ‘new to the world’ standard. This means that the definition of existing knowledge is 
narrower. In addition examiners are not allowed to check for inventive step: this matter is 
reserved for courts.314 These two features, together with a decision making rule strongly in 
favour of the applicant, suggest that patents granted in New Zealand may be even less 
inventive than those granted in Australia. There are, however, reasons to suppose that 
applicants will only patent overseas those inventions considered more valuable (Bosworth 
et al. 2003). Only two of the 19 cases with a New Zealand patent were cases where New 
Zealand was the sole overseas country in which a patent was sought. In both cases the 
applicants are Australian residents. In the other 17 cases applicants also filed in a wide 
range of other countries, with 12 filing in each of the USA, Japan and Canada, and 13 at the 
EPO (see Table A9.1). Thus while New Zealand patent law might allow the grant of 
relatively less inventive patents, there are substantial reasons to suppose that the applicants, 
at least, consider these ‘inventions’ to merit the investment required for multiple 
applications in major markets.  
Eight of the patents have been granted in the USA, or have a parent granted in the USA. 
There is a very large literature suggesting that the USA has very low standards for testing 
 
314  See Section 4.2 for further information on New Zealand. 
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inventiveness (obviousness). With one exception, the 18 cases discussed in this section 
have as yet been granted only in New Zealand and/or the USA.315 One case with a New 
Zealand grant was also granted in the UK so is discussed in Section 6.4.  
The analysis in Chapter 5 indicated that business method patents can be classified in a 
number of ways in terms of any ‘inventive’ contribution they might offer. Some involve the 
simple computerisation of known processes, or use known methods with modern electronic 
networks. Some combine known processes. Yet others offer very trivial differences from 
pre-existing systems and methods. Finally some seem to be nothing more than an idea. The 
18 cases discussed here are sorted according to this classification. Again there are boundary 
problems in this classification, particularly between combinations and trivial differences.  
6.3.1 Computerisation and use of networks 
Five patents are discussed in this sub-section. Four of the patents granted in New Zealand 
and/or the USA as well as Australia are for simple computerisation of well-known 
processes. One involves the computerisation of a particular aspect of the patent application 
filing process, and the other three deal with various logistics systems. The fifth case uses 
computer networks. Details about progress overseas, examiner objections, fast-tracking, 
and claims amendment for these cases are provided in Table A9.1 (Appendix 9).316 
A "System and method of attracting and lodging PCT national phase applications (II)", 
(application 2003244578, filed 28 August 2003, priority date 23 October 2000) received an 
adverse first report. The Australian examiner considered the claim related to two 
inventions, one for a system where an application instruction was received by email, and 
the other via a website interface. The applicant accordingly deleted all claims relating to the 
first process. The examiner had limited his search and report to claim 1, one of the deleted 
claims, and considered this to be neither novel nor inventive, in fact to concern only 
common business practice in attorney firms. Once the elements which had been examined 
were deleted, the patent was granted. There is no indication on the file that there was any 
effective examination of the claims that were granted following the deletions.  
                                                 
315  One of the patents was also granted in Israel. The approach to inventiveness in Israel is not known.  
316  The Intellectual Property Office of New Zealand (IPONZ) does not make examiner’s reports available 
on-line, so details of New Zealand grant processes cannot be investigated. However, as New Zealand law 
does not allow examination for inventiveness this gap is not significant. 
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The patent as granted is for a website where, in response to receiving a national phase filing 
instruction, a database of PCT filings is searched to identify that application, and costs are 
calculated based on number of pages and number of claims. An attorney database is 
checked to identify the instructing attorney, and amend this information if necessary. 
Possible elements in the costing are listed. All this is then re-specified in terms of computer 
interfaces, with details on the database fields, and options for user confirmation (mouse 
clicks or use of keys). This is another example of mere computerisation of a previously 
known manual method (‘mental steps’). The simple computerisation of manual systems is a 
well-known method of raising productivity, at least among economists and business people.  
Despite being a very clear case of mere computerisation, a number of patents have been 
granted for this 'invention'. The patent in the dataset has both a parent (granted in Australia, 
2004) and a child (pending as at 1 January 2008). Two patents have been granted in New 
Zealand. It has been ready for examination in the USA since July 2004, and examination 
has been requested in Canada (September 2006). An adverse examiner’s report was issued 
by the EPO in October 2007,317 and the claims were subsequently amended to restrict the 
scope to a computer based interface which calculates and displays PCT filing costs. This is 
a good example of how a business process claim is re-drafted to masquerade as a 
‘technical’ invention. The application remains pending.  
Since this patent was granted in Australia there has been a Federal Court decision (Grant) 
that legal processes are discoveries not inventions. The patent may therefore be invalid. 
Whether this is so depends on whether a court would interpret the ‘invention’ as concerning 
a legal process or an application system.  
The remaining four patents discussed in this sub-section concern aspects of trade, 
particularly logistics and delivery. "Logistics Chain Management System" (application 
2003262306, filed 14 November 2003, but claiming a priority date of 5 October 2000 from 
its Australian parent) is a computerised system for managing trade that has also been 
granted in New Zealand and the USA.318 This patent focuses on en-route transport and 
storage, centred around agreement about the terms of transport and storage (temperature 
 
317  The ‘technical’ (computer) implementation of the non-technical process was considered not to involve 
any inventive step (epoline Register Plus, application EP1340174). 
318  The US patent involves a ‘terminal disclaimer’, that is the patent will expire at the same time as a very 
similar patent granted earlier to the same applicant (this sounds very like the Australian patent of addition).  
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and shocks), and a monitoring system for this. Much is made of the ability to check 
whether the record of temperatures en route is consistent with the agreed standards.  
However this is not a claim for a new or improved device for continuously maintaining or 
recording temperatures. Nor does it discuss how to monitor shocks. In fact it is not directed 
to either of these technical matters, but rather to a computerised record-keeping system that 
sellers, transport providers, storage providers and buyers can use to monitor progress and 
conditions. There is no claimed contribution to any technological art. Nor is there any 
contribution to knowledge about transport monitoring systems. No objections as to novelty 
or inventiveness were raised in Australia. The search report identified seven other patent 
documents. No non-patent knowledge is recorded in the search report. This seems odd, 
given the nature of the claims. Again it indicates the depth of the problem in regard to 
requiring documentary evidence of existing knowledge in a field where most knowledge is 
practice, not academic or patent documentation.  
While no novelty or inventiveness objections were raised in Australia, the EPO considered 
that there was no technical solution to any technical problem. The examiner’s report 
specifically noted two patent documents regarding data collection means. The applicant 
amended the claims to emphasise ‘a data logger arranged to sense data corresponding to the 
predetermined condition of the goods and provide the sensed data to the data storage 
means’.319 This seems little different from the initial drafting, but it remains to be seen 
whether this is sufficient to convince the EPO that there is a ‘technical’ contribution.  
The next delivery system ‘invention’ uses biometrics to ensure pharmaceutical products go 
to the right people ("Management control of pharmaceutical substances", application 
2004211006, priority 11 February 2003). In this computerised process, a ‘biometric capture 
apparatus’ sends a message to the computer regarding supply of a pharmaceutical to an 
individual. The computer replies with a code, which initiates the biometric capture process. 
When the computer receives the code and the biometric, it checks these against a database, 
and also checks that the elapsed time since it sent the code is not too fast. The database 
contains information about authorised supply, including quantities and periodicity. There is 
also a process for identifying the supplier.  
 
319  epoline Register Plus, application EP1342191 
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The patent is for the computer process, not for anything to do with the developing 
technology of biometrics. If the known process for ensuring a prescription drug is 
dispensed in the right quantity at the right time to the right person were not computerised, 
as has been done here, there would be no need for biometric identification. At best this is a 
combination of old methods, but the combination is only required because of the 
computerisation. The computer programming seems quite a straightforward: respond to a 
request, check certain conditions against a database, and send a response. There is no 
knowledge contribution to either engineering, biometrics, or dispensing processes. 
The Australian examiner rejected the application for want of inventiveness in relation to 
one patent and four non-patent documents. The applicant amended the claims, bringing a 
number of subsidiary claims into the independent claims. The attorney then argued that the 
prior art did not suggest the specific arrangement claimed. It was argued that the specific 
biometric capture process, and the focus on the correct dose were ‘significant advantages 
over the cited prior art’. The patent was granted. Expedited examination had been requested 
due to concerns about possible infringement, suggesting that this type of process was 
obvious to a number of parties.  
The EPO has issued an adverse examiner’s report, pointing out a previous computerised 
identity matching system for pharmaceutical supply, incorporating biometric records. The 
examiner noted that the claimed ‘invention’ differed only in regard to the features of secure 
communication between the biometric capture apparatus and the management computer. 
However all features of such a secure communication system were disclosed in a second 
document. 320 The applicant disagrees that all features of the secure communication system 
are so disclosed, and has amended the claims to emphasise that the stored data records are 
logically separate from the biometric records. The applicant notes that ‘the fact that a 
number of individual features were well known does not conclusively show the 
obviousness of a combination’, and argues that the second document does not disclose 
logical separation of the two sets of records. The application remains pending.  
The patent "Method and apparatus for storing and retrieving items" (application 
2003212105, priority 25 March 2002) is designed for use in a wholesale or mail-order 
 
320  epoline Register Plus, application EP1593073. Only patent prior art was used in the examiner’s report. 
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centre. A patent has been granted in New Zealand. The application was withdrawn from the 
EPO prior to examination. The ‘invention’ claims a process where the locations of items 
are stored in a database, which is interrogated when an order is received. This is designed to 
determine the minimum number of locations that need to be accessed to collect the required 
set of items. This type of problem has been bread-and-butter to operations research experts 
for many decades, and clearly computerisation allows for fast determination of the best 
retrieval option. The apparatus claimed is data storage means, data processing means, 
communication means, and storages with signalling devices attached, in other words fairly 
standard computer equipment. There are five drawings in the application: one shows a 
flowchart and the others general computer equipment.  
Again this patent deals solely with computerisation of known mental steps, these being the 
most efficient route for collecting the desired items from their storage locations. There is no 
indication of any programming challenges. Logistic efficiency is well known in business as 
a key to competitive advantage. Knowledge of the storage facility, the range of products, 
and the ordering pattern of customers is required both to determine where to store the items, 
and how best to retrieve them. This expert knowledge can then be written into detailed 
software specifications. Of course any such expert might come up with a marginally 
different system, and herein lies the difficulty for the patent examiner. S/he is not allowed 
to reject obvious combinations if they are not the sole obvious combination. No examiner 
objections were raised in Australia.  
As demonstrated in Chapter 5, some patents combine old methods with the power of 
modern networks. The Queensland company EPIP Pty Ltd. had two patents in the dataset, 
though one was eliminated as it was a patent of addition (see Section 4.3). The remaining 
EPIP patent concerns the use of modern electronic networks to arrange for the physical 
production of electronic documents closer to the point of final receipt prior to mailing. This 
is clearly a useful service, as it reduces unnecessary travel for postal items. But the whole 
process for taking advantage of networks to send mail to a point closer to delivery before 
printing and enveloping simply involves documentation of known steps and the addition of 
a step to determine where to print and mail the document. That is, the claims are no more 
than an adaptation of known processes to the new power of electronic networks. Software 
programming for this is quite straightforward. It might perhaps be claimed that the idea of 
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printing closer to the destination is novel, though this and many other ideas flow directly 
from the establishment of widespread electronic networks. So it is not possible to see any 
knowledge contributions in this 'invention'. Nor does it seem that the cost of developing 
such a system would be so high that the investment would be dependent on patent 
protection. Indeed there would appear to be substantial first-mover and network 
advantages.  
The company has five applications for this 'invention'.321 The one here ("Means to facilitate 
delivery of electronic documents into a postal network", application 2003254402, priority 
date 4 October 2002), was lodged as a PCT application, and was granted in New Zealand in 
March 2006. Europe was designated in June 2004, but non-entry is noted later in the year, 
indicating that the application has been withdrawn from the EPO. Applications are pending 
in Canada and the USA, but there is as yet no USPTO examiner’s report (Table A9.1).  
The specification in the 2003254402 patent refers to existing knowledge in the form of 
prior patent application WO99/21330, which appears never to have been granted anywhere. 
It notes several disadvantages to the system spelled out in WO99/21330: failure to verify 
correct address positioning for the envelope window, no ability to reposition portions of the 
document, no forwarding rules or quarantine processes, no software for managing 
documents, etc. Other unspecified earlier systems are criticised for deficiencies such as not 
handling the billing for the service. This discussion of deficiencies in the existing systems 
demonstrates very clearly the focus on not merely incremental, but minute, changes in basic 
business processes. It also sets up trivial 'problems' then argues 'inventiveness' in solving 
these. The 'problems' lie outside any field of technology. They do not even appear to be 
genuine problems, but rather normal elements in the design of any quality business system. 
 
321  This patent (2003254402), and the patent of addition which was excluded from the dataset, are not 
shown as linked on IPAustralia's Patsearch system, but esp@cenet's INPADOC system shows both as members 
of the same family. The 2003254402 patent has a child (2005244517, sealed, August 2006), which in turn has 
a child (2006201479, sealed December 2006). The 2006201479 'grandchild' has a child, which is the patent of 
addition, excluded from the dataset (2006203578, sealed August 2007). The patent of addition has a child 
(2007201506), sealed September 2007. So the original patent application has resulted in the grant of five 
patents, one of which is known to be a patent of addition. Unfortunately the Patsearch database does not 
distinguish patents of addition from standard patents. Application 2006203578 was only identified as a patent 
of addition from material on the case file. It focuses on a user's single-click (c.f. the famous Amazon patent) 
to send a graphic image file, e.g. a pdf document, to a remote printing facility for entry into the postal system. 
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There are no contributions to knowledge: merely the application of logic to make minor 
process improvements.  
The International Preliminary Examiner's Report (IPER) was done in Australia and the 
examiner found all 80 claims for system, method and computer readable medium to be 
novel and inventive. Presumably no other available small set of documents listed all the 
minute features in this 'invention'.  
There is clearly a social benefit to this system for reducing unnecessary transport. But does 
this benefit outweigh the costs of preventing others from applying logic and commonsense 
to produce similar services? Given the low investment cost, it seems unlikely that a patent 
was needed in order to induce the invention.  
The Australian Patent Office raised novelty/inventiveness objections to only two of these 
five computerisation ‘inventions’. Yet none make any contribution to knowledge of 
business methods nor of software engineering.  
6.3.2 Combining known processes 
Another type of patent that appears quite uninventive to the ordinary person is that which 
merely combines old ideas. As noted in Section 4.4.2, patent examiners are not allowed to 
reject such patents unless only one combination would be identified in the face of a specific 
problem. But it is in the nature of business methods that there can often be many small 
variations. It is moot whether such variations would be sufficient to avoid a charge of 
infringement. But clearly they are sufficient for the patent to be granted.322 Eight patents 
are discussed here. At best they are combinations of old methods, though this is perhaps 
being overly generous. 
Two of these patents are real estate sales systems. The first claims a monopoly whether the 
method is used in computerised or manual form ("Method and system of exchange", 
application 2003204406, priority date 28 May 2003). The applicant applied for patents only 
in Australia and New Zealand and was granted one in each country. There are no 
challenges in the programming, i.e. there is no technical contribution to the programming 
'art'. The method involves the buyer and seller of property using the same agent (a very 
 
322  It is a matter of some surprise to those new to patent systems that patent offices seem to grant multiple 
overlapping (and therefore infringing) patents (Miceli 2005). 
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frequent occurrence in property sales). Bids are secret (i.e. they are standard closed tenders) 
and are done either through an internet site, or through a secure container such as a locked 
safe. The buyer pays the agent's commission. This final aspect is mere semantics. The 
buyer is the only party handing over money, so naturally the buyer pays the agent.323 There 
has been no contribution to knowledge. Several well-known techniques are combined, in 
one version without even computerisation.  
This patent is a particularly clear example of the effect of a patent statute which presumes 
novelty and inventiveness (Patent Act 1990, Section 7). The onus is on the Patent Office to 
demonstrate a lack of novelty or inventiveness, and this must be done using strictly defined 
documents. Where a method is so obvious that it is not written up (as everyone knows it 
and does it), then the examiner will be unable to find appropriate evidence as a basis for 
refusing a patent. The examiner raised no novelty or inventiveness objections.  
A second real estate patent involves the preparation of reports on physical sites ("Mobile 
report capture", application 2003246060, priority date 12 September 2003). It involves the 
use of a wireless handheld device to capture images and generate reports using standard 
templates (i.e. with pre-determined fields). The specification argues that the process 
removes possible transcription delays and errors, and fraud in report preparation. Beyond a 
certain point entered data cannot be revised, and a date and time stamp is attached to both 
written and image data (see full claims in Appendix 7). While the combination of modern 
electronic technology with report-writing can generate new features such as date and time 
stamps, such new features in themselves were not created by these inventors. Given most 
digital cameras allow (indeed often demand) a date and time stamp on images, including a 
date and time stamp on the written portion seems to require no ingenuity.  
The Australian examiner rejected this application on novelty and inventiveness grounds. 
The applicant's attorney argued that the cited prior art did not involve generation of the 
report at the remote site, but rather generation of the report on a server, following data 
collection at the remote site. He also argued that the cited prior art did not involve date and 
time stamping the written and image data, nor did it involve pre-configuration of the report 
                                                 
323  The alternative view, that the seller pays the agent, is merely a two-step transfer of funds from the 
buyer to the seller to the agent. Indeed in practice these funds are never transferred to the seller, even where 
the agreement is that the seller pays the agent's fees: they are held in a trust account by the real estate agent 
(or lawyer) and the agent's fees are disbursed directly from this account on settlement. 
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format. Finally he argued that images were optional in the prior art, but compulsory in this 
invention. The patent was accepted within the month. This case shows the extent to which 
patent examiners' hands seem tied by patent law as it is currently interpreted. The Patent 
Examiners’ Manual (IPAustralia 2008) makes it clear that great care should be taken in 
raising objections to combinations of old ideas and methods.  
This ‘invention’ contributes no knowledge about businesses practices, and no software 
challenges needed to be overcome. At best this case involves the combination of several 
aspects of previously known methods. At worst it is a trivial variation of another patented 
‘invention’. The attorney's arguments revolved around very small differences from previous 
practice, none involving any contribution to knowledge. If it were the applicant who had to 
demonstrate inventiveness, it is hard to see how this could have been done.  
The USPTO has issued two examiner’s reports. The claims were amended following the 
first rejection. The first rejection, in November 2007, was on the basis of lack of novelty 
compared to a 2001 Korean patent document. The second rejection, in April 2008, was 
based on an updated search. It advised that the ‘invention’ was not novel compared to a US 
patent. This prior US patent concerns generation and management of property reports on 
site, using multiple pre-formatted fields, secure date and time data, and does not allow 
alterations after a given point. It was filed in October 2002, later converted to a PCT 
application, and granted in December 2007. It seems extraordinary that this document was 
not found in the initial USPTO search. Neither does it seem to have been found by the New 
Zealand Patent Office, where the application was accepted in February 2008.324  
This prior US patent should have been published within 18 months of filing.325 In Australia 
the applicant asked for expedited examination, and the search was done in January 2004, 
before the application would have been published. The combination of the request for fast 
processing and the 18 month delay in making patent applications public combined in this 
case to create a situation where a patent was granted despite not being novel. It seems likely 
that if the applicant attempts to enforce this patent, it is likely to be revoked. The 
 
324  http://www.iponz.govt.nz/pls/web/dbssiten.main and enter 545857 in NZ number field.  
325  The American Inventors Protection Act (AIPA) of 29 November 1999 (Public Law 106-113) required, 
for the first time, publication of US patent applications 18 months after filing. This did not apply if there was 
no international application. This legal change partially brought the US into line with general procedures in 
other countries.  
 209 
                                                
application was terminated before grant in the UK, but there is no information on which to 
judge if this was a withdrawal or a rejection.  
The next ‘invention’ has been complex to track down and separate from its parent. This is a 
case where the child is substantially rather than marginally different from the parent, so 
grants or refusals for the parent are not considered. The parent invention is a system for 
coding multiple information fields on an airline boarding pass for use in a variety of 
situations. The ‘invention’ in the dataset is a specific application of some of this 
information. In "Luggage collection installation" (application 2005247009, filed 22 
December 2005, priority date 16 July 2001) disembarking passengers choose subsidiary 
luggage conveyor belts, swipe their boarding passes at the chosen belt, and then data is 
transferred from the boarding pass to divert their luggage to the chosen conveyor belt.  
There is little in the claims about the means for identifying and diverting the appropriate 
luggage, other than ‘a control means’ for achieving this. Despite the claims to an 
‘installation’, there is no claim to any electronic or mechanical device that will achieve the 
desired outcome. The ‘installation’ is generally described, in terms of its broad 
components, and is very similar to the subsequent method and system claims. There is no 
specific claim to any component of an ‘installation’ other than ‘control means’. So it is hard 
to see that there is an ‘installation’ rather than a software program. At best this is a 
combination of the ideas of multiple luggage belts, coded swipe cards, and user choice, 
implementable as a software process. At worst it raises again the lack of any gap between 
an idea and a patented 'implementation' of the idea.  
The claims in the granted patent have been totally re-written. The Australian examiner 
rejected the initial claims for lack of inventiveness. All 55 claims were withdrawn and were 
replaced, the final accepted claims being similar to, but not identical with, the 14 claims in 
the granted US version of the patent. The USPTO rejected the patent twice, and the claims 
were also substantially re-written before grant.326  
While most finance products are services, such service products can only be delivered 
through a process, for example "A Security System" (application 2003201332, filed 18 
March 2003, priority 27 October 2000). This is a method of reducing credit-card fraud by 
 
326  See USPTO, Public PAIR, application 11/268427.  
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sending real-time alerts to mobile devices. It is an excellent example of combining two 
existing methods from closely related fields. The pre-existing knowledge includes a 
Citibank system of sending SMS messages when certain financial events occur, and widely 
used existing fraud prevention systems where banks contact customers when ‘anomalous’ 
transactions occur on their credit card accounts. In response to the examiner's view that the 
'invention' lacked novelty and inventiveness, the applicant amended the claims to 
emphasise that the user could define the anomalous events about which they wished to be 
notified, arguing that ‘the CitiAlert system does not teach or suggest this feature’. The idea 
of users defining preferences is so ubiquitous that it does not merit documentation, so there 
would have been no relevant prior art for the examiner to use as a basis for rejecting this 
obvious combination. Clearly there are no contributions to knowledge.  
So far this application has been granted in New Zealand, but has also received three 
rejections from the USPTO (and has been amended following each rejection). The third 
rejection was on the basis that some claims were not patentable subject matter, some were 
not novel, and one was not inventive. The application remains pending in the USA.  
The dataset includes three patents for methods of electronic trading, one of which is 
discussed in Section 6.4 (as it has a UK acceptance). Electronic trading systems have 
revolutionised how business is conducted in the world's exchange markets, ranging from 
listed equities to forward trading of commodities. Typically systems for electronic trading 
allow potential buyers to monitor buy and sell bids, and volumes and prices of prior trades. 
Buyers and sellers can submit their own bids, specifying quantities and prices, and can 
change these provided the order has not yet been executed. Where only a part of the 
quantity offered can be matched, the systems normally allow for that part to be exchanged 
and the balance to be left on the market for future sales completion. Such systems have 
been available to retail traders since at least 2000,327 and for wholesale use much earlier. 
They have led to a radical reduction in the cost of equity trading, and a large reduction in 
the number of stockbrokers.  
Two of the electronic trading ‘inventions’ have been granted patents in New Zealand as 
well as Australia. "Commodities exchange system and method" (application 2004219547, 
 
327  Based on the author's personal experience.  
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priority 10 March 2003) is a system and method for trading physical commodities on spot 
(current) or futures markets, and includes the capacity for partial orders to be executed. 
Buyers and sellers are warned if their price offer is worse than the current market price.328 
When an order is executed, costs are calculated, including insurance and delivery costs. 
With the possible exception of the automatic insurance and delivery cost calculation, this 
system/method is no different from the many other electronic trading tools that have been 
on the market for some years. So at best it combines old methods. It makes no contributions 
to knowledge in any field. No novelty or inventiveness objections were raised by the 
Australian examiner.  
"Automated Price Improvement Protocol Processor" (application 2004222811, filed 22 
October 2004, priority date 18 December 1998) has been granted in the USA and Israel as 
well as Australia and New Zealand.329 It is an auction type trading system for financial 
instruments such as fixed interest securities. The system allows bids to be revised and 
provides time-limited opportunities for high bidding buyers or low bidding sellers to 
complete transactions. The claim was initially rejected as lacking inventiveness. The 
examiner drew the applicant's attention to the narrower claims of their granted US patent, 
and the original claims were withdrawn and replaced with these narrower claims. The US 
version had been rejected three times prior to grant, so clearly inventiveness issues were 
raised by the USPTO examiner too.330 The family members were fairly hard to track 
down,331 and in fact there are two closely related families, the other being for an 
"Automated auction protocol processor".  
The claims offer a simple auction system with a fixed time period where those who are 
closest in price can negotiate without participation by others. It is unsurprising that 
 
328  Such warnings are typical features of retail securities trading systems. So too is the partial execution of 
orders. 
329  The patent as accepted in Australia is a divisional child and itself has a divisional child (filed June 
2007). The PCT/US version appears to be the parent of this application, and has been granted in Australia 
(May 2007) and New Zealand.  
330  Unfortunately the USPTO's Public PAIR system does not show the usual ‘file wrapper’ for this patent, 
so the examiner's reports cannot be accessed. But from the transaction history, three rejections can be 
identified: a non-final rejection in May 2003, a final rejection in August 2003 and a non-final rejection in 
March 2005. It is likely that amendments were made following each rejection.  
331  The initial INPADOC search on the child in the dataset produced no family members, despite the claims 
being identical to US 6,963,856 granted on 8 November 2005. A search for ‘automated’ in the title and 
‘Cantor Fitzgerald’ as the applicant found nine family members, but within these nine the application lodged 
in China produced 34 family members. Such are the vagaries of patent databases.  
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objections would have been raised, even given the narrow constraints within which patent 
examiners operate. At best this is a combination of old ideas; it could also be classified as a 
very trivial variation on pre-existing systems. Despite the 1998 priority date, computerised 
auction systems were not new at that time. There are no contributions to knowledge.  
Both versions of the ‘invention’ were filed at the EPO, together with another closely related 
‘invention’. One has been withdrawn, and one is pending. The closest parallel to the 
‘invention’ here was revised after an initial adverse examiner’s report. The examiner 
pointed out that electronic trading systems with hierarchical management and execution of 
orders were already widely known in 1998. The 128 claims were withdrawn and replaced 
by two, focusing on ‘the technical features of the computer system’, and minimising 
reference to business features.332 It was claimed that the technical problem addressed was 
increasing the volume of computer processing, achieved through a new logical approach to 
handling bids and offers. Each new bid is tested against the best current bid, and so 
assigned a ranking. If it becomes the new best bid and is not identical to an existing bid, it 
generates a new queue of bids. The application remains pending.   
Another finance product patent is "Payment card processing system and methods" 
(application 2003262344, priority date 5 September 2003), also granted in the USA.333 The 
product is a dual credit/payment card operating both as a normal credit card, and as a store-
specific (private label) card. The application was initially rejected in Australia on novelty 
and inventiveness grounds. Four US patents for ‘multi-application credit/debit/financial 
services cards’ were cited. The attorney replied at length, and her successful arguments 
again show how minute are the differences needed to overcome any examiner objections. 
Several of the cited prior art references were claimed to be inappropriate because they 
allow for multiple accounts rather than a single account on the multi-use cards. It was also 
argued that none of these prior patents specifically combined a store card and a credit card, 
even though they loaded a range of functions and accounts onto a single card. Finally it was 
argued that specific details were not ‘taught’ in the prior art: an upgrade process for 
 
332  epoline Register Plus, application EP1151408. 
333  Unfortunately there is no file wrapper provided for US09/593199, so the US examiner’s report (a 
single non-final rejection) cannot be accessed. 
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converting current store cards to dual cards; migration of data; in-store issuance of a card; 
and activation dependent on customer request. All these are well-known processes.  
Many of us have wished to carry fewer plastic cards around. But clearly the idea of offering 
such multi-use cards has occurred to many others: at least four US patents have been 
granted. While the specific combination of accounts on this card may differ from that on 
other cards, and there may be a different combination of back-room processing features 
compared to other patented multi-use cards, none of the applicant's arguments indicate 
anything new or inventive—simply the possibility that the exact combination of features 
may not have been used before. There is no contribution to either business knowledge or 
information technology. The 'invention' simply takes a number of desirable known features 
and combines them. Because no-one had written down that exact combination, the 
examiner was not in a position to reject the application. 
"System for permission-based communication and exchange of information" (application 
2003247258, priority 19 February 2002) is a market research patent, also granted in New 
Zealand. The claims cover the receipt and storage of data from multiple consumers, 
database searching in response to requests, and providing search results. The method allows 
for receipt of ‘promotional’ material and provision of this to selected consumers, but not 
providing specific information on the consumer to the promoter. If consumers (including 
business consumers) respond to the promotion, the responses are provided to the promoter, 
but without any identifying data. The promoter is charged for these services, and the 
consumers receive a monetary or non-monetary ‘fee’ for their responses, and the fees 
received can be forwarded to a range of destinations (banks, service providers etc.). All of 
this can happen in a variety of environments, including email and SMS. The claims specify 
in detail how consumer data are collected (basically questionnaires with multiple fields) 
and up-dated. A range of identifying data can be collected; the consumer information also 
covers a range of fields.  
This is a straightforward system for collecting, analysing and distributing data, via a range 
of electronic media, and allowing for the collection of fees and payments to data providers. 
No advances in market research techniques are claimed. It is merely a combination of 
standard market research and promotional techniques with an electronic network. Given 
that there is no knowledge contribution to any technology, that the software is protected by 
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copyright, and that there are no lumpiness impediments to development of the product, it is 
hard to see why there is any market failure to be addressed.  
The examiner raised no novelty or inventiveness objections. Given the extreme detail in the 
115 claims, it would be difficult to match with a single existing document, regardless of the 
lack of novelty in the 'invention'. For similar reasons, despite the lack of any contribution to 
knowledge or its application, it would be hard for an examiner, constrained by the minutiae 
of patent law, to rule out the 'invention' on obviousness grounds. On the other hand, if 
patent rules required the inventor to demonstrate that the invention was inventive, it is 
equally hard to see what material could possibly be used to support this application. 
These combination patents confirm the problems identified earlier. The lack of 
documentation of real-world practices, together with legal doctrines limiting commonsense 
application of an obviousness standard, combine with the onus of proof lying with the 
Patent Office to lead to a situation where monopoly rights are being granted for 'inventions' 
which make no contributions to knowledge.  
6.3.3 Trivial differences: Variations on a theme 
Some patents are so similar to known systems and methods that it is hard to spot any 
differences, let alone any contributions to knowledge. While there are many obvious 
patents in the dataset, perhaps the leading candidate is "Online fare booking method and 
system" (application 2004202066). This patent has also been granted in New Zealand, the 
only other country where an application was filed. This patent covers options that had 
already been around for some time by the priority date of 17 March 2004. While it is 
designed for a travel agency, not an airline, a number of travel agencies had on-line 
offerings well before this, some with spectacular commercial success. The system handles 
queries for travel, including varying numbers of passengers, and checks enquiries against 
databases of travel available (including prices). The potential traveller is offered available 
options around the desired date as well as fare options. The system prints a travel document 
and/or a receipt.  
The application was rejected as lacking in novelty and inventiveness, citing one US patent 
(6,304,850, Keller et al.). The response from the applicant's attorney is worth quoting in 
some detail for its demonstration of how minute 'inventiveness' needs to be for a patent to 
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be granted. He said (emphasis added): 
"(1) Keller teaches how a fare availability search can be conducted, whereas the 
present invention goes beyond this by combining a fare search with an availability 
search. 
(2) Keller requires the user to enter a target price for the booking, whereas the present 
invention provides a list of possible fares … 
(3) The fare search phase in the present invention is conducted over an extended time 
period that is larger than the time period specified by the user …" 
And in regard to inventiveness, the attorney stated ‘the Examiner has provided no evidence 
that a skilled address[ee] could have ascertained, understood and regarded as relevant US 
patent documents, and in particular the Keller reference.’ This again refers to the fact that 
patent law can allow the exclusion of patent documents from the body of existing 
knowledge used as the yardstick for testing inventiveness.  
This case again demonstrates the severe problems that arise in practical business fields in 
identifying the current state of knowledge, given the restrictions developed under patent 
law. These restrictions, requiring as they do precise documentary evidence, often in a single 
location, were designed when patentable inventions were limited to tangible applications of 
science and technology. In this case, the pre-grant discussion between the parties revolved 
around a single US patent. No mention was made of the many existing websites where 
airlines and travel agencies already offered a range of date and fare options for any number 
of travellers.   
The next patent shows at best a trivial difference from previously existing web sites. Use of 
the web is a central feature of "Interactive property tour" (application 2003250595, priority 
date 15 August 2002). The ‘tour’ is effectively a set of electronic images of a property, 
including images of a map and a plan. Icons are located on the plan. If the icon is clicked 
you see the view from that location. The application makes much of the use of templates to 
create standard web pages, and offers a number of pre-determined template styles, each 
forming one page (see full details in Appendix 7). Each reference image and associated 
description form a page, and the ‘tour’ is a group of pages.  
Even in mid-2002 there was nothing novel about this, let alone inventive. Nonetheless, the 
Australian examiner raised no novelty or inventiveness objections. There is no contribution 
to software engineering. The sole feature that has any possible difference from pre-existing 
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websites is the icon on the map. As pre-existing property web pages provided photos, 360○ 
video tours, maps, and so on, this seems a very trivial difference. There is no contribution 
to knowledge of any kind. The application has been granted in New Zealand and is pending 
at the EPO. No examiner’s report has yet been issued but the search document notes that no 
technical problem is addressed. 
The response of the patent attorney to the examiner's objections to the next application is 
again worth quoting for its insights into how trivial a difference is involved in the patent 
law's meaning of the word inventive. "Spare part procurement method" (application 
2004202060, priority date 14 May 2004) is a method for a broker to negotiate with a 
manufacturer to sell spare parts from inventory. The manufacturer/potential seller answers a 
set of multiple-choice questions, and the answers are scored to reveal whether the part is 
excess to manufacturing needs. If it is, a means is provided for the buyer and seller to 
negotiate purchase and transfer. The method can operate over the internet, and includes a 
facility for the buyer to continuously monitor the broker's progress in obtaining the part. 
The claims are shown in full in Appendix 7. 
The Australian examiner rejected all eight claims as lacking any inventive step, being the 
mere technical equivalent of a previously patented invention. The attorney replied with an 
amendment merging claims 1 and 4, and disagreed strongly with the view that ‘… the step 
of asking the specific questions required in the claimed method is a technical equivalent to 
the practice in the [prior art] document of assessing a potential seller's spare parts surplus 
by directly examining the potential seller's inventory and product planning databases.’ He 
argued that asking questions elicited higher value information than inspecting databases, 
and thus ‘…provides a more refined understanding of whether a particular spare part is 
excess to the foreseeable needs of the potential seller than would be achieved by simply 
examining the potential seller's inventory and product planning databases, which does not 
involve a score based system for determining relative importance of a part.’ The patent was 
accepted within a week of this response being received by the examiner. 
So under patent law, inventiveness encompasses the minute difference between 
examination of data to obtain an effective answer and achieving the same answer by posing 
a set of (pre-coded) questions to an individual. One might ask whether the earlier invention 
was not superior, as the manufacturer was not required to spend time answering a series of 
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questions. Certainly from a policy perspective the examiner's initial judgement that this is a 
mere workshop variation seems sound. This 'invention' contributes no knowledge to any 
field, either business methods or software engineering.  
"Transaction accounting processing system and approach" (application 2005255399, 
priority 9 June 2004) is an accounting system for traders. It allocates General Ledger (GL) 
codes to ‘transaction-based documents’ (invoices), with the user able to define the codes, 
which can vary depending of the time of day. This allows a variety of parties to use a 
general software program, tailored to each of their needs. The International Preliminary 
Search Report (IPSR) relied heavily on an electronic document delivery patent and an 
accounting patent. The Australian examiner used only the non-accounting patent in 
rejecting the application for lack of novelty and inventiveness. The applicant wrote a cogent 
response as to why the non-accounting patent was not relevant. And the patent was granted.  
But the fact that under patent law it was inventive compared to a patent for electronic 
document delivery does not make it inventive in any ordinary sense. General Ledger codes 
are the building blocks of accounting. User definition of GL codes is far from new. The 
system includes rules for applying the codes, but again this is part and parcel of the 
conventional use of accounting codes. Having different codes for the same item at different 
times of day may well be a useful feature, but is hardly the basis for a claim to an 
'invention', not if an invention is required to add to knowledge. There are no noted software 
challenges that needed to be overcome.  
The US IPER states that this ‘invention’ is simply a computer program. There was 
substantial negotiation between the applicant and the US examiner—four examiner reports 
were issued. The initial rejection, based on novelty and inventiveness grounds, cited only 
two US patent documents. The second rejection argued that the claims were for a computer 
program per se, with no tangible result, i.e. no transformation of a physical state. The 
applicant argued that the claim was not for a computer program as such, as a physical 
computer arrangement was included. The applicant also argued that the data modification 
effected by the program was a tangible result. The third rejection accepted that the 
‘invention’ was not a computer program per se (though outside the patent world it would be 
defined as a computer program), but maintained the objection that it lacked any tangible 
result. At this point the applicant amended the claims, and renewed their argument that 
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there was a tangible result. The examiner then asked the applicant to choose between two 
sub-sets of the claims, and once the applicant had done this, the application was allowed.334  
This lengthy and substantial negotiation process did not include any discussion of the 
myriad real-world uses of computerised accounting systems. Because GL codes are so 
fundamental to accounting it would be hard to envisage that any of these many systems did 
not use GL codes. Nonetheless this ‘invention’ has been granted patents in Australia, New 
Zealand and the USA. 
These four patents, each based on trivial variations to existing systems again demonstrate 
that many patents are being granted for 'inventions' which are not, in any normal sense of 
the word, inventive. It is the detailed prescriptive rules which have grown up in patent law 
which have allowed this absurd situation to develop. 
6.3.4 Simply an idea? 
Some patents in the dataset appear to be nothing more than ideas. These ideas are set down 
in flow charts and legalese. But nowhere in the idea itself is there any technical challenge, 
nor any contribution to knowledge. Such ideas are not really developments in the systems 
and methods of doing business either. They are simply ideas. There is one example here.335  
"Interactive System and Method for Viewing On Line Advertising" (application 
2004210528, filed 9 September 2004, priority 24 September 1999) is about internet 
advertising. This application was granted in New Zealand, but withdrawn from the EPO 
after an adverse examiner’s report.336 Consumers choose what advertisements to view and 
are recompensed (with rebates on internet connection time) proportionate to the time spent 
looking at advertisements. The core of the 'invention' is that the viewer responds to a 
random invitation to view advertisements, but does not need to download any program to 
see them. Claim 1 is presented in the original and in translation in Figure 6.1 below. 
The subsidiary claims concern the form, location, timing and re-appearance of the ads, that 
they disappear, that the computer could alternatively be a range of other devices, that the 
consumer provides data to the advertiser, and that the rewards are rebates for computer time 
 
334  See USPTO, Public PAIR, application 11/121158 for these documents. 
335  Other examples include application 2003244552, where unwanted emails are not downloaded onto the 
server (see Section 5.5), and the linking of barcodes to web sites (application 2004201637, Section 6.2).  
336  The ‘invention’ was considered not to be inventive. See epoline Register Plus, application EP1222588. 
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Figure 6.1  Application 2004210528   "On Line Advertising" 
Claim 1: An on line interactive advertising system which enables viewing of 
advertising by a person engaged in an activity in which the person receives electronic 
data and/or images and at the same time and at the option of the person views said 
advertising; the system comprising;  
[translation: someone at a computer (or similar) receives electronic information and 
chooses whether to look at advertising too] 
a consumer station which receives electronic data or images; an information provider 
which delivers said electronic data or images to said consumer station, a host having a 
website with which said consumer station communicates and interacts, an advertising 
provider in communication with said host; wherein the advertising provider 
communicates via said host with said consumer station via the internet upon election by 
said consumer station responsive to an invitation from said host; wherein, without 
requiring software downloaded and installed into the consumer station, the consumer 
receives said advertising material by responding to a random invitation from the host, 
which appears at the consumer station wherein, when said consumer elects to view 
advertising from said advertising provider via said host, the consumer receives rewards, 
credits or benefits commensurate with the length of time advertising is viewed. 
[translation: the consumer is using a computer, connected to the internet, and, in 
response to an invitation, can choose to access a website with advertising without 
having to download any software; the invitation is random and if the consumer chooses 
to look at the ads s/he gets rewards related to how long s/he looks at the ads]. 
 
used. The idea in claim 1 is a very straightforward and ancient one: do this for me and I will 
recompense you. The subsidiary claims are simple design features. The extent and 
frequency of flashing ads and pop-ups has grown extensively since September 1999, but 
this idea would not have novel even in 1999. 
There are clearly no contributions to software engineering. The sole idea that might have a 
degree of novelty is recompensing people for their time when viewing advertisements. But 
this is a trivial extension of long-standing norms for recompensing people for their time. 
The examiner used the search report for the (lapsed) parent application, and raised no 
novelty or inventiveness objections. All identified existing knowledge was patent 
documentation. This again raises questions about adequate identification of pre-existing 
knowledge in business fields.  
Overall, these 18 patents show no contribution to knowledge in the field of business 
methods. There are three possibly inventive ideas: printing documents nearer to the postal 
destination, choosing your conveyor belt to collect checked-in luggage, and paying people 
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to view advertising. None of these involve any contribution to knowledge. There are no 
software challenges noted in any of the applications, and from consideration of the systems 
proposed, it is clear that the programming will in all instances be quite straightforward, so 
there are no contributions to knowledge in any technical field. Because they contribute no 
new knowledge, there are no spillover benefits to offset the social costs incurred if they are 
used to stop others implementing similar obvious systems. There is no lumpy investment 
that would prevent these 'inventions' occurring without a patent. Like the patents discussed 
in Chapter 5 they raise serious questions about whether there is any balance in the patent 
system as it currently operates. 
6.4 Patents granted by the UK / EPO 
Eight of the patents in the dataset have also been granted in the UK or by the EPO, where 
neither computer software as such, nor business methods as such are patentable. It thus 
seems likely that any business method patent granted in these two jurisdictions would make 
some kind of contribution to technology. Seven of these patents are discussed here. The 
eighth, "A tax refund system" (application 2003219472), was granted in the UK, but as it 
was also refused by the EPO it was discussed in Section 6.2.  
"Automated receiving and delivery system and method" (application 2003262357, filed 19 
November 2003, claimed priority date 9 November 1999) has been granted by the EPO. 
The patent has a moderate sized family, with 18 members, including the parent. In the USA 
one version has been granted and three others are pending. In Canada examination was 
requested in August 2002. As no action since then is noted, some disagreement over 
patentability is likely.  
It provides for a locked storage container which can be opened at a pre-determined time to 
allow delivery of previously ordered goods. The diagrams show a locked container divided 
into parts with different conditions (insulated, refrigerated, etc.), but the claim is not for the 
locked box, but for the system (and method) of using it. The claims cover checking space 
availability, scheduling delivery, allowing the box to be opened during the scheduled time, 
and sending a message when the delivery has been made. They include the capacity to 
divide the delivery into batches if there is insufficient room in the container. The parent 
patent focuses more on serving many customers, while this one focuses on checking that 
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space is available. The claims were amended, to meet concerns that some claims lacked 
novelty and inventiveness, and that the application covered more than one invention: 
checking for space and sending a delivery made advice. The final accepted claim still 
contains both features.  
Underlying this system there is some electrical signalling – though there is no claim to 
anything new in that. In terms of delivery systems, the method claims are drafted so that all 
steps could be performed manually, except for the signals which allow the box to open, and 
to advise that delivery has been made. The idea of having a safe place to leave goods is not 
novel, and modern electronic technologies provide the capacity to allow a suitable lock to 
respond to an electronic signal. Development of such a locking device would fall squarely 
in the technological 'arts', but this application makes no such claims. Nor does the 
application claim any advances in signalling technology. Given the other features of the 
system, it makes sense to provide the capacity to check that space in the box is available. 
The ‘delivery made’ signal leads to customer charging. Where home deliveries are made to 
a person many companies allow the use of credit cards and payment processing is often 
done after the delivery agent has returned to the office. So it is hard to see how this system 
goes beyond the simple application of logic to the problem, or indeed the simple 
documentation of the elements (‘mental steps’) of traditional delivery systems.  
The EPO in fact considered that the application covered two ‘inventions’, one being a time 
scheduler for delivery and the other a delivery system dependent on the size of items to be 
delivered. The applicant deleted the second set of claims, reserving the right to file a 
divisional. The examiner did note that there was nothing novel in a system of delivery to a 
plurality of locked storage containers, or sending delivery made signals. In regard to the 
selected ‘invention’ of identifying a time interval for delivery and delivering during that 
time interval, the examiner considered that available written documents did not suggest 
identifying a time interval for delivery, or making the delivery only during that time 
interval.337 This is an excellent example of why patent law should not be extended to the 
business method field—the patent law assumption that all existing knowledge is well 
 
337  Most householders ask for and appreciate service or delivery within a pre-determined time slot (though 
a minority of companies are still unaware that this has been a basic customer requirement for some decades).  
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documented simply does not work with software or business methods. This extraordinarily 
trivial ‘invention’ is so obvious that no-one would bother to record it.  
Secure transactions over the net, using fingerprint authentication, is the subject of "Method 
of conducting transactions over a network" (application 2004203415, filed 26 July 2004, 
priority 23 February 2000). This patent has also been granted in the USA (2002), the UK 
(2004) and Europe (2007). It is pending in Canada (examination requested January 2006) 
and Japan. A second application in the USA, which is so similar to the initial patent that a 
terminal disclaimer has been filed, has been rejected, with the argument revolving around 
the storage location for the fingerprints and whether this had been ‘taught’ by previous 
knowledge. An appeal is pending regarding this rejection.  
This divisional child was rejected twice, and at length. The Australian examiner initially 
raised concerns about fair basis, more than one inventive concept, and lack of novelty and 
inventive step compared to a wide range of existing knowledge. The applicant made 
considerable amendments to the claims to meet these objections, and presented arguments 
in regard the prior art. It was argued that earlier fingerprint authentication systems involved 
transmission of the fingerprint to a central location for matching against a database, in 
contrast to storing the fingerprints in the fingerprint authentication device. This 
improvement in the 'invention' means that only authentication data need to be transmitted. 
So storing the secure data in a different location potentially becomes grounds for 
inventiveness. The examiner demurred, and again rejected the application arguing that the 
relevant prior art did in fact disclose storing the fingerprints in a stand-alone system. The 
applicant re-argued this point at length, and the patent was accepted in June 2007.  
Based on the discussion between the patent examiner and the attorney, the difference 
between this patent and US patent 5,615,277 (Hoffman) is trivial, at least to the ordinary 
person. Certainly there can be an advantage in transferring less rather than more data. But is 
this difference enough to call this 'invention' inventive? It adds nothing to knowledge. The 
costs of writing the software would not be large, so the inducement effect of the patent 
system is unnecessary. Moreover the software is already protected from copying. Given 
that the difference between this and previous systems lies in the storage location—the issue 
in question in the final USPTO rejection—it is hard to identify the technical effect required 
by the EPC. Nonetheless it was granted both by the UK Patent Office and by the EPO.  
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In fact the EPO initially rejected the application. The examiner’s report recognised that the 
‘invention’ was technical in character as it used a general purpose networked computer, 
including a fingerprint identification device. The report also recognised that the objective of 
the ‘invention’ was a business method, defined in terms of the steps of the claim. The 
examiner considered that there was no solution to any technical problem—the technical 
character of the claim lay in the use of the network to communicate authentication. As the 
core of the ‘invention’ lay in the use of a technical system for a non-technical process, it 
could be implemented by a skilled person without any inventive step. The applicant then 
revised the claims; some were deleted, and others merged to change the emphasis. It was 
argued that the ‘invention’ solved the technical problem of a device that securely stored 
fingerprints (through encryption). The nearest prior knowledge was said not to ‘teach’ use 
of encrypted storage of fingerprints, merely use of fingerprints for authorisation. The EPO 
then accepted the application, and advised that it intended to grant a patent.338  
Again this case highlights the difference between the ordinary understanding of what is 
inventive and that used in patent law. In dealing with a system where security was a 
requirement, the idea of using encryption was clearly neither new nor inventive at the 
priority date of February 2000. The claim is not to a new method of encryption, but merely 
to a system using encrypted storage for fingerprint data. Like some of the cases discussed in 
Chapter 5 it is an example of applying a well-known process in a marginally new area.  
"Method and apparatus for managing information exchanges between apparatus on a 
worksite" (application 2004307528, priority 22 October 2003) lies in the field of 
information management. It has been granted by the EPO, but was withdrawn from the UK 
and Germany. The system was developed in the context of road construction, but claim 1 
generalises this to ‘an outdoor worksite’. There is a hierarchical networked communication 
system, which links equipment (with or without human operators), each piece of equipment 
having a unique address. The system can determine the position of mobile equipment. Each 
piece of equipment can communicate directly with all others. A workplan is automatically 
executed sending information about tasks to relevant equipment.  
 
338  epoline Register Plus, application EP1257952. 
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The Australian examiner rejected the application for lack of inventiveness, on the basis that 
differences from the prior art (unique hierarchically structured addresses, and 
communication between each element) were ‘mere workshop improvements’. The IPER, 
issued by European Patent Office, noted that the solution to the problem addressed in the 
application—activating a module to manage an item over a network—would be obvious, 
including the fact that URLs have by definition a hierarchical structure. In other words the 
initial EPO assessment was also a lack of inventiveness. The claims were extensively 
amended, the added features of claim 1 including the types of worksites, that some items of 
apparatus were mobile, some manned and some unmanned, and converting address 
structures into device addresses stored in a database. Though these amendments appear 
minor, the patent was then granted. This 'invention' is an enhancement of a previous system 
(Osyris), funded as a European Union project. So in Australia a private monopoly has been 
granted for a trivial variation on a system developed with European taxpayer funds. There 
is no evidence of a contribution to knowledge in any field.  
The EPO initially identified the problem addressed by the ‘invention’ as how to activate, 
over a network, a module specific to a particular piece of apparatus. This was not 
considered inventive compared to previous patent documents. The examiner did not cite 
any prior art from the EU funded Osyris project although the applicant noted that the 
‘invention’ was an improvement on this. The applicant replied at length to the examiner, 
but in German, and amended the claims. The patent was granted.339 
"Trading tools for electronic trading" (application 2003228606, priority 19 April 2002), a 
continuation of a US patent, has been granted in the UK. The UK patent office does not 
provide on-line information about examination processes and correspondence, so there is 
no record of the thinking underlying this grant. The applicant suggests the disadvantage of 
existing systems is that multiple elements must be entered to place an order (such as 
commodity identifier, price, quantity, and whether buy or sell order),340 and notes that 
taking longer to enter orders can reduce competitive advantage. The 'invention' allows 
traders to consolidate these elements in a single control icon, which can be amended while 
 
339  epoline Register Plus, application EP1676424. 
340  In fact the ‘such as’ in the specification is misleading. In a typical trading situation these five pieces of 
information, plus the length of time the order should remain on the market, are sufficient to place an order.  
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watching other trading information. Effectively the claimed method repositions the buy/sell 
information into the icon. This feature is technically equivalent to re-sizing screens and 
having several open at once.341 Any computer-literate frequent trader, even if not a 
professional, has probably discovered this technical equivalent for themselves.  
The Australian examiner considered it was neither novel nor inventive remarking that ‘[t]he 
claims relate to a procedure which is well known.’ The applicant cancelled 56 claims, 
added 18 new claims and replaced all the figures. The applicant then argued successfully 
that the precise integers of their 'invention' were not disclosed in the prior art. This patent is 
from a very large family (81 members from 65 applications), and has entered national 
phase in at least five other countries. Effectively this 'invention' is a trivial variation on 
existing systems. There is no new contribution to knowledge of trading systems or to 
software technology.  
Despite the use of the word ‘device’ in "Email Alert Device and Method" (application 
2003236451, filed 22 August 2003, priority date 17 March 2000), this patent is for a 
software system which alerts users to incoming email messages without incurring phone 
charges.342 It is one of two children from an earlier application, of the same title. One of 
these applications was withdrawn or refused in the UK, and the other was granted. The US 
version has to date received four rejection notices, and various amendments have been 
made. During the process of examination in Australia the specification and claims were 
replaced with claims very similar to those of the granted child in the UK (GB2403319). The 
application as initially drafted was rejected in Australia on novelty and inventiveness 
grounds, and on the grounds that ‘[t]he claims are too broad and speculative, and go well 
beyond the enabling disclosure.’  
The 74 claims basically repeat themselves four times: as claims for ‘an indicating device’, 
for a system, for a method, and for a ‘computer program product’. The claims are written in 
general language and use terms such as device rather than telephone, though a number of 
 
341  Another technical equivalent would be multiple screens (monitors). Given the system shown in the 27 
pages of diagrams, it is clearly designed for professional traders, who usually do have multiple monitors. 
342  This patent falls very much on the borderline of classification as a business method patent. When it 
was filed, it was allocated to the business method class G06F/17/60 (IPC7); with the introduction of IPC8 it 
was reclassified to H04L/12/58 in Australia; on the esp@cenet system the GB version shows up in two 
classes: H04L/12/58 and the business methods class G06/Q10/00. 
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the claims specify a mobile phone (or other phone with a display capacity) as the receiving 
device. But effectively the message that email has arrived is sent for such a short period of 
time that the receiving phone is not taken off the hook, so call charges are avoided. The 
message (signal) can be audible or visual. Again it is hard to identify the 'technical 
contribution' required by UK law. Any inventiveness lies in the idea of sending a very short 
message as an alert. There are no software challenges to be overcome in implementing this 
business idea.  
Even with a priority date of March 2000, the procedure for sending a very short message on 
the occurrence of a particular event does not seem to show any ingenuity, nor make any 
contribution to knowledge. While there might be a variety of solutions, this patent does not 
actually provide any technical specifications for the solutions claimed. Claims are for such 
things as ‘an indicating device’, ‘a signal input means’, that the audible signal is distinctive, 
that the visual display depends on the signal received. In fact the fourth (final) USPTO 
rejection refers to an earlier US patent,343 filed in December 1997, for sending a signal 
through a communications system upon the occurrence of an event, without incurring 
charges, and so rejects this ‘invention’ for want of novelty.  
A technology that has recently demonstrated potentially significant gains in monitoring and 
logistics is radio-frequency identification (RFID), which stores and remotely retrieves data 
using tags or transponder devices. RFID systems have been around since the late 1960s. "A 
system for and method of monitoring an item" (application 2003302490, priority date 4 
June 2003) covers both RFID and non-RFID tags, and is designed for use along a supply 
chain from manufacturers, through distributors, to final consumers. At each stage identity 
information (including biometric information) is scanned and checked against databases for 
manufacturers, distributors and consumers. The identification device is attached to the item 
(claim 9), possibly by the manufacturer (claim 10). The seller identification data is included 
in the receipt for the product. Despite the biometrics and radio technologies that can be 
incorporated, these are not the subject matter of the claims.  
The 'invention' is for a system for reading, storing and linking the three sets of 
identification. The programming would be very straightforward (if a bit tedious, given all 
 
343  US Patent number 6,243,739, “Reducing perceived latency in servicing user requests on low-
bandwidth communication channels”. 
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the small detail options that are included). Two of the claims (claims 31 and 62) specify 
how the system/method would work if the item were a piece of luggage, suggesting that the 
system may have been developed for tracking luggage, but has been generalised in the 
patent specification to claim a wider area of monopoly.  
With a priority date of June 2003, one might question how inventive this computerised 
method is compared to methods used, for example, by airlines. Is the addition of biometrics 
a sufficient step forward in a tracking system to deem it a contribution to business 
methods? The application does not claim any advances in biometric technologies, being 
simply a system for reading, storing and linking the different biometric IDs. So there is no 
contribution to software technology as database management techniques are well-known.344  
Giving the patent the benefit of the doubt, it could be called inventive in the sense that it 
makes a small contribution to business method techniques through the addition of 
biometrics to logistics tracking systems. But from a policy perspective one would then ask 
why a change in the items contained in a database would make a system for linking 
databases inventive. Are there any reasons to expect it would not be developed in the 
absence of a patent? As a software system, it is protected from copying but not independent 
invention. There is no particular lumpiness to the investment required to produce this 
product, and it would benefit from network efficiencies once established. So it seems 
unlikely that it was induced by the patent system. While there may be consumer benefits 
through reductions in lost items, these benefits would be largely covered by the price 
charged for the invention. It is hard to see what genuine spillover benefits there might be, if 
there is a small contribution to business method processes. If a social benefit balance were 
written into patent law, then this 'invention' would be very marginal in the likelihood that it 
would generate sufficient social benefits to offset any social costs.  
This ‘invention’ was granted a patent in the UK after the introduction of the four-step test 
(see below), so the UK patent office must consider that it makes a contribution outside the 
business method or software fields. It is hard to perceive what this contribution might be.  
"A system for and method for authenticating items" (application 2003207780, priority 10 
April 2002) has been granted in New Zealand, the USA and the UK. In this case the UK 
 
344  The patent specification certainly claims no such contribution. 
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grant was before the introduction of the four-step test for patentable subject matter. This is 
another case where a known system and method is applied to a marginally new use. The 
patent also claims a very large scope from an 'invention' that is far more specific. It appears 
to have been designed as a system for tracking the owners of items used at public events by 
celebrities. The system incorporates an identification means into the item(s) prior to the 
event, stores the data, and allows for updating. The subsidiary claims cover sporting and a 
range of other events (two claims), the type of item (four claims), the stored data (three 
claims), the ‘identification means’ (four claims), and so on.345 In regard to the 
‘identification means’ this includes a RFID tag and tamper minimisation, including use of a 
heat sealed patch. As found in other patents, the claims do not cover the ‘identification 
means’ themselves, but rather a system within which such means are used. The database 
can be updated when the item is used at subsequent events, and in such cases further 
‘identification means’ are attached to the item.  
So this is essentially a system for storing and updating data. The stored data derive from 
tags on items used at ‘events’. From an ordinary perspective, the sole inventive feature is 
the ‘use at events’ application, as attaching identification to items through a range of means 
is quite old technology.346 The specific use scenario seems inadequate grounds for granting 
a monopoly. Nor is it possible to identify any contribution to software engineering—there 
is no technical challenge which this 'invention' overcomes. Again it is hard to identify any 
'technical contribution'. 
This 'invention' was granted in Australia less than eight months after filing, a remarkably 
speedy outcome in the patent world. No novelty or inventiveness objections were raised by 
the examiner. Although granted in the USA, the US examiner issued two non-final and one 
final rejection prior to final amendment and grant. The first two rejections were on both 
novelty and obviousness grounds; the third was on obviousness grounds only. Following 
each rejection the claims were amended. In responding to the third rejection the argument 
was put that the ‘invention employs an RFID similar to the way a master craftsman 
historically used his signature or mark’ (emphasis added) This seems an extraordinary 
 
345  Other subsidiary claims include such ordinary features as scanning, on-line access to the database and 
on-line purchasing, including a bidding facility. 
346  Indeed in the 1950s, and probably much earlier, schoolchildren often had their name tags sewn into 
items of clothing, such as jumpers and cardigans. 
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argument to put in trying to show inventiveness. The applicant went on to argue the 
invention was unique in providing authentication ‘in some way associated with an event or 
with one or more participants in the event.’ The examiner then issued a notice allowing 
grant of a patent, commenting that existing knowledge did not ‘teach’ use of a RFID tag ‘to 
authenticate that the item has been used at the event.’ 347  
Overall there seems no difference between these seven patents granted in the UK or by the 
EPO and the general set of patents granted in Australia, in terms of inventiveness generally 
or technical ingenuity in particular. At best the degree of inventiveness is trivial. At worst 
there is none, or only simple computerisation. None of these seven 'inventions' make any 
contributions to knowledge either in the field of business methods, or to software 
engineering.348 In each, the trivial difference from previous knowledge lies either in 
computerisation or in a business idea. It is not possible to identify any 'technical' 
contributions, despite this being a requirement of the EPC. 
On the other hand there were nine cases that were refused by the UK or the EPO (or were 
withdrawn after adverse examiner’s reports), including four betting cases. The betting cases 
involve particular issues, and all with any overseas applications have been refused (or 
withdrawn following adverse reports) in either the UK or the EPO. Of the general business 
method cases, one has been granted in the UK but refused by the EPO (the tax (VAT) 
refund system). With one exception the UK grants for business method patents pre-date the 
new four-step procedure introduced on 2 November 2006. There is no particular pattern to 
the EPO grants and refusals, though it appears from examiners’ reports that there has been a 
recent shift in EPO ‘case law’. More recent reports state that (unspecified) case law does 
not allow rejection simply as excluded subject matter under Article 52(2)/(3). These reports 
continue, however, with the ‘technical’ ‘non-technical’ distinction and rejections are now 
for lack of technical inventiveness under Article 56. 
While the EPO appears to have continued its tradition of widening patentability, the UK 
has moved to clarify that the subject matter exceptions in the EPC (and therefore in UK 
patent law) should be respected. In a lengthy discussion of these exclusions, their 
 
347  See USPTO, Public PAIR, application 10/475,155, applicant arguments of 6 June 2006, pages 3 and 4 
and Notice of Allowance of 6 July 2006, page 2.  
348  Nor does the eighth case with a UK patent (2003219472, “A tax refund system”), which was discussed 
in Section 6.2.1 above.  
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rationales, and how each should be treated, Prescott J took the view that the computer and 
business method exceptions were ‘hard’ exceptions: 
"You are not allowed to get round the objection—that you are attempting to patent a 
computer program—by claiming it as a physical artefact, a mere change of form." 
[2005] EWHC 1589 (Pat) at 36 
Following this judgement, the UK Patent Office announced a four-step test for assessing 
patentable subject matter: 349 
1. properly construe the claim  
2. identify the actual contribution  
3. ask whether it falls solely within the excluded subject matter  
4. check whether the actual or alleged contribution is actually technical in nature. 
That is, first confirm what the application is for—the claimed area of monopoly, then 
identify what contribution this makes to new knowledge. If this contribution is to business 
methods or computer software, then it is not patentable subject matter. If the answer to step 
three is ‘yes’, the assessment stops at that point and the ‘invention’ is not patentable. If the 
answer to step three is ‘no’, then the assessment continues to step 4, and the question of 
whether the knowledge contribution it makes is technical is asked. It would be an 
interesting test to see whether the five patents in this set granted by the UK Patent Office 
before this notice would be granted now. 
The one case granted in the UK after these guidelines were issued is “A system and method 
for monitoring an item” (2003302490), an ‘invention’ using RFID and non-RFID tags to 
monitor items. It is assessed here as being simply a system linking three databases, 
including biometric information. Given that the claims describe only a computer system for 
linking these databases, it is hard to imagine how it passed the new UK four-step test. 
6.5 The Contentguard patents 
The four Contentguard patents are for 'inventions' in the field of ‘digital rights 
management’ (DRM). The first of these is from a family of 16 members. The other three 
are from a single family of 197 members (which can be reduced to 17 sub-inventions, and 
five stand-alone inventions). The family size and patent thicket aspects of the Contentguard 
cases are discussed in Appendix 6. Here the focus is on the four patents in the selected 
                                                 
349  Available at http://www.patent.gov.uk/patent/p-decisionmaking/p-law/p-law-notice/p-law-notice-
subjectmatter.htm, accessed 27 August 2007. 
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dataset (Table 6.4). Like the other 'inventions' to which they are closely related, they are all 
software based. They revolve around commercial access to copyrighted material.  
Table 6.4 The four Contentguard patents: overseas outcomes 
  Application 
  Number 
Invention Title 
(abbreviated) 
Known 
outcomes 
Unknown outcomes 
(only listed where known entry) 
Number 
of claims
Times 
claims 
amended 
2003243179 Specifying and processing 
legality expressions 
 - - - CA (exam req 10/4);  
EP (exam req 4/4);  
US (ready for exam 4/5); 
CN, JP, KR, MX 
67 2 
2003219907 Networked services 
licensing system and 
method 
 - - - EP1 (exam req 9/4);  
EP2  (1st report 11/6, reply 4/7);  
US1 (amended 5/8, after 3rd report)  
US2 (appealed 1/8 after 2nd rejection); 
CN, JP, KR, MX 
29 2 
2003240981 Supplying and managing 
rights expressions 
KR: grant 1/7 EP (adverse 1st report 3/5, reply 8/5); 
BR, JP, MX, PH; US 
101 1 
2003290930 Granting access or 
permission to use an item 
based on configuration 
JP: w'drawn 
10/6 
EP (exam req 4/5) 
US: appeal notified 10/7 after 2nd 
rejection.  
43 1 
Source:  WIPO, CIPO, EPO (epoline Register Plus and esp@cenet), and USPTO (applications and Public 
PAIR) databases, supplemented by inspection of files relating to the Australian applications. 
Information last updated June 2008. 
The first (application 2003243179) identifies a number of elements needed to write a 
‘legality expression’ for agreeing access to digitised material. These elements are a duty, a 
prohibition, an intent and a claim. The second (application 2003219907) controls access to 
networked services where this cannot be based on an ID or log-in code system. Instead 
‘rights expression information’ is used to authorise access. The third (application 
2003240981) develops ‘expressions’ for how items can be used, based on purchasers and 
providers agreeing usage conditions, including use of rules to determine if rights should be 
granted. Finally "system and method for granting access to an item or permission to use an 
item based on configurable conditions" (application 2003290930) sets up multiple 
conditions in the sale of access to items. All have priority dates in 2002, and were filed 
during 2003. The company requested both expedited examination and postponement of 
acceptance for all four applications.350  
Underlying all these 'inventions' are commercial contracts (or elements of contracts), for 
access to copyrighted material. They all involve logic, and careful consideration of the 
                                                 
350  It is not the only company to request both fast-track examination and postponement of acceptance. 
This strategy allows the company to establish at an early date whether the application will be accepted. But 
the company can then delay the actual grant of the patent.  
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range of options and possibilities that could be incurred in selling access to and use of such 
material. There are no claims in the specifications to any challenges in software engineering 
that needed to be overcome to implement these contracts for access or sale.351  
The patent which belongs to a family of 16 members (“Specifying and processing legality 
expressions”, application 2003243179) has not yet been granted or refused overseas.352 
Examination was requested in Canada and the EPO in 2004. Despite the USA being this 
company's base, this patent has been waiting for examination at the USPTO since April 
2005. The Australian examiner raised novelty and inventiveness objections, citing one US 
patent. The claims were amended and the patent granted. 
The other three patents belong to a large and complex family, but none is either a divisional 
parent or child.353 While the total family is complex, it can be divided into 17 sub-groups, 
based on identical patent titles (see Appendix 6, Table A6.4). These three patents belong, 
respectively, to three of these sub-groups. The outcomes from parallel overseas applications 
are shown above in Table 6.4.  
There are no known overseas outcomes for "networked services licensing system and 
method" (application 2003219907). In Europe there are two pending applications with this 
exact title (one is a divisional child of the other). An adverse examiner's report for the child 
was issued in December 2006, and a response received in April 2007. The US situation is 
more complex: there are three applications with the same title, one of which is the PCT 
application. All were filed in 2003 but are still pending. One was amended in May 2008 
following a third rejection report from the examiner (application 10/374,729); another was 
appealed in January 2008 (application 10/712,268) following a second rejection report; and 
there is no status information for the PCT application.  
This is the shortest of the Contentguard patents, with only 29 claims, covering both the 
system and the method. While much of the language suggests a software and DRM focus, it 
is actually a broad claim for a method of developing licenses specifying the terms and 
conditions for anything which can be provided over a distributed network. The claim details 
                                                 
351 The claims are written in particularly complex and obtuse language, even for patents. They are also very 
lengthy: see Table 6.4.  
352  This family consists of two sets of applications with slightly different titles. The data here and in Table 
6.4 refer only to the sub-set with the same title as in the selected Australian patent.  
353  Based on information available on IPAustralia's Patsearch system. 
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sending specific messages such as ‘license missing’ and covers a wide range of options. 
The Australian examiner raised novelty objections, citing three previous US patents. As in 
cases discussed above, the attorney responded by amending the claims and arguing that the 
exact detail in each of the cited patents differed marginally for this 'invention'. The patent 
was granted. 
The assessment by the EPO in the examiner’s report of November 2006 is worth quoting as 
it provides both an independent summary of the content, and an assessment that there is no 
technical problem addressed: 
“… the applicant wishes to attain protection for a business method and a system 
which are used for digital rights management and for providing licenses to users of 
networked services distributed over a communications network such as the Internet. 
In order to implement this licensing management method, the present application 
further discloses the use of general technical features such as distributed computing 
environments, databases, … which features are however only used for their 
commonly known functions but their combination, despite solving and implementing 
business requirements, does not contribute to solve any particular technical problem 
and does not seem to induce any surprising effect.”354 
The next patent has also been granted in Korea. Despite the complexity of the 101 claims in 
"system and method for supplying and managing rights expressions" (application 
2003240981), this is really just a computerisation of the terms and conditions relating to 
various sale options. The claims provide detail about various manners of use, and the 
resolution of conflicts using pre-specified rules. The claims cover both digital and non-
digital goods, content and services. The Australian examiner objected, on the basis that the 
'invention' was technically equivalent to an earlier US patent. The attorney wrote at great 
length arguing that the previous patent concerned purchase and possession of goods, not 
purchase of a ‘rights expression’. Much was made of the possible variations in the manner 
of use in the purchase in this invention.355 The attorney also argued that there were 
differences in how buyers and sellers were matched. The patent was granted. The EPO 
examiner rejected the application in March 2005 on the grounds that there was no technical 
solution to a technical problem. The applicant then deleted and replaced all the claims. No 
further examiner’s report is yet available. 
 
354  epoline register Plus, publication EP1505530, annex to examination report of 30 November 2006, third 
paragraph of point 2.  
355  But sale of different types of use is simply the technical equivalent of selling different services or 
products.  
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The US outcome for this patent is unclear. The Australian application claimed priority from 
two US applications, each with different titles. One of these has been granted and one 
rejected, and the rejection is being appealed. But the only US version with the identical title 
is the PCT version, and there are no status data available for that application. 
The final Contentguard patent, "system and method for granting access to an item or 
permission to use an item based on configurable conditions" (application 2003290930) has 
been withdrawn from Japan, and rejected but appealed in the USA. No examiner objections 
were raised in Australia in regard to this system for negotiating sales which have multiple 
conditions attached. The system uses ‘rights expressions’ to specify these conditions.  
All four patents are written at a high degree of abstraction, using ‘devices’, ‘filtering steps’, 
‘processing steps’, ‘repositories’, ‘rules’, and, of course ‘rights expressions’. Each relates to 
a specific aspect of the terms and conditions for access to or sale of material (broadly 
specified to include digital or non-digital), with a principal characteristic being that there 
are many conditions attached to each sale agreement. Such relatively restricted sale 
agreements are clearly suitable for the sale of copyright material, where the owner is trying 
to extract maximum revenue. But fundamentally these are simply sales contracts that have 
been automated, at least to some degree. The specifications disclose no technical software 
challenges that had to be overcome in implementation. The business method is writing a 
contract for sale, albeit computerised. There is no evident contribution to knowledge in any 
of these patents. The costs imposed on competitors by the lengthy and abstract claims, 
together with the large number of patents, could be considerable. A large investment would 
be needed to determine what areas of ‘technology’ are legally monopolised by 
Contentguard, and what areas are open to competition.  
6.6 Policy Implications 
The cases reviewed in this chapter confirm the findings in Chapter 5. Standards of 
inventiveness in patent law are so low as to be almost invisible from a policy perspective. 
They are far below any standard that would be set to encourage the development of the kind 
of new applications of science and technology that contribute new knowledge and hence 
create spillover benefits and dynamic growth in the economy.  
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The evidence presented here shows, however, that this does not need to be the case. 
Countries can, and do, define inventiveness, novelty and subject matter in ways that prevent 
the grant of uninventive patents. Korea, for example, claims to apply a standard to the 
concept of invention that exceeds that in Australia or the USA.356 The UK, and to a lesser 
extent the EPO, more narrowly prescribe patentable subject matter. While fewer business 
method patents are issued in the UK, there does not seem to be any noticeable differences 
in the inventiveness of the six that have been granted there. The UK avoids granting patents 
for some applications that make no new technology contribution. But some are granted, and 
of such a low standard of 'inventiveness' that one must conclude that the UK too suffers 
from very low actual (de facto) definitions of novelty and inventiveness. Despite the lack of 
any specific subject matter exclusion, Canada seems to date to have been more successful 
than the UK in restricting the grant of uninventive business method patents. 
Once the rorts of royal monopoly privileges had been removed (by the Statute of 
Monopolies 1623), patents of invention were used to encourage new industries. The costs 
of developing new machines or artefacts could be significant, often involving considerable 
trial and error. As the knowledge embedded in the new artefacts spread, others were able to 
apply it in novel ways further adding to dynamic growth. Such a balanced system 
incorporated both reasonable spillover benefits and quite significant development costs. 
Patents were not particularly easy to acquire, despite the lack of examination,357 and 
technology fields had very low patent population densities. This is in sharp contrast to the 
millions of patents being issued today.358  
For the 39 business method patents examined in this chapter, there are no new contributions 
to knowledge, and any new artefacts/services/processes involve only trivial variations from 
those that existed before. Consequently it is hard to see that any spillover benefits would 
exist. Development costs are generally low. There are legal costs incurred in seeking these 
patents, and further costs will be incurred by other parties if they are used successfully.  
 
356  These claims (see Lanteigne 2003) suggest that Korea will reject ‘mere computerisation’ applications, 
yet it has granted Contentguard a patent for computerised sales contracts.  
357  See Dutton 1984; Coulter 1986 for academic treatments, or Dickens 1850, 1857 for a more informal 
view from the period. 
358  As at 15 July 2008 7,401,362 patents had ever been granted in the USA. By the end of 2006, 7,155,745 
patents had been issued and 4,065,671 of these (57 per cent) had been issued in the period from 1963.  
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The problems with the onus of proof and decision-making rules, limitations on what pre-
existing knowledge can be used, and legal doctrines narrowing the meaning of 'obvious' 
that were identified in Chapter 5 are confirmed here. Other findings also re-appear in these 
cases: claims are drafted at a very high level of generality, thus reducing the value of any 
information they contain, and broadening the scope of the claims. The patents considered 
here include cases of mere computerisation of known methods, application of well-known 
methods to narrow new fields, combinations involving trivial variations on previous 
systems and methods, and ‘inventions’ where there is little if any difference between the 
idea and its implementation.  
Again they are all patents for software implementation of business processes, though three 
also claim a manual version. The policy question of the patentability of software is still an 
active issue, at least in Europe. Within the USA some allege it is a settled question.359 But 
the recent further extension of patentable subject matter, to business methods, re-opens the 
question. Most business method patents would not issue if software remained unpatentable. 
A difficulty in public policy debates on subject matter boundaries is that they are dominated 
by those with a direct and substantial interest in ever-widening patent scope (Bessen 2003: 
257; IPAC 1984: 80). The Advisory Council on Intellectual Property (ACIP) is a body 
composed largely of users of intellectual property, including those who make a living 
directly and solely as intermediaries in the ‘intellectual property’ system.360 Most reviews 
of aspects of the Australian patent system are commissioned through this body.361  
 
359  Interestingly Kahin, who is very critical of software and business method patents, uses Lehman (2001) 
to document this view (Kahin 2003b). Bruce Lehman is the patent attorney who was appointed to head the 
USPTO during the period of the TRIPS negotiations. He is an ex-President and ex-CEO of the International 
Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI). He can hardly be called a disinterested voice. Sarginson and Langan 
(2001) consider it likely that business method patenting in the USA will be wound back. 
360  Its members include patent attorneys and business people familiar with the system (that is, more 
frequent patenters). As at mid 2008 there are no consumer representatives. There are two academics and two 
ex-officio public servants. See Appendix 10. In some ways patent attorneys can be seen as the industrial 
property equivalents of tariff consultants—a profession which flourished when tariff barriers were high, but 
which has now all but disappeared.  
361  For example it was ACIP which undertook the review of business method patents (ACIP 2003). The 
process for seeking submissions to that review focussed on users of patents. Nineteen submissions were 
received and 18 were made publicly available. One of these identifiably came from a consumer group; nine 
identifiably came from patent attorneys or their associations. ACIP has also been charged with the current 
review of patentable subject matter (ACIP, 2008). Again there seems to be little knowledge of this review 
outside the patent community.  
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While judges in Australia and the USA seem to be constantly widening the scope of the 
patent system, and reducing the thresholds, a recent UK case was refreshing in its insistence 
on implementing the patent statute.362 The UK Patent Office has subsequently issued 
advice about a new approach to assessing software and business method patents, based on 
this judgement. It will be interesting to see the impact of this. Indeed a useful study could 
be set up comparing outcomes from the UK Patent Office and the EPO. There is a strong 
desire for consistency in the application of patent law in Europe: that was one of the 
purposes underlying the European Patent Convention, and countries such as the UK 
specifically changed their legislation to exclude software as such in order to comply with 
the EPC. A detailed study of the innovative contribution and likely spillover benefits 
arising from any software and business method patents granted would be useful. In addition 
to the UK and the EPO, it would be interesting to include Germany, which has a reputation 
for very high patent standards. This would provide useful evidence on the value, or 
otherwise, of extending patentability to software and business methods. Bakels and 
Hugenholtz (2002), in reviewing the proposed European Union Software Directive, argued 
strongly for the establishment of a European Patent Observatory. There has, as yet been no 
response to this recommendation.  
Although the material presented here shows that countries have the capacity to shape patent 
policy to genuinely balance costs and benefits, thus contributing to economic growth rather 
than detracting from it, there are no evident differences in the 'inventiveness' of the 39 
patents considered here. Regardless of whether they have been granted overseas in a 
country with low or high standards, or refused, they seem equally lacking in inventiveness, 
when this is defined as a contribution to knowledge. None contribute new business method 
knowledge. None make any contribution to any scientific or technological field. 
Much of the discussion about the extension of patenting to business methods has been 
couched in terms of the issue being low inventiveness standards rather than a problem with 
subject matter extensions (Sub-Section 3.3.3.2). Indeed Kahin asks whether it is useful to 
see business method patents as an issue in patent policy or patent administration (Kahin 
2003c). Certainly if software were excluded from patentability, or if a genuine contribution 
 
362  [2005] EWHC 1589 (Pat). This judgement, by Prescott J has been discussed more fully above. 
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in a field of technology were required, it is unlikely that any of these patents would have 
been granted. But it is equally true that if there was a genuine inventive step threshold—
requiring at least a modest contribution to new knowledge and comparing this to the body 
of previously existing knowledge—none of these patents would have been granted. So this 
study suggests that both subject matter extensions and other critical design features of 
patent law and administration are important issues in innovation policy. 
Currently discussions on removing further scope for national tailoring from patent systems 
are occurring under the auspices of WIPO, with participants in this discussion being almost 
exclusively members of the ‘patent community’: those who have a deep self-interest in a 
globalised system. Representatives of consumer interests, and advocates of free market 
policies are conspicuous by their absence. So too are those advising on innovation policy. 
The proposed Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT) provides a platform which could later 
be used to remove international differences in the definitions of key terms, such as novelty 
and inventiveness, and the decision-making rules. The ability of national parliaments to 
determine these important details in patent laws would be removed. The legal doctrines 
which have been adopted into statute law, and which do so much to unbalance the patent 
system in many countries, would be cast in tablets of stone.   
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7 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
"As it reaches the patent office the application combines technological and legal invention, and 
the latter, if of superior quality, may do much to offset deficiencies in the former."  
(Edwards 1949: 218) 
7.1 An evidence base for patent policy 
This study was motivated by three issues. Firstly the inequity of requiring today's low-
income countries to eschew a policy that was so effective when rich countries were at an 
early stage of economic development: imitation and learning by doing.363 The TRIPS 
Treaty is a compulsory element of participation in the world's 'free trade' community, and it 
requires a style of patent policy that is known not to be suitable for the majority of WTO 
member countries (Penrose 1951). Secondly patent policy seems to be driven by opinion, 
with a remarkable absence of evidence. Despite this lack of evidence, a small group of 
major beneficiaries have been successful in achieving significant extensions in patent law, 
partly through their role in the TRIPS Treaty and Special 301, and partly by lobbying to 
ensure that legal judgements widening the scope of patent law were not returned by 
legislators to the previously prevailing situation (status quo ante).  
The third motivation was a concern about the possible negative impacts of the patent 
system as it operates today. The apparent significant reduction in the inventiveness 
threshold of patents suggests that an increasing proportion of granted patents will generate 
only welfare losses. Patent policy may thus be inducing very little genuine innovation, and 
reducing welfare rather than increasing it.  
Given that patent policy is a prime example of regulatory intervention into the operation of 
the market, there should ideally be a substantial body of direct evidence that the 
intervention is welfare-enhancing. Despite previous calls for the collection of appropriate 
data (for example IPAC 1984; Bakels and Hugenholtz 2002), there continues to be an 
almost total absence of such evidence about the operation of the patent system. Some calls 
 
363  Chaudhuri comments ‘it is actually morally and historically unfair to deny the developing countries the 
privileges which developed countries enjoyed at the comparable stages of their development’ (Chaudhuri 
2007: 18).  
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for the collection of data about the use and impact of patents seem to have been deliberately 
undermined.364  
Despite the lack of direct evidence, there is now a substantial body of empirical work on 
industrial innovation. Based on the evidence from large-scale surveys, repeated in many 
countries, and covering firms of all sizes and in all industry sectors, it is clear that in most 
circumstances patents are the least effective of a number of mechanisms for ensuring a 
return to investment in industrial R&D. The exceptions are discussed below. The general 
finding is that for firms of all sizes, and in almost all industries, most investment in 
industrial innovation would occur in a world without patents. Patent policy is thus not 
having the intended effect. In most circumstances it does not induce additional innovation 
activity—it simply provides a potential windfall gain for activity that would occur anyway. 
As there are costs generated by a patent system, the clear conclusion is that, in most 
circumstances patent policy is welfare-reducing not welfare enhancing. Its position as the 
default innovation policy choice can only be seen as irrational. 
There are, however, some exceptions where patents are reported, by senior industry figures, 
to be essential as a mechanism to induce innovation investment. The principal circumstance 
is the narrow range of industries where the new knowledge embodied in innovations is 
highly codified (and thus relatively more easily copied), and where innovation investment 
costs are large and indivisible. The primary examples are the pharmaceutical and fine 
chemicals industries. Some commentators have argued that patent policy is precisely 
designed for the type of innovation system where information is highly codified 
(Mandeville 1996; Macdonald 2004). Others have suggested that the only market failure 
will be where the initial investment is large relative to the market (Boldrin and Levine 
2004). For these few industries, patent policy may generate more benefits than costs, and so 
may be welfare-enhancing. 
The empirical evidence provides a sound evidence base for selecting between competing 
economic theories that have been used in discussions on patent policy. To date, much of the 
discussion on patent policy has been theoretical or opinion-based. Those in favour of strong 
patent systems draw on a conventional static neo-classical framework to argue that, absent 
 
364  See footnote 72 (p. 43).  
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patents, the level of innovative activity would be socially sub-optimal. Those who are in 
favour of a weak patent system use a framework which emphasises the key role of 
knowledge as an input into the production function, and that the costs of acquiring 
knowledge are high. They conclude that there are adequate market mechanisms to ensure a 
return to innovation, except where such innovation has a high component of codified 
knowledge. As a consequence, patents are unnecessary in most circumstances. 
The empirical data collected over the past thirty years provide a substantial evidence base 
for selecting between these competing theories, thus placing policy debate on a more 
rational basis. It is clear that the principal assumptions on which the standard economic 
justification of patents rests are wrong. Except where innovation is highly codified 
imitation costs are generally substantial so market conditions (such as lead-time advantages 
and access to complementary assets) operate to ensure a sufficient return to innovation. 
This is possible because there is no general failure in the market for industrial innovation. 
Indeed patent intervention can reduce market incentives to innovation where cross-
licensing prevails and first-mover advantages are substantial (Bessen 2003).  
Information economics provides a much sounder basis for the development of a welfare-
enhancing patent policy. Its assumptions are consistent with the empirical evidence across 
all industries. Its predictions align well with the facts. Where the codified element of 
knowledge is high, as in the pharmaceutical industry, copying will be relatively less 
expensive. But where the tacit component is high copying will be expensive, both in terms 
of time and resources, and the market provides adequate returns to innovation investment. 
The clear conclusion from this evidence is that a well-designed patent policy should be 
based on the insights offered by information economics. A welfare-enhancing patent policy 
would not apply across-the-board, but would rather be used only where it was effective in 
inducing additional innovation investment. This is unfortunately precluded by the TRIPS 
Treaty. However there is substantial opportunity, within TRIPS, to re-design patent systems 
to minimise their cost to society. 
Because of the absence of direct data on patent system operations there has been a tendency 
to gloss over the costs. One view is that the static efficiency losses due to the operation of 
patent monopolies will be low because mostly there will be substitute products or processes 
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(Gans et al. 2004). This may well be true. It would be useful if there were data that could be 
brought to bear on the issue. But to the extent that it is true, it also suggests that patent 
policy is entirely ineffective in inducing benefits. If a patent owner has very little market 
power, then s/he cannot obtain the monopoly returns which are alleged to be the 
inducement mechanism. Either there are monopoly opportunities, acting as an inducement 
mechanism—in which case there are both benefits and costs. Or there are no monopoly 
opportunities, and so neither costs nor benefits, except for direct transaction costs.  
The absence of direct data on the impact of patented inventions is problematic. 
Commentators have suggested that the costs of a patent system are high (Cole 2001), and 
increasing as patent systems are strengthened (Jaffe 2000). Many patent offices have 
expressed concerns about the direct costs to patentees, especially smaller companies (for 
example, EPO 1995a). Of more concern from a welfare perspective is the possible cost to 
society in terms of negative impacts on subsequent innovation. There is an unfortunate gap 
in evidence on this matter, except for anecdotal evidence.365 There is the opportunity to 
obtain such evidence through the large-scale innovation surveys which are now regularly 
carried out in many countries. These surveys provide an excellent opportunity to ask 
innovating firms about the impact of the patents owned by others on their own innovative 
investment. This would provide an evidence base for discussions of what is alleged to be 
one of the major costs of patent systems. 
The essence of effective policy is that it achieves the intended outcome, at minimum 
unwanted cost. But patent policy does not appear to be effective in achieving the intended 
outcome—an increase in innovative activity—except in very narrowly circumscribed 
circumstances. It is estimated that only some 3 per cent of patented inventions granted in 
Australia are induced by the patent system and have the potential to generate the positive 
spillover benefits that would offset any costs imposed by the patent system. Other countries 
where the proportion of patents domestically owned is small would be in a similar 
 
365  And some important historical examples where technological development has been held up because 
of patents. The most often quoted are the steam engine (Sell and May 2001), radio, and airplane stabilisation 
and steering (Merges and Nelson 1990; Cohen 2005). Cohen concludes that although the probability of such 
hold-ups might be small, the social cost if they occur can be very substantial. Bessen and Meurer (2008) also 
conclude that although there is no evidence that patents are necessary to induce innovation, neither is there 
any substantial evidence that patents operate to impede innovation.  
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situation.366 At the opposite end of the spectrum is the USA, where some 25 to 33 per cent 
of patented inventions may be induced and potentially generating positive externalities. 
Thus in a country where a high proportion of patents are domestically owned, and where 
many foreign owned patents are domestically worked, a substantial minority of patents may 
generate benefits. For patent policy to be welfare-enhancing these benefits need to be 
greater than the costs imposed by the patent system as a whole. 
Another important input in assessing whether a patent policy is welfare enhancing or not is 
the benefits created by higher (or faster) innovation. These are likely to be directly related 
to the level of inventiveness of granted patents. It is the development of new products and 
processes which can potentially generate spillover benefits, both in the form of increased 
consumer surplus, and through knowledge spillovers. The more inventive the innovations, 
the greater such benefits are likely to be. If a patented invention is only very marginally 
different from previous artefacts, it is unlikely to generate much additional consumer 
surplus. And if a patented invention does not contribute new knowledge, it cannot generate 
knowledge spillovers. The higher the threshold level of inventiveness required for a patent, 
the more likely there will be a high level of benefits attributable to a patent system. 
The main contribution of this study is a detailed investigation of the inventiveness of 72 
recently granted Australian patents. Unlike previous studies, inventiveness is assessed in 
terms of the contribution to new knowledge or know-how, rather than on the basis of the 
very low standards used in patent law. Inventiveness is assessed on the basis of the claims 
in the patent, rather than through indirect proxy measures. 
The selected patents are from the new field of business methods. While historically the 
patent system was reserved for new artefacts based on science and technology, a 1998 US 
court decision removed this limitation. This decision has spread to other countries, notably 
Australia and New Zealand. There has been much debate about the need for such a change, 
and considerable concern expressed about its possible consequences. Before investigating 
the selected Australian patents, this study looks at the background to this change in patent 
law and so in patent policy. 
 
366  For example the proportion of patents owned by residents is 12.4 per cent in the UK and 15.1 per cent 
in Sweden (Bates 2003: 55).  
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7.2 What has happened to the balance in patent law? 
The discussion of patent policy is dominated by lawyers, notwithstanding its clearly 
economic policy goals. Patent law has developed from a simple social contract—more 
innovation in exchange for temporary monopolies—into a complex and arcane set of rules, 
described in language still closely related to that used in the 1623 Statute of Monopolies. 
The rule-complexity and archaic language have been effective in limiting discussion of 
patent policy to members of the patent community (patent attorneys, patent office staff, and 
major users of the patent system, often represented by their in-house patent attorneys).  
In this study the story of the development of patent law is told from an economic policy 
perspective. One objective is to open this complex area to greater input from industry and 
innovation policy analysts. The other is to begin an analysis of the economic impact of 
patent case law. The story is told in three parts. 
First there is the issue of how the subject matter of patents has changed, from a system 
limited to mechanical contrivances to a system where almost anything that is functional and 
can be sold can be patented. The second part of the story is the existing literature on the 
extension of patenting to business methods. This literature has one resounding theme: has 
the extension only been possible because the inventiveness threshold has fallen to a very 
low level? So the third part of the story turns to the current rules used to determine how 
inventive an innovation must be before it can be granted a patent. 
Patent law has changed considerably since the English parliament first codified limits to a 
monarch’s right to grant monopoly privileges. Section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies 
provided an inventions exception to these limitations on the Royal Prerogative. Monopoly 
privileges could be granted for ‘any manner of new manufactures’, provided these were 
‘not contrary to the law or mischievous to the State, by raising prices of commodities at 
home or hurt of trade, or generally inconvenient.’ For some 200 years patents were granted 
only for physical artefacts. Then, in 1842, a patent was granted for a process for smelting 
iron, involving no physical artefact. This judicial extension of patentable subject matter to 
processes formed the basis for the subsequent extension of patents to computer software 
and business methods. This legally developed doctrine, that processes were patentable, was 
adopted into statutory law, apparently without any policy debate.  
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But processes raise far greater boundary problems for patent law than physical artefacts. 
Such difficulties are compounded in patent systems where a patentable invention is defined 
as a manner of manufacture, with reference to the Statute of Monopolies. In Australia the 
High Court determined, in 1959, that a manner of manufacture was effectively any 
‘artificially created state of affairs’ that had economic value. This is an extremely broad 
definition of what might be patentable. Christie considers that it means there are no subject 
matter limits to patentability in Australia, other than the exceptions in the Patents Act 1990 
(Christie 2000). Van Caenegem considers the NRDC criteria are ‘vague and embryonic’, as 
demonstrated through difficulties in their application (van Caenegem 2002: 44).  
With the development of computers in the mid-twentieth century, there was an active 
policy debate as to whether patents should be extended to this new technology area. In the 
USA the 1966 President's Commission on the Patent System recommended that 
patentability not be extended to software, and in 1980 copyright protection was formally 
extended to cover computer programs (Samuelson et al. 1994; Smith and Mann 2004). 
Subsequently the US government lobbied others to provide this form of protection for 
software. Its first success was in Japan. In 1994 it succeeded in having copyright protection 
for computer programs made compulsory, as part of the TRIPS Treaty (Article 10). The 
Australian history was similar (except for the influence on other countries). The 1984 IPAC 
review of patents considered the issue of computer programs, and concluded both that there 
was no need for patents to encourage software innovation and that implementing patent 
'protection' for software would raise substantial practical problems (IPAC 1984). The 
government accepted these recommendations. In 1984 the Copyright Act was amended to 
formally extended copyright protection to computer programs (Bell 1987).  
Unfortunately the legal view appears to be that, if no limits are specifically written into a 
statute, then there are no limits, even if a government has considered the matter and reached 
a firm policy conclusion. The 1981 Diamond v Diehr case determined that a patent should 
not be refused simply because the ‘invention’ included software. During subsequent years 
lawyers continually pushed the boundaries of this decision, and in 1998 the US Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit determined that ‘anything under the sun made by man’ was 
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patentable (State Street Bank case).367 Subsequently the USPTO’s internal review board 
has determined that a technological basis is not necessary for patentability (Ex parte 
Lundgren). The State Street Bank decision has effectively been adopted into Australian and 
New Zealand law. Even in Europe, where statute law specifically excludes the patenting of 
computer programs or business schemes as such, many patents are being granted for 
software and business methods, particularly by the EPO (Bakels and Hugenholtz 2002).  
Because of the recency of the judicial decision to extend patents to business methods, 
combined with the long delays between filing and grant of a patent, there is as yet only a 
small empirical literature on business method patents. This literature largely takes a series 
of quantitative proxies of patent quality and compares business method patents to patents in 
general. But much of the doctrinal analysis and legal commentary on patents in general and 
business method patents in particular, suggests that there are good reasons to believe that 
the general standards of patent quality have fallen to a very low level. So comparisons 
between business method patents and general patents provide only a limited insight into the 
likely economic effect of business method patents. This literature is largely about the US 
experience and the US patent system. However, the global patent community is tight-knit, 
and decisions and approaches in one country more often than not seem to flow rapidly to 
other countries.  
Given the questions raised in the business method and general literature about the 
inventiveness threshold required for a patent, attention is turned to these matters. Of 
considerable interest to policy analysts is how the ‘any manner of new manufacture’ 
condition evolved into a novelty test against existing knowledge, considered only one item 
at a time, and an inventiveness test which considers that the use of a well-known method in 
a marginally different field is not obvious. The bottom line is that the Australian Patents 
Act 1990 now has three tests to see if an 'invention' is inventive enough to be granted a 
patent. These are the novelty and inventiveness tests, and a third test to see if the invention 
is actually inventive enough to merit the term invention. This last test has been used to deny 
at least one patent to an 'invention' that had passed the novelty test (Christie 2000).  
 
367  Menell provides a useful criticism of this line of reasoning (Menell 2006).   
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This story of a series of doctrines developed through case law and gradually adopted into 
statute law without any apparent economic or policy analysis provides the context for 
understanding patent law as it operates today. It also explains the gulf between the meaning 
of the word obvious in terms of its normal meaning, and its meaning in patent law. There is 
a large commentary on the number of obvious patents being issued. Most of these meet the 
legal definition of inventive. This raises serious questions about the impact of key legal 
doctrines on the state of balance in the patent system as it now operates. It is, of course, the 
balance between the benefits conferred and the costs incurred by a patent system that 
determines whether the system is welfare-enhancing or not. A reasonable standard of 
inventiveness is critical to the quantum of social benefit from the patent system.  
7.3 What business method patents reveal about patent law 
The main contribution of this study is an investigation into the inventiveness of 72 recently 
granted Australian business method patents. The study is based on an assessment of the 
content of each patent, particularly the claims. In this manner it is similar to Campbell-
Kelly and Valduriez’s useful investigation of software patents (Campbell-Kelly and 
Valduriez 2005). However Campbell-Kelly and Valduriez used the low inventiveness 
standard of current US patent law as their test of inventiveness. They concluded that all 50 
of the best US software patents were incremental innovations, but that only two were 
obvious. They suggested that these two technically obvious patents were less obvious than 
many other software patents being granted.  
In this thesis a new approach is used to operationalise inventiveness in regard to the patent 
system. This approach is based on the twin policy goals of inducing additional innovation 
and ensuring that the net social impact of the patent system is an increase in national 
welfare. The principal test used in assessing the recent patents is whether they contribute to 
knowledge or know-how, either in the technical field of software engineering, or in the 
non-technical field of business methods.  
One possible contribution to knowledge is found among the 72 recently granted patents.368 
Three others possibly contribute new ideas,369 but there appears to be no ingenuity required 
 
 
368  Converting dates to numeric format relative to an origin before using cycles, including lunar cycles, to 
calculate future events. There is no readily available documentary evidence as to the underlying algorithms in 
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in their implementation. As indicated in the detailed discussion of their contributions, it is 
unclear that the owners of any of these patents would be able to demonstrate they were 
inventive if the onus of proof lay with the applicant.  
While there are severe boundary problems, it is possible to classify the patents into three 
groups, based on the form the 'inventiveness' takes. Some simply take a known method or 
process and combine this either with computers or with networks—19 of the patents fall 
into this group. Others make trivial variations to existing processes, or combine known 
processes—41 fall into this group. The last 12 seem to involve the simple specification of a 
'problem', then the use of straightforward logic to generate a 'solution'. This latter set 
includes the six betting patents, and the reverse mortgage finance patent which lapsed when 
it was opposed. 
7.3.1 The doctrine of analogous use and combinations 
An early patent doctrine was that of analogous use—where the known properties of a 
material make it well-suited for use in a new situation, this was deemed obvious, and thus 
unpatentable. From a policy perspective, this seems an eminently sensible doctrine, as it 
prevents the grant of a legislated monopoly for something that is likely to generate no 
spillover benefits. Again from a policy perspective this doctrine appears to be regularly 
over-ridden, at least in Australia, by a ‘combinations’ doctrine with a very low 
inventiveness threshold—not obvious unless someone has already done exactly that 
combination, or has written down how to do exactly that combination.370 But as Ullman 
(2000) points out the obvious is rarely written down.  
The 'inventions' involving mere computerisation or combining a known process with a 
network include examples such as the computerisation of the standard method of 
performing property valuations, ordering ID cards over a network, checking if someone is 
home to take a delivery, a geared investment loan package, evaluating performance in 
business units, evaluating business risk, and implementing new software systems. Five of 
the many calculators performing these or similar functions and on the market for a decade or more before the 
priority date of this ‘invention’. So no firm conclusion is possible.  
369  Using biometrics as well as other information to track goods; stopping unwanted email at the server; 
and linking bar codes directly to website addresses. These ideas may be novel.  
370  While this is the Australian situation, similar patents are issuing in the USA, where the CAFC has 
changed the rules about demonstrating obviousness such that what appear obvious combinations to the 
ordinary person are deemed not obvious under patent law (Lunney 2004).  
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the six patents which have been rejected overseas involve the mere computerisation of 
known methods. On the other hand, six of the 19 computerisation/network patents have 
already been granted patents overseas.  
Forty-one of the 'inventions' either combine well-known methods or make trivial variations 
to well-known methods. In the worst cases, they involve the application of well-known 
techniques in narrow new fields, for example benchmarking or audit. Again one might 
expect that such 'inventions' would be ruled uninventive on the basis of the analogous use 
doctrine. But, for reasons which are unclear, courts seem to give precedence to the later 
‘combinations’ doctrine. This effectively allows the grant of a patent for any combination 
of elements which has not been patented before in exactly that form. 
The widespread use of this doctrinal rule leads directly to an unbalanced patent system. 
Such a strong priority is being given to avoiding the risk of rejecting inventive inventions 
(type I errors) that very large numbers of patents are being granted for uninventive 
inventions (type II errors). The grant of invalid patents incurs high costs for the economy, 
through their impact on competition and invention (US FTC 2003). While design of any 
policy involves trade-offs, there is general agreement that a low inventive step incurs high 
social costs, which are not offset by spillover benefits. In discussing this issue, and the 
design of patent policy, Jensen and Webster suggest that there will always be some errors 
(Jensen and Webster 2004). Patent applicants have always been able to challenge rejection 
decisions. Earlier legal judgements paid more attention to the social costs incurred through 
invalid patents. From a distributional perspective, it is an innocent party who bears much of 
the cost in challenging an invalid patent, while it is the party seeking a monopoly who bears 
the cost of challenging a patent office rejection.  
There is a considerable asymmetry in the incentive to litigate a patent between the patent-
holder and alleged infringers. Litigation costs are high, and the benefit of a decision that a 
patent is invalid is spread among many parties, not all of whom pay for the litigation. In 
contrast, where a patent is deemed valid (either through litigation or because no litigation 
takes place), the patent holder receives the full benefit. Because of these asymmetries, the 
likelihood that an invalid patent will be challenged is less than might be warranted from a 
public good perspective.   
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7.3.2 Existing knowledge problems 
The discussion of the patents assessed in this thesis raised a number of issues about the 
rules used to determine inventiveness under patent law. Patent law presumes that there is a 
good, readily available, library of material demonstrating the current state of knowledge. 
But in the business method field, as with software, much existing knowledge is not 
available in such a form. This practical difficulty was one reason that government-
appointed advisory committees recommended that patentability not be extended to 
software. The difficulty remains. There is a large literature looking for solutions to this 
problem, particularly in the USA, where there is no effective system for opposing the grant 
of a patent prior to sealing (see, for example, Graham et al. 2002; Hall et al. 2003; Levin 
and Levin 2003; and Noveck 2006). One option is to exclude such fields from patentability. 
Another simple alternative would be to place the onus on the party seeking the monopoly to 
demonstrate inventiveness. This option is discussed further below. 
Related to this problem is the set of narrow prescriptive rules determining which pieces of 
knowledge can be used to determine either novelty or inventiveness. If it is an objective of 
patent policy to generate knowledge about new ways of doing things, then the body of 
existing knowledge used to test inventiveness or novelty should not be artificially 
narrowed. To narrow the body of existing knowledge is to tilt the playing field in favour of 
the applicant, and against the public interest. Statute law embodies doctrines developed 
through case law that limit the existing knowledge against which an alleged 'invention' is 
measured. The most surreal of these rules is that previously patented inventions are not 
automatically considered part of the body of knowledge for the inventiveness test. 
Changing this rule would require amendment of Section 7(2) of the Patents Act 1990.  
Courts now seem to be defining the relevant field of technology in a very narrow way. In 
respect of the US patent system, Bagley (2001) has demonstrated how technology fields are 
being so narrowly construed that most relevant prior knowledge is ruled inadmissible in the 
obviousness test. In the key Australian case, Welcome Real Time, the way in which the 
relevant field was construed, not as smartcard technology, but as loyalty programs, was 
critical to the decision of validity. Given the important policy goal that the social benefit of 
a patent system should exceed its cost (IPCRC 2000: 143-144), this judicial approach adds 
further to the imbalance in the patent system. Like the doctrine that combinations should 
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not be deemed obvious unless someone has said they are, this approach leans strongly in 
the direction of ensuring that patents are granted, regardless of whether there is a benefit to 
society. In part this is possible because the patent statute specifies no overall objectives. 
Again this issue is taken up further below.  
7.3.3 Level of generality 
Another major point emerging from the analysis is that some patents are written at such a 
high level of generality that there appears to be no difference between the idea and its 
implementation. Such cases, like the Signature patent at the heart of the State Street Bank 
case, effectively provide a monopoly on the idea.371 The patents in the dataset considered 
here are mostly software applications, and are written in terms of such broad concepts as 
‘calculating modules’, ‘control means’, ‘display means’, ‘receiving device’, ‘capture 
apparatus’ and so on. In no cases are there any technical specifications, even where specific 
devices are used. This means that the patent specifications disclose little other than the 
general idea of the 'invention'. The lack of knowledge disclosure is not, however, a problem 
for this set of patents, as they contribute no new knowledge.  
The higher the level of abstraction, the broader the scope of the claims. In some cases 
examined it is clear that the 'invention' has been developed in a specific environment (e.g. 
the sustainability of residential property, processing insurance claims) but the scope 
claimed is for a much wider field (the sustainability of all property, workflow prediction). 
While such claims are yet to be tested in court, they do pose risks for other businesses. And 
the broader the claim, the greater the risk, if the patent is held to be valid.  
Bessen and Meurer (2008) suggest that broad claims effectively mean an ownership claim 
to an invention, or to embodiments of an invention, that the owner does not actually possess 
at the time of the application. They provide several examples. Where such patents are 
enforced (for example the E-Data patent) other businesses incur substantial costs. Again 
there is a clear impact on the net balance of the patent system. 
 
371  In that case, a monopoly on implementation of US Internal Revenue Service guidelines for minimising 
the tax liability of pooled mutual funds in joint portfolios (Krause 2000).  
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7.3.4 ‘Manner of manufacture’ 
Another issue emerging from this study is that the requirement for a specified output is so 
general as to be meaningless. Acceptable outputs such as ‘accepting an offer’ or ‘providing 
for user access to the accounting data’ mean that the ‘manner of new manufacture’ test has 
become totally ineffective in limiting the reach of the patent system. The requirement for a 
technology basis has been quietly removed from the Australian patent system. The 
Australian Law Reform Commission has recommended review of the antiquated ‘manner 
of manufacture’ concept (ALRC 2004). This study indicates that such a review is not only 
urgent, but should also address the issue of whether a specific technology basis should be 
written into the definition of an invention in patent law.  
The Australian Government has recently announced such a review. It has asked ACIP—a 
body almost entirely composed of members of the ‘patent community’—to undertake this, 
and an issues paper has been released (ACIP 2008). There appears to be no link between 
this review and the broader national innovation system review (see Section 7.4.2.1).  
7.4 Implications 
While in other fields there has been an increasing emphasis on the need for an evidence 
base to policy,372 no such concerns have yet led to the development of appropriate 
databases from which to assess the real costs and benefits of patent systems.  
There have been previous calls for the development of data on which patent policy 
decisions could be based. In Australia the IPAC review recommended collection of data on 
the use of patents, perhaps periodically on renewal (IPAC 1984: 78). This recommendation 
has never been implemented. More recently Bakels and Hugenholtz have called for the 
establishment of a European Patent Observatory (Bakels and Hugenholtz 2002: 44). Again 
no action has been taken. In the specific field of the extension of patents to software and 
business methods, there have been several efforts to develop a knowledge base for use in 
 
372  The Cochrane Collaboration—to consolidate empirical evidence as a basis for determining the best 
approach to treating diseases—has been influential in the movement towards a demand for a stronger 
evidence basis for public policy beyond the health field. Information on the Cochrane Collaboration is 
available at http://cochrane.org, accessed 28 January 2008. 
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policy determination in the USA. These have been stopped by interested parties (Kahin 
2003a).373  
7.4.1 Developing an evidence base 
So the first need is for the establishment of effective data to measure the economic costs 
and benefits of patent systems. There are two obvious avenues for this. The first is to ensure 
that patent databases are re-oriented to meet public policy needs.374 This means that patent 
data need to be accessible for economic analysis.375 Further, when patents are renewed 
patentees should be required to provide information on how the patent is being used. This 
would not be an onerous task for patentees—a simple one-page pre-coded set of options 
could be provided. These data on how patents are being used would be invaluable 
information for assessing both the costs and the benefits of patent policy. They would 
provide a basis for establishing whether there are significant differences between different 
categories of patents in their costs and benefits. Indeed it might also be reasonable to 
require that the Patent Office be advised whenever any legal action is taken to enforce a 
government-sanctioned monopoly. This would fill a major gap in knowledge. Patent law is 
being used to impose costs on other parties, so should it not also incorporate compulsory 
provision of information about this? 
The call for the establishment of a European Patent Observatory to analyse patent as a basis 
for evidence-based policy making (Bakels and Hugenholtz 2002:44) is similar. If such an 
observatory were established, a most useful project would be a detailed study of the 
innovative contribution and likely spillover benefits arising from any software and business 
method patents granted. While there is a strong desire for consistency in the application of 
patent law in Europe, it is clear that there are substantial differences between patent 
administration at the European Patent Office and in specific countries. Recent changes to 
the examination approach for software and business method applications in the UK provide 
an excellent opportunity to compare the outcomes from different approaches to patent 
 
373  See footnote 72, page 43. 
374  At present they are principally if not exclusively designed to meet the needs of patent attorneys and 
patent applicants. 
375  This requires the ability to analyse patent data on the basis of multiple fields, with these being 
determined by the analyst. It also means that improved cross-classifications to industry must be developed, so 
that data can readily be matched to other economic information on the behaviour of firms.  
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administration.376 The window of opportunity for this may be short. As applicants realise 
the implications of the new UK approach, they will be more likely to lodge their 
applications through the EPO, and request examination there.  
The second avenue for collecting useful data on patents are the national innovation surveys 
that are now being undertaken in many countries, including Australia, the European Union 
and Canada. Given the clear policy orientation of these surveys, it is surprising how little 
information they collect about patent use.377 Mairesse and Mohnen (2003) note that the 
second (European) Community Innovation Survey (CIS2) asked no questions about 
mechanisms to protect innovation. The third survey (CIS3) asked whether patents and other 
formal (legal) or strategic (market) mechanisms were used, but did not ask about the 
relative importance or effectiveness attached to them. These surveys are regularly 
undertaken, and are targeted at innovative firms—the exact target group for patent policy. 
They provide an ideal opportunity for finding out a great deal more about the operations of 
patent systems. In particular, they could be used to collect data both on the forms in which 
patents are used by firms that own them, and on the impact of patents owned by other firms 
on the behaviour of innovating firms. These are currently major gaps in knowledge about 
the impact of patent systems. It is time they were filled. 
It has also become apparent during this study that while there has been considerable 
research on industrial innovation, and much analysis of patent data, there are still many 
gaps in knowledge. This thesis has not been oriented to identifying these gaps, though 
others do so (for example Dixon and Greenhalgh 2002). This thesis does however identify 
two major gaps: the absence of any economic assessment of patent case law; and a lack of 
genuine assessment of the actual inventiveness of granted patents. It would be useful to 
establish whether the doctrinal and decision-making rules which give rise to such a low 
level of inventiveness for business method patents also apply in other fields of technology. 
Pharmaceutical and chemical patents would be a priority area for investigation, as it has 
 
376  In addition to the UK and the EPO, it would be interesting to include Germany, which has a reputation 
for very high patent standards, and where courts have taken a similar approach to the UK—that inventions 
must be technical to be patentable (Pilch 2003: 293).  
377  Or perhaps it is not. Perhaps innovation analysts are well aware that patents are of only very limited 
use in encouraging innovation, and hence do not waste space asking about them.  
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been suggested that many patents in these technology fields are also obvious (Dreyfuss 
2000; Correa 2004; Kesselheim 2007).  
7.4.2 Policy changes 
Changes to patent policy should not wait until such databases are established and analysed. 
There is sufficient evidence already on the table to show that, for most industries, patents 
are ineffective policy. They have no effect in inducing additional innovation. Neither is 
there substantial systematic evidence about the costs of the patent system: some theorists 
consider these negligible. Firms successfully sued because of their independent inventions, 
such as Catuity, might not agree. Nor might firms such as State Street bank, which was 
unable to agree a reasonable price for a license for a monopoly on implementation of the 
IRS’s guidelines for minimising the tax liability of pooled mutual funds in joint portfolios.  
This combination of evidence—that the system is generally ineffective in achieving its 
purpose but that the costs it imposes are unknown—suggests several possible options. 
Members of the patent community might argue for no change. No change to the ‘flexible’ 
‘manner of new manufacture’ test that allows expansion of the regulatory intervention into 
new markets without any economic assessment. No change to the very low inventiveness 
threshold that allows such a large volume of trivial patents to be granted. And no change to 
data collection systems, especially no collection of data that would document the extent of 
use of the patent system. 
At the opposite extreme would be the option that an ineffective monopoly system with 
unknown but potentially significant costs (falling mainly on innovators and consumers) 
should cease forthwith. This is no longer possible for sovereign states. Not, that is, unless 
they can persuade the global community to rescind TRIPS.  
But between these two options there are a range of reforms which are TRIPS-compliant and 
which would eliminate some of the worst features of the current system.  
As indicated in Chapter 1, there is an important parallel between patent law and tax law. In 
both systems there are substantial financial incentives for parties who are well able to 
afford outstanding legal advice to ‘game’ the system. The story of how legal semantics—
‘clever’ legal drafting—has been used to undermine statutory and doctrinal exclusions has 
been told above. This is in some ways parallel to financial arrangements which are picked 
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up by the ‘anti-avoidance’ principles of tax law. Braithwaite (2005) argues that in such 
circumstances it is important that statute law has over-arching principles which trump 
specific rules. He also argues that it is important that there be ‘anti-avoidance’ 
mechanisms378 and that the legislature must be willing to intervene when judicial decisions 
are made that undermine the purpose of the legislation.  
The two important principles that should be incorporated into the patent statute are the 
purpose of the legislation—providing an incentive to innovation and ensuring that this 
incentive be counter-balanced by a genuine consideration passing to the nation.379 In other 
words, the statute needs to spell out the clear economic goals of the patent system, and 
specify that a reasonable quantum of inventiveness is required so that a patented invention 
is likely to contribute a benefit to the nation. These two objectives would give judges the 
guidance they clearly need in interpreting the statute in a manner that is welfare-enhancing 
rather than welfare-reducing.  
7.4.2.1 Subject matter exclusions 
The empirical evidence clearly demonstrates that patents are relatively unimportant in 
many technology fields, and are therefore likely to induce little additional invention. The 
norm in regard to regulatory intervention in the market is that this should occur only where 
benefits clearly exceed costs. This means that patents should only be granted where 
innovations have a very high component of codified knowledge, and where development 
costs are high. That is, for inventions that might not occur without a patent system.  
One obvious reform would be to restrict the fields for which patents are granted. The 
simplest way to implement this boundary would be to establish which technologies can be 
patented and which cannot. This, however, would breach Article 27 of TRIPS, and any 
country contemplating this welfare-enhancing change to patent policy would face very high 
costs. An alternative would be to add codification proportions and development cost 
minima as new threshold tests for patentability. While far more complex and thus riskier 
(who knows what the courts would read into such limitations), this would be a TRIPS-
 
378  The Patent equivalent to complex tax-avoidance products is ‘clever drafting’. Both are designed to 
undermine the purpose of the legislation. As Prescott J said: ‘You are not allowed to get around the [statutory 
provisions] … by … a mere change of form’ [2005] EWHC 1589 (Pat) at 36.  
379  While balance has been an important feature of patent policy since 1624 it is not written into modern 
patent statutes. Indeed the purpose of patent policy is not generally written into patent statutes. 
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compliant approach to limiting the scope of patents to those areas of innovation where 
patent policy is likely to enhance rather than reduce welfare.  
When TRIPS was agreed, in 1994, it was accepted that the most appropriate form of 
'protection' for software was copyright. It is a requirement of the TRIPS Treaty that 
copyright 'protection' be provided for computer software (Article 10). It was commonly 
understood that computer software was not patentable, and the question of the patenting of 
business methods had not even been raised. It is therefore possible to exclude these fields 
from patentability without breaching the terms of the TRIPS Treaty. This would create 
boundary problems, but these are implicit in any market regulation, and simply have to be 
dealt with. Previous boundary problems were eroded by the continuous extensions in 
software patenting, argued in court between private parties. The challenge and costs of 
boundary problems are not a reason for removing boundaries, though they might be a 
reason for removing market regulation. They are certainly a reason for including over-
arching principles and anti-avoidance principles in the statute.  
With one exception, the patents reviewed here are all for computer programs.380 Computer 
programs are, of course protected against copying by the Copyright Act 1968, amended in 
1984 to include software programs. These 'inventions' are therefore double-dipping in terms 
of 'protection' against imitation. Providing patent protection for software not only protects 
against copying, but it also prohibits independent creation. Where the 'invention' is only 
trivially different from existing systems, such independent invention is highly likely. This 
increases the social cost of the monopoly grant.  
The policy question of the patentability of software is still an active issue, at least in 
Europe. The recent extension of patentable subject matter to business methods makes 
serious policy attention to this question urgent. If software were excluded from 
patentability, the only 'invention' from this dataset that would have been granted a patent is 
the system for teaching children about the meaning of money by them working for their 
pocket money. 
In reviewing the proposed European Software Directive for the European parliament, 
Bakels and Hugenholtz drew attention to two major issues. One was the very low 
 
380  Though four also claim a monopoly over the manual version. 
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inventiveness threshold that has developed in European patent law, as in other jurisdictions. 
This is discussed further below. The other was the large number of software patents being 
granted despite the legislative exclusion in the European Patent Convention (EPC). They 
suggest that the EPC requirement for a ‘technical character’ is drawing only a very arbitrary 
distinction, which is easy to avoid by ‘clever’ legal drafting. They recommend that the 
exclusion for computer software and business schemes be moved from Article 52(2), where 
the exclusion is limited by the as such provision (Article 52(3)), to Article 52(4) where the 
exclusion would be absolute (Bakels and Hugenholtz 2002: 36). To the extent that the 
software and business method patents currently being granted by the EPO are as trivial as 
the business method patents being granted in Australia, this would clearly be a welfare-
enhancing change.  
In Australia a move to restrict patentable subject matter to inventions based on technology 
could usefully be considered as part of the current review of the term ‘manner of 
manufacture’. The ACIP issues paper raises a number of questions about patentable subject 
matter as well as virtually every other substantive criterion for patentability (ACIP 2008). 
This could provide a real opportunity to return balance to the patent system. Whether this 
opportunity eventuates depends in part on whether there is broad input into the review. The 
ACIP patentable subject matter review was announced while a wider review into 
Australia’s national innovation system was occurring. To undertake this broader review the 
Government has appointed ‘an expert panel to review the national innovation system and 
the coherence and effectiveness of existing public support for innovation’.381 The review 
was initially due to report in the month that the patentable subject matter issues paper was 
released. Some two weeks after the release of the ACIP issues paper at least two members 
of the expert panel were completely unaware of the very existence of this review.382 This 
suggests that submissions to the ACIP review will again be heavily weighted by 
submissions from the patent community: if members of the broader innovation community 
are unaware of the review they will be unlikely to provide input. If patents are indeed 
central to innovation, then input into patent policy design from innovation experts is 
 
381  http://www.innovation.gov.au/innovationreview/Pages/home.aspx, accessed 31 August 2008 (pre-
amble to terms of reference).  
382  Email communications with each of two members of the panel who had contacted me regarding  
my submission (http://www.innovation.gov.au/innovationreview/Documents/513-Hazel_Moir.pdf ) to their 
broader review. 
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essential. So too is input from consumers and from those interested in maximising 
competitiveness in the Australian economy. 
Kahin asks whether it is useful to see business method patents as an issue in patent policy 
rather than patent administration (Kahin 2003c). Certainly if software were excluded from 
patentability, or if a genuine knowledge contribution in a field of technology or science 
were required, almost none of these patents would have been granted. But it is equally true 
that if there was a genuine inventive step threshold, requiring at least a modest contribution 
to new knowledge, and comparing this to the body of previously existing knowledge, 
almost none of the patents reviewed in this thesis would have been granted. So this thesis 
suggests that both subject matter extensions and other critical design features of patent law 
and administration are important issues in innovation policy. It also suggests that both 
subject matter exclusions and the height of the inventive step are policy matters and both 
need to be addressed through legislative change.  
7.4.2.2 A genuine inventive step 
This study has noted the wide body of expert opinion in the USA that suggests the standard 
of inventiveness required in US patent law is extremely low (Chapter 3). Bakels and 
Hugenholtz (2002) argue cogently that the current very low inventiveness standard in 
Europe is based on standards introduced through case law and legal doctrine. This study 
has shown that the inventiveness standard in Australia is equally low, and has developed in 
a similar manner. A series of legal doctrines, based on individual cases, has so sloped the 
playing field in favour of avoiding type I errors that the inventiveness threshold in patent 
law is unlikely to exclude many applications (Lawson 2008).  
Because these low standards have developed through case law, they can only be reversed 
by amending the relevant statutes. Legislative change is required. This view is echoed by 
Bakels and Hugenholtz (2002: 37). In this they part company from many other 
commentators who recommend a range of administrative changes within patent offices. But 
this study makes it clear that it is legal doctrine that is increasingly sloping the patent 
playing field in the interests of patent applicants, in a manner that significantly reduces 
economic welfare. Changing patent office practices will not change the attitude of judges, 
who are entirely independent. It will simply result in judges telling patent offices to adopt 
different procedures. The only available mechanism for raising the inventiveness standard 
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is legislative change. In Australia there have been two very minor changes to statute law to 
attempt to raise the inventiveness threshold (1990, 2001), but these moves fall far short of 
what is needed. The legislative amendment to require applicants to submit information 
from overseas patent office searches for existing knowledge was first watered down, then 
eliminated in late 2007. As long as most existing knowledge is ruled out of court for the 
purposes of assessing the novelty or inventiveness of a patent application, and applicants 
are exempted from any obligations to provide information on relevant existing knowledge, 
the standard for the grant of patents will be low. Consequently there will be many patents 
granted that provide no spillover benefits to offset the costs they create.  
7.4.2.3 Onus and standard of proof 
This study has indicated a range of changes that should be made to patent law to re-
introduce balance and to increase the likelihood that the system is welfare-enhancing. A 
number of specific changes to legal doctrines have been discussed above. More broadly, 
patent law could usefully draw on the general approaches used for ensuring that market 
regulations are welfare-enhancing. These approaches would be of great assistance in 
ensuring that patents were only granted for inventions that were likely to contribute 
spillover benefits, thus offsetting the social costs created by the patent system.  
The legislative presumptions of novelty and inventiveness mean that it is the government 
which has to show that a patent application is uninventive, rather than the applicant 
showing that it is inventive. Attorneys actively use this rule in arguing for grant of a patent. 
There is no logical or evidence-based reason for this reversal of proof within the patent 
system. The normal regulatory rule is that the onus lies with the party seeking intervention 
in the market to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that such intervention would be welfare-
enhancing. If this normal rule were adopted, it is likely that most of the uninventive 
'inventions' reviewed in this study would not have been granted a patent. Others have also 
suggested that the onus of proof should be made consistent with normal regulatory norms 
(for example, Stern 1999). Such a policy change would be TRIPS-compliant.383 
 
383  Extraordinarily, the TRIPS Treaty includes an Article requiring that the normal burden of proof be 
reversed in the case of process patents. Article 34 sets out circumstances where a product shall be deemed to 
have been produced using a patented process unless the alleged infringer (the accused) proves otherwise 
(http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm, accessed 30 April 2008). However Article 34 
applies only to litigation about infringement of a granted patent. Nothing in the TRIPS Treaty prevents an 
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The norm in most cases of regulatory intervention is that the benefit of regulatory 
intervention must be significantly greater than the harm. Due to the dominance of the legal 
approach in patent policy discussions such an option was dismissed by the IPCRC as being 
inappropriate for a civil matter (IPCRC 2000: 166). But patent policy is a tool of economic 
policy. The appropriate standard for regulatory intervention in the market is that the benefit 
be significantly greater than the harm. The appropriate decision-making standard in patent 
policy is therefore beyond reasonable doubt. This decision-making rule should be adopted 
for all aspects of patent policy and should be clearly written into the statute.  
7.4.2.5 Patent policy objectives 
Changes to both the onus and standard of proof and the height of the inventive step would 
return a degree of balance to the patent system. As a consequence a sharp fall in the volume 
of patents might be anticipated. This would reduce costs to innovating firms. Those 
inventions remaining in the patent system would be more likely to be reasonably inventive, 
and thus might provide some benefit to the economy.  
The history of patent law has shown, however, that most judicial decision-makers need 
clearer guidance on the overall objectives of patent policy. Without such guidance they may 
continue to make decisions which are welfare-reducing. Strategic behaviour (including 
‘clever drafting’) will again be used to erode the inventiveness threshold. A solution is to 
write into the statute the twin policy goals of inducing genuine invention and ensuring that 
only inventions which might benefit society are granted patents. Also needed are principles 
which will ensure that semantics are not used to undermine the purpose of the legislation.  
Currently discussions are quietly taking place on removing further scope for national 
tailoring from patent systems. The participants in these discussions are almost exclusively 
members of the patent community: those who have a deep self-interest in a particular 
outcome. Representatives of consumer interests, competition authorities and other 
advocates of free market policies are conspicuous by their absence. So too are those 
advising on innovation policy, except for patent experts. The proposed Substantive Patent 
Law Treaty (SPLT) creates a platform for the possible removal of international differences 
administrative requirement that applicants for patents be required to demonstrate that their inventions meet 
the statutory requirements of novelty, utility and inventiveness.  
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in the definitions of key terms. This proposed treaty is cast largely as a technical matter. 
But as this study has shown apparently minor legal doctrines can have a substantial impact 
on balance in the patent system. Although discussion of the critical terms novelty and 
inventiveness and the decision-making rules has been at least temporarily deferred, the very 
existence of the treaty would create a further platform for proponents of global patent 
policy to push that agenda. Sovereign governments handed over a great deal of flexibility in 
minimising welfare-reducing monopolies when they signed TRIPS. Agreeing the wider 
range of matters proposed through the SPLT would further undermine the capacity of 
sovereign governments to design patent systems to minimise harm and maximise national 
benefit. The material presented in this study suggests that until there is a stronger evidence 
basis for patent policy, moves to develop further the single globalised system should be 
strongly resisted. 
The view that there needs to be a technology basis to a patentable invention has been so 
widely held that it has rarely been written down. As a consequence it seems in danger of 
being removed from the patent system. But there are some equally tacit assumptions in 
patent law that make it difficult to extend patentability beyond a technology base without 
bringing patent law into disrepute. One of these assumptions is that there is an accessible 
well-documented library of existing knowledge. The other is that is is possible to 
distinguish very clearly the boundaries between patented ‘inventions’. 
As the 1966 US President’s Commission and the 1984 ACIP review noted, there are 
substantial practical difficulties in applying patent law to software. Experience has 
confirmed major difficulties in determining existing knowledge for both software and 
business methods. The high level of abstraction in drafting patents in these fields has also 
been documented. Together these difficulties so undermine the important central principle 
of balance in patent law in these fields that the outcome appears welfare-reducing. The 
available flexibility under TRIPS could be used to clearly define these fields as lying 
outside any field of technology. Learning from the EPC experience these exclusions should 
be drafted as absolute exclusions to minimise the speed with which they will be 
undermined by ‘clever drafting’. If the inventiveness lies in the software or the business 
method it should not be a patentable invention.  
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Appendix 1 Empirical evidence on innovation spillovers 
As discussed in Section 2.3.3, the extent to which there are positive externalities from 
innovation is not a critical issue in determining the most adequate theoretical model for 
analysing innovation and the need for patents. However, the alleged existence of such 
benefits is frequently put forward by industry lobbyists as a reason for 'strong' patent 
‘protection’ (see, for example, Maddock 2002). In contrast, Plant (1934) and Machlup 
(1958) were most sceptical that the resource re-allocation consequent on the patent 
incentive would be welfare-enhancing. It is therefore worth reviewing the empirical 
evidence about this view. 
Before reviewing the data on spillovers, it should be noted that theoretical expositions are 
for closed economies. As spillover benefits (positive externalities) need paths to flow 
through, and can flow overseas, this is a major limit to their value in assessing appropriate 
policy from a national perspective. A number of analysts have noted that optimal patent 
policy in a technology-importing nation may well be very different from that in a 
technology-exporting nation (Penrose 1951; BIE 1994b; Gruen et al. 1996). A recent study 
on productivity by the National Office for the Information Economy (NOIE) includes a 
useful appendix on the relationship between R&D expenditure and productivity growth, 
focusing on the role of externalities. They conclude: 
"So, while the rate of social return to R&D from a global perspective may be quite 
high, the domestic social rate of return in a small country may not be much above the 
private return to R&D, due to cross-border spillovers."  
(NOIE 2004: 97) 
Very few countries in the world are net exporters of technology. But even in a technology-
exporting nation, the flow of spillover benefits to other countries may affect the net benefits 
of a patent system.  
The social return to innovation includes the private return and any externalities. The 
externalities take two principal forms—increases in consumer surplus, and knowledge 
flows (Dempster 1994). To the extent that an innovator can exercise monopoly power, 
consumer surplus benefits will be lower. To the extent that patents are effective in 
preventing imitation and adaptation, knowledge flows (spillovers) may be lower. The net 
positive externalities flowing from industrial innovation are thus likely to be higher when a 
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patent regime is weak than when it is strong. This is also the conclusion Mandeville reaches 
in his discussion of novelty and the patent system (Mandeville 1996).  
There are two types of empirical studies on the social returns to innovation: econometric 
studies, based on national accounts and other highly aggregate data, and case studies, based 
on survey data. Both are plagued by measurement problems. There are massive problems in 
adequately measuring knowledge, changes in knowledge, own knowledge, public domain 
knowledge and knowledge appropriated from private owners. Nor is it easy to separate 
knowledge from capital—indeed there are arguments as to whether disembodied knowledge 
can have any direct impact on economic output.  
Two recent review articles reach somewhat different conclusions, but are useful in 
marshalling the available evidence.384 Sena reviews four types of econometric studies and 
concludes that sizeable intra- and inter-industry spillovers exist (Sena 2004). In contrast the 
US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) considers the evidence (from three different types 
of studies) to be relatively speculative, largely because of severe measurement difficulties 
(US CBO 2005). These large econometric studies give very divergent estimates of the 
relative value of social returns to industrial innovation.  
Information on the important role suppliers and customers play in technology development 
certainly indicates that knowledge spillovers can be important, and two case studies are 
discussed below. But more systematic data are needed to estimate the overall magnitude of 
such spillovers. If they are large, knowledge spillovers would disproportionately increase 
the contribution of R&D expenditure to economic growth. The magnitude of such 
spillovers at the economy-wide level is therefore an important policy issue. Unfortunately, 
these large econometric studies give very divergent estimates as to the relative value of 
social returns to industrial innovation. In particular, estimated spillovers are much lower 
from time-series than cross-sectional studies (US CBO 2005). As the key policy issue is the 
impact over time of innovation spillovers on productivity and economic growth, the lower 
time-series estimates are of some concern.  
 
384  Dempster’s review article usefully separates out the discussion into that part of the social return which 
is pecuniary (taking the form of producer or consumer surplus) and that part which occurs outside the market, 
principally flows of knowledge (Dempster 1994). This study is hard to obtain, though the library at the 
Australian Commonwealth Department of Innovation, Industry, Science and Research has a copy.  
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There is consensus on some issues. Knowledge spillovers flow through a variety of 
channels (Sena 2004: 318). Firms must invest in their own innovation capabilities if they 
wish to be able to benefit from spillovers (US CBO 2005: 26-27; Cohen and Levinthal 
1989). There is some evidence to support a greater magnitude of knowledge spillovers 
between firms in technological or geographic proximity (Jaffe 1986, 1988; Porter 1990). 
Differences in the magnitude of knowledge spillovers are also reported, with some 
industries contributing a high level of knowledge spillover benefits, and others very little 
(Bernstein and Nadiri 1991). 
Given the differences in opinion about the magnitude of spillovers at the industry level, it is 
interesting to consider the results of case studies. These can throw light on the nature and 
form of spillover benefits, and on some of the conditions under which they occur.  
The seminal case study used to support high social returns from industrial innovation is the 
1977 study by Mansfield and colleagues which estimated the median social return to R&D 
at 56 per cent. This study is repeatedly quoted to indicate than industrial innovation 
generates a high social return, though the authors themselves emphasised the care that was 
needed in interpreting their results, given the limitations created by the assumptions in their 
model (Mansfield et al. 1977).  
What is rarely reported is that this study is based on of 13 product innovations and four 
process innovations. Only 30 per cent of these had both a high social return and a low 
private return (Figure A2.1). Nor is it always noted that the methodology is based on 
estimated consumer surplus, and does not attempt to measure knowledge spillovers.  
Of the 17 innovations, 12 had a high private return, and six of these also had a high social 
return. Five of the innovations had low or negative social returns. The authors suggested 
three factors as being likely to influence the gap between private and social rates of return: 
market structure in the innovator's industry; whether the innovation is major or minor; and 
whether it is a process or product innovation. In the context of any policy discussion, it is 
important to note that only a minority of these innovations (about one-third) were 
innovations where there was both a high social return and the possibility that they might not 
happen without any policy intervention (low private return).  
 Figure A2.1 Estimated social and private returns to US industrial innovations, 1970s 
low or -ve social 
returns
high social and 
private returns
N = 5 N = 6
N = 6
high social returns; low private returns
 
Source: Mansfield et al. 1977: Table II (p 233)  
Also available, but less widely quoted, is the Bureau of Industry Economics (BIE) study of 
spillovers, which usefully considers both consumer surplus and knowledge spillovers (BIE 
1994a). This study shows that benefits frequently flow along the value chain, i.e. between 
parties in a market relationship with each other: suppliers and customers. Where there is 
such a relationship benefits are measured as a change in consumer or producer surplus, 
rather than as spillover benefits. The study also emphasises two factors that are critical for 
benefits to eventuate: in regard to knowledge spillovers, market depth, i.e. a sufficiency of 
other firms, is necessary for there to be high social returns. In regard to firms in market 
relationships, competition is essential if the innovator is to pass benefits to users of the 
innovation.   
The empirical work indicates that spillovers from industrial innovations can be high, but is 
also extremely variable. It also indicates that private returns can also be very high.385  
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385  This variability in returns also applies to patents. Studies of the private value of patents show that a 
very small percentage have very high private values, but that the median private value is low (Pakes and 
Simpson, 1989). Bessen and Meurer calculate that the net private return to publicly listed US firms is strongly 
positive for pharmaceutical companies, but negative for those in other sectors (Bessen and Meurer 2008). 
Greenhalgh and Rogers find a positive market value for EPO patent applications, but not for UK patent 
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Overall, then, there is still some difference in opinion as to whether there is strong evidence 
for intervention in the innovation market. Plant and Machlup both expressed considerable 
reservations about the proposition that re-allocating resources to inventive activity through 
the patent system is welfare-enhancing. Plant pointed to the wide range of incremental 
improvements occurring outside formal research laboratories as being cumulatively more 
important to the development of technology than formal R&D (Plant 1934).386 Machlup 
deliberated over whether industrial R&D clearly had a higher pay-off, in terms of economic 
growth, than other major drivers of growth, such as education (Machlup 1958).  
The studies typically use R&D expenditure as a key independent variable. The relationship 
between R&D expenditure and patenting has changed significantly over the past two 
decades (Kortum and Lerner 1999; Jaffe 2000; Blind et al. 2003; Hall 2005). So, for 
patents, they do not tell us whether the net social return for the whole set of patents granted 
in a year is positive. To date this question has been addressed only in respect of private 
returns to patenting, and only in respect of US publicly listed firms (Bessen and Meurer 
2008). This study showed a negative private return, except for pharmaceutical firms.  
From a policy viewpoint, the critical question is whether the patents which are induced by 
the patent system create sufficient social benefits to offset the social costs attributable to all 
patented inventions. Only a minority of patents are induced (see Appendix 2), and not all 
industrial innovations have high spillover benefits. Because the spillovers take the form of 
either consumer surplus or knowledge flows, they are greater the more innovative the 
patented invention. If patents are being granted for incremental rather than significant 
innovations, then any knowledge spillovers will be low, and social benefits will not differ 
greatly from private benefits. In such circumstances social benefits may fall short of social 
costs.  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
applications, except in two sectors, and then only for firms with above a threshold market share (Greenhalgh 
and Rogers 2004). 
386  Recent Canadian research indicates that 32 per cent of innovations occur in firms which neither fund 
nor undertake any formal R&D (Hanel 2008: 294). Pavitt (1984) pointed to the importance of production 
engineering departments and undifferentiated design and development inputs in small specialised firms.  
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Appendix 2 Induced innovation 
If patents are not important in appropriating a return to investment in innovative activities, 
they can hardly operate to induce much innovative activity. The empirical evidence on this 
issue was discussed in Section 2.4. These results can be used to make a very rough estimate 
of the proportion of patents that might represent induced innovation. The approach used is 
similar to that used by Lemley (2001). While inexact, it does at least provide an indicative 
estimate of the effectiveness of patent systems in inducing innovation. Estimates are 
developed here for Australia and the USA to provide two contrasting cases. 
Ideally one would match the empirical estimates on the proportion of patents that would not 
take place if patents were unavailable with data on granted patents. Unfortunately patent 
classification systems do not map well to industry classification systems.387 It is therefore 
necessary to take a second-best approach, and separate out those few industries where 
innovation activity would fall, absent patents. In the estimates below, granted patents are 
separated into a group where a very high proportion of patents are induced, and a second 
group where a much lower proportion is induced.  
The first group is taken as the pharmaceuticals and fine chemicals industries, as the survey 
data show unambiguously that it is here that firms systematically report patents to be 
important in ensuring a return to innovation. It is assumed here that all patented inventions 
in these fields are induced by the patent system. This assumption substantially over-
estimates induced patents in this group, as the survey data (and real world experience) show 
that some pharmaceutical and chemical innovation would occur absent patents.388  
In most other technology fields, firms report patents as the least important protection 
mechanism. Mansfield specifically asked about what innovations would not have been 
 
387  This is in addition to the problem of determining whether to map industry of invention, production or 
use. For an excellent discussion of these issues, and some early efforts to develop concordance tables, see 
Griliches 1990.  
388  For a summary of the real world experience see Boldrin and Levine (2008: chapter 9), or for a specific 
study of the Italian experience see Scherer and Weisburst (1995). Mansfield specifically asked respondents 
whether innovations would have occurred absent patents. He reports that 60 to 65 per cent of pharmaceutical 
innovations would not have been developed or commercially introduced (Mansfield 1986: 175). This leaves 
some 35 to 40 per cent that would have occurred absent patents. The second highest-ranking industry on this 
measure was chemicals where 30 to 38 per cent of innovations would not have occurred. The third highest-
ranking industry on this measure was petroleum where 18 to 25 per cent of innovations would not have 
occurred.  
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commercially introduced or developed in the absence of patents. Outside the chemically 
based industries the highest reported percentage so affected was for machinery, where 15 to 
17 per cent of innovations would not have occurred (Mansfield 1986: 175).389 Using data 
on defensive patenting from the Carnegie-Mellon survey, between 63 and 74 per cent of 
innovations are reported as being patented to protect their owners from infringement suits. 
The corollary is that some 26 to 37 per cent are not required for defensive purposes.390 A 
generous assumption about induced inventions is therefore that between 25 and 40 per cent 
are induced by the patent system.  
In most countries, the bulk of patents are owned by overseas-based companies (Lamberton 
and Mandeville 1980; Bates 2003). So in making estimates of induced innovation in any 
specific country, it is important to consider the likelihood that the patent system in one 
country will induce an innovation by an innovator resident overseas. This likelihood will 
vary with the size of the market where the innovation is being patented, in comparison to 
the size of the market in the innovator’s home country. Where a market is large, the patent 
system may very well have an inducement effect for overseas innovators. But where the 
market is small this seems unlikely, unless the company's home market is also small.  
In making estimates of induced patents in Australia, it seems improbable that Australian 
patents would offer much of an inducement effect for innovators from the North American, 
Japanese or UK/European markets.391 In contrast, a New Zealand innovator might take into 
account the possibility of an Australian patent monopoly in determining whether to proceed 
with a costly innovation. This leaves a large number of countries with a very small share of 
granted Australian patents (3 per cent). These are a mixed set, with some having much 
larger markets and some much smaller than Australia. It is assumed here that the 
inducement effect for innovators based in these countries is the same as for Australian and 
New Zealand firms. 
 
389  Fabricated metal products followed with 12 per cent, then electrical equipment at 11 per cent, primary 
metals 1 per cent, and instruments at 1 per cent. For four industries the figure was zero. 
390  In fact the proportion not taken out for defensive purposes cannot be calculated from these data as 
firms reported multiple reasons for patenting. Nonetheless as these estimates exceed the direct estimates of 
the proportion that would not occur provided by Mansfield, they provide a basis for an upper estimate of 
induced patents.  
391  Of all Australian patents granted from 1990 to 2005, 88 per cent went to applicants resident in Europe, 
Canada, Japan or the USA. Using GDP as a measure of market size, Australian forms only 2 per cent of the 
total OECD market.  
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There may, of course, be specific innovators based in large markets where Australia forms 
a large share of a specific niche market, and Australian patents are therefore important. 
Equally there may be innovators in New Zealand where the ability to acquire an Australian 
patent creates no incentive to innovate. But the general pattern assumed here, that the 
inducement effect depends on relative market sizes, probably holds in most cases.  
Based on these assumptions it is estimated that some 10,033 - 13,093 patents out of the 
203,815 granted in Australia between 1990 and 2006 may have been induced by the patent 
system (Table A2.1). This is some 4.9 to 6.4 per cent of granted patents.392 This low figure 
should not surprise. It has long been clear that a patent system is unlikely to induce much 
Table A2.1 Estimated patents induced, Australia, 1990-2006 
 
Grants to: 
# patents 
granted 
% 
induced 
# induced # not 
induced 
residents of USA, Japan, UK, other 
European countries, and Canada 178,478 0% 0 178,478 
Australian and New Zealand residents 18,652    
residents of other countries 6,685    
AU, NZ and ‘other’ residents: 
pharmaceuticals, and fine chemicals 
(estimated) * 
4,931 100% 4,931 0 
25% 5,102 15,305 Grants to AU, NZ and ‘other’ residents: other technology fields (estimated) * 20,406 
40% 8,162 12,244 
Total granted 203,815  10,033 -13,093  
190,722-
193,783  
Notes: Data on standard patents granted for the period 1990-2006 are from IPAustralia's website 
(http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/about/statistics.shtml, Table P31(Feb08) Countries of Origin of 
Granted and Certified Patents, accessed 19 July 2008).  
* Estimated patents granted by technology field is based on applications data for the technology 
groups ‘organic fine chemicals’ and ‘pharmaceuticals, cosmetics’ for the period 1990-2006 (from 
http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/about/statistics.shtml, Table P61(Oct07) Standard Applications by 
Technology Real standard patent applications, accessed 19 July 2008). Of all standard applications in 
the period 1990-2006, 19.5 per cent were in these two technology fields (compared to 18.4 per cent 
of grants in these two technology fields in the 1992-2005 period from Table P63(May06) Grants of 
Standard patents by Technology, accessed 5 March 2007 but not currently available). The figure of 
19.5 per cent was applied to the 25,337 grants for the period 1990-2006 to residents from Australia, 
New Zealand or ‘other’ countries. 
 
 
                                                 
392  If we were to assume that all patents from Australian, New Zealand, and ‘other’ residents (25,337) 
were induced innovations, this would still be only 12.4 per cent of patents granted in the period. 
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innovation in a small economy, especially where the proportion of activity in high-
technology areas is low (Penrose 1951).  
It is induced innovations which are responsible for any positive innovation impacts flowing 
from the operation of a patent system. From the perspective of any nation, it is the induced 
innovations which give rise to positive externalities and dynamic efficiency gains. These 
benefits flow from a re-allocation of resources, increased consumer surplus, and knowledge 
spillovers. But if a patented product is imported, the resource re-allocation will be in the 
country of origin. Where knowledge spillovers depend on local working for the transfer of 
the important associated know-how, then such spillover benefits will not flow from that 
proportion of patented goods which are imported.393  
There are, of course, no data on the proportion of patented products locally produced in 
Australia. But with the dismantling of tariff barriers, and the small size of Australia’s 
market compared to global markets, it can be assumed that many products patented in 
Australia are imported. A rough proxy has been adopted for locally produced patented 
goods: those where the patent is owned by an Australian innovator.394 On this basis some 
6,752 to 8,812 patents represent induced inventions owned by Australian residents (3.3 to 
4.3 per cent of granted patents). It is this set of patents which must generate the dynamic 
efficiency gains to offset any social costs created by the patent system.  
A quite different picture might emerge for a country such as the USA. Because of the size 
of the US market, it would be reasonable to assume that the US patent system might induce 
innovations from firms in most other countries, including those with large local markets, 
such as Japan and Europe. A starting assumption therefore is that innovation might be 
induced for 50 per cent of patented inventions from the five large G7 economies outside 
North America (Japan, France, Italy, Germany and the UK),395 and for all patents from 
other countries. It is again assumed that for those patent classes most likely to cover 
 
393  Geographic proximity appears important for knowledge spillovers (Jaffe 1986).  
394  Of course many Australian firms develop products locally and produce them overseas, importing back 
into Australia, and some overseas firms have some production facilities in Australia. 
395  While Canada is also a member of the G7, its proximity to the USA and its membership of NAFTA 
create a different dynamic. It is assumed here that Canadian firms consider the joint Canada/USA market 
when making investment decisions. They are thus treated in the same manner as US firms.  
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pharmaceuticals and fine chemicals,396 100 per cent of patents might represent induced 
innovation. For all other classes it is assumed that between 25 and 40 per cent of patents 
represent induced innovations. These two dimensions are combining for the five G7 
countries—that is 50 per cent of Life and Agricultural Science and Chemical Compound 
patents are assumed to be induced innovations, and 12.5 to 20 per cent of other classes. 
These rather brave assumptions provide an estimate of between 29 and 40 per cent of 
patented inventions in the US being induced by the patent system (Table A2.2).  
Table A2.2  Estimated patents induced, USA, 2001-2005 
 
Grants to: 
# patents 
granted 
% induced # induced # not 
induced 
US residents 421,372    
others # 121,764    
Sub-total US + ‘other’,  
of which: 543,136    
Life and Ag Science classes 42,397 100% 42,397 0 
Chemical compounds classes 32,098 100% 32,098 0 
Other classes 468,641 25% 117,160 351,481 
  40% 187,456 281,185 
     
5 G7 members*, of which: 267,351    
Life and Ag Science classes 13,695 50% 6,848 6,848 
Chemical compounds classes 21,172 50% 10,586 10,586 
Other classes 232,484 12.5% 29,061 203,424 
  20% 46,497 185,987 
Total granted 810,487  238,150- 325,882 
484,606- 
572,338 
Notes: Calculated from USPTO data provided at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ 
ac/ido/oeip/taf/tecstc/classes.htm. ‘Life and Agricultural Sciences and Testing Method’ and 
‘Compositions and Synthetic Resins; Chemical Compounds’ classes are as described in the U.S. 
Classification System (Arranged by Related Subjects) June 2006 version available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/opc/documents/classescombined.pdf . Both sites accessed 5 
March 2007. 
# i.e. grants to residents in all countries but the US, Japan, France, Germany and the UK 
* Excluding Canada, and the USA. 
 
Of course, a fair proportion of these ‘induced’ innovations are owned by non-residents of 
the USA (between 89,000 and 122,000). So the proportion of US patent grants that appear 
                                                 
396  Of course, patent data are not available by industry classification. The two classes selected (‘Life and 
Agricultural Sciences and Testing Method’ and ‘Compositions and Synthetic Resins; Chemical Compounds’) 
seem to come closest to covering the industries drugs and fine chemicals, though it is clear from the 
classification descriptions that these are in fact quite heterogeneous classes. To that extent, use of these 
classes as approximations will over-estimate induced innovation.  
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to be induced among US resident firms and individuals is between 18 and 25 per cent. Of 
course, in considering dynamic efficiency gains, there will be some benefits flowing to the 
US economy from patents owned by non-residents. This is because US buying practices 
seem very US-focused, and overseas firms can experience considerable difficulty selling 
into US markets if they do not manufacture in the US. 'Local working' by overseas 
companies will generate spillover benefits to the US economy. In the absence of any direct 
information on the proportion of overseas-owned patents made in the USA, rather than 
imported, it is assumed that 50 per cent are manufactured in the USA. This gives a final 
guesstimate of the number of patents which might generate dynamic efficiency gains for 
the US economy of between 193,680 and 265,030 (or between 25 and 33 per cent of 
granted patents). The non-induced granted patents may generate static welfare losses, but 
cannot generate any benefit attributable to the patent system.  
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Appendix 3 Sources used to obtain data on the selected patents  
Patent offices in high-income countries offer electronic access to certain patent information, 
especially information about applications. This brief appendix provides a short description 
of the electronic databases used to access information for this thesis.  
Australia 
Four databases have been used to obtain case data for Australia. General information about 
the patent databases provided by the Australian Patent Office can be obtained from 
http://pericles.ipaustralia.gov.au/ols/searching/content/olsPatents.jsp (accessed 20 July 2008).  
The Patent Specifications database allows access to the patent specifications, and is 
available at http://pericles.ipaustralia.gov.au/aub/aub_pages_1.process_simple_search. To search 
this database one must have the patent or the patent application number, and documents are 
accessible one case at a time. Sometimes both the original application (the ‘A’ documents) 
and the granted version (the ‘B’ documents) are available, sometimes only the granted 
version is available. Sometimes IPAustralia refers the searcher to http://ep.espacenet.com for 
the documents, but the link is only a general one, so the search details must be re-entered 
(the full Australian application number preceded by AU works best).  
Patsearch provides considerable administrative detail about applications filed from mid 
2002. It was a major source for identifying whether cases were divisionals. It is available at 
http://pericles.ipaustralia.gov.au/ols/searching/patsearch/search_page.jsp (accessed 20 July 2008). 
This database is searchable, but for some items it has to be searched on a reverse basis—
that is, instead of being able to search for cases that have been sealed or lapsed (i.e. ever 
granted), one has to search by excluding statuses. So to achieve a set which might 
approximate ever granted standard patents one has to exclude the following: withdrawn, 
under examination, under opposition, provisional, innovation.  
Patadmin provides vestigial administrative detail for cases filed before mid 2002. It is 
available at http://www2.ipaustralia.gov.au/hd3270/he3270en.htm (accessed 20 July 2008).  
AusPat is a new database with similar detail to Patsearch, but with improved search 
facilities. It allows searches by status, including sealed or accepted. It also allows searches 
which cover a time period (eg filed between 2003 and 2006). It also allows easy 
customisation of selected data fields in the returned results, so that outcomes can be 
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scanned without having to access each case. However some important fields are missing, 
such as country of residence of applicants. Nonetheless AusPat is a considerable 
improvement on the searching capacities of the Patsearch system.  
Canada 
The Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) provides search facilities which link to 
the patent specifications or administrative detail on the progress of the application. 
However the administrative database does not include any information on the issue of 
examiner’s reports or responses to these. The database is available at 
http://patents.ic.gc.ca/cipo/cpd/en/introduction.html (accessed 20 July 2008). 
Europe (EPO) 
The EPO provides two major public access databases.  
The first is the esp@cenet database, which is in fact a collection of specific databases 
(worldwide, then a number of databases each with the - esp@cenet suffix (one for each of 
WIPO, EPO and each of the member countries). In obtaining data for this thesis, I used two 
of these databases: worldwide and GB - esp@cenet. For an unknown reason sometimes 
only the worldwide, WIPO and EPO databases are accessible for searching, but the link 
http://gb.espacenet.com/ (then ‘advanced search’) allows access to all the individual 
databases, as well as the worldwide one.  
A successful search via the worldwide database gives access to a very useful database 
called the ‘INPADOC patent family’ which provides information on ‘all the documents 
sharing directly or indirectly (e.g. via a third document) at least one priority’. This database 
is the source for most of the ‘family’ information used in this thesis. Once a family list has 
been opened it is relatively fast to then check the legal status of each member,397 by 
scrolling through family members when in the ‘INPADOC legal status’ tab. It needs to be 
noted that some countries seem more active in providing legal status data than others. For 
example, information readily available from the USPTO’s Public Pair system was rarely 
shown on esp@cenet.  
                                                 
397  Relatively fast is actually quite slow. With the exception of the USPTO which has a granted patents 
database, official patent databases are generally unhelpful if one wishes to search to avoid infringement. For 
example if a company wished to search for all granted patents in a particular country and classification field, 
this would not be possible on the esp@cenet databases, except by searching for the classification and then 
checking the status of each application individually.  
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epoline’s Register Plus (http://www.epoline.org/portal/public/ then click on Register Plus at 
the top left) provides access to most of the correspondence regarding the progress of an 
application through the EPO (use all documents tab). There is also, for each application, 
summary information about legal status, event history and citations. There is a direct link to 
esp@cenet. Register Plus also has a better search facility than esp@cenet, and this search 
facility will return more than the 500 hits to which esp@cenet limits the searcher. A major 
limitation of this search facility is that it is not possible to search for granted patents; all 
searches return all applications within the search terms, regardless of their legal status. 
New Zealand 
The Intellectual Property Office of New Zealand (IPONZ) provides a searchable patents 
database at http://www.iponz.govt.nz/pls/web/dbssiten.main (accessed 20 July 2008). It 
provides basic administrative data (but not advice on examiner’s reports or related 
correspondence), and a link to the patent specifications.  
United Kingdom (UK) 
The EPO esp@cenet data base is the route for searching for applications made directly to 
the UK Patent Office. A successful search via the link http://gb.espacenet.com/ gives access 
to a link to status information from the UK Patent Office. For some recent cases this status 
information includes information on the basis for a rejection. 
United States of America (USA) 
The USPTO provides several databases. Searchable databases are provided separately for 
published applications and for issued patents (http://www.uspto.gov/patft/index.html, accessed 
20 July 2008).398 There is also an extremely useful database called Public PAIR (available 
from http://www.uspto.gov/ebc/index.html accessed 20 July 2008), where one can usually find 
a substantial amount of administrative detail including examiners’ reports and replies to 
these. This database also provides information about ‘continuations’ so that one can track 
related applications. To access this database one needs either the application or the 
publication number. Application numbers are always provided if one can find the case in 
either the published applications or the issued patents databases. 
                                                 
398  This makes it much easier to search for only granted patents, which of course are of far greater 
economic and policy interest than patent applications.  
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WIPO 
WIPO’s PCT database (available at http://www.wipo.int/pctdb/en/, accessed 20 July 2008) 
sometimes includes useful data on the current status in different countries, and on occasion 
there is a direct link. This can be very useful, and was how I found my way into the 
invaluable USPTO Public PAIR system. 
A general note on reference numbers 
While each application in each country has a unique application number, the reference 
numbers most easily found in the various databases described above are often ‘publication’ 
numbers. Thus most of the EPO reference numbers given in footnotes in Chapters 5 and 6 
are publication numbers not application numbers, as these are what is provided in the 
esp@cenet database. Reference numbers provided for US cases are application numbers as 
these seem to work most reliably for searching Public PAIR. Often the way in which 
numbers are provided in one database does not match with the data entry requirements in 
another, and much time can be spent trying to work out the exact format in which a number 
needs to be entered to find the relevant case. These matters are not well documented.  
 279 
Appendix 4 International patent classification: 
business method classes 
The International Patent Classification (IPC) commenced in September 1968. It is changing 
rapidly with the growth in the volume and subject matter of patents. IPC5, introduced in 
January 1990, did not contain a recognisable class for business method patents. Indeed 
electrical digital data processing was only introduced as a class (G06F) in January 1995 
(IPC 6). It was not until IPC7, introduced in January 2000, that a specific sub-group (G06F 
17/60) was provided for business method patents. IPC8 came into effect on 1 January 2006, 
and the number of sub-groups to which a business method patent might be classified 
expanded to six (G06Q/10/00; G06Q/30/00; G06Q/40/00; G06Q/50/00; G06Q/90/00; and 
G06Q/99/00).399 Details of these various sub-classes are shown below. 
 
Class G06: Computing, Calculating, Counting 
 
IPC7  [January 2000] 
G06F: Electrical Digital Data Processing 
17/00 Digital computing or data processing equipment or methods, specially adapted 
for specific functions 
17/60 Administrative, commercial, managerial, supervisory or forecasting purposes 
 
IPC8  [January 2006] 
G06Q: Data processing Systems or Methods, specially adapted for Administrative, Commercial, 
Financial, Managerial, Supervisory or Forecasting Purposes; Systems or Methods, specially 
adapted for Administrative, Commercial, Financial, Managerial, Supervisory or Forecasting 
Purposes, not otherwise provided for 
10/00 Administration, e.g. office automation or reservations; Management, e.g. resource 
or project management 
30/00 Commerce, e.g. marketing, shopping, billing, auctions or e-commerce 
40/00 Finance, e.g. banking, investment or tax processing; Insurance, e.g. risk analysis 
or pensions 
50/00 Systems or methods specially adapted for a specific business sector, e.g. health 
care, utilities, tourism or legal services 
90/00 Systems or methods specially adapted for administrative, commercial, financial, 
managerial, supervisory or forecasting purposes, not involving significant data 
processing 
99/00 Subject matter not provided for in other groups of this subclass 
 
Source:  Guide to IPC7: http://www.wipo.int/classifications/fulltext/new_ipc/ipcen.html (last accessed 28 
November 2006); Guide to IPC 8: http://www.wipo.int/classifications/ipc/ipc8/?lang=en (last 
accessed 25 August 2008). 
                                                 
399  However there may very well be business method patents in other classes. A useful comparison, with 
US data, between different classes is provided by Hall (2003).  
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Appendix 5 Creation of the selected patent set 
During the course of this research the International Patent Classification (IPC) was up-
dated, and this up-date affected the class used for business method patents. The seventh 
edition of the IPC, known as IPC7, generally classified business method patents to class 
G06F/17/60. The eighth edition (IPC8) was adopted on 1 January 2006, and business 
method patents are now generally classified to one of G06Q/10/00, G06Q/30/00, 
G06Q/40/00, G06Q/50/00, G06Q/90/00, G06Q/99/00, that is the subclass G06Q, excluding 
the main group G06Q/20/00. Australian patents were re-classified from IPC7 to IPC8 in 
late 2005 / early 2006. However some patents were not re-classified. The business method 
classes in IPC7 and IPC8 are shown in Appendix 4.  
IPAustralia, which incorporates the Australian Patent Office, provided two excel 
spreadsheets on 2 March 2007, one with cases selected on the basis of the IPC8 business 
method classes, and the other on the basis of the IPC7 business method class. Each 
spreadsheet included all standard patent applications in the IPC business method classes, 
including Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) applications which had entered national phase 
by 31 December 2006.400 The two spreadsheets were combined, and duplicate cases were 
removed. This combined spreadsheet identified 65 applications where a patent had been 
granted. Of these one was not a business method (being a manufacturing process), one was 
a pure software patent and three were patents for betting methods. Sixteen belong to an 
extremely large family of patents filed by a single Australian company, Silverbrook 
Research Pty Ltd., and four to a smaller, but still large, family owned by the US company 
Contentguard Holdings Inc.  
In mid-July 2007, a search was made on the on-line IPAustralia Patsearch system, for 
patents in IPC7 and IPC8 business method classes, filed between 1 January 2003 and 31 
December 2006, which were sealed or accepted.401 This search identified a further 29 cases 
                                                 
 
400  Under the PCT systems, applicants have up to 30 months before they must decide whether to activate 
an application for a particular country. Many PCT applications are filed, but the filing has no real meaning 
until the application ‘enters national phase’. Hence the limitation in PCT filings to those which had entered 
national phase.  
401  As Patsearch works on the basis of selecting categories not wanted, rather than categories wanted, the 
search was: excluding provisional and innovation applications and excluding lapsed, withdrawn, ceased and 
under examination patents. The applications identified in this search had one of three statuses: filed (i.e. still 
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not in the previously identified set of patents. One of these was not a business method. The 
criteria used for selection of these cases was that they were either sealed, or had been 
accepted by 30 June 2007.402 An interesting case to emerge from this final search is one 
(2003200436) which was accepted on 19 July 2005, but whose grant was opposed. The 
opposition was withdrawn early in 2008, and it was sealed on 8 May 2008. By December 
2007 all but one of those with accepted status had been sealed. The exception was 
application 2006202244, where an opposition was filed on 31 August 2007, and the 
application lapsed in September 2007, due to non-payment of the acceptance fee.  
Overall then of the 94 patents identified, three have been excluded as not being business 
method patents, and one is excluded as it is a patent of addition and its great-grandparent is 
also in the dataset (see discussion in Section 4.3). Among the remaining 90 cases, there are 
18 which are owned by a single company, Silverbrook Research Pty. Ltd. The technology 
involved is a high-speed printer, a scanning device, pre-printed forms and invisible ink. 
These cases are not genuine business method patents. So the final set selected for study 
numbers 72 cases. Of these, six are betting cases, and four belong to the one applicant, 
Contentguard Holdings Inc. Among these 72 cases, one was never sealed, but is retained in 
the dataset. 
Summary details of the 72 cases are shown in Table A5.1. Further information on the 18 
Silverbrook cases is provided in Appendix 6. 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
in the system), accepted, or sealed. The listed applications then had to be accessed individually to establish 
which had accepted or sealed status.  
402  Interestingly, many of the patents identified in the earlier spreadsheets were not identified in this 
search. In addition two of the identified cases had been sealed prior to March 2007, and should have been, but 
were not in the original dataset. Patent databases are largely organised to meet the needs of patent applicants, 
patent attorneys, and patent examiners. Extracting useful data for any form of economic or policy analysis is 
laborious and time-consuming. Indeed it is not even possible in the EPO and UK systems to search for 
granted patents in a particular class—in other words a company working in a specific technology area simply 
cannot do a quick search to find out what patents have been granted in that technology class. In addition the 
databases seem to have odd quirks, often throwing up duplicate cases, and, as found here, missing cases. 
Anyone who has tried to use patent databases will not be surprised at the last-minute emergence of cases that 
should have been identified in earlier runs. 
 Table A5.1  Australian Business Method Patents sealed or accepted by 30 June 2007 and filed in 2003 to 2006 
 
 Application 
 Number 
 Invention Title (in full) Priority 
date 
Weeks 
to Grant
# claims Applicant   
(I) indicates individual(s) 
Origin Subject 
matter 
Section
2003200220 System and method for selecting a service provider 23-May-02 11 37 River Dynamics Pty Ltd AU purchasing 5.3 
2003200436* Automatic Flight Management in an Online 
Marketplace 
8-Feb-02 128 43 Overture Services, Inc. USA e-advertising 6.2 
2003200483 Method and system for risk evaluation 13-Feb-02 69 19 SAP Aktiengesellschaft DE risk 5.7 
2003200819 Browser Plug - ins 27-Feb-02 125 11 Aceinc Pty Limited AU internet 5.5 
2003200960 System for Ordering, Tracking and Payment of 
Goods and Services 
18-Sep-02 93 68 Mackinnon, S., Mulcahy, M.J. 
(I) 
AU purchasing 5.3 
2003201332 A Security System 27-Oct-00 62 18 Markets-Alert Pty Ltd AU fraud 
prevention 
6.3.3 
2003203582 A Financial Education System 8-Apr-03 16 10 Success Academy Pty Ltd AU finance 5.4 
2003204139 System for Confirming the Presence at Home 10-May-02 209 9 NEC Infrontia Corporation JP distribution 6.2 
2003204214 System and Method for On-line Analysis and 
Reporting of Financial Operation Data from 
Community Pharmacies 
25-Jun-02 66 15 Desert Mentors, L.L.C. USA accounting 6.2 
2003204278 Distributed Transaction Event Matching 21-May-02 78 35 Accenture Global Services 
GmbH 
CH e-commerce 6.2 
2003204406 Method and system of exchange 28-May-03 9 15 McMahon, K., Arnall, L.R., 
Williams, N. (I) 
AU real estate 6.3.1 
2003204420 Systems and methods for work list prediction 29-May-02 36 22 Staffware plc UK workflow 5.7 
2003206509 System and method for conducting online auctions 7-Mar-02 220 22 OzB2B Pty Ltd AU purchasing 5.3 
2003207780 A system for and method for authenticating items 10-Apr-02 20 76 Shaw IP Pty Ltd AU security 6.4 
2003212105 Method and apparatus for storing and retrieving 
items 
25-Mar-02 161 31 VNH Systems Pty Ltd AU logistics 6.3.1 
2003219472 A tax refund system 18-Mar-02 216 27 European Tax Free Shopping 
Limited 
IE tax refunds 6.2 
2003219907 Networked services licensing system and method 27-Feb-02 137 29 Contentguard Holdings, Inc. USA DRM 6.5 
2003228606 Trading tools for electronic trading 19-Apr-02 210 21 Trading Technologies 
International, Inc. 
USA e-trade 6.4 
2003231594 On-line interactive system and method for 
transacting business 
6-Jul-99 52 11 Duncan, D.B. (I) USA purchasing 6.2 
2003235214 Ad market system and method 15-May-02 212 18 Dentsu Inc. JP e-advertising 5.6 
2003236451 Email Alert Device and Method 17-Mar-00 111 74 EMAD Communications 
(International) Pty Ltd 
AU e-mail 6.4 
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Table A5.1  Australian Business Method Patents sealed/accepted by 30 June 2007 and filed in 2003 to 2006 (continued) 
 
Application 
 Number 
 Invention Title (in full) Priority 
date 
Weeks 
to Grant
# claims Applicant   
(I) indicates individual(s) 
Origin Subject 
matter 
Section
2003240981 System and method for supplying and managing 
rights expressions 
3-Jun-02 143 101 Contentguard Holdings, Inc. USA DRM 6.5 
2003243179 System and method for specifying and processing 
legality expressions 
29-Apr-02 101 67 Contentguard Holdings, Inc. USA DRM 6.5 
2003244552 Method and system for blocking unwanted e-mail 4-Sep-03 32 16 New Millenium Solutions Pty 
Ltd 
AU e-mail 5.5 
2003244578 System and method of attracting and lodging PCT 
national phase applications (II) 
23-Oct-00 145 20 PCTFILER Holdings Pty Ltd AU legal services 6.3.1 
2003246060 Mobile report capture 12-Sep-03 31 12 Valorem Systems Pty. Limited AU real estate 6.3.3 
2003247258 System for permission-based communication and 
exchange of information 
19-Feb-02 211 115 Pureprofile.com Inc USA market 
research 
6.3.3 
2003248001 Emergency communication service providing 
method and device 
30-Sep-02 120 14 Mitsubishi Denki Kabushiki 
Kaisha 
JP emergency 
services 
5.8 
2003250595 Interactive property tour 15-Aug-02 66 12 Proactive Technologies Pty Ltd AU real estate 6.3.4 
2003252947 System and method for betting on a subset of 
participants in an event 
3-Apr-03 145 44 Cantor Index LLC USA betting 5.9 
2003254402 Means to facilitate delivery of electronic 
documents into a postal network 
4-Oct-02 73 80 EPIP Pty Ltd AU distribution 6.3.2 
2003255356 Change navigation toolkit 1-Aug-02 188 72 Accenture Global Services 
GmbH 
CH software 
implementati
on 
5.7 
2003257910 System and method for generating customized 
odds bets for an event 
1-Jul-03 181 5 Cantor Index LLC USA betting 5.9 
2003262306 Logistics Chain Management  System 5-Oct-00 146 8 Exago Pty Limited AU distribution 6.3.1 
2003262344 Payment card processing system and methods 5-Sep-03 74 37 General Electric Capital 
Corporation 
USA payment card 6.3.3 
2003262357* Automated receiving and delivery system and 
method 
9-Nov-99 145 10 Simms, J., Simms, N. (I) USA distribution 6.4 
2003264604 Dynamic Collaboration Assistant 19-Mar-03 144 44 Accenture Global Services 
GmbH 
CH information 5.7 
2003268606 Performance evaluation tool and method 8-May-98 178 26 etalk Corporation USA evaluation 5.7 
2003268607 Performance evaluation tool and method 8-May-98 178 8 etalk Corporation USA evaluation 5.7 
2003271414 A financial management system 27-Sep-02 81 24 Pangaea Pty Ltd AU finance 5.4 
 
 Table A5.1  Australian Business Method Patents sealed/accepted by 30 June 2007 and filed in 2003 to 2006 (continued) 
 
Application 
 Number 
 Invention Title (in full) Priority 
date 
Weeks 
to Grant
# claims Applicant   
(I) indicates individual(s) 
Origin Subject 
matter 
Section
2003280529 Service points liquidation system 29-Nov-02 75 20 Ichihime Shoji Co., Ltd. JP loyalty 
schemes 
6.2 
2003281184 Medical data warning notifying system and method 15-Jul-02 207 10 JMS Co., Ltd. JP expert 
systems 
6.2 
2003290930 System and method for granting access to an item 
or permission to use an item based on configurable 
conditions 
18-Nov-02 93 43 Contentguard Holdings, Inc. USA DRM 6.5 
2003302490 A system for and method of monitoring an item 4-Jun-03 16 74 Shaw IP Pty Ltd AU logistics 6.4 
2004200942 Method and Tool for Assessing the Sustainability 
of a Development 
7-Mar-03 59 31 Director-General of the 
Department of Infrastructure, 
Planning and Natural Resources
AU real estate 5.2 
2004201587 A system and method for representation of 
business information 
16-Apr-04 105 49 Forge Research Pty Limited AU information 6.2 
2004201620 An Identification Card Production and Distribution 
Method 
20-Apr-04 29 12 Fastcards Pty Ltd AU trade & 
logistics 
5.3 
2004201637 Method for managing printed medium activated 
revenue sharing domain name system schemas 
21-Apr-99 30 5 AirClic, Inc USA internet 6.2 
2004202060 Spare part procurement method 14-May-04 117 7 Davidson, K.G. (I) AU purchasing 6.3.4 
2004202066 Online fare booking method and system 17-Mar-04 27 29 Concorde International Travel AU e-commerce 6.3.4 
2004202762 Interactive Wagering Systems and Methods with 
Parimutuel Pool Features 
5-Apr-00 31 20 ODS Properties, Inc. USA betting 5.9 
2004203415 Method of conducting transactions over a network 23-Feb-00 152 60 Sony Electronics, Inc. USA e-commerce 6.4 
2004203807 A Method of Commerce 7-May-04 22 14 Wheeler, L., Peters, M. (I) AU loyalty 
schemes 
5.6 
2004210528 Interactive System and Method for Viewing On 
Line Advertising 
24-Sep-99 132 30 Discountnet Pty Ltd AU e-advertising 6.3.5 
2004211006 Management control of pharmaceutical substances 11-Feb-03 111 23 Argus Solutions Ltd AU purchasing 6.3.1 
2004219547 Commodities exchange system and method 10-Mar-03 66 23 Graincom Pty Ltd AU e-trade 6.3.3 
2004222811 Automated Price Improvement Protocol Processor 18-Dec-98 140 12 CFPH, L.L.C.; Cantor Fitzgerald 
L.P. 
USA e-trade 6.3.3 
2004233489 A system for validation of chemical usage in the 
production of foodstuffs 
26-Nov-04 20 18 Go Farm Pty Ltd AU audit 6.2 
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Table A5.1 Australian Business Method Patents sealed/accepted by 30 June 2007 and filed in 2003 to 2006 (continued) 
 
Application 
 Number 
 Invention Title (in full) Priority 
date 
Weeks 
to Grant
# claims Applicant   
(I) indicates individual(s) 
Origin Subject 
matter 
Section
2004252925 Transaction verification system 30-Jun-03 120 19 Narainsamy, S. (I) ZA fraud 
prevention 
5.4 
2004307528 Method and apparatus for managing information 
exchanges between apparatus on a worksite 
22-Oct-03 140 24 Leica Geosystems AG CH information 6.4 
2005200780 An improved betting method 2-Jul-04 88 11 Fiorino, J. (I) AU betting 5.9 
2005200984 Communal Gaming Jackpot Method 3-Mar-04 120 16 Stargames Corporation Pty 
Limited 
AU betting 5.9 
2005201458 An improved betting method 24-Aug-04 113 4 Fiorino, J. (I) AU betting 5.9 
2005203023 A method for performing an asset valuation 12-Jul-05 30 19 EVR Services Pty Ltd AU real estate 5.2 
2005204292 Integrated financial service product 26-Aug-05 85 20 Westpac Banking Corporation AU loans 5.4 
2005210510 A system and method for electronic commerce 4-Feb-04 71 39 GlobeCharge Pty Ltd AU e-commerce 5.5 
2005234625 Skills Dissemination Tool 15-Nov-05 28 14 The-Regeneration.com Pty Ltd AU employment 
services 
5.8 
2005247009 Luggage collection installation 16-Jul-01 77 17 Al Amri, M.E. (I) UAE distribution 6.3.3 
2005255399 Transaction accounting processing system and 
approach 
9-Jun-04 106 17 U.S. Bancorp Licensing, Inc. USA accounting 6.3.4 
2005265435 Financial products 17-Nov-04 31 62 McAlary, M. (I) AU loans 5.4 
2006200104 A method of determining a target event of a 
reoccurring event 
12-May-05 67 16 Cinc, V. (I) AU information 5.7 
2006202244# Method and processing arrangement for providing 
various financing options 
26-May-05 51 55 Pollock, F., Menzies, S. (I) AU reverse 
mortgage 
5.4 
Source: Data supplied by IPAustralia on 2 March 2007 and updated from the Patsearch database: see discussion in text (Appendix 5). 
Notes: Of the 94 patents originally identified, 22 were excluded: 21 because they were not business method cases (application 2003200458 "Method and system for 
diagnosis of plant"; application 2004200995 "Method for the operation of a lift installation"; application 2003204108 "Interface for distributed objects and 
development platform therefore", and 18 cases owned by Silverbrook Research Pty. Ltd.) One case was excluded as it became a patent of addition, and its great-
grandparent, with very similar subject matter, is in the dataset (application 2006203578 "Non-printing regular expressions for electronic submission of 
documents".) Two of the cases in the selected set were opposed. One subsequently lapsed (application 2006202244 "Method and processing arrangement for 
providing various financing options"); the other was granted in 2008 after the opposition was withdrawn (application 2003200436 "Automatic Flight 
Management in an Online Marketplace"). The lapsed case (#2006202244) is retained in the dataset. Information on the 18 excluded Silverbrook patents is 
provided in Appendix 6.  
 * 2003262357 ceased May 2008;  # 2006202244 lapsed after acceptance but before sealing. 
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Appendix 6 Patent families and patent thickets:  
the Silverbrook and Contentguard cases 
The original selection of 94 recently granted Australian patents filed in the IPC7 and IPC8 
business method classes in the period 2003-6 included 18 patents granted to a single 
company. Details of these patents are shown in Table A6.1. As the titles show, it is 
understandable that many of these patents were classified as business methods. However 
the underlying technology involves a high-speed printer, a scanning device, pre-printed 
forms and invisible ink. This falls outside the business method field, and the cases have 
therefore been excluded from the detailed investigation of inventiveness.  
Nonetheless they provide an interesting example of a patent thicket. The issue of patent 
fences and thickets falls well beyond the central subject matter of this thesis, so the brief 
discussion below is only introductory. But it does provide some context for the set of four 
Contentguard patents included in the dataset, as these also exhibit characteristics of patent 
thickets. These aspects of the Contentguard cases are discussed in this appendix, while their 
inventiveness is considered in Section 6.5. 
Patent families 
Strategic patenting has led to the development of many large patent 'families'. EPO's 
esp@cenet defines a patent family as ‘a group of patents which, like a family, are all related 
to each other, in this case by way of the priority or priorities of a particular patent 
document.’403 Sometimes the family members are more like clones: the same application 
lodged in different countries will, at least initially, be identical to other members of the 
family. During examination the specification may be amended and variations may emerge 
between the patent as granted in one country compared to another. As parents and children 
(divisionals and continuations) share the same priority date(s), they are counted as members 
of the same family. By definition, there are at least minor differences between the initial 
application and continuations or divisionals, though some are so close that the USPTO will 
not grant the second one until a terminal disclaimer, that the term will end at the same time 
as the first patent, has been lodged. Some 'parents' produce multiple 'children' and these 
'sibling' patents are closely related 'inventions'.  
 
403  http://gb.espacenet.com/gb/en/helpV3/patentfamily.html , accessed 16 August 2007. 
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Table A6.1  Silverbrook Business Method Class Patents 
Application 
Number 
Invention Title Priority 
date 
#  
claims 
2003248037 Method and system for searching information using coded marks 30-Jun-99 51 
2003248038 Method and system for searching information using sensor with identifier 30-Jun-99 50 
2003248039 Method and system for searching information using processing sensor 30-Jun-99 47 
2003254705 Method and system for user registration using coded marks 30-Jun-99 29 
2003254706 Method and system for user registration using processing sensor 30-Jun-99 41 
2003254714 Method and system for user registration using sensor with identifier 30-Jun-99 50 
2003262326 Method and system for graphic design 25-Oct-99 12 
2003262333 Category buttons on interactive paper 25-Oct-99 11 
2003262334 Method and system for providing insurance services 25-Oct-99 11 
2003262339 Method and system for advertising 25-Oct-99 7 
2004200136 Method and system for route planning 25-Oct-99 7 
2004202969 A method for accessing travel services 30-Jun-99 24 
2005200764 Computer System for Online Purchasing 25-Nov-00 20 
2005200941 Network Refrigerator and Printer 27-Nov-00 19 
2005200942 Method for Searching Information Using Processing Sensor 30-Jun-99 27 
2005201280 Method for searching information using coded data 30-Jun-99 20 
2006200747 Method of requesting an action in a computer system via printed form 25-May-99 32 
2006200748 Method of inputting information into a computer system via printed form 25-May-99 32 
Source: Silverbrook patents identified in the selected business method data set, i.e. limited to those filed 
between 2003 and 2006, and sealed or accepted by 30 June 2007. 
 
A corollary of a large patent family size is significant overseas patenting, and it can be 
difficult to track specific patents for parallel grants or refusals overseas. The 18 Silverbrook 
patents found in the dataset are from a very large family indeed: there were over 1,400 
members in January 2008. It is not possible to undertake a one-for-one assessment of 
whether these patents have been granted or rejected overseas.404  
Silverbrook is not the only large family among the originally selected patents. The dataset 
includes four other cases of large family size, all owned by US companies. Four patents in 
the dataset are owned by Contentguard Holdings, Inc: three of these belong to a family with 
nearly 200 members.405 The other three have smaller families: 65, 69 and 71 members.  
                                                 
404  Even within small patent families changing titles and amendment of claims during negotiations with 
examiners give rise to some difficulties in identifying exact matches. With the 1,400 plus members of the 
Silverbrook family it would take enormous resources to trace the family relationships in full.  
405  And apparently growing. In mid 2007 the family size was just over 130, by early January 2008 it was 
182, and by June 2008 had reached 197.  
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Patent fences and thickets 
There are a wide range of patent strategies used by different businesses. In general 
'strategic' patent use is where the principal motivation is to use the patent system for more 
than the ‘protection’ of one's own invention(s). These uses are frequently anti-competitive, 
for example to exclude potential new competitors and to limit and block existing 
competitors. Endeshaw points to an array of patenting styles designed so that: 
“competitors would not be able to differentiate valid and invalid patents and the cost 
of litigation or, alternatively, of inventing around becomes so high that they would 
refrain from indulging in any activity that is protected by the network of patents.”  
(Endeshaw 1996: 92).  
From the very early days of patents, there has been evidence of predatory and anti-
competitive uses of patents. Since then there have been many studies of the use of patents 
within particular firms, much concerning the strategic use of patents. Summarising the 
situation in today's knowledge economy, Andersen focuses on the unfair competitive 
advantage that can be created through strategic patenting: 
"… the IPR [intellectual property rights] regime tends to be a winner-takes-all 
system, so it can encourage corporate strategies to create patent blocking and fast 
lock-in to technological and institutional frameworks in order to control or protect 
market advantages, instead of searching for optimal solutions and thereby increasing 
overall welfare. That is, IPRs in the new electronic age can enforce the creation of 
suboptimal technological and economic solutions, provide a platform for the unfair 
exploitation of individuals and sectors of the economy that subsequently have to 
adapt to established technological trajectories or paradigms, and create major 
corporate concentration in industries rather than competition with many players."  
(Andersen 2003: 1022-23) 
A search of the 67 business journals in JSTOR for articles with the terms for 'patent*' and 
'strategic' in the full text returned 1,330 hits; and 284 for 'patent*' and 'abuse'. A search of 
the 38 economics journals in JSTOR for articles with 'patent*' and 'strategic' in the full text 
returned 721 hits; and 249 for 'patent*' and 'abuse'.406 Note that JSTOR specialises in older 
issues of journals. In this context, 'strategic' is a euphemism for manipulation of the market. 
Despite game theory, with its limited cases, strategic behaviour undermines essential 
assumptions in all economic models and thus challenges their applicability in a real-world 
 
406  JSTOR's mission is to create and maintain an archive of important scholarly journals, and to provide 
wide access to them (www.jstor.org ). This search was done on 26 August 2008. The business and economics 
fields were selected as these are the two academic disciplines which take at least some interest in the 
economic use and impact of patents.  
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setting. The findings of this journal search indicate the prevalence of strategic patenting, 
such as that demonstrated in the Silverbrook case. But such behaviour directly undermines 
the value of a patent system by raising the social costs, particularly in respect of entry by 
new firms, a fundamental criterion for competitive markets. Motives for patenting are 
discussed in Section 2.4.5. A useful review or recent surveys of strategic motives for 
patenting is Blind et al. 2006.  
A general reason for large-scale patenting is to hide genuinely inventive patents among a 
large number of relatively uninventive patents. Patent fences and thickets are designed to 
'fence' competitors out of a specific product or technology area that the patenting firm 
wishes to dominate. The concept of patent thickets has been around for some time. Gilbert 
and Newbery report on a 1978 allegation that Xerox had a large patent thicket and was not 
actually using much of the technology it was patenting (Gilbert and Newbery 1982). The 
gardening analogy of patent fences and thickets implies that while a fence simply marks out 
a boundary within which others cannot trespass, a thicket is so dense that it is impossible to 
see through it or into the enclosed space. Reitzig attempts to operationalise these concepts 
and assess them in relation to discrete and complex technologies (the greater the number of 
potentially patentable elements of a technical invention, the more ‘complex’ the 
technology). Using the number of patents per innovation as a measure, he distinguishes 
patent fences as largely involving substitute technologies, finding these are now prevalent 
in both discrete and complex product industries (Reitzig 2004).  
Bessen defines patent thickets as occurring where many complementary patents cover a 
single product. He notes that much of the literature on patents rests heavily on the 
assumption of an identity between a single patent and a single product. But in many fields 
access to hundreds if not thousands of patents may now be needed to produce a single 
product (US FTC 2003: 6). Bessen uses a simple, but relatively realistic game-based model 
to analyse the welfare outcomes in such industries. He finds that large patent portfolios and 
cross-licensing can operate to substantially reduce market incentives to innovate because 
first-mover returns must be shared with less successful innovators. This perverse outcome 
is more likely where first-mover advantages are substantial and patenting standards are low 
(Bessen 2003). Others agree that low inventiveness standards may encourage the 
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development of patent thickets and other strategic techniques designed as anti-competitive 
devices (e.g. Jensen and Webster 2004).  
A large patent family can be indicative of the building of a patent fence or thicket.  
The Silverbrook patents 
The 18 Silverbrook Research patents come from an extraordinarily large family. Using the 
esp@cenet INPADOC family system, ten of the patents initially appear to be from small 
families. But each shows up on IPAustralia's Patsearch system as being a divisional child: 
two are even grandchildren.407 For the other ten patents, the INPADOC family system warns 
‘the system limits have been exceeded, therefore the family is incomplete’. Nonetheless the 
smallest family size for these patents is 1,451 (in mid 2007). The relationships are shown in 
Table A6.2.  
Despite the range of concepts indicated in the key words in the titles, these patents all relate 
to an underlying technology well outside the business method field—high-speed printing. 
Not all appear to be forward steps in terms of the technological frontier. For example 
2003248037 covers searching for information by submitting a form with coded marks. A 
scanner is used, and the position of the marks on the form is meaningful. Given modern 
search engines, it sounds very laborious, even at the priority date of 30 June 1999. Printed 
forms are used in at least eight of the patents, and a sensing device is used in at least six. 
Others seem very strained in terms of credibility. For example 2005200941 "Network 
Refrigerator and Printer", and 2004200136 "Method and system for route planning". The 
latter is a means of printing out a map containing coded data. A sensing device needs to be 
used in conjunction with the map, and a computer then determines a location and route. The 
"Network Refrigerator and Printer" is what it says it is: a refrigerator with a printer.  
The old priority dates should be also noted. All 18 of these applications were lodged on or 
after 1 January 2003, yet none conform to the norm that the filing and priority dates should 
be within 12 months of each other. Every patent in the selected dataset is either a divisional 
child (16 cases) or a divisional grandchild (two cases). One of the patents "Computer 
 
407  A patent is only allowed to contain one inventive concept. Any additional 'inventive' ideas can be 
separated out into divisional children, retaining the original priority date. Several ‘inventive’ concepts can be 
separated out from a single application, and divisional ‘children’ can in turn breed children and grand-
children. In the USA this process is referred to as a ‘continuation’.  
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System for Online Purchasing" (2005200764) may hold the world record for the fastest 
ever grant of a patent: four months and nine days between filing and sealing.408 
Table A6.2  The Silverbrook patent family relationships 
Parent Children INPADOC family 
size 
Grand-
children 
Title key 
words 
Priority date 25  May 1999 
2003248036* 2006200747 3  online payments 
2003254722* 2006200748 1485  online purchasing 
Priority date 30-Jun-99 
200053751* 2003254714 
2003254705 
2003254706 
1480 
1483 
1483 
2005202932* user registration 
200053754* 2004202969 1  travel services 
200055120* 2003248037 
2003248038 
2003248039 
2 
3 
4 
2005201280 
2005203483* 
2005200942 
2006203382*# 
searching 
information 
Priority date 25 October 1999 
200110092* 2003262339 1462 2006203380* advertising 
200110093* 2003262334 1463  insurance 
services 
200110101* 2003262326 1462  graphic design 
200110107* 2004200136 1462  route planning 
200110108* 2003262333 1451  interactive paper 
Priority date 27 Nov 2000 
2001216803* 2005200941 1  network 
2002223287* 2005200764 1484  online purchasing 
Source:   These 18 patents are those identified in the original search for recent business method patents (see 
Appendix 5). IPAustralia's Patsearch system was then used to identify parents and children for these 
patents. Forward linkages were checked for each child, but lateral relationships (other children of 
parents, called siblings in this study) have not been investigated. 
Notes:     * Patent is not in the selected dataset. 
 # 2006203382 is a child of 2005200942, thus a grandchild of 2003248039 and a great-
grandchild of 200055120. 
Overall Silverbrook seems to be trying to set up a complex web of patents to protect its 
high-speed colour printer, the sensor pen, and the invisible ink that the sensor pen can read. 
Silverbrook's website highlights its Memjet printer technology and notes that  
"Patents are an important part of the printer business. Silverbrook Research has 
ensured that its Memjet technology is well protected by patents in the US, and around 
                                                 
408  In part this is due to its status as a divisional child. The search has thus been done for the parent 
application, and examination can be very speedy.  
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the world. Silverbrook Research Pty. Ltd. holds over 1,800 US patents, with more 
than 2,000 US patents pending."409  
Silverbrook claims to be eighth among information technology companies in terms of the 
number of granted US patents.410 
Other patent thickets in the selected dataset 
The selected dataset contains four other cases with large family sizes. For three, there is 
only a single patent in the dataset, and some clear information has been obtained on 
overseas grant or refusal status. Two have been both granted and refused overseas, and are 
discussed in Section 6.2.411 The other has been granted in the UK and is discussed in 
Section 6.4.412 The fourth case is one where the owner, Contentguard Holdings, has four 
patents in the dataset. While the inventiveness of the Contentguard patents is discussed in 
Section 6.5, some information on the size of the patent families is provided here. 
As three of the four Contentguard patents belong to a family of nearly 200 members, a 
further search was made for patents held by this company. IPAustralia's Patsearch facility 
identifies 28 other Australian applications for ‘Contentguard Holdings’,413 of which nine 
were not classified as business methods, either in terms of their main class, or any 
subsidiary classes. Among the 19 additional business method filings, eight have a business 
method class as their main IPC class. Of these 19 applications, all claiming priority dates 
from US applications, 13 were allowed to lapse. In other words the company initially took 
out an option to pursue an Australian patent, but then abandoned this (see Table A6.3). For 
the other nine patents, six have been granted (all filed in 2001 or 2002).  
 
409  http://www.silverbrookresearch.com/l-en/patents.html, accessed 22 June 2008.  
410  Silverbrook Research Pty Ltd. is the only Australian company in the USPTO table of organisations 
owning 1,000 or more US patents. The company was not listed in the 1963 to 2005 version of the table, but 
appeared in the 1963 to 2006 version, with 1,299 patents granted (Part B of 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/h_at.htm ). This table is regularly updated, replacing previous 
versions. The version available on-line at June 2008 is for the period to end 2007, by which time Silverbrook 
had been granted 1,832 US patents.  
411  These are application 2004201637 (“Method for managing printed medium activated revenue sharing 
domain name system schemas”) and 2003200436 (“Automatic Flight Management in an Online 
Marketplace”).  
412  Application 2003228606 (“Trading tools for electronic trading”). 
413  As at 1 August 2007.  
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Table A6.3  Contentguard's recent Australian business method applications 
Filing  
Date 
Status 
Application 
Number 
Title  (see notes) 
15-May-02 Lapsed 2002303731 … dynamically assigning usage rights to digital works 
6-Jun-02 Lapsed 2002312352 … subscription digital rights management 
10-May-02 Lapsed 2002305506 Method and apparatus for hierarchical assignment of 
rights to documents and documents having such rights 
9-May-02 Lapsed 2002303669 … assigning conditional or consequential rights to 
documents and documents having such rights 
28-Aug-01 Lapsed 2001286788 Document distribution management and controlling 
method and apparatus using a standard rendering engine 
19-Nov-02 Lapsed 2002350203 … creating, manipulating and processing rights and 
contract expressions using tokenized templates 
19-Nov-02 Lapsed 2002350209 An extensible rights expression processing system 
14-Mar-03 Lapsed 2003220269 … processing usage rights expressions 
14-Mar-03 Lapsed 2003221995 …  graphical rights expressions 
14-Mar-03 Lapsed 2003225804 …  expressing usage rights using modulated signals 
14-Mar-03 Lapsed 2003230651 Rights expression profile system… using templates and 
profiles 
29-Apr-03 Lapsed 2003232016 Rights management system using legality expression 
language 
10-Dec-03 Lapsed 2003296380 …  assigning consequential rights to documents and 
documents having such rights 
28-Aug-01 Sealed 2001285298 …  integrity certification and verification of content 
consumption environments 
17-Oct-01 Sealed 2002211756 …  automatically publishing content 
17-Jan-02 Sealed 2002234254 …  managing digital content usage rights 
15-May-02 Sealed 2002303732 … establishing usage rights for digital content to be 
created in the future 
6-Jun-02 Sealed 2002312351 …  managing the transfer of rights 
5-Jun-02 Sealed 2002305814 Cryptographic trust zones in digital rights management 
The following 4 patents are in the dataset being analysed in this study. 
29-Apr-03 Sealed 2003243179 …  specifying and processing legality expressions 
27-Feb-03 Sealed 2003219907 Networked services licensing system and method 
3-June-03 Sealed 2003240981 …  supplying and managing rights expressions 
14-Nov-03 Sealed 2003290930 …  granting access to an item or permission to use an 
item based on configurable conditions 
Source:  Patsearch, 1 August 2007, using applicant ‘Contentguard Holdings’ and excluding the nine cases 
without any business method IPC code. Patsearch covers only applications filed after 5 July 2002, or 
PCT applications entering national phase from August 2002, so earlier applications are not covered. 
Status data updated 22 June 2008 using AusPat. 
Notes: The words ‘method and apparatus for…’ and ‘method(s) and system(s) for’ (or vice versa) have been 
removed and replaced by ‘… ‘ to allow easier focus on the substantive content. 
 
The four patents in the selected dataset all relate to automated processes for writing legal 
contracts, principally contracts regarding the use of digital content. The 19 additional patent 
applications all also deal with digital rights management. It is clear that the company is 
trying to carve itself out a solid position that will be difficult for other players to challenge. 
At a minimum, the company has a substantial portfolio of related patents, and can use this 
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to negotiate cross-licenses. At best, from the company perspective, it will be able to 
dominate the market and exclude new entrants. 
Contentguard lists its patents on its website, and claims to hold over 175 patents, with more 
than 300 applications pending.414 It lists 72 US patents, 30 European patents, 15 Japanese 
patents, 13 in each of Australia and Korea, as well as smaller numbers in Singapore, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, China, Mexico, Canada, New Zealand and India. The company claims 
their ‘portfolio of DRM related intellectual property and knowledge is the most widely 
deployed across the DRM market.’415  
Of the four Contentguard patents in the selected dataset, one has a family of 16 members. 
The other three belong to a single family, with 197 members derived from 146 applications. 
By sorting these applications by title, they can be classified into 17 sub-groups and five 
'singleton' applications. Three of the 17 sub-groups are the other three patents in the 
selected dataset, and are discussed in more detail in Section 6.5. All 17 sub-groups have a 
PCT application. The WIPO site showed that Contentguard had a total of 46 PCT 
applications as at 12 January 2008. The USPTO website showed 62 granted patents and 69 
applications,416 some of which may also fall into the list of granted patents. So the evidence 
from key patent databases bears out Contentguard's claim to have a large portfolio of 
patents in the digital rights management field. 
Details of the sub-groups in the large family to which three of the selected patents belong 
are shown in Table A6.4. These applications were filed between 17 January 2001 and 3 
June 2003. By January 2008 12 had been granted in at least one country. Both Australia and 
Korea granted seven patents, five were granted through the EPO, and just one was granted 
in Contentguard's home base, the USA. Among this set of 12 'inventions' with granted 
patents there are also countries where the applications have been withdrawn or refused. 
Korea, the EPO and the USA have each refused to grant one patent. The US decision is 
being appealed. Applications have been withdrawn in Japan (three cases), and the EPO 
 
414  http://www.contentguard.com/patents.asp ; data are as at 17 January 2008. The number is increasing 
quite rapidly. On 26 August 2007 the website showed 159 granted patents: 63 from the USA, 30 from Europe, 
13 from Japan and 53 ‘international’, including 13 in Australia, two in Canada and one in New Zealand. 
415  http://www.contentguard.com/home.asp, accessed 17 January 2008. 
416  As at 12 January 2008.  
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Table A6.4  Sub-groups in the large Contentguard family 
ID 
# 
Title of invention  Number of 
applications 
Countries with 
> 1 application*
Priority 
Date 
Known Outcomes 
(dates are month /year) 
1 Networked services licensing system and method 10 2: EP; US 27 2 2002 Granted:  AU 02/06 
2 System and method for supplying and managing rights expressions 8 - 3 6 2002 Granted:  AU 06/06; KR 01/07 
3 System and method for granting access to an item or permission to 
use an item based on configurable conditions 
5 - 18 11 2002 Granted:  AU 12/05  
Appeal:   US: 10/07 
Withdrawn:  JP 10/06 
4 Method and apparatus for managing digital content usage rights 8 - 17 1 2001 Granted:  AU 08/05; KR 08/06 
Withdrawn:  EP 09/06 
5 Method and apparatus for establishing usage rights for digital 
content to be created in the future 
19 2: DE; KR; WO 
3: EP; US 
31 5 2001 Granted:  EP 03/07 
Refused:  KR 08/06 
6 Method and apparatus for dynamically assigning usage rights to 
digital works 
11 2: DE; US 31 5 2001 Granted:  EP 12/05; KR 03/07 
7 Method  for managing access and use of resources by verifying 
conditions and conditions for use therewith 
14 2: DE; JP 7 6 2001 Granted:  AU: 03/05; KR 08/06 
Refused:  EP 01/06#  
8 Method and apparatus for distributing enforceable property rights 12 2: DE; EP 
3: US  
7 6 2001 Granted:  EP 12/05 
Withdrawn:  JP 04/06 
9 Rights offering and granting 12 - 7 6 2001 Granted:  KR 09/06 
Withdrawn:  JP 04/06 
10 Method and apparatus for tracking status of resource in a system for 
managing use of the resources 
11 - 7 6 2001 Granted:  AU 02/06; KR 06/06; EP 
07/06 
11 Method and system for subscription digital rights management 11 2: DE 7 6 2001 Granted:  EP 07/06; KR 08/06 
12 Method and apparatus for managing the transfer of rights 9 - 7 6 2001 Granted:  AU 03/07 
13 Protected content distribution system 6 3: US 7 6 2001 Withdrawn:  JP 04/06 
14 An extensible rights expression processing system 6 - 20 11 2001 - 
15 Systems and methods for creating, manipulating and processing 
rights and contract expressions using tokenized templates 
5 - 20 11 2001 Withdrawn:  JP 05/06; EP 03/07 
16 Rights expression system 5 - 20 11 2001 Withdrawn:  JP 05/06 
17 System and method for supplying and managing usage rights 
associated with an item repository 
2 - 3 6 2003 -- 
Source: Search of esp@cenet site, on 11 January 2008, using worldwide database and application number AU2003219907. For the first three sub-groups (all in the 
selected dataset), status data are from the esp@cenet and WIPO sites. For the remaining sub-groups, status data are from the WIPO site only. 
* Two or more applications with the same title.   # Also withdrawn (04/06) three months after the rejection (WIPO site). 
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(one case). Among the remaining five applications where there are not yet any patent 
grants, three have been withdrawn (from Japan). 
Both the Silverbrook and Contentguard cases demonstrate the volume of patents that can be 
accumulated by a company determined on such a strategy. A low inventiveness criterion 
facilitates the development of multiple closely related patentable applications: each needs 
to exhibit only a marginal difference from the others. Where the margin of inventiveness is 
low, it is more likely that a patent will be invalid, or if valid that it will deliver little social 
benefit. Freedman suggests that invalid patents are an inherently unfair method of 
competition (Freedman 2000). The development of such thickets can impose large social 
costs, particularly through their inhibiting effect on market entry. These costs are 
compounded by the lengthy and complex language used in the claims. It would require a 
large investment to establish the boundaries of the ‘property’ claimed by Contentguard. 
Further, a company that wishes to compete in such a market would need to develop an 
equally large portfolio of its own patents. The patent race, thus becomes the patent portfolio 
race (Cohen et al. 2000; Hall and Ziedonis 2001). As Bessen notes, cross-licensing in 
markets with strong first-mover advantages can reduce market-based incentives to innovate 
(Bessen 2003).  
There is no evidence that such behaviour does anything to raise national competitiveness. 
Indeed such behaviour suggests the expenditure of considerable resources. While 
Silverbrook employs in-house patent attorneys, the filing costs alone of 3,800 US 
applications would be considerable. The diversion of significant resources to the 
development of patent thickets implies that these companies are competing in the legal 
rather than the business arena. The only party likely to be better off are the lawyers, indeed 
the small patent attorney sub-set of the profession. It is hard to imagine that so many 
patents could be issued in such narrow fields unless each carved the territory into very 
narrow, even miniscule, slices. If inventiveness standards were higher, patent thickets 
would automatically be considerably thinner.  
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Appendix 7 Original claims: selected patents 
This appendix provides the exact wording of the claims for seven of the patents studied. 
This is to allow the reader to check the conclusions drawn in the analysis, at least for a sub-
set of cases. Cases were selected on a non-random basis. The two criteria were that the 
claim length be relatively short, and that an electronic version relatively close to the 
Australian version be available. The seven patents included here have claim length of 
between five and 24 compared to the dataset range of four to 115. Average claims in the 
seven patents presented here is 12, compared to 30 for the full dataset.  
Much is made in the literature of the number of claims as a proxy for inventiveness, but this 
has not been the experience in this dataset. Longer patent claims are often duplicated 
(sometimes presented three or four times), as method, system, computer-readable medium, 
etc. claims. The underlying 'invention' is not more complex. The attorney has simply 
phrased the claims in alternative forms to maximise the chance that the patent will survive 
any legal challenge.417 One of the patents included here (AU 2003271414, “A Financial 
Management System”) shows as an example of this approach: claims 1-11 are for a system, 
and the substance of these claims are repeated in claims 12-22, which are for a method. The 
final two claims are 'omnibus' claims and are a standard feature in Australian patents. 
Another reason for a lengthier claim is where the applicant includes a large amount of 
detail in the claims. This can tend to limit the scope of the claimed monopoly. But, based 
on a reading of these 72 patents, it does not indicate any greater inventiveness. These 
subsidiary claims often include remarkably everyday items. The trivial detail included in 
patent claims can be seen in Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.4 in Chapter 5. 
The seven patents presented here are all cases with multiple overseas applications, five 
using the PCT. In only one case is there as yet no known overseas outcome (Australian 
PCT). Three cases have been accepted or granted in New Zealand (all Australian 
applicants, two using the PCT). One has been refused in Korea (Japanese PCT). Another 
case was rejected in the US and is being appealed (Japanese PCT). The final case has been 
 
417  The Canadian Appeal Board decision that a claim for a "Data Processing System for Facilitating 
Transactions in Diamonds" was upheld because it was defined as a claim for an apparatus (presumably a 
programmed computer). In the real world this is still a claim for a system, even if it is legally defined as a 
claim for a machine.  
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rejected in Norway and withdrawn from the EP after adverse reports, but has been granted 
by the US (US non-PCT). In three of the cases the Australian examiner raised queries about 
the novelty or inventiveness of the 'invention'. In three cases no such objections were 
raised. One case was granted on the basis of modified examination, based on the US grant.  
Although these seven cases are unrepresentative in their brevity, they do provide a 
reasonably diverse insight into the types of claims and the actual claim language.  None of 
them are among the most complex in terms of comprehensibility.  
Table A7.1  Guide to cases where full details of claims provided 
Application # Title Other outcomes Examination 
results 
Section 
AU2003250595 Interactive property 
tour 
granted in NZ no objections 6.3.3 
AU2003271414 A financial 
management system 
--- no objections 5.4 
AU2003246060 Mobile report capture accepted in NZ examiner 
objections 
6.3.2 
AU2003204139 System for confirming 
the presence at home 
rejected by US 
(appeal) 
no objections 6.2.1 
AU2004202060 Spare part procurement 
method 
granted in NZ examiner 
objections 
6.3.3 
AU2003281184 Medical data warning 
system 
refused by KR examiner 
objections 
(twice) 
 
6.2.1 
AU2004201637 Method for managing 
printed medium 
activated revenue 
sharing domain name 
system schemas 
rejected Norway; 
withdrawn EP 
(after adverse 
reports); 
withdrawn DE, 
KR; granted USA 
 
modified 
examination 
(and therefore 
no objections) 
 
6.2.1 
 
 
 
AU 2003250595 INTERACTIVE PROPERTY TOUR 
granted in New Zealand no examiner objections 
CLAIMS:  
1. A system for creating a web based tour for an item of interest characterised in that it 
includes the steps of: 
- establishing a tour identity;  
- associating one or more reference images with the tour identity;  
- positioning one or more reference icons on one or more of said reference images, each of 
said reference icons being associated with a further reference image;  
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- and wherein a position of each of said reference icons is selected to provide information 
relating to said further reference image.  
2. A system for creating a web based tour according to claim 1, characterized in that said 
tour identity optionally has associated therewith a tour description.  
3. A system for creating a web based tour according to claim 1, characterized in that each 
of said reference images optionally has an associated image description.  
4. A system for creating a web based tour according to claim 3, characterized in that a 
reference image and a respective associated image description collectively form page and 
wherein said tour consists of a plurality of pages collected together as a list of pages.  
5. A system for creating a web based tour according to claim 4, characterized in that each 
page is prepared according to a template selected from a number of predetermined template 
styles.  
6. A system for creating a web based tour according to claim 1, characterized in that said 
reference images are stored on one or more remote host servers.  
7. A system for creating a web based tour according to claim 1, characterized in that at least 
one of said reference images is a map.  
8. A system for creating a web based tour according to claim 1, characterized in that in that 
at least one of said reference images is a plan.  
9. A system for creating a web based tour according to claim 1, characterized in that each 
of said reference icons serve to provide information regarding said further reference image 
associated therewith.  
10. A system for creating a web based tour according to claim 1, characterized in that said 
item of interest is real estate.  
11. A system for creating a web based tour according to any one of claims 1 to 10, further 
including the step of: 
receiving user input indicating the position of the one or more icons on the one or more 
reference images and indicating an association between each icon and the further reference 
image, and wherein each reference icon is positioned in response to the user input. 
12. A system for creating a web based tour according to claim 11, further including the step 
of: 
displaying to the user the one or more reference images, allowing the user to subsequently 
provide the user input whilst viewing the one or more reference images. 
13. A system for creating a web based tour according to claim 11 or 12, wherein the user 
input indicating the position of an icon is provided by clicking on a part of a displayed 
image. 
14 A system for creating a web based tour according to claim 7, wherein the one or more 
reference icons are positioned on the map, at least one of the associated further images 
relates to the item of interest, and the position of the reference icon indicates the position of 
the item of interest on the map. 
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AU 2003271414 A FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM  
  no examiner objections 
CLAIMS: 
1. A financial management system including:  
presentation means for presenting financial information to a user wherein the financial 
information includes a planned value in respect of a pre-determined period of time, a 
target value being a proportion of the planned value at a pre-determined point during 
the period of time, and an actual value as at the pre-determined point during the period 
of time, each of the planned value, the target value and the actual value being 
represented by a graphic; 
the graphics are associated with one another so that the variance between the target 
value and the actual value is visually apparent to the user; 
the system further including manipulation means for manipulating at least one of the 
graphics in response to an action of a user; and  
modifying means for modifying the financial information based on the manipulation of 
the at least one graphic.  
2. A financial management system according to claim 1 wherein the financial information 
that the at least one graphic represents is proportional to a dimension of the graphic and the 
graphic may be manipulated by being resized.  
3. A financial management system according to either claim 1 or claim 2 wherein the 
financial information that the at least one graphic represents corresponds to the position of 
the graphic and the graphic may be manipulated by being moved.  
4. A financial management system according to any one of the preceding claim further 
including creation means for creating a graphic and the financial information represented 
by that graphic.  
5. A financial management system according to any preceding claim further including 
means for generating icons indicative of positive and negative financial status.  
6. A financial management system according to any preceding claim further including 
means for storing the financial information.  
7. A financial management system according to any preceding claim further including 
means for substituting the at least one graphic with an alternative graphic.  
8. A financial management system according to any preceding claim wherein the means for 
presenting the financial information can represent the financial information wholly 
numerically.  
9. A financial management system according to any preceding claim wherein the planed 
value is a budget and the system further includes means for generating icons representative 
of budget items within the budget.  
10. A financial management system according to claim 9 further including means for 
associating a graphic with each icon whereby that budget item can be modified by 
manipulating the graphic.  
11. A financial management system according to either claim 9 or claim 10 further 
including means for generating icons representing the time period over which a budget is to 
extend.  
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12. A method of managing financial information including the steps of:  
presenting financial information to a user wherein the financial information includes a 
planned value in respect of a pre-determined period of time, a target value being a 
proportion of the planned value at a pre-determined point during the period of time, and 
an actual value as at the pre-determined point during the period of time, each of the 
planned value, the target value and the actual value being represented by a graphic; 
associating the graphics with another so that the variance between the target value and 
the actual value is visually apparent to the user; 
manipulating at least one of the graphics in response to an action of a user; and  
modifying the financial information based on the manipulation of the at least one 
graphic.  
13. A method according to claim 12 wherein the financial information that the at least one 
graphic represents is proportional to a dimension of the graphic and the step of 
manipulating the graphic includes the step of resizing the graphic.  
14. A method according to either claim 12 or claim 13 wherein the financial information 
that the at least one graphic represents corresponds to the position of the graphic and the 
step of manipulating the graphic includes the step of moving the graphic.  
15. A method according to any one of claims 12 to 14 further including the step of creating 
a graphic and the financial information represented by that graphic.  
16. A method according to any one of claims 12 to 15 further including the step of 
generating icons indicative of positive and negative financial status.  
17. A method according to any one of claims 12 to 16 further including the step of storing 
the financial information.  
18. A method according to any one of claims 12 to 17 further including the step of 
substituting the at least one graphic with an alternative graphic.  
19. A method according to any one of claims 12 to 18 further including the step of 
representing the financial information wholly numerically.  
20. A method according to any one of claims 12 to 19 wherein the planned value is a 
budget and further including the step of generating icons representative of budget items 
within the budget.  
21. A method according to claim 20 further including the step of associating a graphic with 
each icon whereby that budget item can be modified by manipulating the graphic.  
22. A method according to either claim 20 or claim 21 further including the step of 
generating icons representing a time period over which the budget is to extend.  
23. A computer program arranged to instruct a computing system to implement a system 
according to any one of claims 1 to 11.  
24. A computer readable medium carrying a computer program according to claim 23.  
 304 
AU 2003246060 MOBILE REPORT CAPTURE 
accepted in New Zealand examiner objections 
CLAIMS: 
1. A method of generating and managing property reports, in which a report is generated 
using a remote device at the place of inspection or occurrence, said device including an 
image capture function, said report including both written and image data wherein the date 
and time of creation of both said data are recorded and related to each other.  
2. A method according to claim 1, wherein the report is generated such that after a 
predetermined step the data cannot be revised by a user.  
3. A method according to claim 1 or claim 2, wherein the report is generated using a 
predetermined format.  
4. A system according to claim 3, wherein said predetermined format includes multiple 
fields, said fields specifying a data type, wherein said fields include at least data types 
being written data and image data, so that multiple fields may specify the same data type.  
5. A method according to claim 4, wherein the fields also specify other data types.  
6. A method according to claim 5, wherein said other data types include one or more of 
audio, images, numbers, signatures and pre-loaded images.  
7. A method for generating a property report, including at least the steps of:  
a) providing a handheld computing device including a predetermined report format 
accessible to the user;  
b) the user taking said device to a required location;  
c) the user commencing the preparation of a report using said predetermined format, said 
report preparation including taking a digital image with said device;  
d) the device retaining text and image data integrated into a report document together with 
an indication of the time and date said data was entered; and  
e) collating said data in a form suitable for an upload to a control device.  
8. A method according to claim 7, wherein the report is generated using a predetermined 
format.  
9. A method according to claim 8, wherein said predetermined format includes multiple 
fields, said fields specifying a data type, wherein said fields include at least data types 
being written data and image data, so that multiple fields may specify the same data type.  
10. A method according to claim 9, wherein the fields also specify other data types.  
11. A method according to claim 10, wherein said other data types include one or more of 
audio, images, numbers, signatures and pre-loaded images.  
12. A method according to any one of claims 7 to 11, wherein after a predetermined step 
the data cannot be altered by the user.  
 
 
AU  2003204139 SYSTEM FOR CONFIRMING THE PRESENCE AT HOME 
rejected in USA (appeal) no examiner objections 
CLAIMS: 
1. A system for offering a delivery service to a delivery destination, said system including: 
at least one subscriber's terminal accessible to a communication network; and  
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at least one deliverer's terminal accessible to said communication network,  
wherein said at least one subscriber's terminal includes a first function unit for allowing a 
subscriber to set, in said at least one subscriber's terminal, a presence-at-destination 
information which identifies whether said subscriber is present or absent at said delivery 
destination, and  
wherein said at least one deliverer's terminal includes a second function unit for 
recognizing whether said subscriber is present or absent at said delivery destination, based 
on said presence-at-destination information.  
2. The system as claimed in claim 1, 
wherein said at least one deliverer's terminal further includes a third function unit for 
sending an inquiry for inquiring about said presence-at-destination information to said 
subscriber's terminal, and  
wherein said subscriber's terminal further includes a fourth function unit for sending said 
presence-at-destination information as set by said first function unit to said deliverer's 
terminal in response to said inquiry from said deliverer's terminal.  
3. The system as claimed in claim 2, further including: 
a delivery information processor accessible to said communication network,  
wherein said deliverer's terminal further includes a fifth function unit for sending a notice 
of outstanding of a requested delivery service to said delivery destination and said delivery 
information processor.  
4. The system as claimed in claim 3, 
wherein said subscriber's terminal further includes a sixth function unit for sending, to said 
delivery information processor, a request for offering a requested but outstanding delivery 
service to said delivery destination, in response to said notice from said deliverer's terminal.  
5. The system as claimed in claim 4, 
wherein said delivery information processor includes a seventh function unit for collating 
said request with said notice, to confirm a correspondence between said request and said 
notice.  
6. The system as claimed in claim 5, 
wherein said delivery information processor includes an eighth function unit for sending, to 
said subscriber's terminal, a delivery schedule which notify when said deliverer plans to 
offer said outstanding delivery service at said delivery destination.  
7. The system as claimed in claim 6, 
wherein the delivery information processor includes a ninth function unit for sending 
delivery-destination-related data to said deliverer's terminal, to enable said deliverer's 
terminal to send said inquiry to said subscriber's terminal based on said delivery-
destination-related data.  
8. A system for offering a delivery service to a delivery destination substantially as herein 
described with reference to an embodiment shown in Figs. 1 and 2 of the accompanying 
drawings. 
9. A method for confirming presence at a delivery destination, said method substantially as 
herein described with reference to an embodiment shown in Figs. 1 and 2 of the 
accompanying drawings. 
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AU  2004202060 SPARE PART PROCUREMENT METHOD 
granted in New Zealand examiner objections 
 
CLAIMS: 
1. A method of facilitating broker mediated matching of a potential buyer of a spare part 
with a potential seller of the spare part, the potential seller having an inventory of spare 
parts for use in a manufacturing process run by the potential seller, the method comprising 
the following steps undertaken by the broker:-  
(a) receiving a request for the spare part from a potential buyer,  
(b) enquiring with a potential seller as to the presence of the spare part in its inventory,  
(c) if the spare part is present, assessing whether or not the spare part is excess to the 
foreseeable needs of the potential seller in running the manufacturing process efficiently 
by the application of software that presents a series of questions for answering by the 
potential seller, the answers to which will reveal whether or not the spare part is excess 
to said needs, and wherein the software further presents a plurality of possible answers 
to the potential seller for each question presented for answering by the potential seller, 
each possible answer for any one question having a predetermined score, the score for 
giving any one answer to a question being different to the score for giving any other 
answer to the question, whereby a cumulative score is achieved by answering the series 
of questions that will reveal whether or not the spare part is excess to said needs, and 
(d) if the spare part is excess to said needs, providing means by which the potential seller 
and potential buyer will communicate with each other, whereby they may finalise details 
for securing the sale and transfer of the spare part. 
2. The method of claim 1 wherein the series of questions are presented over the internet. 
3. The method of claim 1 wherein the step of assessing whether or not the spare part is 
excess to the foreseeable needs of the potential seller includes asking questions to 
determine how critical is that spare part to the efficient running of the manufacturing 
process. 
4. The method of claim 1 and including the steps of providing a rolling activity report on a 
dedicated portion of a website of the broker for continuously updating the potential buyer 
on steps the broker has taken in response to step (a), and logging and recording on the 
rolling activity report the steps taken by the broker. 
5. The method of claim 1 wherein the request for the spare part is received via the internet 
from the potential buyer. 
6. The method of claim 5 wherein the request for the spare part is received at a website of 
the broker. 
7. The method of claim 6 wherein the request for the spare part is undertaken by 
completing an on-line request form appearing on the broker's website.  
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AU  2003281184 MEDICAL WARNING SYSTEM 
refused in Korea examiner objections (twice) 
CLAIMS: 
1. A medical data warning notifying system in which a patient terminal used by the patient, 
a server that controls data that is exchanged between the patient terminal and a hospital 
terminal, and the hospital terminal used by a doctor are connected via a network, 
wherein the server includes: 
a medical data receiving portion for receiving medical data input at the patient terminal; 
a medical data storage portion for storing the received medical data;  
a judging portion for judging whether or not the received medical data include abnormal 
data;  
a warning notifying portion for sending a warning signal to the hospital terminal if it is 
judged that the medical data include abnormal data; and  
a message transceiver portion for receiving a message generated by the hospital terminal 
and sending the message to the patient terminal,  
wherein the judging portion is provided with respective threshold values for the medical 
data for each patient for determining whether the received medical data includes 
abnormal data, and compares the received medical data with the respective threshold 
value, judging that the medical data includes abnormal data when a medical data out of 
the threshold value is detected, and 
when the judging portion has judged that the medical data includes abnormal data, the 
server operates the warning notifying portion so as to send the warning signal to the 
hospital terminal and at the same time sends the medical data judged to be abnormal data 
to the hospital terminal, and then the server assumes a standby mode until a message is 
received from the hospital terminal, and when the message transceiver portion has 
received a message from the hospital terminal, the message is sent to the patient terminal 
from the message transceiver portion.  
2. The medical data warning notifying system according to claim 1, wherein the judging 
portion determines that there is an abnormality if given medical data exceeds a 
predetermined threshold value. 
3. The medical data warning notifying system according to claim 1, wherein received 
records are stored by type of the medical data, an average value is calculated, and the 
judging portion determines that there is an abnormality if the difference between the 
average value and the stored medical data exceeds a predetermined percentage of the 
average value. 
4. The medical data warning notifying system according to claim 3, wherein the received 
records are records for a predetermined period of time and the average value is an average 
value for a specified period of time during the predetermined period of time.  
5. The medical data warning notifying system according to any one of claims 1 to 4, 
wherein the warning signal is a signal that changes a display specification of the notified 
message. 
6. The medical data warning notifying system according to any one of claims 1 to 3, 
wherein the warning signal is a signal that controls a sound output of the hospital terminal 
receiving the warning signal. 
7. A medical data warning notifying method provided in an environment in which a patient 
terminal used by a patient, a server that controls data that is exchanged between the patient 
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terminal and a hospital terminal, and the hospital terminal used by a doctor are connected 
via a network, 
wherein the server is operated so as to perform the steps of:  
receiving medical data input at the patient terminal;  
storing the received medical data;  
judging whether or not the received medical data include abnormal data;  
sending a warning signal to the hospital terminal if it is judged that the medical data 
include abnormal data;  
receiving a message generated by the hospital terminal and sending the message to the 
patient terminal; and 
wherein in the judging step, the received medical data is compared with respective 
threshold values for each patient for determining whether or not the received medical 
data includes abnormal data, and it is judged that the medical data includes abnormal 
data when a medical data out of threshold value is detected; and 
when it has been judged that the medical data includes abnormal data, the server sends 
the warning signal to the hospital terminal and at the same time sends the medical data 
judged to be abnormal data to the hospital terminal, and then the server assumes a 
standby mode until a message is received from the hospital terminal, and when a 
message from the hospital terminal has been received, the message is sent to the patient 
terminal from the message transceiver portion.  
8. A recording medium storing a computer executable program in a server for 
implementing a medical data warning notifying method provided in an environment in 
which a patient terminal used by the patient, a server that controls data that is exchanged 
between the patient terminal and a hospital terminal, and the hospital terminal used by a 
doctor are connected via a network, the computer program being executable by the server 
to perform the steps of: 
receiving medical data input at the patient terminal;  
storing the received medical data in the server;  
judging whether or not the received medical data includes abnormal data;  
sending a warning signal to the hospital terminal if it is judged that the medical data 
includes abnormal data; and 
receiving a message generated by the hospital terminal and sending the message to the 
patient terminal; and 
wherein in the judging step, the received medical data is compared with respective 
threshold values for each patient for determining whether or not the received medical 
data includes abnormal data, and it is judged that the medical data includes abnormal 
data when a medical data out of the threshold value is detected, and 
when it has been judged that the medical data includes abnormal data, the server sends 
the warning signal to the hospital terminal and at the same time sends the medical data 
judged to be abnormal data to the hospital terminal, and then the server assumes a 
standby mode until a message is received from the hospital terminal, and when a 
message from the hospital terminal has been received, the message is sent to the patient 
terminal from the message transceiver portion.  
9. A medical data warning notifying system according to claim 1 substantially as 
hereinbefore described with reference to the accompanying drawings.  
10. A medical data warning notifying method according to claim 7 substantially as 
hereinbefore described with reference to Figure 5 of the accompanying drawings.  
 309 
 
AU  2004201637 METHOD FOR MANAGING PRINTED MEDIUM  
  ACTIVATED REVENUE SHARING DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM SCHEMAS 
Rejected Norway; granted USA modified examination 
CLAIMS: 
1. In a system that includes a plurality of end-user device systems each of which 
automatically reads machine-readable codes affixed to objects, sends code information 
representative of scanned machine-readable codes to a portal server, and receives provider 
information associated with at least one of the machine-readable codes from one or more 
remote servers coupled to the portal server over a communications network, wherein the 
portal server includes a link table that associates machine-readable codes recognized by the 
portal server with corresponding addresses of remote servers coupled to the portal server 
over the communications network, and each of a plurality of the remote servers corresponds 
to a different provider and has provider information associated with at least one of the 
machine-readable codes stored thereon, a method for operating the portal server comprising 
the steps of:  
(a) charging each provider a sign-up fee for including an entry in the link table that links 
each of a plurality of the end-user device systems to a remote server associated with the 
provider in response to scanning of a machine-readable code associated with the provider 
by an end-user device system; and  
(b) charging each provider a usage fee based on a frequency at which the link table links 
one of the plurality of end-user device systems to a remote server associated with the 
provider in response to scanning of a machine-readable code associated with the provider 
by an end-user device system.  
2. The method according to claim 1 wherein the machine-readable codes are UPC codes.  
3. The method according to claim 1 wherein the portal server further comprises a credit 
card module in communication with one of the scanner, the receiver, or the portal server, 
the credit card module being capable of at least one of the steps of  
tracking transactions and corresponding referrals,  
accessing electronically credit limits for the transactions,  
tracking the size and frequency of purchases and corresponding purchasers,  
communicating in a two-way manner,  
obtaining credit and balance information and  
maintaining transactions.  
4. The method according to claim 1 wherein the portal server further comprises a 
transaction tracking module in communications with one of the scanner or the receiver, the 
transaction tracking module being capable of tracking purchasers based on transaction size 
and frequency and matching the size and frequency to a scanner device such that the device 
cost is subsidized based on the size and frequency of the transaction.  
5. The method according to claim 1 wherein the portal server further comprises an affinity 
information tracking module, the module maintaining at least one of benefit redemption, 
frequent flyer, or affinity information. 
 
Note: UPC means universal product code. 
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Appendix 8 Cases granted only in Australia 
Table A8.1   Cases granted only in Australia: current status overseas and selected other information 
Application 
 Number 
Invention Title 
(abbreviated) 
Int'l  
status 
Known outcomes Unknown outcomes 
(for known entries) 
Parent / 
child? 
Examiner 
rejection? 
Fast? Amended
2005203023 Performing an asset valuation nil  - - -  - - -   yes, twice yes (negotiations to 
commercialise) 
4 
2004200942 Assessing the Sustainability 
of a Development 
nil  - - -  - - -   yes yes (licensing 
negotiations) 
1 
2003200220 Selecting a service provider PCT/AU JP: w'drawn 7/6 
NZ: voided pre-acceptance 8/6 
US (ready for exam 8/6); ZA   no no -- 
2003206509 Conducting online auctions PCT/AU W'drawn EP (3/7), JP (8/6) US (ready for exam 8/5); CA   no no -- 
2004201620 ID Card Production and 
Distribution  
nil  - - -  - - -   yes, twice yes (decide if file 
o'seas) 
2 
2003200960 Ordering, Tracking and 
Paying Goods and Services 
PCT/AU EP: non-entry 11/5;  
JP: w'drawn 8/6 
US (ready for exam 12/6)   yes, twice no 4 
2003203582 A Financial Education System nil  - - -  - - -   yes no -- 
2005265435 Financial products PCT/AU Non-entry: DE 5/7, EP 12/7 CA, NZ   no yes 1 
2005204292 Integrated financial service 
product 
nil  - - -  - - -   yes, twice yes (commercial 
launch) 
1 
2006202244* Providing various financing 
options 
PCT/AU EP: abandoned 4/8  
(non-payment of fees) 
US (amended 2/8 after 1st 
rejection 9/7) 
parent no yes (commercial-
isation; potential 
infringement) 
2 
2003271414 Financial management  PCT/AU UK: terminated before grant 3/7; 
JP: w'drawn 8/6 
US (1st rejection 3/8);  
CN; PH; ZA 
  no no -- 
2004252925 Transaction verification  PCT/ZA EP: w’drawn 1/7 US (ready for exam 12/7);
CA, CN,  
  no yes (unauthorised 
use; desire to start 
infringement 
action) 
3 
2005210510 Electronic commerce PCT/AU DE: w'drawn 8/6 EP (adverse 1st report 10/6); 
CA 
  unknown yes -- 
2003244552 Blocking unwanted e-mail nil  - - -  - - -   yes yes (potential 
infringement) 
-- 
2003200819 Browser Plug - ins AU/US 
only 
 - - - US (1st rejection 3/8)   yes, twice no 2 
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Table A8.1   Cases granted only in Australia: current status overseas and selected other information  (continued) 
 
Application 
 Number 
Invention Title 
(abbreviated) 
Int'l  
status 
Known outcomes Unknown outcomes 
(for known entries) 
Parent / 
child? 
Examiner 
rejection? 
Fast? Amended
2003235214 Ad market system PCT/JP  - - - EP (search not possible 
advice 9/7); US (ready for 
exam 5/5); CN; KR;  
  yes no 1 
2004203807 A Method of Commerce PCT/AU DE: w'drawn 11/6;  
EP: non-entry 7/7 
US; CN   yes yes (desire to 
commercialise) 
-- 
2003268606 Performance evaluation tool  Int'l KR: non-entry 11/0 
DE: non-entry 3/1,  
CA (exam req 5/4);  
EP (adverse 1st report 3/5); 
US (ready for exam 2/6)  
child no directed to request, 
and took longest 
time possible 
1 
2003268607 Performance evaluation tool  
[sibling to 2003268606; no 
clear o’seas parallels] 
Int'l  - - -  - - - child yes see above 2 
2003200483 Risk evaluation Int'l  - - - EP (adverse 1st report 2/8)
US (ready for exam 8/7) 
  no no -- 
2003204420 Work list prediction PCT/UK UK: terminated before grant 11/6
DE: w’drawn 1/8 
US (2nd rejection 4/8);  
JP 
  yes yes (establish 
likely patentability)
-- 
2003264604 Dynamic Collaboration 
Assistant 
Int'l  - - - EP (reply 12/6 to 2nd adverse 
report 8/6); US: (reply 4/8 to 
4th rejection 12/7); CA 
  yes, twice no 1 
2003255356 Change navigation toolkit PCT/EP JP: w'drawn 7/6 CA (exam req 1/5);  
EP (reply 7/7 to adverse 1st 
report 1/7); CN 
   no no -- 
2006200104 Determining a reoccurring 
event 
AU/US 
only 
 - - - US (ready for exam 4/7)   yes yes  1 
2004233489 Validation of chemical usage 
in foodstuffs 
PCT/AU DE: w'drawn 5/6;  
EP: non-entry 3/7 
- - -  yes yes 2 
2005234625 Skills Dissemination Tool AU/US 
only 
 - - - US (1st rejection 4/8) child yes, twice yes (commercial 
reasons) 
6 
2003248001 Emergency communication 
service  
Int'l  - - - JP, KR  yes no 2 
  Table A8.1   Cases granted only in Australia: current status overseas and selected other information  (continued) 
[betting cases] 
 
 Application 
 Number 
Invention Title 
(abbreviated) 
Int'l  
status 
Known outcomes Unknown outcomes 
(for known entries) 
Parent / 
child? 
Examiner 
rejection? 
Fast? Amended
2004202762 Interactive Wagering with 
Parimutuel Pool Features 
PCT/US DE: w'drawn 9/2;  
JP: non-entry 1/5 
NZ: voided pre-acceptance 10/5
CA: died 4/6;  
US: appealed 8/7 after 4th rejection 
EP: refused 3/8 
ZA child no direction to request 
exam 
-- 
2003252947 
 
 
Betting on a subset of 
participants in an event 
PCT/US NZ: grant 3/6;  
US: grant 12/7 
JP: w'drawn 3/7 
UK: rejected 3/7 
appeal dismissed 2/8  
EP (reply 3/8 to adverse 1st 
report 11/7);  
CA 
  no no -- 
2003257910 
 
# 
Generating customized odds 
bets for an event 
PCT/US NZ: grant 3/6;  
JP: non-entry 6/7 
UK: rejected 10/7 
EP (exam req 1/6);  
US (2nd rejection 5/8);  
CA 
  yes, twice no 2 
2005200780 An improved betting method nil  - - -  - - -   (mere 
scheme) 
no 2 
2005201458 An improved betting method nil  - - -  - - -   yes no 4 
2005200984 Communal Gaming Jackpot 
Method 
Int'l EP: w’drawn 12/7 after 2nd adverse 
report 
US (amended 4/8 after 1st 
rejection 9/7) 
  yes no 1 
Source: See Appendix 5 for details of the selection methodology. Data are from spreadsheets provided by IPAustralia supplemented by searches of the Australian files 
and the following on-line databases: Patsearch (IPAustralia); esp@cenet and Register Plus (EPO); WIPO; USPTO; IPONZ; and CIPO. 
Notes: Cases are listed in the order they are discussed in Chapter 5.  Date references are month and year, e.g. 5/7 is May 2007. For country codes see page xii. 
 * This application (2006202244) lapsed before sealing. Following lodgement of a notice of opposition, the acceptance fees were not paid. 
 # 2003257910 was opposed in New Zealand prior to grant.  
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Table A9.1 Cases with known outcomes overseas: current status overseas and selected other information  
 Application 
 Number 
Invention Title 
(abbreviated) 
[subject matter] 
Int'l 
status 
Known outcomes Unknown outcomes 
(for known entries) 
Parent / 
child? 
Examiner 
rejection?
Fast? Amended
2004201637 Managing printed medium 
activated revenue sharing 
domain name schemas 
[e-commerce] 
PCT/US Rejected NO 9/5;  
Granted US 4/3;  
KR: w'drawn 4/5; 
EP: w'drawn 9/5 (after adverse report 3/5); 
CA: died 4/6 
JP   no; 
modified 
no 3 
2003281184 Medical data warning 
notifying system and method 
[miscellaneous] 
PCT/JP KR: refused 12/6 CA (exam req 1/5); CN 
EP (exam req 2/5);  
US (ready for exam 7/6)  
  yes, twice no 6 
2003231594 On-line interactive system 
for transacting business 
[trade & logistics] 
PCT/US 
(parent)
RU: grant 1/4;  
US: grant 8/5;  
KR: refused 4/6;  
EP: w'drawn 11/6 (after adverse reports) 
CA (exam req 12/1);  
CN 
child no no -- 
2003280529 Service points liquidation  
[marketing] 
PCT/JP KR: refused 8/6 
EP: w'drawn 8/6 (after adverse report 1/6) 
CA: died 5/7 
US (ready for exam 1/5); 
CN 
  no yes  3 
2003204214    On-line Analysis and 
Reporting of Financial Data 
from Pharmacies 
[finance] 
AU/US 
only 
US: abandoned 3/8  
(after 2 rejections) 
 - - -   no dk -- 
2004201587 Representation of business 
information 
[business performance] 
AU/US 
only 
US: abandoned 6/8  
(after 4th rejection) 
 - - -   yes, x 4 no 6 
2003204139 Confirming the Presence at 
Home 
[trade & logistics] 
Int'l US: rejected 2/8  
(appeal 4/8) 
 - - -   no no 1 
2003200436* Automatic Flight 
Management in an Online 
Marketplace 
[marketing] 
PCT/US US: grant 5/7;  
UK: rejected 6/3;  
JP: w'drawn 5/6 
CA (exam req 3/2);  
EP (adverse 1st report 2/8) 
  yes no 2 
2003204278 Distributed Transaction 
Event Matching 
[e-commerce] 
Int'l EP: refused 8/7  
(appeal 9/7) 
CA (exam req 5/3);  
US (6th rejection 3/8) 
  yes no 1 
 316 
Table A9.1  Cases with known outcomes overseas: current status overseas and selected other information  (continued) 
Application 
 Number 
Invention Title 
(abbreviated) 
Int'l 
status 
Known outcomes Unknown outcomes 
(for known entries) 
Parent / 
child? 
Examiner 
rejection?
Fast? Amended
2003219472 A tax refund system 
[finance] 
PCT/IE UK: grant 10/5;  
NZ: grant 7/6 
JP: w'drawn 6/6; 
EP: refused 10/7; appealed 11/7 
CA (exam req 10/5);  
US (ready for exam 10/6); 
IL; KR; ZA 
  yes yes  4 
2003244578 Attracting and lodging PCT 
national phase applications (II) 
[miscellaneous] 
PCT/AU NZ grant 4/6;  
DE: non-entry 9/3; 
JP: non-entry 9/5 
CA (exam req 9/6),  
EP (1st report 11/7),  
US (ready for exam, 7/4); 
ZA 
child & 
parent 
yes no 4 
2003262306 Logistics Chain Management  
System 
[trade & logistics] 
PCT/AU NZ: grant 1/4;  
US: grant 6/6 
CA (exam req 9/6); EP 
(amended 9/7 after adverse 
1st report 5/7); JP; ZA 
child no direction to 
request 
exam 
1 
2004211006 Management control of 
pharmaceutical substances 
[trade & logistics] 
PCT/AU NZ: grant 5/7 EP (amended 10/7 after 
adverse 1st report 4/7)  
US (ready for exam 5/7); CA
  yes yes 
(infringe) 
4 
2003212105 Method and apparatus for 
storing and retrieving items 
[trade & logistics] 
PCT/AU NZ: grant 1/8; 
EP: w’drawn 11/7 
US (ready for exam 7/5); 
JP: ZA 
  no yes 4 
2003254402 Delivery of electronic 
documents into postal network 
[trade & logistics] 
PCT/AU NZ: grant 3/6;   
EP: non-entry 12/5; 
JP: w'drawn 7/6; 
CA (exam req 3/5);  
US (ready for exam 9/7) 
parent no no 1 
2003204406 Method and system of 
exchange 
[real estate] 
AU/NZ 
only 
NZ: grant 2/6  - - -   no yes 
(commerce)
-- 
2003246060 Mobile report capture 
[real estate] 
PCT/AU NZ: accepted 2/8 
EP: non-entry 2/7 
UK: terminated 3/8 
US (2nd rejection 4/8);  
CA 
  yes yes 
(commerce, 
copiable) 
-- 
2005247009 Luggage collection installation 
[trade & logistics] 
PCT/IB US: grant 6/7 EP; JP; ZA   yes no 3 
2003201332 A Security System 
[finance] 
PCT/AU 
(parent)
NZ: grant (parent) 2/5; 
DE: non-entry 3/7 
EP (exam req 7/7);  
US (3rd rejection 11/7); 
CN, JP 
child yes yes -- 
2004219547 Commodities exchange system 
and method 
[finance] 
PCT/AU NZ grant 6/6;  
EP: non-entry 4/6 
CA (exam req 5/6); 
BR; ZA 
  no yes 
(commerce, 
risk) 
2 
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Table A9.1  Cases with known outcomes overseas: current status overseas and selected other information  (continued) 
Application 
 Number 
Invention Title 
(abbreviated) 
Int'l 
status 
Known outcomes Unknown outcomes 
(for known entries) 
Parent / 
child? 
Examiner 
rejection?
Fast? Amended
2004222811 Automated Price Improvement 
Protocol Processor 
[finance] 
PCT/US NZ: grant 3/3;  
US: grant 11/5;  
IL: grant 9/6 
EP1: w’drawn 6/4 (after adverse reports) 
CA (exam req 10/4);  
EP2 (exam req 3/5);  
CN; JP; KR; ZA 
child & 
parent 
yes no 2 
2003262344 Payment card processing  
[finance] 
PCT/US US: grant 7/5 CA (exam req 3/6);   
EP (exam req 8/6) 
  yes no 1 
2003247258 Permission-based 
communication and exchange 
of information 
[marketing] 
PCT/AU NZ: grant: 9/7 CA (exam req 1/7);  
EP (exam req 9/4);  
US (ready for exam 4/5); 
BR; IL; JP; ZA 
  no direction to 
request 
exam 
-- 
2004202066 Online fare booking method 
and system   [e-commerce] 
AU/NZ 
only 
NZ: grant 10/5  - - -   yes yes 
(important)
-- 
2003250595 Interactive property tour 
[real estate] 
PCT/AU NZ: grant 11/5;  
JP: w'drawn 7/6 
EP (exam req 2/5)   no no -- 
2004202060 Spare part procurement 
method 
[trade & logistics] 
PCT/AU NZ: grant 3/8;  
EP: non-entry 7/7 
DE: w'drawn 11/6 
US (ready for exam 6/8);
CA; CN; JP; PH 
  yes no 2 
2005255399 Transaction accounting 
processing  
[finance] 
PCT/US US accepted (4/8);  
DE: w'drawn 12/6 
EP (exam req 12/6);  
CA; CN 
  yes yes  1 
2004210528 Interactive Viewing On Line 
Advertising 
[marketing] 
PCT/AU NZ: grant 5/4  
DE: w'drawn 9/2; 
KR w'drawn 9/5; 
EP w'drawn 5/6 (after adverse report 10/5) 
CA (exam req 9/6);  
CN; JP; ZA 
child no direction to 
request 
exam 
1 
2003262357 Automated receiving and 
delivery system and method 
[trade & logistics] 
PCT/US US: grant 8/5 
EP: grant 12/6 
CA (exam req 8/2);  
CN 
child yes direction to 
request 
exam 
2 
2004203415 Method of conducting 
transactions over a network 
[e-commerce] 
PCT/US US: grant 9/2; 
UK: grant 8/4; 
EP: grant 6/7 
CA (exam req 1/6);  
DE, JP 
child yes, twice no 2 
2004307528 Managing information 
exchanges between apparatus 
on a worksite 
[business performance] 
PCT/EP UK: w'drawn 3/6;  
DE: w'drawn 4/6 
EP: grant 2/8 
US (ready for exam 2/7); 
CA; CN; JP 
  yes yes (utmost 
commerce)
1 
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Table A9.1  Cases with known outcomes overseas: current status overseas and selected other information  (continued) 
 
Application 
 Number 
Invention Title 
(abbreviated) 
Int'l 
status 
Known outcomes Unknown outcomes 
(for known entries) 
Parent / 
child? 
Examiner 
rejection?
Fast? Amended
2003228606 Trading tools for electronic 
trading 
[finance] 
PCT/US UK: grant 12/5 CA (exam req 10/4);  
EP (exam req 1/5);  
CN, JP, KR 
child yes no 3 
2003236451 Email Alert Device and 
Method   [e-commerce] 
PCT/AU UK: child granted 1/5, parent terminated 10/4;
EP: non-entry 8/3;  JP: non-entry 12/4 
US (4th rejection 3/8) child yes no 2 
2003302490 Monitoring an item 
[trade & logistics] 
PCT/AU UK: grant 3/7 EP (exam req 5/6);  
NZ (late entry granted 11/6); 
US (ready for exam 1/6); CN
  no no -- 
2003207780 Authenticating items 
[miscellaneous] 
PCT/AU UK: grant 5/5;  
NZ: grant 10/5; 
US: grant 11/6 
EP (exam req 1/5);  
CA; CN; JP; ZA 
  no yes 
(production
, licensing, 
financing)
-- 
2003243179 Specifying and processing 
legality expressions 
[digital rights management] 
PCT/US
*** 
CA (exam req 10/04);  
EP (exam req 4/4);  
US (ready for exam 4/5) 
CN, JP, KR, MX 
  yes yes (and 
postphone
ment) 
2 
2003219907 Networked services licensing 
system and method 
[digital rights management] 
PCT/US  - - - 
US2 (appeal 10/7 after 2nd rejection) 
EP1 (exam 9/4); EP2 (reply 
4/7 to adverse report 11/6); 
US1 (amended 5/8 after 3rd 
rejection); CN, JP, KR, MX
  yes yes (and 
postphone
ment) 
2 
2003240981 Supplying and managing rights 
expressions 
[digital rights management] 
PCT/US KR: grant 1/7 EP (reply 8/5 to adverse 1st 
report 3/5);  
BR, JP, MX, PH; US 
  yes yes (and 
postphone
ment) 
1 
2003290930 Granting access or permission 
to use an item based on 
configuration 
[digital rights management] 
PCT/US US: appeal 10/7, after 2nd rejection): 
JP: w'drawn 10/6 
 
EP (exam req 9/5)   no yes (and 
postphone
ment) 
1 
Source: See Appendix 5 for details of the selection methodology. Data are from spreadsheets provided by IPAustralia supplemented by searches of the Australian files 
and the following on-line databases: Patsearch (IPAustralia); esp@cenet and Register Plus (EPO); WIPO; USPTO; IPONZ; and CIPO. 
Notes: Cases are listed in the order they are discussed in Chapter 6. Date references are month and year, e.g. 5/7 is May 2007. For country codes see page xii. 
 *** This application belongs to a family of 16, with two sub-groups (based on titles). For the sub-groups with this title there are no known outcomes: for the 
other sub-group, the application has lapsed in Australia but was granted in Korea 10/6 
.
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Appendix 10 Membership of the Australian Council on Intellectual 
Property (ACIP) 
(as at 1 December 2007) 
 
Anne Trimmer* President of the Law Council 
Leon Allen Patent Attorney 
Paul Brennan Plant breeder, member, Plant Breeder’s Rights Advisory 
Committee  
Sharyn Ch'ang IP auditor, Ernst & Young 
Trevor Choy Lawyer specializing in trade mark law 
Andrew Christie Professor of intellectual property, Melbourne University 
Edwina Cornish Microbiologist, Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Research), Monash 
University 
Michael Gilbert General Manager, Australian Centre for Plant Functional 
Genomics; Director, AusBiotech Ltd 
Graeme Huon creator of HuonLabs; owner of 22 patents 
Philip Mendes Partner, Innovation Law & Director, Ozgene Pty Ltd. and CAST 
Cooperative Research Centre Ltd 
Keith Smith Managing Director, Oncaidia Ltd.; member, SA Branch 
Committee, AusBiotech (AusBiotech is Australia's Biotechnology 
Industry Organisation; Oncaidia is a recently floated biotechnology 
company based in Adelaide. Mr Smith has over 20 years 
experience in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry.) 
ex-officio members 
Ian Heath Director-General, IPAustralia 
Patricia Kelly  Deputy Secretary, Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources 
 
Notes:  The ACIP home page provides no bibliographic information about its members. The data provided above 
has been gleaned from Google.  
* Ms Trimmer became Chief Executive Officer of the Medical Industry Association of Australia in late 
2007. Before that she held a leading role in the Licensing Executives Society of ANZ, suggesting a 
background in technology licensing issues. (http://www.miaa.org.au/pages/images/Anne%20Trimmer 
%20Bio.pdf, accessed 17 January 2008). She was a member of Minter Ellison 's technology team before 
taking up her new appointment (http://www.slatteryit.com.au/sponsors.html accessed 17 January 2008). 
Ian Heath is known to have left IPAustralia. He has been replaced by Phillip Noonan.  
Source: http://www.acip.gov.au/members.html (accessed 12 July 2008; page is copyrighted 2007) 
Postscript: On 22 December 2008, while this thesis was in examination, the Minister for Innovation, Industry, 
Science and Research announced the appointment of four new members to replace four retiring members 
(Anne Trimmer, Sharyn Ch'ang, Trevor Choy and Keith Smith). The new members are Associate 
Professor Elizabeth Webster (academic economist with numerous publications on the patent system), 
Adam Liberman (General Manager of intellectual property at CSIRO), Dr Tracie Ramsdale (Director of 
Alchemia Ltd., a listed biotechnology company) and Dr Noel Chambers (Director, Centuris Pty Ltd., a 
very small company providing specialist services to biotechnology companies, including on intellectual 
property). Leon Allen became chair. The http://www.acip.gov.au/members.html page now also shows 
Philip Noonan as having replaced Ian Heath (page accessed 2 March 2009, page is still copyrighted 
2007).  
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